Strategic stocking for new products to signal quality information

This paper investigates the signaling role of stocking for new experience products in a two-period setting. The seller privately observes the product quality information, which cannot be resolved until the second selling period. We show that the stocking plays a pivotal role in signaling the quality information, and the equilibrium strategy depends highly on ordering cost and the consumer prior belief about the seller type. If the seller is unable to dynamically decide the retail prices, separating equilibrium arises more frequently and such a fixed pricing may result in a win-win situation for both seller and consumers.     

Strategic Buying to Prevent Seller Exit

We consider a dynamic oligopoly model in which a seller may drop out of the market when demand for its product is insufficient in the first period. Buyers suffer some disutility if a seller exits the market and so their first‐period purchase decision not only depends on current period preferences and prices, but also on the potential effect that their behavior has on the probability of seller survival. Specifically, some buyers may choose to purchase from the seller with the lower survival probability even though they like the other seller's product better, a behavior that we call “strategic buying.” We analyze how the incidence of strategic buying depends on parameters and also the implications of the strategic buying motive for sellers' first‐period pricing decisions.     

考虑资金时间价值的网店产品动态定价研究

在资金时间价值影响背景下,以仅有网店渠道的销售商为研究对象,为在期末能将产品销售完毕并最大化其收益,在假设顾客所订商品由卖家免费配送,并且顾客在收到产品之前可以取消订单的前提下,通过建模给出了销售商期初的最优订货量、期内价格调整的最佳次数及每阶段的最优价格的动态定价求解算法。最后的算例分析表明模型和算法是有效的,且动态定价相对于静态定价能带来更大的收益。     

Hassle Costs: The Achilles' Heel of Price-Matching Guarantees*

We show that price-matching guarantees can facilitate monopoly pricing only if firms automatically match prices. If consumers must instead request refunds (thereby incurring hassle costs), we find that any increase in equilibrium prices due to firms' price-matching policies will be small; often, no price increase can be supported. In symmetric markets price-matching guarantees cannot support any rise in prices, even if hassle costs are arbitrarily small In asymmetric markets, higher prices can be supported, but the prices fall well short of maximizing joint profits. Our model can explain why some firms adopt price-matching guarantees while others do not.     

Privacy Is Precious: On the Attempt to Lift Anonymity on the Internet to Increase Revenue

We investigate the effect of a reduction of anonymity on consumers' purchase decisions (whether to buy, and if so how much to pay) at an online music store with Pay‐What‐You‐Want (PWYW)‐like pricing and in an Internet experiment mimicking the real world situation. Revealing the customer's name, e‐mail, and payment to the artist (seller) led to insignificantly higher payments, although it drastically reduced the number of customers purchasing. Overall, the regime led to a revenue loss of 25%. In the online experiment, revenue drops by 35%. These results suggest that the positive effect of reduced anonymity, previously established for donation or public goods contexts, does not extend to a consumption environment. Instead, the substantial opt‐out of customers is likely to be motivated by concerns about privacy.     

How firms compete when they set identical prices: Nonprice strategies in the Indian biscuit industry

How do firms compete when all firms in an industry set identical prices? Using Nielsen data on India's biscuit manufacturers, we document productivity-based competition on nonprice strategies under industry-wide uniform pricing. Products with one standard deviation higher quantity-based productivity contain, on average, 13% more quantity per pack for the same price. Productivity also positively correlates with promotions on pack size, availability, and variety. A higher price (per pack size) sensitivity in rural markets combined with industry-wide uniform pricing imposes a greater burden on rural consumers. Additional analyses show that firms can reduce this burden by selling different pack sizes in urban and rural areas.     

