Volatility increases Subsequent to NYSE and AMEX Stock Splits

The post-split increase in daily returns volatility is less for AMEX stocks than for NYSE stocks. The exchange trading location is a significant factor in explaining the volatility shift even after stock price and firm size are considered. Furthermore, when measured on a weekly basis, there is no increase in AMEX stocks' returns volatility. These results suggest that measurement errors created by bid-ask spreads and the 1/8 effect, and also one or more of the elements that make the NYSE different from the AMEX, explain why the estimated volatility of daily stock returns increases after the ex split date.     

EXCHANGE LISTING AND STOCK LIQUIDITY

Two measures are used to estimate the liquidity of stocks that switch their places of trading (from OTC to NYSE, from OTC to AMEX, and from AMEX to NYSE). Using an event-type methodology, results are obtained that indicate a decline in liquidity for stocks leaving the OTC market. Stocks switching from the AMEX to the NYSE experience an initial increase in liquidity, followed by a decline almost to previous levels.     

Does Idiosyncratic Risk Really Matter?

Goyal and Santa‐Clara (2003) find a significantly positive relation between the equal‐weighted average stock volatility and the value‐weighted portfolio returns on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks for the period of 1963:08 to 1999:12. We show that this result is driven by small stocks traded on the Nasdaq, and is in part due to a liquidity premium. In addition, their result does not hold for the extended sample of 1963:08 to 2001:12 and for the NYSE/AMEX and NYSE stocks. More importantly, we find no evidence of a significant link between the value‐weighted portfolio returns and the median and value‐weighted average stock volatility.     

On the Stability of the Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns in the Cross‐Section: Understanding the Curious Role of Share Turnover

In this paper, we shed further light on cross‐sectional predictors of stock return performance. Specifically, we explore whether the cross‐section of expected stock returns is robust within stock groups sorted by past monthly return. We find that the book/market and momentum effects are remarkably robust to sorting on past returns. However, share turnover is negatively related to future returns for stocks with abnormally low stock price performance in the recent past, but postively related to returns for well‐performing stocks. This casts doubt on the use of turnover as a liquidity proxy, but is consistent with turnover being a proxy for momentum trading which pushes prices in the direction of past price movements. Our results are robust to both NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks, and also robust to stratifying the sample by time period.     

Dual Domestic Listing, Market Structure and Shareholder Wealth

This paper examines the impact of dual domestic listing of common stocks on shareholder wealth. The sample contains 137 AMEX- and NYSE-listed companies that dually listed their common stocks on the Pacific and Midwest Stock Exchanges between 1984 and 1988. Because the sample stocks do not have unlisted trading privileges, dual listing changes the market structure in which the stocks traded. Changes in market structure may affect stock returns through the liquidity services provided by the competing markets and through the possible nonhomogeneous clientele across markets. Using standard event methodology to examine stock market behavior around dual listing shows that the net effect of dual listing on returns is negative. Such negative returns suggest that corporate managers have reasons for dual domestic listing other than increasing shareholder wealth.     

THE EFFECT OF THE 1986 TAX REFORM ACT ON EX-DIVIDEND DAY RETURN BEHAVIOR

In this study I examine whether the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has an effect on ex-date stock return behavior. Results indicate that the tax reform has a significant effect on ex-date returns for NASDAQ stocks, but not for NYSE/AMEX stocks. Further analysis suggests that the ex-date returns on NASDAQ stocks are primarily determined by the tax premium. However, the ex-date returns on NYSE/AMEX stocks are more influenced by short-term trading.     

Volume autocorrelation,information, and investor trading

This study investigates whether the widely documented daily correlated trading volume of stocks is driven by individual investor trading, institutional trading, or both. We find that at least 95% of NYSE and AMEX stocks exhibit statistically significant, positive serial correlation. Volume autocorrelation decreases with the level of institutional ownership of a stock. We also show that the rate of arrivals of new information to the market contributes to the clustering of trades. When there is high information flow to the market, institutional trading generates a more pronounced effect on volume autocorrelation than individual investor trading. Our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of trading volume patterns suggested by most theoretical models of stock trading and by empirical research on investor trading.     

The information content of stock split announcements: Do options matter?

We provide a new test of the informational efficiency of trading in stock options in the context of stock split announcements. These announcements tend to be associated with positive abnormal returns. Our traditional event study results show abnormal returns that are significantly lower for optioned than non-optioned stocks, whether traded on the NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq. After controlling for market returns, capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and trading volume, we find that the abnormal returns are significantly lower for NYSE/Amex optioned than non-optioned stocks. Although the results for Nasdaq stocks are not as clear, the overall effects tend to be lower after optioning. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the prices of optioned stocks embody more information, diminishing the impact of the stock split announcement. They provide new evidence of the beneficial effects of options on their underlying stocks.     

