Nonparametric estimation of a dependent competing risks model for unemployment durations

In this paper we simultaneously analyze transitions from unemployment to employment and to nonparticipation. We estimate a dependent competing risks model with nonparametric specifications of the destination-specific duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity terms, allowing for mutual dependence of the unobserved heterogeneity terms. We use an administrative data set covering all registered French unemployed over the period 1988–1994, stratified by gender type, duration class and exit state. We thank the Editor and three anonymous referees for their useful comments. A preliminary version of this paper was distributed under the title “Individual variation in exit rates from unemployment: a nonparametric multivariate analysis using aggregate data”. The Département de Marché du Travail of the Ministère du Travail, de l’Emploi et de la Formation Professionelle of France kindly provided the data.     

Jobs specialization versus unemployment: more on the productivity effect of unemployment benefits

We use the Marimon and Zilibotti (Econ J 109: 266–291, 1999) circle model and we endogenize the choice of the degree of specialization of jobs. We show that an increase in unemployment benefits not only reduces the mismatch of talents (as in Marimon and Zilibotti), but it also raises the degree of specialization of jobs. This reinforces the productivity enhancing effects of unemployment benefits.      

A competing risks analysis of firms’ exit

Firms may exit the market in several ways and each form of exit is likely to be caused by different factors (Schary in RAND J Econ 22:339–353, 1991). This paper explores the determinants of different exit routes. Using a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms for 1990–2000, we estimate a competing risks proportional hazards model to identify the factors leading firms to exit the market through (the mutually precluding events of) liquidation/bankruptcy and acquisition/merger. Our results show the existence of a sharp difference between the determinants of these two exit routes in terms of firm and industry characteristics.     

The effect of unemployment on labour productivity: an international comparative analysis

This is a comparative empirical analysis of the effect of unemployment - via a ‘work-intensity effect’ and/or a ‘workplace-innovation effect’ - on manufacturing productivity growth in eight advanced capitalist economies. My econometric results confirm earlier findings of positive work-intensity and workplace-innovation effects of unemployment on productivity growth in the United States; but I do not obtain similarly strong results for the other countries, and in Germany and Sweden I find evidence of negative unemployment effects. My findings are consistent with the comparative hypothesis that the sign and strength of unemployment effects on productivity growth will vary negatively with the degree to which a country's socioeconomic environment is characterized by cooperative capital-labour relations and worker security.     

Fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits : A theoretical analysis with reference to income tax evasion

The harshest abusers of the unemployment insurance program are those employed who collect benefits while working. This paper analyzes fraudulent claiming behavior and optimal deterrence policy under two alternative penalty schemes, commonly used in tax evasion analyses: one relates punishment to the magnitude of the dishonesty, whereas the other relates punishment to the amount of illegal returns. Two exclusive features of fraudulent benefit claiming are given special attention: the requirement to report at a labor exchange to demonstrate availability for work, and the need to serve a waiting period before benefits can be collected.     

Running out of time: Limited unemployment benefits and reservation wages

We study unemployment insurance (UI) in an equilibrium environment in which unemployed workers only receive benefits for a finite length of time. Although all workers have identical productivity and leisure value, the random arrival of job offers creates ex-post differences with respect to their time remaining until benefit expiration. Firms, which are also homogeneous, can exploit these differences, leading to an endogenous wage distribution.This allows us to examine the equilibrium effect of policy changes in both the size and length of UI benefits. Surprisingly, an increase in benefits can actually cause wages to fall, which is contrary to the predictions of on-the-job-search models. Moreover, we explain well-documented patterns of how the hazard rate of exiting unemployment responds to these policy changes. Our theory also explains why this hazard rate jumps at the time of benefit exhaustion.     

Income convergence clubs for Brazilian Municipalities: a non-parametric analysis

This article analyses the evolution of relative per capita income distribution of Brazilian municipalities over the period 1970–1996. Analyses are based on non-parametric methodologies and do not assume probability distributions or functional forms for the data. Two convergence tests have been carried out – a test for sigma convergence based on the bootstrap principle and a beta convergence test using smoothing splines for the growth regressions. The results obtained demonstrate the need to model the dynamics of income for Brazilian municipalities as a process of convergence clubs, using the methodology of transition matrices and stochastic kernels. The results show the formation of two convergence clubs, a low income club formed by the municipalities of the North and Northeast regions, and another high income club formed by the municipalities of the Center-West, Southeast and South regions. The formation of convergence clubs is confirmed by a bootstrap test for multimodality.     

Long-term unemployment and short-term unemployment benefits: The changing nature of non-employment subsidies in Central and Eastern Europe

Non-employment rates in all central and eastern European countries have increased dranatically thoroughout the transition and are currently larger than those of the lowest income OECD countries. Non-employment benefits other than unemployment benefits are providing income support to this growing number of able-bodied individuals out of work. Under the present design of unemployment benefits and social assistance, there may be serious incentive problems related to the shift from unemployment benefits to other, means-tested, non-employment benefits and this shift occurs in transition countries at rather early stages of an unemployment spell; these incentive problems are bound to become particularly acute in a less inflationary environment.     

