Searle and Collective Intentionality

A BSTRACT . Several key elements go into Searle's construction of social reality, namely, collective intentionality, constitutive rules, and status functions. But by far the most important and arguably contentious of these is collective intentionality. Searle postulates his notion of collective intentionality as a solution to a conflict between two of his own problematic claims: the irreducibility of collective intentions to singular intentions and what he sees as the requirements of methodological individualism. According to Searle, methodological individualism seems to require that we reduce collective intentionality to individual intentionality; however, this contradicts his claim that collective intentionality is irreducible to individual intentionality plus some mutual beliefs. I will show that at least part of what is really at stake here is Searle's internalism or, as he puts it, his "brain in a vat condition." My strategy will be to examine his internalism and show that Searle's account is far more radical than other internalists in that he extends internalism beyond its usual domain of the mental to incorporate social facts. While there are no knockdown arguments in favor of either internalism or externalism as normally construed in the philosophy of mind, I will show that Searle's account of collective intentionality introduces an element of privacy to social facts that denies us the public access to the conditions on the basis of which we normally take collective facts to obtain.     

The New Role of the Constitutive Rule

A BSTRACT . Searle used to analyze institutional facts in terms of the constitutive rule. In his more elaborate account in The Construction of Social Reality he introduces the notion of a status function. The "counts as" locution is central to both the constitutive rule and the status function. The main question I ask is what role is left for the constitutive rule after the introduction of the status function. In order to answer this question, I start by analyzing the notion of a status function. An examination of the relation between status functions and the function of representation reveals that the former is a species of the latter. An exploration of the relation between status functions and collective acceptance reveals that Searle does not provide an argument as to why collective acceptance is required for institutional facts. Searle's new account goes beyond his old analysis of institutional facts in terms of the constitutive rule. Rather than declaring the notion to be redundant, Searle assigns the constitutive rule a new role: it is to account for the fact that there can be counterfeit instances of a subclass of institutions, including, for example, that of money. This subclass consists of institutions that are codified.     

Searle's Monadological Construction of Social Reality

A BSTRACT . One aim of this paper is to make visible the connection between Searle's views on social reality and his general ontology, and at the same time to show that some peculiar features of his analysis of social reality are a natural outcome of his general ontology. The paper contains five sections. In the first Searle's naturalism is philosophically situated and its differentia specifica explained. Then, Searle's view that intentional states exist only in brains is presented. One might say that, according to Searle, each mind is, although caused by a material brain, a Leibnizian monad. This view is related to an important, but neglected, distinction that Searle himself has made between requirement conditions of satisfaction and required conditions of satisfaction. In the third section, it is pointed out that, necessarily, sometimes there has to exist some kind of relation of satisfaction between the two kinds of conditions of satisfaction. Searle, however, has never really discussed what this satisfaction relation may look like. The upshot of all the remarks is that, fourth, Searle's general ontology automatically implies an ontology of social reality according to which a social fact can only exist as a scattered aggregate whose items exist in the brains of the people who constitute it. Finally and fifth, I try to think with Searle against Searle. His monadological view of social reality cannot, Searle notwithstanding, be regarded as being close to the direct realism of common sense. Searle's realism is an indirect realism. However, if Searle's view that intentional states exist only in brains is rejected, then the rest of his ontology has features that may take us closer to a direct realism. Such a move, which in one respect takes us closer to common sense, takes us in another respect away from common sense. The title of the last section is "Social Reality and the Impossibility of Common Sense."     

Can Collective Intentionality Be Individualized?

A BSTRACT . Searle's philosophical construction of social reality has three basic "building blocks": collective intentionality, constitutive rules, and the imposition of functions. This article will focus on the first of these, collective intentionality, which is taken to be the central span on the bridge from physics to society. Searle analyzes this notion in terms of his own internalist theory of intentionality. In his view, we could have all the collective intentionality we have even if we were a brain in a vat, i.e., even if we were radically mistaken about the outside world. It will be argued that such an internalist view of collective intentionality cannot capture normative aspects of social phenomena. Social reality requires a radical relational approach.     