Reverse Pricing and Revenue Sharing in a Vertical Market

Advancing in information technology has empowered firms with unprecedented flexibility when interacting with each other. We compare welfare results in a vertical market (e.g., manufacturers and retailers) for several types of pricing strategies depending upon the following: (1) which side (retailers or manufacturers) chooses retail prices; and (2) whether there is revenue sharing or linear pricing between the two sides. Our results are as follows. Under revenue sharing, retail prices (and thus industry profits) are higher if and only if they are chosen by the side featuring less competition. Under linear pricing, however, retail prices are higher if they are chosen by the side featuring more competition (for linear demand functions). Relative to linear pricing, revenue sharing always leads to lower retail prices, higher consumer surplus and social surplus. However, the comparison on industry profits depends on the demand elasticity ratios. Revenue sharing raises industry profits when the elasticity ratios are small, but the results are reversed when the elasticity ratios are large. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于信用期销售策略下的易损物品采购和定价研究

以零售商最大化收益为目标,结合分析易损物品的特性,拓展带价格弹性的Jaggi分析模型,探讨零售商采购、定价策略,并进一步以数学模拟的方法分析了损耗系数、价格弹性对订货周期、定价以及零售商收益的影响,揭示了零售商对易损物品的采购策略。     

Learning quality through prices and word‐of‐mouth communication

This paper studies the effect of word‐of‐mouth communication on the optimal pricing strategy for new experience goods. I consider a dynamic monopoly model with asymmetric information about product quality, in which consumers learn in equilibrium from both prices and other consumers. The main result is that word‐of‐mouth communication is essential for the existence of separating equilibria, wherein the high‐quality monopolist signals high quality through a low introductory price (lower than the monopoly price), and the low‐quality one charges the monopoly price. The intuition is simple: low prices are costly, and will only be used by firms confident enough that increased experimentation (and therefore communication among consumers) will yield good news about quality and increased future profits. Additional results are the following: for the high‐quality seller, the expected price (quantity) is increasing (decreasing) over time; whereas for the low‐quality one, the opposite is true. Moreover, signaling becomes more difficult when consumers pay less attention to their peers' reports and more attention to past prices. Finally, word‐of‐mouth communication improves consumer welfare.     

Price Fairness in the Case of Green Products: Enterprises' Policies and Consumers' Perceptions

This study investigates the extent to which prices of ecological products are fair. In particular, it explores the gap that can exist between the pricing policies adopted by enterprises and the consumers' price expectations in terms of fairness. The existing academic literature on sustainable consumption neglects this question. Findings from a qualitative investigation combining a consumer study and enterprise case studies show that managers' behaviors vary. While some enterprises take into account consumers' expectations and purchasing power to propose a fair price based on the value of the green product, others continue to adopt a pricing policy that is exclusively based on profitability and competition. The authors draw some business and academic implications. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Market competition and pricing strategies in retail supply chains

This study provides a better explanation for the continued prevalence of high–low (Hi–Lo) pricing strategy. We investigate the impact of market competition on adopting two different pricing strategies in the retail industry: everyday low price (EDLP) strategy and Hi–Lo strategy. We developed two analytic models using a game-theoretic modeling approach: the profit maximization model and the sales revenue maximization model. We then conducted an econometric analysis based on retail store-level dataset. The result shows that an EDLP player's equilibrium price depends highly on the cost level rather than competitor's price whereas the Hi–Lo player's equilibrium price depends mainly on the range of promotional basket as well as the cost level.     

Unlimited shelf space in Internet supply chains: Treasure trove or wasteland?

Internet retailing offers merchants limitless shelf space. This has led experts to highlight the existence of a “long tail” of offerings on the web and assert that the future of online business is “selling less of more.” However, it is difficult for Internet retailers of physical goods to sell a large scope of products without having to handle potentially large amounts of product returns from customers. This is due to the fact that customers can and do get overwhelmed by excessive product variety and often make erroneous purchasing decisions. We shed light on this issue through an assessment of theoretical predictions based on data from sales and returns of almost 7000 products in a particular product category. While retailers can benefit from expanding the scope of their inventories to generate Internet sales, the success of this strategy will depend on the control of unjustified product returns by consumers and the management of recurrent execution errors and product fit failures in transactions with customers. Furthermore, from our results, the gains that this strategy will bring to retailers will be bound by the amount of time products have been available on the Internet retailer's site, as well as by other attributes such as product price and size.     