MARKET STRUCTURE AND REPORTED TRADING VOLUME: NASDAQ VERSUS THE NYSE

Trading volume for common stocks is of interest to financial economists, investors, and securities lawyers. NASDAQ is a dealer market where trades with dealers are included in reported trading volume. This procedure does not accurately measure the trading volume by public buyers and sellers. Trading volume reported on the NYSE, which is primarily an auction market, provides a much closer measure of trades by public investors. We examine a sample of firms whose stock traded on the NASDAQ/NMS and subsequently on the NYSE. When trading switches to the NYSE, the firms' trading volume drops to about 50 percent of the volume previously reported on NASDAQ. A control group of firms that switched from the AMEX to the NYSE shows a small, but statistically insignificant, increase in trading volume.     

A Dividend Payment Effect in Stock Returns

This paper presents evidence for the period 7/62-12/89 that individual NYSE and AMEX stocks provide relatively high average excess returns on the payment dates of quarterly cash dividends and several subsequent trading days. Additional results indicate that returns during the payment period: (a) are not a manifestation of the January, monthly or dividend yield anomalies; (b) are positively related to the stock's dividend yield; and (c) are higher for firms that have dividend reinvestment plans. These findings are consistent with a tendency by stock-holders to reinvest dividend income into the stock of the paying firm, thereby increasing demand for the stock and raising its price. Additional evidence links the returns on these days with (previously-documented) excess returns around the ex-dividend date.     

The Impact of Company Pre-Listing Attributes on the Market Reaction to NYSE Listings

This study examines the market behavior of common stocks transferring from the NASDAQ stock market to the New York Stock Exchange from 1982 to 1989. Using event study methodology, the study tests the joint liquidity-signaling hypothesis that a stock's pre-listing liquidity and earnings per share (EPS) growth (a proxy for signaling) affect the market behavior around NYSE listings. The results show that the market responds more favorably to stocks with low liquidity and high signaling than to stocks with high liquidity and low signaling before listing. Stocks in the former group do not have an anomalous pattern of negative post-listing abnormal returns.     

The Cross-Section of Expected Trading Activity

This article studies cross-sectional variations in trading activityfor a comprehensive sample of NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks overa period of about 40 years. We test whether trading activitydepends upon the degree of liquidity trading, the mass of informedtraders, and the extent of uncertainty and dispersion of opinionabout fundamental values. We hypothesize that liquidity (ornoise) trading depends both on a stock’s visibility andon portfolio rebalancing needs triggered by past price performance.We use firm size, age, price, and the book-to-market ratio asproxies for a firm’s visibility. The mass of informedagents is proxied by the number of analysts whereas forecastdispersion and firm leverage proxy for differences of opinion.Earning volatility and absolute earning surprises proxy foruncertainty about fundamental values. Overall, the results providesupport for theories of trading based on stock visibility, portfoliorebalancing needs, differences of opinion, and uncertainty aboutfundamental values.     

S&P 500 trading strategies and stock betas

This paper shows that S&P 500 stock betas are overstatedand the non-S&P 500 stock betas are understated becauseof liquidity price effects caused by the S&P 500 tradingstrategies. The daily and weekly betas of stocks added to theS&P 500 index during 1985-1989 increase, on average, by0.211 and 0.130. The difference between monthly betas of otherwisesimilar S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 stocks also equals 0.125during this period. Some of these increases can be explainedby the reduced nonsynchroneity of S&P 500 stock prices,but the remaining increases are explained by the price pressureor excess volatility caused by the S&P 500 trading strategies.I estimate that the price pressures account for 8.5 percentof the total variance of daily returns of a value-weighted portfolioof NYSE/AMEX stocks. The negative own autocorrelations in S&P500 index returns and the negative cross autocorrelations betweenS&P 500 stock returns provide further evidence consistentwith the price pressure hypothesis.     

PRICE AND VOLUME EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CREATION OF STANDARD & POOR'S MIDCAP INDEX

In this paper we explore price and volume effects associated with the 1991 creation of Standard & Poor's MidCap 400 index. Prior work on changes in the composition of existing indices finds a significant price response to the announcement. Various authors link the effect to price pressure, information, an outwardly shifting demand curve for securities, and the increased attention that comes with inclusion in an index. Using event study methodology, we find significant price and volume effects during the two weeks leading up to the Standard & Poor's announcement, but no significant effect in the two-day interval around the event. Apparently, information leakage and/or anticipation preceded the creation of the index. The price run-up is permanent since the positive abnormal returns leading up through the announcement are not associated with significantly negative abnormal returns after the announcement. In addition, MidCap stocks significantly outperform the market during the fifty-two weeks following the announcement. Using cross-sectional regressions, we show that these prior-period abnormal returns are positively related to abnormal volume and institutional holdings. We also find that firms trading over-the-counter had larger price run-ups than NYSE or AMEX firms.     

