Membership Participation and Centralized Control

The union faces severe economic and political problems: it is becoming increasingly expensive to perform important union functions, membership losses are difficult to replace, job mortality is high, firm size is small, membership income is modest, skill level is low, and the union has minority status in almost all of its industries. The policy response to financial pressure is to encourage members to volunteer to perform many union functions which the union can not otherwise afford. Policies supportive of this goal include supply of a broad array of services at union headquarters, insistence that members pay dues in person, insistence on meeting attendance, and emphasis on the steward and crew and the role of the experienced member. The political pressure is weakened union authority. Unusual heterogeneity among employers, occupations, and members, plus an unavoidably decentralized collective bargaining situation, present strong centrifugal tendencies. Major variations in occupation, skills, income level, union background, job security, and ethnic and cultural identification contribute to a diversity of interests and loyalties. A tendency for the membership to be clustered or differentiated by character of their employment also adds a potential threat of balkanization by local. The policy response to political pressure has been the effort to centralize authority and initiative. For example, the 1,000-member General Council has been granted almost unlimited governmental authority. The Council is the channel for downward communication flow; the related structuring, sequencing, and common agendas of all union meetings also keep initiative and authority at the Districtwide level. Additional centralizing aspects include the absence of constitutional restraints on leadership freedom of action; the lack of restraints from the international union; emphasis on crew and steward, rather than on local and local officer; the discouragement of electoral conflicts inherent in the application of the “majority rule”; the preferred ballot position of Districtwide candidates; the Districtwide vote required for the four “regional” leaders; and the offsetting of decentralized collective bargaining with an array of control devices. Meeting attendance, dues payments (without benefit of checkoff), and electoral participation are unusually high. However, volunteer offices are difficult to fill; experienced occupants are difficult to hold. There is little volunteer participation in organizing and collective bargaining and participation is way below the level prescribed by union policy pronouncements. Areas of inconsistency, if not conflict, exist between the two major strands of policy, i.e., encouragement of membership participation, on the one hand, and centralization of authority, on the other. Centralization makes it more difficult to involve members in union affairs. De-emphasis of the role of the local officer and organizer in favor of stewards and vice-presidents has minimized potential divisive influences, but at the cost of inhibiting volunteer leadership activity.     

Unionization,Inequality and Redistribution

This article explores the implications of the OECD‐wide decline of union density for earnings inequality and income redistribution by looking at aggregate (country‐level) data. Over the period 1975–95, countries that experienced relatively large declines in union density also experienced relatively large increases in earnings inequality. In addition, governments apparently became less willing to engage in ‘compensatory redistribution’ in these countries. Since the early 1990s, however, union decline has become less closely associated with rising earnings inequality and redistributive policy changes. I argue that the declining relevance of unionization has to do with changes in the position of union members in the income distribution. In most OECD countries, the average union member has become relatively better off as union density has declined and union members have probably become less supportive of wage solidarity and redistributive government policies.     

There is power in a union? Union members' preferences and the conditional effect of labour unions on left parties in different welfare state programmes

This article studies the effect of labour unions on policy-making in six different parts of the welfare state (passive and active labour market policy, employment protection, old-age pensions, health care and education) in OECD countries after 1980 with a two-level strategy: At the micro-level, we investigate union members’ preferences. Ordered logit regression analyses indicate that union members favour generous social policies more strongly than non-members. Moreover, this effect is stronger for programmes closely related to the labour market than for programmes without a strong labour market link. At the macro-level, we investigate the conditional effect of unions on left parties expecting the former to push the left towards more generous labour market-related (but not towards less-labour market-related) programmes. Regression analyses essentially provide evidence for such a relationship. Overall, unions have been powerful in promoting their members’ social policy preferences via left parties in government but their power is recently vanishing.     

Ten Years of New Labour: Workplace Learning,Social Partnership and Union Revitalization in Britain

The establishment of a role in workplace learning has been perceived as one of the achievements of trade unions under New Labour. This article analyses the part the Trades Union Congress (TUC) has played in public policy since 1997. It examines its attempts to influence government and develop social partnership and statutory backing for vocational training. It assesses its degree of success and considers whether the TUC's role is best characterized in terms of social partnership or as a rediscovery of the unions' public administration function. It reviews the literature which suggests that involvement in learning stimulates union revitalization. The article concludes that the TUC has failed to attain significant influence over public policy. Rather it has delivered policy determined by government with priority accorded to employer predilections. A public administration role focused on the Union Learning Fund has provided the TUC with a new, secondary function, which provides some compensation for the failure of its primary agenda. Nonetheless, on the evidence, involvement in workplace learning appears an implausible path to union revitalization.     

