Payoffs in Nondifferentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies

We show that a single-valued solution of nonatomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underling them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51, D61.     

Collective bargaining under perfect information. The negotiation of national agreements

We structurally estimate a perfect information bargaining model of collective negotiations using data on national agreements for Spain. The model is a stochastic model of sequential bargaining in which we allow for the possibility of negotiations ending without agreement, a common feature in the data. Delays in equilibrium are the result of uncertainty about the surplus to be divided among the players and not of information asymmetries. The model fits the data well regardless of the limitations imposed by the parametric specification adopted. Our results show that agents are patient and that the advantage from proposing is large.JEL Classification: J50, C73, C78We thank Fabian Marquez, Sergio Santillan and Jose Maria Zufiaur for helping us to create the data base on Spanish National Agreements. We also thank Cesar Alonso, Juanjo Dolado, Gautam Gowrisankaran, Maia Guell, Antonio Merlo and participants at the 1999 European Meeting of the Econometric Society for very helpful comments. Jose E. Galdon thanks financial support from the following institutions: European Commission for a TMR Marie Curie Fellowship, Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia for project BEC2002-00954 and Spanish Ministerio de Educacion, Cultura y Deporte for project PR2004-0057. He also thanks the hospitality of STICERD (LSE) and the IR Section (Princeton University) where part of this work was completed. The usual disclaimers apply.     

The core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information

This paper studies the core of an exchange economy in which agents are asymmetrically informed about states of nature. An agent's information is modelled as part of his consumption set and thus as part of his consumption plans. If an agent joins a coalition, his information changes according to an exogenously given information rule, a concept introduced by B. Allen. It is shown that an exchange economy with asymmetric information generates a well defined cooperative game and that the core of this game and thus the core of the underlying economy is nonempty. In contrast to recent results, this holds independently of the given information rule.     

Identification of consumers’ preferences when their choices are unobservable

Summary. We provide conditions under which the heterogenous, deterministic preferences of consumers in a pure exchange economy can be identified from the equilibrium manifold of the economy. We extend those conditions to consider exchange economies, with two commodities, where consumers preferences are random. For the latter, we provide conditions under which consumers heterogenous random preferences can be identified from the joint distribution of equilibrium prices and endowments. The results can be applied to infer consumers preferences when their demands are unobservable.Received: 8 May 2003, Revised: 14 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D12, D51.I am very grateful to an anonymous referee, Donald Brown, and Daniel McFadden for their detailed comments and insightful suggestions. Section 2 of this paper is joint work with Donald J. Brown; it is included here for publication with his permission. Those results were presented at the 1990 Workshop on Mathematical Economics at the University of Bonn, the 1992 SITE Workshop on Empirical Implications of General Equilibrium Models at Stanford University, and, more recently, at the June 2000 Conference in Honor of Rolf Mantel, in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The comments of the participants at those conferences and workshops are much appreciated. The research presented in this paper was supported by NSF Grants SES-8900291, SBR-9410182, and SES-0241858. This paper is dedicated to Marcel K. Richter, who has inspired much of my research.     

Efficient compromising

Two agents must select one of three alternatives. Their ordinal rankings are commonly known and diametrically opposed. Efficiency requires choosing the alternative the agents rank second whenever the weighted sum of their von Neumann Morgenstern utilities is higher than under either agent's favorite alternative. The agents' utilities of the middle-ranked alternative are i.i.d., privately observed random variables. In our setup, which is closely related to a public goods problem where agents face liquidity constraints but no participation constraints, decision rules that truthfully elicit utilities and implement efficient decisions do not exist. We provide analytical and numerical results on second-best rules.     

Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information

Summary. We study the core and competitive allocations in exchange economies with a continuum of traders and differential information. We show that if the economy is “irreducible”, then a competitive equilibrium, in the sense of Radner (1968, 1982), exists. Moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the “private core” (Yannelis, 1991). We also show that the “weak fine core” of an economy coincides with the set of competitive allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which the traders information is the joint information of all the traders in the original economy. Received March 22, 2000; revised version: May 1, 2000     

Two remarks on the inner core

For the case of smooth concave exchange economies, we provide a characterization of the inner core as the set of feasible allocations such that no coalition can improve on it, even if coalitions are allowed to use some random plans. For the case of compactly generated games, we discuss Myerson's definition of the inner core, and we characterize it using lexicographic utility weight systems.     

Epsilon Cores of Games with Limited Side Payments: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility, and demonstrate conditions ensuring that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty -core. Our main result is that, when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly-effective small groups is assumed and large transfers are prohibited, then all payoffs in the -core treat similar players similarly. A bound on the distance between -core payoffs of any two similar players is given in terms of the parameters describing the game. These results add to the literature showing that games with many players and small effective groups have the properties of competitive markets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71.     

The relative importance of capital inflows: some evidence from emerging market economies

This article examines the relative importance of the main components of capital inflows for a sample of emerging market economies. Does composition matter? Is there a nexus between capital inflow components? We assess, firstly, how each capital inflow component reacts to important macro and policy variables, and secondly, how the components themselves interact. We find that bank inflows appear the most sensitive to macro factors, institutions matter more for Latin America and external financial factors matter more for Asia. Further, for Latin America, capital inflows interact largely as complements, while for Asia, any expansion of bank inflows might crowd out FDI and portfolio flows.     

Devaluation and pass-through in indebted and risky economies

This paper develops a structural general equilibrium model to analyse the pass-through from devaluation to producer and consumer prices in Emerging Market Economies (EMEs). Simulation analysis shows that balance-sheet effects created by capital market imperfections and the home bias shrink the impact of devaluation on both types of internal prices. This finding helps explain why pass-through to internal prices is low in EMEs. It also shows that, for benchmark values of the parameters, devaluation remains a good device to modify the real exchange rate and to mitigate the negative impact of external shocks in EMEs.     

“Very Nice” trivial equilibria in strategic market games

Following Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976], we study the problem of the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which each trading post is either active or “legitimately” inactive, and we call it a Shapley NE. We consider an example of an exchange economy, borrowed from Cordella and Gabszewicz [Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 162–169], which satisfies the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik [J. Econ. Theory 17 (1978) 1–20], and we show that the trivial equilibrium, the unique NE of the associated strategic market game, is not “very nice,” in the sense that it is not “legitimately” trivial. This result has the more general implication that, under the Dubey and Shubik's assumptions, a Shapley NE may fail to exist.     

The fuzzy core and the (\Pi, \beta)-balanced core

Summary. This note provides a new proof of the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core in a pure exchange economy with finitely many agents. The proof is based on the concept of -balanced core for games without side payments due to Bonnisseau and Iehlé (2003).Received: 8 May 2003, Revised: 8 August 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C71.Helpful comments of Jean-Jacques Herings and Hans Peters are gratefully acknowledged.     

新兴市场经济国家腐败对经济影响研究:基于1995-2008年实证分析

当学术界观点一致强调腐败将为国家经济发展带来巨大不良后果的同时,新兴市场经济国家却以经济快速增长且腐败较为严重的情况展现于世人。本文拟透过实证分析,以人均GDP增长率作为因变量,探讨可能影响经济发展的变量,如实际国内固定资产增长率、就业人口增长率、中学入学率、政治稳定程度、腐败程度等,探究在新兴市场经济国家中,这些因素,特别是腐败对经济增长有何影响。     

Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for the winner that is at least as good for the center as any of the contracts offered by the non-winning players. When each bidder can always offer a contract with higher utility for the center at an arbitrarily small loss of her own utility, the QVA is the only mechanism that is individually rational, strategy-proof, selects stable outcomes, and is Pareto efficient. For general continuous utility functions, a variant of the QVA involving fixed tie-breaking is strategy-proof and also selects stable outcomes. However, there is no mechanism in this setting that in addition also selects Pareto efficient outcomes.