对发展我国农业产业化的建议

1.提高农民组织化程度。小农经济下的农户生产经营活动是分散的,分散的农户面对经营管理高度组织化的市场主体,交易费用高、谈判地位低,在商品交易中处于不利地位,利益得不到保障。提高农民组织化程度,有利于改善目前农户面临的不利环境。2.积极发展民营经济和中小企业。农业产业化的发展离不开企业的带动。通过企业带动,增加就业机会,搞活经济,促进农业产业化的快速、健康发展。3.提高农业专业化水平,促进生产性职能与经营性职能分开与专业化,延伸产业链,提高商品率,增加农民收入。4.创新农户同公司合作方式,针对农户缺乏资金、抵押品的现…     

我国农业生产经营组织的发展方向与创新路径

现阶段,我国农业生产经营组织比较落后,仍然是松散的市场型组织结构,农业生产经营的组织化程度低。根据我国生产力发展水平的实际情况和不同农产品生产的特点,我国近期农业生产经营组织变迁的基本方向是建立具有极强包容性和灵活性的混合型农业生产经营组织。通过构建农户与市场的衔接通道、优化农业资源配置、提高农户的组织化程度、完善农村市场主体和农业产业化经营主体、创新农业生产经营的组织体系等建构农业生产经营组织创新路径。     

提高农民组织化程度有效增加农民收入

全面建设小康社会背景下的农业和农村经济发展,面临着一些深层次的矛盾和问题,特别是农民进入市场的组织化程度较低,严重制约着农业产业化经营水平和农业综合效益的提高,从而成为制约农民收入增加的一大体制障碍.因此,进入新的发展阶段以后,在尊重农户的市场主体地位的前提下,推动和提高农民组织化程度为重心的农村经营体制创新,是有效增加农民收入的重要制度保障.     

农业经济组织的现状与发展——基于江苏苏南、苏中、苏北896个农户的调查分析

农业资源禀赋的特点,决定了江苏农业经济的发展依赖于农民素质提高基础上农业组织化程度的提高.目前,江苏农业经济组织呈现多样化的特征,各类农业组织有着不同的适应性和作用,不同地区农民对农业经济组织的偏好也存在着较大差异.农民对农业经济组织的选择和参与,取决于各类组织的组织形式、方式和能发挥的作用.10个县(市)896个农户的调查显示,独资经营和合伙是基本形式,合作经济组织是过渡形式,有限责任和股份有限则是未来理想的形式.可以认为,江苏农业组织化的轨迹为:独资和合伙经营(分散化)--合作经营(一体化)--企业化经营(一元化).在农业组织化推进过程中,应根据各地实际,从提高效果和效益的角度,选择适合的农业经济组织形式和方式.     

农民专业合作社是发展农村经济的新生力量

党的＂十八大＂报告中提出：＂坚持和完善农村基本经营制度,依法维护农民土地承包经营权、宅基地使用权、集体收益分配权,壮大集体经济实力,发展农民专业合作和股份合作,培育新型经营主体,发展多种形式规模经营,构建集约化、专业化、组织化、社会化相结合的新型农业经营体系。＂这是在新形势下提出的伟大战略,通过改革开放后的快速发展,农村形势已发生了很大变化,农民专业合作社的快速兴起,正是在新形势下出现的新生事物。通过几年的发展,湟中县农民专业合作社已形成了一定的规模,实现了规模化生产和经营,在农业生产和农民增收中开辟了一条新型的道路,有效提高了农业生产效率,增加了农民就业渠道,增加了农民收入,转变了以农户为单位的个体化农业生产模式,进入了规模化生产和经营的格局。     

提高农民组织化程度有效增加农民收入

全面建设小康社会背景下的农业和农村经济发展,面临着一些深层次的矛盾和问题,特别是农民进入市场的组织化程度较低,严重制约着农业产业化经营水平和农业综合效益的提高,从而成为制约农民收入增加的一大体制障碍.因此,进入新的发展阶段以后,在尊重农户的市场主体地位的前提下,推动和提高农民组织化程度为重心的农村经营体制创新,是有效增加农民收入的重要制度保障.……     

提高农民组织化程度有效增加农民收入

全面建设小康社会背景下的农业和农村经济发展,面临着一些深层次的矛盾和问题,特别 是农民进入市场的组织化程度较低,严重制约着农业产业化经营水平和农业综合效益的提 高,从而成为制约农民收入增加的一大体制障碍。因此,进入新的发展阶段以后,在尊重农户的市场主体地位的前提下,推动和提高农民组织化程度为重心的农村经营体制创新,是有效增加农民收入的重要制度保障。     

福建省农业龙头企业集团产业化经营发展策略

目前福建省农产品供求出现了明显的结构性过剩的矛盾,探索新时期农业经济发展的有效运行方式,意义重大。文章根据农业产业化经营的实际情况和基本条件,分析农业产业化经营的影响因素,提出企业化股份制农场发展模式是农业产业化经营的主导模式,指出紧密企业与农户的利益联结,提高农业产业化主体的组织化程度;大力发展专业合作组织和行业协会,提高农民的组织化程度;发展壮大龙头企业规模,增强带动能力,是提高农业龙头企业集团产业化经营效益的有效途径。     

关于山东省昌乐县农民组织化程度的调查

农民组织化程度包括两面的内容 ,其一是农民在生产经营过程中分工和协作的程度 ,它体现了农民与农民、农民与其他经济主体之间的经济关系 ;其二是农民作为劳动者和集体经济主人的社会化组织水平 ,它反映着农民的社会地位和政治权利。正确把握第一种意义上的农民组织化程度 ,对于应对入世挑战、提高农业综合竞争力、更好地解决“三农”问题具有非常重要的现实意义。为此 ,山东省昌乐县人民政府对昌乐县的农民组织化程度进行了专题调查。一、农民组织化程度的五种运作模式农民进入市场的组织形式是农民组织化程度的重要内容之一 ,农民进入市场…     

有效需求、道德风险:农业产业化和政策性农业保险

农业产业化与政策性农业保险存在着互动机制,农业产业化对政策性农业保险的促进机制则是本文研究的重点.农业产业化通过强化农户的风险意识和提高农户的支付能力来增加政策性农业保险的有效需求;同时,通过提高农户的组织化程度和加强农户的合作机制来降低政策性农业保险的道德风险.     