What happens to diet and child health when migration splits households? Evidence from a migration lottery program

The impact of migration on food security and child health is likely to differ depending on whether children themselves migrate or whether they remain behind while other household members migrate. However, existing studies have not been able to examine how impacts differ in these two scenarios because parallel data are required for both the sending and receiving country. Moreover, self-selection into migration makes unbiased estimation of either impact difficult. We overcome these problems by using a unique survey of Tongan households that applied to migrate to New Zealand through a migrant quota which selects households through a random ballot. This survey covers both migrant children in New Zealand and non-migrant children in Tonga, with the migration policy rules providing a source of exogenous variation for identifying impacts. Our estimates of short-run impacts show that diets diverge upon migration: children who migrate experience improvements, while diets worsen for children who remain. There is also suggestive evidence of a divergence in health outcomes, with increases in weight-for-age and height-for-age found for migrant children, and decreases found for children who remain behind while other household members migrate.     

Trade Unions, Political Fund Ballots and the Labour Party

The Trade Union Act 1984 required trade unions to reballot their members on continuation of their political funds. All unions voted for retention. A second wave of balloting has now taken place: the results are broadly similar to those in 1985/6. This paper examines the outcome of the 1994/6 voting, compares the results with those from 1985/6 and considers the implications of the results on the relationship between unions and the Labour Party. The distancing of the relationship between unions and Labour is related to the political fund campaign which stressed union rights to campaign politically rather than their specific political links with the Labour Party.     

Telecommunications and the UK government

The first article in this series reviewed the nature of the UK Post Office's monopoly, its relations with government and a number of forces for change. Since then (September 1977), the UK government has published: the government's response to the Carter Committee's proposals; an appendix to the Carter Report; and a ‘White Paper’ concerning all nationalized industries. This article reviews the government's response to the Carter Committee against the background of the evidence submitted to the Committee, the government's overall policy towards nationalized industries and the political debate concerning that policy. Finally, subsequent political and union responses to the government's telecommunications policy are reported which may result in considerable change.     

Foodgrain price and trade policy in the Dominican Republic

As in many developing countries, the Dominican Republic has both an overvalued official foreign exchange rate and a policy of heavy government intervention in foodgrain markets. The Institute of Price Stabilization (INESPRE) controls the marketing, pricing and imports of the staple foodgrain, rice. INESPRE's operations and the overvalued currency produced an undervaluation of domestic rice production and an upward distortion of foodgrain imports. Additionally, the increasingly unfavourable rice-fertilizer price ratio has undoubtedly suppressed yields. As part of a set of austerity measures, the newly elected President banned rice imports. Dominican foodgrain policy may be at an important crossroads and a policy assessment is very timely.     

Is There Room for an Independent Trade Unionism in Russia? Trade Unionism in the Russian Aviation Industry

On the basis of a detailed study of two 'independent' unions, representing pilots and air traffic controllers, this paper argues that there are very limited prospects for independent trade unionism in Russia at present. The air traffic controllers' union has adopted a resolutely independent and militant strategy of pursuing the sectional interests of its members, which has brought it into conflict with management, other unions and the government. The pilots' union, by contrast, has sought to consolidate the position of its members as a labour aristocracy, collaborating closely with management to secure its privileged position. The success of the pilots contrasts starkly with the heavy defeat suffered by the air traffic controllers following their strikes in August and December 1992, indicating the barriers that face the attempt to create trade unions independent of management in Russia.     

A Theory of Trade Union Membership Retention

The retention rate of unemployed members can vary substantially between trade unions and may not particularly reflect the structure of the labour market within which a union operates. This raises the issue of whether retention of these members is due to supply-side factors characterised by individuals or to the policy of trade unions towards their unemployed members.     

Unionism and Employer Discrimination: Analysis of 8(a)(3) Violations

The choice model of firm violations of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA specified here was tested for the period 1972–1979 using a sample of firms from the New York and American Stock Exchange. The results show that previous violations of this section of the Act, relative per cent of union organization, and changes in firm employment are statistically significant determinants of the marginal benefits of violations. These findings generally support union officials' claims that the penalties in the Act are not strong deterrents to management violations and may be considered a relatively low cost of doing business. However, assertions by union officials that product market factors are important in firm decisions to violate the Act are not supported. In addition, the results do not support NLRB officials' belief that firms that commit violations are not likely to commit them again. The fact that there are no significant differences in violations by firms in our sample as a result of product market variables or industry implies that ethical considerations may be a factor in choosing to violate the Act. Since current penalties are low, and past violations are significant in determining current violators, an increase in penalties may reduce violations by those who do not consider the ethical implications of the Act. If the intent of the current NLRA is to reduce the coercion of employees by employers, an amendment to increase the economic costs to employers seems indicated.     

A Law of Large Numbers: Bidding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Refuse Collection Contracts

In this paper we investigate the relationship betweencosts and number of bidders for U.K. local authorities'refuse collection contracts. We find that a highernumber of bids is associated with a lower cost ofservice. This finding, as well as being an importantempirical verification of standard proposition inauction theory, has important policy implications. TheU.K. Labour government elected in 1997 has abolishedCompulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT). Our findingsindicate that this would increase local authorities'expenditure in refuse collection.     