Rationality-in-Relations

A BSTRACT . If in a game with multiple proper coordination equilibria there is a single one that is best for all participants, it is rational for each participant to choose the strategy that has the best equilibrium as one of its possible outcomes. This seems so obvious that any plausible theory of rationality should be expected to be applicable to such situations. However, this is not true for the "orthodox" theory of rational choice, as Robert Sugden has convincingly shown. In this paper, I shall argue that this failure is due to an implicit individualistic understanding of intentionality . John R. Searle's concept of collective intentionality (as put forth in his Construction of Social Reality ) and his more recent theory of Rationality in Action provides important conceptual tools pertaining to a more comprehensive theory of rationality. The account I shall develop differs from Searle's own, as for reasons to be found in his overall project, Searle's departure from the orthodox view of rationality gets stuck half-way.     

Searle, Rationality, and Social Reality

A BSTRACT . This paper makes a critical assessment of some contributions of John Searle of direct relevance to social science—his theory of rationality and his theory of institutions. The former is criticized for being able to account for how people can act for "external reasons," as opposed to their desires, only in cases where an obligation derives from a promise; a rival account is much more general. The latter is criticized on three grounds: (1) his theory of institutions can only account for a narrow range of social reality, that deriving from some kind of "enactment"; (2) his notion of "collective intentionality" is unnecessary to explain institutions and is introduced only so that Searle can stay within an individualistic, Cartesian theory of the mind, something of no interest to social scientists; (3) his account implies that if an institution exists, "we collectively accept it," whereas it may in fact not be accepted, but merely tolerated or submitted to.     

Explaining Collective Intentionality

A BSTRACT . The Construction of Social Reality contains interesting suggestions about the ways in which phenomena of we-intentionality derive from beliefs and desires of social agents. This explanatory trust is in deep tension with Searle's general view that we-intentionality is a primitive phenomenon. I propose that we preserve the explanations and reject the general view, and argue for the proposal.     

Collective Acceptance, Social Institutions, and Social Reality

ABSTRACT . The paper presents an account of social institutions on the basis of collective acceptance. Basically, collective acceptance by some members of a group involves the members’ collectively coming to hold and holding a relevant social attitude (a “we‐attitude”), viz. either one in the intention family of concepts or one in the belief family. In standard cases the collective acceptance must be in the “we‐mode,” viz. performed as a group member, and involve that it be meant for the group. The participants must be collectively committed to what they have accepted. Social institutions are taken to be norm‐governed social practices introducing a new social and conceptual status on the practices or some elements involved in those practices. This requires that some of the involved norms be constitutive norms as opposed to merely “accidentally” regulating ones. A classification of social institutions is presented. The account is broader in scope than is Searle’s.     

Intrinsic Motivation and the Logic of Collective Action: The Impact of Selective Incentives

I integrate the notion of intrinsic motivation, applied to economics most notably by Frey (1997 ), into the logic of individual contributions toward collective goods as analyzed since Olson ([1965] 1971 ). This illuminates the many and various ways through which the intrinsic motivation to contribute toward such goods can be crowded out by the application of selective incentives. I suggest that the crowding‐out effect increases the cost to society of organizing the provision of collective goods and argue in favor of designing selective incentives that mitigate this effect.     

Collective learning in clusters: Mechanisms and biases

Although collective learning has long been considered a core feature of successful clusters, many researchers have treated the concept of learning more as a metaphor than a construct that requires an understanding of the various processes and mechanisms involved. I draw on the cultural-evolutionary perspective to argue that learning in clusters is an inherently biased process, with outcomes that can be both functional and dysfunctional. The cultural-evolutionary approach views learning as a process of imitation, treats beliefs as the unit of selection, and considers individuals as agents who are limited in their cognitive capabilities and social autonomy. Using interview data on 62 small business owners and 34 institutional actors in a textile and a surgical instruments cluster in South-west Germany, I show that the learning process can involve social biases which, in these cases, have the effect of reproducing a collective mindset built on distrust and rivalry. The findings provide an explanation for the fact that many studies of clusters have not been able to document the high levels of interfirm collaboration that cluster theory predicts.     

