IPO限价发行与新股二级市场价格泡沫——论股票市场“弹簧效应”

本文通过对比2009年7月1日至2014年6月30日IPO市场化定价发行阶段与2014年7月1日至2018年6月30日IPO限价发行阶段共1950个IPO样本,发现IPO限价发行对于新股在二级市场股价表现具有“弹簧效应”:即抑制股票一级市场发行价格会造成新股在二级市场价格短期内超涨,限价发行新股的二级市场定价显著高于市场化定价发行新股的二级市场定价。限价发行引起的过高二级市场定价最终导致股票长期回报率低下。另外,创业板公司“弹簧效应”显著强于主板公司。这些实证结果都可以被本文提出的一级市场价格压抑造成二级市场非理性投资者上涨预期一致、盲目追涨的理论模型所解释。本文的研究指出抑制股票一级市场定价虽然形式上可以解决新股发行价过高问题,但是却造成二级市场更大的价格扭曲。这一发现为进一步完善我国IPO发行定价机制提供了依据。     

合资承销商影响新股破发率的实证研究

新股破发是目前中国股市目前面临的一个重要现象。本文基于2004年至2010年上市的A股IPO,研究合资承销商对新股破发率的影响。研究发现,合资承销商所承销的新股破发率显著低于本土承销商。合资承销商的低破发率主要归功于更加有效且符合市场预期的一级市场发行定价能力,其表现为合资承销商发行的股票的短期市场价格相对发行价的偏离程度显著低于本土承销商发行的股票。另外,我们还发现合资承销商采取了一定的托市行为,该行为也减小了短期内新股跌破发行价的概率。本文的发现从新股发行的角度提供了开放金融市场对我国资本市场影响的新现象。     

Information Uncertainty,Earnings Management,and Long‐run Stock Performance Following Initial Public Offerings

We examine how information uncertainty surrounding IPO (initial public offering) firms influences earnings management and long‐run stock performance. For low‐information‐uncertainty issuers, at‐issue earnings’ management is positively related to subsequent unmanaged earnings and has no relationship to market reaction to earnings announcement and long‐run stock performance following the offering. For high‐information‐uncertainty issuers, however, at‐issue earnings’ management is unrelated to subsequent unmanaged earnings and negatively related to market reaction to earnings announcement and long‐run stock performance following the offer. The evidence suggests that, on average, managers in low‐information‐uncertainty firms tend to engage in earnings’ management for informative purposes, while managers in high‐information‐uncertainty firms engage in earnings’ management for opportunistic purposes.     

Are share price levels informative? Evidence from the ownership, pricing, turnover and performance of IPO firms

We ask whether a firm's choice of IPO price is informative in the sense that it relates systematically to the firm's other choices and characteristics. We find that both institutional ownership and underwriter reputation increases monotonically with the chosen IPO price level. We also find that the relationship between IPO price and underpricing is U-shaped. In contrast, post-IPO turnover displays an inverted U-shaped relation to IPO price. Moreover, firms choosing a higher (lower) stock price level experience lower (higher) mortality rates. Our results are robust to controls for market liquidity and firm size, and for partial adjustment of IPO prices based on pre-market information.     

A Theory of IPO Waves

In the IPO market, investors coordinate on acceptable IPO pricebased on the performance of past IPOs, and this generates anincentive for investment banks to produce information aboutIPO firms. In hot periods, the information produced by investmentbanks improves the quality of IPO firms, and this allows exante low quality firms to go public and increases the secondarymarket price, thus synchronizing high IPO volumes and high firstday returns. When investment banks behave asymmetrically ininformation production, the "reputations" of investment banksare interpreted as a form of market segmentation to economizeon the social cost of information production.     

新股发行机制、投资者乐观情绪与IPO高抑价

固定价格、累计投标询价和拍卖发行机制下的IPO抑价模型可解释我国新股发行市场长期存在的高抑价现象:散户投资者对新股发行的乐观情绪会推高二级市场的IPO交易价格,但却不能在IPO发行定价中得到完全体现。单纯通过变革新股发行机制并不能够从根本上抑制IPO高抑价产生,只有疏导散户投资者的乐观情绪才能彻底解决IPO高抑价问题,权宜之策是将散户投资者的乐观情绪嵌入IPO发行定价之中以消除IPO高抑价现象,允许散户投资者参与询价可以有效缓解这一现象,且具有可操作性。     

Market Making Contracts,Firm Value,and the IPO Decision

We examine the effects of secondary market liquidity on firm value and the IPO decision. Competitive aftermarket liquidity provision is associated with reduced welfare and a discounted secondary market price that can dissuade IPOs. The competitive market fails in particular for firms or at times when uncertainty regarding fundamental value and asymmetric information are large in combination. In these cases, firm value and welfare are improved by a contract where the firm engages a designated market maker to enhance liquidity. Such contracts represent a market solution to a market imperfection, particularly for small, growth firms.     

