Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection

We extend the strategic contract model where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs within each owner–manager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation involves a trade‐off between strategic commitment and the cost of an extra informational rent linked to decentralization. Which policies will arise in equilibrium? We introduce in the game an initial stage where owners can simultaneously choose between control and delegation. We show that if decision variables are strategic substitutes, choosing output control through a quantity‐lump sum transfer contract is a dominating strategy. If decision variables are strategic complements, this policy is a dominated strategy. Further, two types of dominant‐strategies equilibrium may arise: in the first type, both principals use delegation; in the second one, both principals implement delegation for a low‐cost manager and output control for a high‐cost one. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Delegation and strategic incentives for managers in contests

Owners usually want their managers to maximize profits. As the literature on strategic delegation has shown it may be beneficial to owners to put a positive weight on sales in the optimal linear incentive scheme for managers to make them behave more aggressively in the market. This paper shows that if the competition between the managers can be characterized as a contest, owners may induce their managers to maximize sales. Moreover, there is a first‐mover advantage for owners when choosing their incentive schemes. If delegation is endogenous the type of contest will determine whether all owners delegate their decisions to managers or not. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal

Motivated by examples from the automobile industry, insurance, retailing, and multinational strategy, we study an organizational structure we refer to as "partial delegation." In a bargaining problem between an informed party and an uninformed party, partial delegation involves the informed party delegating bargaining to an agent while retaining control of its private information. We show that partial delegation enables the informed party to earn information rents without creating quantity distortions. First‐best quantities are traded in equilibrium. We argue that partial delegation allows an informed party to implement efficient trade with outside parties by endogenously improving its bargaining power.     

Managerial Delegation Contracts under Centralized Unionization

This paper studies how alternative managerial delegation contracts in a duopoly product market interact with wage decisions taken by a central (industry‐wide) union in the labor market. Interestingly, results prove to be more varied with respect to findings by the managerial delegation literature with exogenous production costs. Most notably, it is pointed out that, in equilibrium, both firm profitability and welfare outcomes can be superior under both sales delegation and relative profit delegation, depending on various factors such as the degree of product differentiation and the competition regime. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Delegation and Incentives under Evolutionarily Stable Conjectures

Existing results show that in a homogenous Cournot duopoly, commitment by delegation harms profit. This conclusion presupposes that market conduct is the same whether incentives are aggressive or accommodating. We study delegation and incentives under evolutionarily stable conjectures and show how performance pay co‐determines market conduct. In fact, in equilibrium with evolutionarily stable conjectures, we show that commitment through delegation leads to a profit increase. Manipulation of managerial incentives produces less competition and therefore benefits firms' owners even in symmetric homogenous oligopoly. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Organizational Structure and Product Market Competition

This paper explores the link between delegation of authority and product market competition. It considers a firm that is contemplating entering a market served by an incumbent. The firm can adopt either a decentralized or a centralized authority structure. In the former, authority is delegated to an agent, while in the latter, it is retained by the principal. We address the questions of how the toughness of future product market competition affects the delegation decision, and how this decision in turn affects product market competition. The delegation decision is determined by a trade‐off between inducing the agent to take greater initiative and accepting lower operating profits from a less efficient decision taken by the agent.     

Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Generalized Oligopolistic Case

The main purpose of this paper is to disclose the properties of the equilibrium outcomes in the differentiated‐products model with two stages: (i) owner‐shareholders negotiate managerial compensation with their managers that comprises their profits and sales (sales delegation) and (ii) they engage in their market competition. The other purpose of this paper is to study the differentiated goods model in which an owner bargains the managerial compensation with her/his manager that comprises her/his profit and her/his rival's profit (relative performance delegation). We further investigate the situation wherein the firm with sales delegation and the firm with the relative performance delegation coexist. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bilateral Delegation in Duopoly Wage and Employment Bargaining

We study bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining between firms and unions in a Cournot duopoly. Incentive delegation creates frictions for each party between its objectives of within‐firm rent extraction and market/job stealing from the rival firm. The net effect is restraint in production, resulting in a larger bargaining pie. But each player's payoff will be inversely related to his bargaining power. We also show that if players are given a choice to delegate, they will not resort to delegation when their bargaining power is sufficiently high. This is in contrast to the scenarios commonly assumed in many models. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Bargaining–sales‐delegation Game

This article revisits the managerial delegation literature led by Vickers ( 1985 ), Fershtman and Judd ( 1987 ) and Sklivas ( 1987 ) by introducing a bargaining mechanism between owners and managers over managerial contracts. It shows that the degree of bargaining interacts with the extent of product differentiation in determining whether the sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium is sales delegation or profit maximisation. In contrast with the classical result, no sales delegation emerges and the typical prisoner's dilemma of the managerial delegation literature is solved. This holds in both contexts of Cournot and Bertrand rivalries. The article also provides results for the more general cases with heterogeneous managerial bargaining power and endogenous decisions of the owners regarding the bargaining power of the manager that should be or not be hired in a firm. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Delegation in first‐price all‐pay auctions