Health, Wealth, Fertility, Education, and Inequality

The authors use a new cross-country dataset to estimate the strength of the links between different dimensions of social and economic development, including indicators of health, fertility, and education, as well as material wellbeing. This differs from previous studies in employing data for different income groups in each country in order to provide direct evidence on factors driving inequality, and in using a unique measure of material wellbeing that does not rely on PPP comparisons.     

Vicarelli,Keynes, and the unstable nexus between investment,liquidity, and finance

The goal of this article is to reconstruct Keynes’s vision of the unstable nexus between investment, liquidity and finance, as set out by the Italian economist Fausto Vicarelli (1936–1986). As argued in the article, one of Vicarelli’s main contributions consists of explaining the inherent instability of financially sophisticated capitalist economies in terms of the interaction (and double dissociation) between investment, saving, and stock-holding decisions, within a Keynesian framework characterized by the presence of fundamental uncertainty. While Vicarelli’s interpretation of Keynes is best understood in the context of the post-Keynesian literature, its relevance goes beyond that, as its sheds light on current issues related to the post-2008 financial crisis and its policy implications.     

Private information, money, and growth: Indeterminacy, fluctuations, and the Mundell-Tobin effect

We introduce an informational asymmetry into an otherwise standard monetary growth model and examine its implications for the determinacy of equilibrium, for endogenous economic volatility, and for the relationship between steady-state output and the rate of money growth. Some empirical evidence suggests that, for economies with low initial inflation rates, permanent increases in the money growth rate raise long-run output levels. This relationship is reversed for economies with high initial inflation rates. Our model predicts this pattern. Moreover, in economies with high enough rates of inflation, credit rationing emerges, monetary equilibria become indeterminate, and endogenous economic volatility arises.     

Complementarity, growth, and trade

We consider an endogenous growth model with international trade in complementary capital goods. The model possesses several distinct, balanced growth solutions, which we classify using stability under adaptive learning. Some of the equilibria can involve growth rates much higher than others. We show that, in addition to a small (usually positive) effect on a given equilibrium, an expansion in trade may sometimes yield a much larger, sudden jump in growth. The small effect on the initial equilibrium may reduce growth if the opportunity cost of capital rises very fast as growth accelerates. JEL Classification: F12, F15, O41
Complémentarité, croissance, et commerce international. Les auteurs utilisent un modèle de croissance endogène en présence de commerce international de biens capitaux complémentaires. Le modèle possède plusieurs solutions de croissance équilibrée distinctes que les auteurs classifient en utilisant des mesures de stabilité avec apprentissage adaptatif. Certains de ces équilibres peuvent impliquer des taux de croissance plus élevés que d'autres. Il appert qu'une expansion du commerce international, en plus d'avoir un petit effet (habituellement positif) sur un équilibre donné, peut parfois engendrer une augmentation plus forte et soudaine de la croissance. Le petit effet sur l'équilibre initial peut réduire la croissance si le coût d'opportunité du capital augmente rapidement à proportion que la croissance accélère.     

Ecosystems,externalities, and economies

This paper incorporates an ecosystem model into a model of a simple economy. The decisionmaking agents in the ecosystem are individual organisms aggregated to the species level. A species may provide utility directly to humans, or it may provide utility indirectly because it is used either as a raw material in goods fabrication or as sustenance for other species. We describe a comparative static equilibrium of the ecosystem where species' demands for other species are equal to the supplies of those other species, and energy is conserved. The ecosystem is then embedded in the economy so that the effects of human intervention can be traced through both the ecosystem and the economy. Human intervention creates ecosystem externalities such that ecosystem equilibria are shifted and the new equilibria affect the utility or the production processes of other humans. This framework allows us to describe in principle which ecosystem services can be efficiently usurped by humans, which waste flows can be efficiently allowed into ecosystems, and which ecosystem organisms and physical attributes can be efficiently maintained.     

Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution

This paper develops a contractarian theory of the state and the existence of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of agents. No veil of ignorance is needed. This avoids obligational problems inherent in most other contractarian theories of justice. Hence, this paper departs from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental insurance and interprets it as stemming from a principle of reciprocity in trade. Since this paper deals with an anarchic society, the implementation of redistributional rules is constrained by the assumption of self-enforcement. We show that this assumption changes the interpretation of the state: the state is characterized by a particular design of equilibrium strategies, not by the existence of enforcement agencies.     

Min, Max, and Sum

This paper provides characterization theorems for preferences that can be represented by U(x₁, …, x_n)=min{x_k}, U(x₁, …, x_n)=max{x_k}, U(x₁, …, x_n)=∑ u(x_k), or combinations of these functionals. The main assumption is partial separability, where changing a common component of two vectors does not reverse strict preferences, but may turn strict preferences into indifference. We discuss applications of our results to social choice. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C0, D1, D6.