The beneficial effects of generous unemployment benefits on profits and employment

Theories of the labor market generally predict that high unemployment benefits put upward pressure on wages, thus diminishing the profitability of employing labor and exacerbating unemployment. It remains to be explained why firms agree to contribute to generous schemes (replacement rates for general schemes in Europe and US are in the range 50–85%) that they are often willing to supplement (with sector- or firm-specific schemes that may involve even 100% replacement and long benefit duration). An answer can be found by including in the shirking–efficiency wage model, the hypotheses that workers are risk-averse and that those discharged for misconduct are not eligible to benefits. It is then optimal for risk-neutral firms (and for employment) to introduce an insurance scheme with full income coverage and with a duration limited only by the workers' participation constraint (there is no trade-off between level and duration of benefits). The more difficult it is to detect and fire shirkers, the higher is the rent workers enjoy above the competitive wage and the longer is the benefit duration consistent with the participation constraint. This result can be interpreted as a complementarity between the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) and the duration of benefits, which seems to conform with broad patterns observed in primary vs. secondary employment and in continental Europe vs. Anglo-Saxon countries.     

The effect of NAFTA on internal migration in Mexico: a regional economic analysis

Trade facilitates growth in some regions of a country while shrinking others, and therefore to benefit from trade, labour may need to be able to migrate. This mobility is particularly crucial in a developing country with high income inequality like Mexico. We seek to answer the following questions: What characteristics facilitate or hinder that internal migration? Has trade liberalization changed the pattern of internal migration in Mexico? We first predict regional economic growth resulting from changes in Mexico-US tariffs by sector. We find that trade liberalization appears to have largely benefited the manufacturing sector. Next, using a spatial gravity model of migration, we find that while economic growth from trade openness drew workers to urban regions in the northern Border States of Mexico, much of the trade-driven migration occurred before NAFTA. Second, contrary to popular belief, migration from largely rural states appears to have decreased since NAFTA. We also find evidence that migration to the United States increased after NAFTA. Last, we find that income disparity in both the destination and origin region deters migration and that this effect increases after NAFTA. Thus, we see evidence that within-region income disparity can hinder migration, potentially exacerbating income disparity among regions.     

A new look at the UI effect on transitions from unemployment into wage employment in Spain: the limited duration of the UI benefits entitlement

This article is a new look at the study of the unemployment insurance effect on the transition probability from unemployment into wage employment in Spain. It is found that individuals increase their search effort and reduce their reservation wage as the unemployment insurance benefit entitlement exhaustion approaches, and their exit rate equals that of the unemployed who never got benefits from the exhaustion moment. Financial constraints are not important in Spain. Business cycle affects more to long-term unemployed. And, finally, it is found that the probability of being offered a vacancy decreases with time spent in unemployment, having allowed for unobservable heterogeneity.     

The impact of benefits on unemployment in Britain in the interwar period: Some further empirical evidence

Smyth's (1983) model of the labor market is modified to allow for real wage rather than money wage adjustment. The results reported by Smyth are robust with respect to this change in specification.     

Migration,unemployment and development: a dynamic two-sector analysis

"A time-minimizing problem of attaining a full employment state is solved in a dual-economy model with [the] Harris-Todaro migration mechanism and with a positive level of urban unemployment in the starting period. It appears that the optimum solution lies in the specialization of investment in the urban sector at least in the initial stage of development if the per-capita stock in the urban sector is very small in the starting period."     

Sources of German unemployment: a structural vector error correction analysis

In this paper we analyze the sources of German unemployment within a structural vector error correction model (SVECM) framework. For this purpose we estimate a VECM model using data for unified Germany. The cointegration analysis reveals a long-run relationship between real wages, productivity and unemployment which is interpreted as a wage setting relation. Based on a reduced form subset VECM we identify structural shocks and assess their importance for unemployment by impulse response analysis, forecast error variance and historical decompositions. In contrast to previous studies for West Germany, we find that productivity, labor supply and labor demand shocks are important sources of unemployment in the long-run.

Examining the link between crime and unemployment: a time-series analysis for Canada

We use national and regional Canadian data to analyse the relationship between economic activity (as reflected by the unemployment rate) and crime rates. Given potential aggregation bias, we disaggregate the crime data and look at the relationship between six different types of crimes rates and unemployment rate; we also disaggregate the data by region. We employ an error correction model in our analysis to test for short-run and long-run dynamics. We find no evidence of long-run relationship between crime and unemployment, when we look at both disaggregation by type of crime and disaggregation by region. Lack of evidence of a long-run relationship indicates we have no evidence of the motivation hypothesis. For selected types of property crimes, we find some evidence of a significant negative short-run relationship between crime and unemployment, lending support to the opportunity hypothesis. Inclusion of control variables in the panel analysis does not alter the findings, qualitatively or quantitatively.     

The benefits and costs of ethanol: an evaluation of the government’s analysis

Ethanol production in the United States has been steadily growing and is expected to continue growing. Many politicians see increased ethanol use as a way to promote environmental goals, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and energy security goals. This paper provides a benefit-cost analysis of increasing ethanol use based on an analysis by the Environmental Protection Agency. We find that the cost of increasing ethanol production to almost ten billion gallons a year is likely to exceed the benefits by about three billion dollars annually. We also suggest that earlier attempts aimed at promoting ethanol would have likely failed a benefit-cost test, and that Congress should consider repealing ethanol incentive programs, such as the ethanol tariff and tax credit.      

The effect of unemployment insurance on the riskiness of occupational choice

This paper examines the effect of unemployment insurance on the riskiness of occupational choice by postulating a model of job search in which job offers have two characteristics; their wage and their security of tenure. Two versions are considered: a general case in which the unemployment benefit is earnings-related, and a special case in which the benefit is of a flat-rate form. Of particular interest in the paper is the individual's desired trade-off between wage and security of tenure, and how this trade-off is affected by the type of insurance scheme in operation. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that an earnings-related scheme encourages risk-taking behaviour by the poor, and risk-avoiding behaviour by the rich; in contrast, a flat-rate scheme neither encourages nor discourages risk-taking.