The paradox of inelastic sports pricing

Rodney Fort's (2004) article in Managerial and Decision Economics attempts to explain the recurrent phenomenon of inelastic ticket pricing in professional sports. In his explanation, Fort mistakenly substitutes the marginal revenue generated by the acquisition of talent for the marginal revenue generated by lowering the gate ticket price. This article corrects the mistake, pointing out that inelastic ticket pricing is still inconsistent with profit maximization. In addition, it is demonstrated that the marginal revenue generated by additional talent cannot be negative. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managing competition on a two‐sided platform

On many two‐sided platforms, users on one side not only care about user participation and usage levels on the other side, but they also care about participation and usage of fellow users on the same side. Most prominent is the degree of seller competition on a platform catering to buyers and sellers. In this paper, we address how seller competition affects platform pricing, product variety, and the number of platforms that carry trade.     

基于拍卖的垄断型产品供应链的博弈分析

论文研究了基于拍卖交易的垄断型产品供应链中卖方和买方的博弈问题,成交价格同时取决于卖方向拍卖市场的供货数量和买方向拍卖市场的竞拍数量。博弈结果显示,在垄断供应的情况下,博弈的纳什均衡将会是买卖双方都不通过拍卖渠道来进行交易,只有在非常极端的条件下可以达成供货和竞拍等量的均衡。最后,论文引入一个新卖方作为买方参与拍卖后的补货来源,得到的新均衡解能使原买卖双方的收益提高,从而说明单纯的拍卖并不总是最好的交易方式,多渠道的销售方式有时更能保障买卖双方的利益。     

青年消费者冲动性购买行为特征研究

冲动性购买行为在今天看来已然成为一种普遍存在的现象,几乎人人都有过冲动购买的经历。青年消费者作为当今消费市场上十分重要的消费群体,由于其庞大的数量,和可观的购买能力,他们必定将成为今后的主流消费者。现在的市场上充斥着吸引青年人的消费产品,基于青年人的消费心理使然,更加容易产生冲动心理,使得他们更容易发生冲动的购买行为。     

Departures from marginal-cost pricing in the American automobile industry: Estimates for 1977–1978

How are prices set in the American automobile oligopoly? This paper seeks empirical estimates of the extent of departure from marginal-cost pricing and of the effects of foreign competition. The model estimated has product differentiation, multiproduct firms, and heterogeneity in consumer tastes. The estimation presumes that product type (proxied by engineering specifications) is exogenous to the price/quantity market equilibrium. Cross-section results for the 1977 and 1978 model years yield price-cost margins around 10%. Import competition has the effect of lowering equilibrium margins for compact and subcompact models.     

Information provision and consumer search behavior for products with asymmetric uncertainty

When selling multiple products with asymmetric uncertainty, should the seller disclose product information so that customers do not have to incur any cost to resolve their uncertainties; if so, which product should the seller choose? To address these questions, we consider a monopolist selling two substitutable products to a group of consumers. Each consumer has asymmetric uncertainty regarding the two products. A total of four different information provision structures are considered based on whether the seller discloses information about each product with the aim of determining which strategy provides the seller with the greatest revenue. We derive several interesting results. First, the optimal information provision strategy depends on the magnitude of uncertainty in relation to the product with lower uncertainty. Specifically, if the uncertainty regarding the product with lower uncertainty is sufficiently small, it is optimal for the seller to provide information about the product with higher uncertainty, otherwise, the seller should provide information about both products. Second, when only one product's information should be revealed, it is optimal for the seller to choose the product with higher uncertainty and charge a higher price. Third, withholding information on both products is never optimal for the seller. Finally, our main model is extended by examining the Mean-Preserving Spread setting, and the robustness of our main results is confirmed. Furthermore, we examine the situation in which a monopolist sells a single product with two main attributes. We find that each of the four information provision strategies can be optimal under various scenarios.     

Odd Prices at Retail Gasoline Stations: Focal Point Pricing and Tacit Collusion

This study empirically investigates the theory that odd‐numbered pricing points can be used as focal points to facilitate tacit collusion. Like other retailers, gasoline stations in the United States disproportionately sell at prices ending in odd digits. I show that station prices are higher and change less frequently in locations using more odd prices (particularly those ending in 5 or 9), even after controlling for other market characteristics. The evidence suggests that the use of pricing points can be an effective mechanism for tacitly coordinating prices, providing an alternative explanation for the widespread use of odd prices in retail markets.