Targeting population nutrition through municipal health and food policy: Implications of New York City’s experiences in regulatory obesity prevention

Obesity remains a major public health challenge across OECD countries and policy-makers globally require successful policy precedents. This paper analyzes New York City’s innovative experiences in regulatory approaches to nutrition. We combined a systematic documentary review and key informant interviews (n = 9) with individuals directly involved in nutrition policy development and decision-making. Thematic analysis was guided by Kingdon’s three-streams-model and the International Obesity Task Force’s evidence-based decision-making framework. Our findings indicate that decisive mayoral leadership spearheaded initial agenda-change and built executive capacity to support evidence-driven policy. Policy-makers in the executive branch recognized the dearth of evidence for concrete policy interventions, and made contributing to the evidence base an explicit goal. Their approach preferred decision-making through executive action and rules passed by the Board of Health that successfully banned trans-fats from food outlets, set institutional food standards, introduced menu labeling requirements for chain restaurants, and improved access to healthy foods for disadvantaged populations. Although the Health Department collaborated with the legislature on legal and programmatic food access measures, there was limited engagement with elected representatives and the community on regulatory obesity prevention. Our analysis suggests that this hurt the administration’s ability to successfully communicate the public health messages motivating these contentious proposals; contributing to unexpected opposition from food access and minority advocates, and fueling charges of executive overreach. Overall, NYC presents a case of expert-driven policy change, underpinned by evidence-based environmental approaches. The city’s experience demonstrates that there is scope to redefine municipal responsibilities for public health and that incremental change and contentious public discussion can impact social norms around nutrition.     

The Microeconomic Impacts of Employee Representatives: Evidence from Membership Thresholds

Employee representatives in firms are a potentially key but not yet studied source of the impact of unions and works councils. Their actions can shape multiple drivers of firm performance, including collective bargaining, strikes, and training. This article examines the impact of union representative mandates by exploiting legal membership thresholds present in many countries. In the case of Portugal, which we examine here, while firms employing up to forty‐nine union members are required to have one union representative; this increases to two (three) union reps for firms with fifty to ninety‐nine (100–199) union members. Drawing on matched employer–employee data on the unionized sector and regression discontinuity methods, we find that a one percentage point increase in the legal union representative/members ratio leads to an increase in firm performance of at least 7 percent. This result generally holds across multiple dimensions of firm performance and appears to be driven by increased training. However, we find no effects of union representatives on firm‐level wages, given the predominance of sectoral collective bargaining.     

Bundling communications policy for the new US administration

The USA does not have a coherent framework for communications policy. The author sets out what should be the prime concerns of a communications policy aimed at serving a pluralistic society in an ‘electronic age’. She describes the current situation, in which responsibilities for communications are divided over a wide range of government organisations. The Communications Act of 1934 is under review, and the author focuses on major aspects of the debate, and lists suitable areas for government involvement. She concludes by stressing the need for the new US administration to provide a coherent structure for communications policy making to encourage the essential free flow of information.     

Putting Partnership into Practice in Britain

The paper reviews industrial relations developments in Britain during 1999 by assessing how New Labour's policy commitment to encouraging 'partnership' is developing in practice. After a discussion of the Employment Relations Act, it considers the wider influence of European legislation. It then describes how partnership approaches have been developing in trade union policy and industrial practice. This leads to an analysis of the operation of two explicit 'social partnership' institutions, ACAS and the Low Pay Commission. The paper ends with a consideration of the developing arguments at the ILO and WTO over international labour standards.     

The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing

Our study provides the first national analysis of the labour market implications of workers who are licensed by any agency of the government in the USA. Using a specially designed Gallup survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans, we provide an analysis of the influence of this form of occupational regulation. We find that 29 per cent of the workforce is required to hold a licence, which is a higher percentage than that found in other studies that rely on state‐level occupational licensing data or single states. Workers who have higher levels of education are more likely to work in jobs that require a licence. Union workers and government employees are more likely to have a licence requirement than are non‐union or private sector employees. Our multivariate estimates suggest that licensing has about the same quantitative impact on wages as do unions — that is about 15 per cent — and that being both licensed and in a union can increase wages by more than 24 per cent. However, unlike unions which reduce variance in wages, licensing does not significantly reduce wage dispersion for individuals in licensed jobs.     

Environment, Corporate Ideology, and Employee Involvement Programs

Corporations are implementing employee involvement programs in both union and nonunion settings in response to growing environmental pressures. This study examines the relationships among environmental pressures, corporate ideology, and participative practices in union and nonunion settings and tests two industrial relations models. Questionnaires measuring environmental pressures, corporate ideology, and participation were completed and returned by the Vice President of Human Resources (or similar corporate executive) in 159 of the largest manufacturing companies in the United States. Multiple regression results show that environmental pressures exert little effect on corporate ideology, but ideology has a significant effect on participative practices in both union and nonunion settings.