An Illuminating Exchange The Construction of Social Reality

A BSTRACT . In his The Construction of Social Reality , Searle presents an account of rights, responsibilities, obligations, duties, and similar entities in terms of the formula X counts as Y in context C , where " X " refers in the simplest case to some physical object or event and " Y " to the result of imposing upon X some deontic power or function. Smith attempts to show the limitations of this formula, focusing especially on the examples of contested property rights (where C is not uniquely defined), and of money in bank accounts and other phenomena (where no physical X -term is available). Searle responds to these criticisms, above all by pointing to the fact that some of the problems Smith raises are to be addressed not by an ontological analysis of social reality but rather through legal or political means.     

How Collective Engagement Creates Competitive Advantage for Organizations: A Business-Level Model of Shared Vision,Competitive Intensity,and Service Performance

We argue that collective engagement can serve as a unique value-creation capacity at the business level by linking shared vision and service performance. We also propose that competitive intensity will be a market indicator by which management can enhance the effect of shared vision on collective engagement, and indirectly strengthen service performance (through collective engagement). Furthermore, we argue that this distinctive value-creation capability, embedded in collective engagement, generates competitive advantage; specifically, one that competing organizations will struggle to replicate. We examine our moderated-mediation model by using a three-time-point method derived from five different sources in 198 retail-service branches. Our findings indicate that collective engagement, fueled by shared organizational vision, improves service performance. Furthermore, as this conditional indirect effect of shared vision on service quality and customer satisfaction was solely generated through collective engagement rather than other mechanisms (i.e., commitment and involvement), it creates a competitive advantage for engagement-oriented organizations.     

A Narrative Approach to Collective Identities*

abstract From a narrative perspective, organizations' identities are discursive (linguistic) constructs constituted by the multiple identity‐relevant narratives that their participants author about them, and which feature, for example, in documents, conversations and electronic media. By defining collective identities as the totality
of such narratives I draw attention to their complex, and often fragmented and heterogeneous nature. My approach contrasts with much of the theorizing in this field which has tended to homogenize collective identities by emphasizing what is common
or shared, failed to capture the interplay between different communities within organizations, and produced bland, undifferentiated empirical research. In particular, the theoretical framework that I outline focuses attention on the importance of reflexivity, voice, plurivocity, temporality, and fictionality to an understanding of collective identities as locales for competing hegemonic claims. In combination, these notions form a unique conceptual model for theorizing and researching collective identities. This said, a narrative approach also has its limitations, and is proposed as an additional, not exclusive, interpretive lens.     

Confucianism,Moral Equality,and Human Rights: A Mencian Perspective

This paper attempts to show the compatibility between Confucianism and human rights, first by revisiting the moral philosophy of Mencius, a key founder of the Confucian tradition, then by reconstructing the Mencian‐Confucian idea of human rights from the perspective of his moral philosophy. One of my central claims is that not only did Mencius acknowledge core human rights—socioeconomic as well as civil‐political—justified by his foundational faith in universal moral equality and human dignity, but he further understood the right to subsistence as an essential part of Confucian‐constitutional rights. Contrary to the widely received notion that in Mencian‐Confucianism the right to subsistence has an overriding value vis‐a‐vis civil‐political rights, I argue that Mencius (and Confucians in general for that matter) never stipulated such a lexical ranking among rights. I conclude by discussing how the type of Confucian moral reasoning that Mencius employs in justifying the moral value of human rights can be re‐appropriated to produce Confucian rights suitable for today. … … … … … …     

Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results

In the traditional approach to consumer behaviour it is assumed that households behave as if they were single decision‐making units. This approach has methodological, empirical and welfare economic deficiencies. A valuable alternative to the traditional model is the collective approach to household behaviour. The collective approach explicitly takes account of the fact that multi‐person households consist of several members which may have different preferences. Among these household members, an intrahousehold bargaining process is assumed to take place. In addition to providing an introduction to the collective approach, this survey intends to show how different collective household models, each with their own aims and assumptions, are connected.     