Insider Trading in the Hong Kong Stock Market

Many previous studies on insider trading are based ondata in the U.S. capital market and conclude thatinsiders can earn abnormal profits. This paperexamines abnormal price performance associated withinsider trading in the Hong Kong stock market. We findthat abnormal profits associated with insider tradingare all concentrated on small firms. Trading volumedoes matter in determining the magnitude of thoseabnormal profits. Our results show that insiders ofmedium-sized and large firms do not earn abnormalprofits. Finally, it is found that outsiders who mimicthe information of insider trades associated withmedium-sized and large firms cannot earn abnormalprofits.     

A theory of the going-public decision

We address the question: At what stage in its life should afirm go public rather than undertake its projects using privateequity financing? In our model a firm may raise external financingeither by placing shares privately with a risk-averse venturecapitalist or by selling shares in an IPO to numerous smallinvestors. The entrepreneur has private information about hisfirm's value, but outsiders can reduce this informational disadvantageby evaluating the firm at a cost. The equilibrium timing ofthe going-public decision is determined by the firm's trade-offbetween minimizing the duplication in information productionby outsiders (unavoidable in the IPO market, but mitigated bya publicly observable share price) and avoiding the risk-premiumdemanded by venture capitalists. Testable implications are developedfor the cross-sectional variations in the age of going-publicacross industries and countries.     

Information Collection and IPO Underpricing

This study provides new evidence that IPO underpricing is economic rents paid for investor to gather costly information. Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) report that diverse investor information, once aggregated in the public market, could provide a more informative stock price and accurate feedback to firm’s investment decision. I investigate the hypothesis that IPO underpricing as economic rents could be higher, when investor information is diverse. In support of this hypothesis, I find a positive and significant correlation between the extent of underpricing and the information diversity measure proposed by Barron et al. (1998). There is a positive and significant correlation between this information diversity measure and an IPO firm’s subsequent (absolute) change in capital and R&D expenditures. In addition, firms with high information diversity measure and change in subsequent investment exhibit a better subsequent return performance than firms with low diversity and change in investment. This is consistent with the proposition that investor information serves as useful feedback for managers in the IPO market.JEL Classification: G32     

Price Discovery and Dissemination of Private Information by Loan Syndicate Participants

We delineate key channels through which flows of confidential information to loan syndicate participants impact the dynamics of information arrival in prices. We isolate the timing of private information flows by estimating the speed of price discovery over quarterly earnings cycles in both secondary syndicated loan and equity markets. We identify borrowers disseminating private information to lenders relatively early in the cycle with firms exhibiting relatively early price discovery in the secondary loan market, documenting that price discovery is faster for loans subject to financial covenants, particularly earnings‐based covenants; for borrowers who experience covenant violations; for borrowers with high credit risk; and for loans syndicated by relationship‐based lenders or highly reputable lead arrangers. We then ask whether early access to private information in the loan market accelerates the speed of information arrival in stock prices. We document that the stock returns of firms identified with earlier private information dissemination to lenders indeed exhibit faster price discovery in the stock market, but only when institutional investors are involved in the firm's syndicated loans. Further, the positive relation between institutional lending and the speed of stock price discovery is more pronounced in relatively weak public disclosure environments. These results are consistent with institutional lenders systematically exploiting confidential syndicate information via trading in the equity market.     

Do banks price their informational monopoly?

Theory suggests that banks’ private information lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since new information about a firm is revealed at the time of its bond IPO, it follows that banks will be forced to adjust their loan interest rates downwards after firms undertake their bond IPO. We test this hypothesis and find that firms are able to borrow at lower interest rates after their bond IPO. Importantly, firms that get their first credit rating at the time of their bond IPO benefit from larger interest rate savings than those that already had a credit rating. These findings provide support for the hypothesis that banks price their informational monopoly. We also find that it is costly for firms to enter the public bond market.     

Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors' and Officers' Insurance Purchases

We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information, we hypothesize that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post-offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negative relation between the three-year post-IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjunction with the IPO. One plausible interpretation is that, like insider securities transactions, D&O insurance decisions reveal opportunistic behavior by managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D&O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable.     

Does aggressiveness help? Evidence from IPO corruption and pricing in China

Using a unique database of Chinese firms bribing initial public offering (IPO) regulators, we examine the impact of bribing on IPO pricing. Our findings suggest that bribing firms are younger, smaller, more volatile in their operating activities, and more generous in compensating underwriters and management. Most important, bribing firms price their IPO shares more aggressively than non-bribing firms and exhibit a higher price-to-earnings ratio, lower first-day return, and poorer post-IPO stock performance. Additional analyses suggest that both bribing and non-bribing firms exhibit negative announcement returns after the arrest of corrupt officials. However, the effect is stronger for bribing firms. Overall, bribing firms are systematically more aggressive than their non-bribing counterparts. They concede less to IPO investors and reward underwriters and management for helping them access the capital market.     

The effect on stock performance of executives' emotions during IPO roadshows

This paper describes the correlation between executives' emotions expressed at IPO online roadshows and post-IPO stock performance in the Chinese stock market. The executives' emotion is quantified by face recognition models used for analyzing facial expressions during the IPO roadshows. Our results show that the more negative emotions are expressed by executives at the roadshow, the lower the short-term stock returns after IPO, and this finding is stronger for firms with limited information disclosure. These results are robust to the implementation of an instrumental variable strategy using Air Quality Index or Comfort Index of Human Body as the instrumental variable, various measures of management emotions, and the subsample analysis in which the financial firms and industries has the limited number of firms are excluded.     

The IPO corporate social responsibility information disclosure: Does the stock market care?

We create textual information indices using corporate social responsibility (CSR) information extracted from IPO prospectuses in China. We use the indices to measure the issuers’ corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate environmental performance (CEP) and assess how the stock market reacts. We find that CSP disclosure is significantly related to the post‐market performance of the firm. Specifically, better CSP disclosure is correlated with higher post‐IPO listing holding period returns among firms that do not disclose donations or environmental expenditures, although the association does not hold for firms that make donations and environmental expenditures. In addition, institutional investors seem to care more about the CEP information for a firm than the CSP information.     

Global equity offerings and access to domestic loan market: U.S. evidence

This study examines whether and to what extend global equity offerings at the IPO stage may affect issuing firms' ability to borrow in the domestic debt market. Tracking bank loans taken by U.S. IPO firms in the domestic syndicated loan market, we observe that global equity offering firms experience more favorable loan price than that offered to their domestic counterparts. This finding holds for a set of robustness tests of endogeneity issues. We also find that, compared with their domestic counterparts, global equity offering firms are less likely to have financial distress, engage more in international diversification, and are more likely to wait a longer time to apply for syndicated loans.     

D&O insurance and IPO performance: What can we learn from insurers?

We investigate whether a firm’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurance contract at the time of the IPO is related to insured firms’ first year post-IPO performance. We find that insurers charge a higher premium per dollar of coverage to protect the directors and officers of firms that will subsequently have poor first year post-IPO stock performance. A higher price of coverage is also associated with a higher post-IPO volatility and lower Sharpe ratio. Our results are robust to various econometric specifications and suggest that even when the high level of information asymmetry inherent to the IPO context prevails, insurers have information about the firms’ prospects that should be valuable to outside investors.     

Management quality,certification, and initial public offerings

We empirically examine the relationship between the quality and reputation of a firm's management and various aspects of its IPO and post-IPO performance, a relationship that has so far received little attention in the literature. We hypothesize that better and more reputable managers are able to convey the intrinsic value of their firm more credibly to outsiders, thereby reducing the information asymmetry facing their firm in the equity market. Therefore, IPOs of firms with higher management quality will be characterized by lower underpricing, greater institutional interest, more reputable underwriters, and smaller underwriting expenses. Further, if higher management quality is associated with lower heterogeneity in investor valuations, firms with better managers will have greater long-term stock returns. Finally, since better managers are likely to select better projects (having a larger NPV for any given scale) and implement them more ably, higher management quality will also be associated with larger IPO offer sizes and stronger post-IPO operating performance. We present evidence consistent with the above hypotheses.     

Executive stock options and IPO underpricing

In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.