In a first‐price all‐pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non‐cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests

Considering oligopolistic contests with R&D spillovers and strategic delegation three results can be obtained: (1) There exist multiple asymmetric equilibria where one owner highly favors sales as a basis for his manager's incentives which drives the other firm out of the market. (2) If R&D spillovers are zero, a managerial firm will have a strong strategic advantage when competing with an entrepreneurial firm. If both owners endogenously decide about delegation, each owner's dominant strategy will be to delegate, given that the manager's reservation value is not too large. (3) If R&D spillovers are maximal, collusive market outcomes become very likely, which makes strategic delegation less important. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bargaining over managerial contracts in delegation games: managerial power,contract disclosure and cartel behavior

Modern corporate governance codes include clauses requiring the disclosure of managerial compensation. Such codes have been installed to protect shareholders' interests. In this paper, we explore the impact of such disclosure on consumer welfare. We consider two‐stage delegation games in which owner‐shareholders negotiate about compensation with their managers in the game's first stage. At the end of the first stage, the managerial compensation contract outcomes of the bargaining process are publicly announced. In the second stage, Cournot competition evolves. We prove that sales delegation generates equilibria radically different from relative performance delegation. Using classical Cournot as the benchmark, contractual bargaining over sales compensation gives tougher product market competition—and hence higher consumer surplus. The opposite holds true for relative performance delegation. Then, cartel behavior is promoted, reducing consumer surplus. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Efficiency of Some Distribution-Free Tests

Laten T₁ en T₂ twee toetsen zijn voor dezelfde hypothese θ=θ₀betreffende de waarde van een parameter θ, Zij verder de onbetrouwbaarheidsdrempel van beide toetsen gelijk aan α en het onderscheidingsvermogen tegen de alternatieve hypothese θ=θ₁ geliik aan 1-β. Indien toets T₁ nu n₁ waarnemingen vergt en toets T₂n₂ waarnemingen, dan wordt de relatieve doeltreffendheid (Eng.: efficiency) van toets T₁ ten opzichte van toets T₂ (als toetsen voor θ=θ₀ tegen θ=θ₁ gegeven door: e = n₂/n₁. Indien men de waarde van θ₁ op een bepaalde wijze naar θ₀ laat convergeren bij toenemende n₁, is het in vele gevallen, door gebruik te maken van een stelling van α en β Deze limiet-waarde wordt de asymptotische relatieve doeltreffendheid (volgens Pitman) genoemd. In dit artikel wordt een overzicht gegeven van hetgeen bekend is over de asymptotische relatieve doeltreffendheid van een aantal verdelingsvrije toetsen ten opzichte van de corresponderende standaardtoetsen.
De conclusie van de schrijver is, dat men bij het gebruik van verdelingsvrije methoden met een hoge doeltreffendheid (bijv. de symmetrietoets en de twee-steek-proeven-toets van Wilcoxon, de toets van Kruskal voor k steekproeven en de methode van m rangschikkingen) slechts zeer weinig informatie kan verliezen en dat zelfs het gebruik van minder doeltreffende verdelingsvrije methoden gerechtvaardigd kan zijn.     

Simultaneous minimization of the error probabilities in a statistical test: An economic example

Summary Bij het toetsen van hypothesen bestaat een verband tussen de kans op een fout van de eerste soort P(I), de kans op een fout van de tweede soort P(II) en de steekproef-omvang n. Bij een vaste n kan een optimale combinatie van P(I) en P(II) bepaald worden met behulp van een zgn. verliesfunctie. De specificatie van zulk een verliesfunctie is echter in veel gevallen moei-lijk. Vaak kiest men dan maar een P(I) op intultieve gronden. Dit artikel illustreert aan de hand van een eenvoudig economisch model dat zulk een P (I) vrij ver van het optimum kan afwijken. Specificatie van een verliesfunctie is hierbij niet nodig. Een bepaalde economische doelstelling i.e. winst-maximering blijkt hiervoor in de plaats te treden.     