Empirical Analyses of Three Explanations for the Positive Autocorrelation of Short-Horizon Stock Index Returns

This paper provides empirical analyses of three explanations for the observed positive autocorrelation of short-horizon stock index returns, using NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ data. Results indicate that index autocorrelation cannot be substantially explained by either autocorrelated, time-varying expected returns, or nonsynchronous trading. The third explanation for index autocorrelation, the nonsynchronous information transfer hypothesis, states that stocks incorporate market-wide information on a nonsynchronous basis due to information and transaction costs. Evidence from analyses of mean returns on various portfolios following large returns on the S 500 futures contract, as well as regressions of portfolio returns on current and lagged futures returns, support this explanation. Small (large) firms collectively require approximately 7 (1-2) weeks to fully incorporate new market information on average, and this delayed impoundment accounts for the bulk of the observed autocorrelation.     

LIQUIDITY AND ASSET PRICING UNDER THE THREE‐MOMENT CAPM PARADIGM

We examine whether the use of the three‐moment capital asset pricing model can account for liquidity risk. We also make a comparative analysis of a four‐factor model based on Fama–French and Pástor–Stambaugh factors versus a model based solely on stock characteristics. Our findings suggest that neither of the models captures the liquidity premium nor do stock characteristics serve as proxies for liquidity. We also find that sensitivities of stock return to fluctuations in market liquidity do not subsume the effect of characteristic liquidity. Furthermore, our empirical findings are robust to differences in market microstructure or trading protocols between NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ.     

Reputation Effects in Trading on the New York Stock Exchange

Theory suggests that reputations allow nonanonymous markets to attenuate adverse selection in trading. We identify instances in which New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks experience trading floor relocations. Although specialists follow the stocks to their new locations, most brokers do not. We find a discernable increase in liquidity costs around a stock's relocation that is larger for stocks with higher adverse selection and greater broker turnover. We also find that floor brokers relocating with the stock obtain lower trading costs than brokers not moving and brokers beginning trading post‐move. Our results suggest that reputation plays an important role in the NYSE's liquidity provision process.     

Weather and intraday patterns in stock returns and trading activity

We examine the relation between weather in New York City and intraday returns and trading patterns of NYSE stocks. While stock returns are found to be generally lower on cloudier days, cloud cover has a significant influence on stock returns only at the market open. There are significantly more seller-initiated trades when there is more cloud cover at the market open, which is consistent with the return results. Cloudy skies are associated with higher volatility and less market depth over the entire trading day. Finally, cloud cover is not significantly correlated with spread measures and turnover ratios. The findings overall suggest that weather has a significant influence on investors’ intraday trading behavior.     

Microstructure and reverse stock splits

In this paper we show that, similar to NYSE/AMEX stocks, NASDAQ stocks exhibit significant ex date returns for reverse stock splits. Although the 10-day cumulative return after the ex date is close to –10%, this does not violate market efficiency, because the average bid-ask spread for the reverse split stock is at least double this return. We also document that these large negative returns are mostly due to a drop in the ask price while bid prices barely change at all. Furthermore, the ex date returns are negatively related to trading volume.These results suggest that there is abnormal selling and a significant buildup of market makers' inventories near the ex date. To reduce the inventory buildup, market makers lower ask prices to induce buying by investors, resulting in the observed negative returns. Lowering bid prices, an alternative strategy for reducing inventories, is not attractive to market makers due to competitive factors and the reduction of commissions associated with a smaller number of transactions. Notably, selling investors have no incentives to sell their stocks early to avoid the observed negative ex date return, since this return is largely an ask price phenomenon and does not represent realized returns to sellers.     

The Impact of Short-Sales Constraints on Liquidity and the Liquidity–Return Relations

Baker and Stein's (2004) model predicts that individual stock liquidity, commonality in liquidity across stocks, the contemporaneous correlation between stock returns and liquidity, and the degree of high liquidity associated with low subsequent stock returns decrease in the absence of short-sales constraints relative to in the presence. To test these theoretical predictions, we examine both the component stocks of the Taiwan 50 index and other nonindex stocks for the sample period before and after the removal of short-sales constraints on the former and use trading turnover and Amihud's (2002) illiquidity ratio as the measure of liquidity to proxy for investor sentiment. Overall, our empirical results are consistent with these theoretical predictions and therefore provide evidence in support of Baker and Stein's (2004) model.