Santiago Calatrava and the ‘Power of Faith’: Global Imaginaries in Valencia

The focus of this article is on the importance of collective imaginaries for urban policy mobility, and on the agents and modes of power through which imaginaries are translated, mobilized and become materialized in specific places. Through the case study of the monumental complex of the City of Arts and Sciences in Valencia, designed by Valencian global architect Santiago Calatrava, I discuss Calatrava's mobilization of ideas of modernity, tradition, democratization and self‐esteem already present in the collective imaginary of the people and the politicians of post‐Franco's Spain to promote his global architecture. In this process, I argue, global imaginaries were translated into local imaginaries and vice versa as they became embodied in persons and objects, represented in this case by Calatrava's figure as a local/global architect and by the architecture of the City of Arts and Sciences. Particularly, I analyse Calatrava's use of the power of seduction, persuasion and coercion to mobilize such imaginaries in order to build his ubiquitous signature architecture in Valencia.     

PART II Criticisms and Reconstructions Searle's Foole

In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle promises a causal account of how social facts are constructed by human acts of intention, but specifically disavows a special theoretical space in that account for human motivation. This paper argues that such a story as Searle tells cannot serve as a causal account of society. A causal account must illuminate motivations, because doing so illuminates the aims and interests lacking which we cannot explain why these social practices come to be and not potential others. Thus Searle's would‐be account of society has a problem analogous to that of Hobbes, which Hobbes's own Foole poses, and that Hobbes never answers to anyone's satisfaction.     

Collective and individual benefits of trade unions: a multi‐level analysis of 21 European countries

In light of internationally declining union density, this article examines to what extent employees derive advantage from trade unions. Data collected in 21 countries through the European Social Survey 2010 are being used. Multilevel analyses show that it is not so much individual membership but unions' collective power that matters. Perceived union influence and a union‐friendly industrial relations regime (mainly the organized corporatism in the Nordic countries) are positively linked to the occurrence of regular workplace meetings and to the impact of these meetings on organizational decisions. Employees also appear to benefit from unions' collective power in terms of appropriate pay and job security, although the regime pattern is then less clear.     

Did Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian?

A bstract .   Walter Block's critique of my paper fails to address the main argument: that Ludwig von Mises's support for laissez faire comes from a comparison of the systems recommended by the ideologies of socialism, interventionism, and liberalism. Mises compares these systems according to the criterion of their capacity to achieve the goal of satisfying material wants. This goal is either explicit or implicit in the arguments made by those who subscribe to the above ideologies. He uses value-free economic reasoning to determine whether the systems recommended by the three ideologies will achieve the goal. In this reply, I reaffirm the argument in the face of Block's critique. In addition, I address two other arguments. The first is the implicit argument in Murray Rothbard and in Block that Mises erred because he failed to take account of all the goals that policy advocates might have in recommending a policy. I argue that he did not err. The second is that Mises is a utilitarian, an argument also advanced by Leland Yeager. I argue not only that Mises was not but also that he repudiated the idea that his support for laissez faire was based on utilitarian welfare principles. The reply also answers some of Block's more specific criticisms of my paper.     

Engaging in duty of care: towards a terrorism preparedness plan

Abstract

A minor digression, if you will: it has been over 30 years since I (referring to lead author) first wrote on the topic of terrorism and its potential impact on conducting business in a global context. The most vivid memory I have relative to that initial foray into this new topic was making a presentation at the annual summer American Marketing Association (AMA) conference in Chicago. I got halfway through the paper and I started to hear jeering noises emanating from the audience. As I remember (it is not a pleasant memory), the audience thought that I had lost my mind and that the reviewers of the paper allowed this rubbish into the AMA meeting (the implication was that they must have been drinking at the time). This is a true account of the presentation and when I left the session, I would be dishonest if I didn’t tell you that I had made a terrible error and there would be significant ramifications to my young academic career. Yet, no country is untouched by global terrorism today, and the ramifications for global organizations are escalating year by year.