Managing workforce diversity at IBM: A global HR topic that has arrived

To be successful, global companies must continue to look toward the future, and CEOs, senior line and HR management, and diversity leaders play a key role in that process. Workforce diversity cannot be delegated; it must be a partnership. Although the HR team plays the key staff role, total delegation from the top, without active involvement, is a recipe for failure. IBM considers diversity a business imperative as fundamental as delivering superior technologies in the marketplace. To ensure that talented people can contribute at the highest possible level, the company insists on a workplace that is free of discrimination and harassment and full of opportunity for all people. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Task assignment,incentives and technological factors

In this paper, we examine the allocation of tasks between a principal and an agent considering their incentives to provide effort, their different abilities in handling tasks, and transmission costs. We focus our attention on two tasks: the first may be handled by the principal or by the agent, whereas the second is necessarily carried out by the agent. Under a fully decentralised organisation, the agent performs both tasks, whereas, under partial delegation, the principal handles the first task and transfers the outcome to the agent who handles the second task. Assuming technological complementarities, from our analysis it emerges that, if there is imperfect observability of effort, full delegation is better at eliciting effort by the agent in the second task, whereas, in comparison with partial delegation, it lowers effort in the first task. Although with contractible effort, the choice between the two organisational forms depends only on transmission costs and on the relative ability of its members, when moral hazard problems are taken into account, the organisational choice is related to the relative importance played by the two tasks in production. If the agent's task is relatively important in production, full delegation, encouraging a higher level of effort in this task, may be optimal, even if technological factors favour partial delegation. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multimodality in a family of probability densities, with application to a linear mixture of two normal densities.

In dit artikel worden enige eigenschappen samenhangende met het aantal toppen van kansdichtheden afgeleid. Beschouwd wordt de situatie bij een dichtheid h(x, θ) (met θ parametervektor), die voor elke toegestaneparameterwaarde θɛθ tweemaal differentieerbaar is naar x, terwijl zowel h zelf, als zijn eerste en tweede afgeleide naar x, continu zijn in (x, θ). In paragraaf 2 worden enige eigenschappen afgeleid van de verzamelingen θ_k (k > o) van parameterwaarden waar strikt k-toppigheid optreedt (definitie in paragraaf 1) en θ_o van die parameterwaarden, waarbijh(x, θ) voor geen enkele k (> o) aan de eisen voor strikte k-toppigheid voldoet. In paragraaf 3 wordt h(x, θ) gespecialiseerd tot een lineair mengsel van twee kansdichtheden en in paragraaf 4 wordt gedetailleerd het geval van een lineair mengsel van twee normale dichtheden nagegaan.     

A Note on Managerial Delegation with Asymmetric and Convex Costs

In this note, we investigate if the standard result by the managerial delegation literature, i.e., the sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto‐optimal from the firms' viewpoint, still applies when asymmetric and convex costs are introduced into the analysis. In such a framework, the managerial delegation choice still represents a sub‐game Nash perfect equilibrium, but the more efficient firm may obtain higher profits provided that the degree of cost asymmetry between firms is sufficiently large. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The best quadratic estimator of the residual variance in regression analysis

De beste kwadratische schattingsfunctie van de storingsvariantie in regressie-analyse.
Dit artikel handelt over de schatting van de variantie σ² van de storingen in de regressieanalyse onder klassieke veronderstellingen: niet-stochastische waarden aangenomen door de verklarende variabelen en normaliteit, onafhankelijkheid en homoskedasticiteit van de storingen. Bekend is dat de schatting volgens maximale aannemelijkheid neerkomt op net bepalen van de kwadratensom van de volgens kleinste-kwadraten geschatte storingen en deling door T (het aantal waarne-mingen); voorts, dat de schatting die minimale variantie heeft binnen de klasse van schattingsfuncties die zuiver zijn en kwadratisch in de afhankelijke variabele (de beste zuivere kwadratische schattingsfunctie) gevonden wordt door genoemde kwadratensom te delen door T–A, waarbij λ het aantal te schatten coëfficiënten is [d.w.z. het aantal verklarende variabelen (+ 1 indien een constante term aanwezig is)]. Hier wordt aangetoond, dat de schattingsfunctie van σ² die een minimaal tweede moment heeft binnen de klasse van schattingsfuncties die kwadratisch zijn in de afhankelijke variabele (de beste kwadratische schattingsfunctie) gevonden wordt door de kwadratensom van de volgens kleinste kwadraten geschatte storingen te delen door T–Λ+ 2.     

External bargaining versus internal manipulation: A theory of managerial delegation

Does the competition mode influence the delegation decisions of the firm owners? By constructing a vertical negotiation game model, we find that under Cournot competition in the downstream market, the downstream firm's owner will not choose delegation, whereas under Bertrand competition, the downstream firm's owner will choose delegation. If the product substitution is relatively large, the adoption of delegation management by the owners of downstream firms under Bertrand competition will bring higher profits. It further shows that compared with the situation of no delegation, delegation management may reverse the social welfare ranking under Bertrand and Cournot competitions.