财务契约、财务危机预警与公司财务治理

本文将财务预警系统纳入公司财务治理结构中，根据财务契约与财务预警的关系，采用制度形式对财务预警系统的信息传输渠道和反馈方法规范化，以提高有效性的发挥。文章从财务契约的股权契约，报酬契约，信贷契约和其他利益相关者契约与财务危机预警的关系入手，分别讨论在股东之间，股东与经营者之间，债权人与股东和经营者之间如何用契约的形式，保证财务预警系统在公司治理中有效运作。     

金融危机下公司实力、治理质量与投资研究——来自金融危机背景下中国制造业上市公司的证据

本文利用中国制造业上市公司的季度平衡面板数据,采用双重差分和固定效应模型,探讨金融危机对公司投资的影响,并进一步分析金融危机背景下公司的财务实力、竞争优势以及治理质量与投资之间的关系.回归结果表明,在全球金融风暴的冲击下,中国制造业上市公司的投资额明显降低,但是,那些拥有雄厚财务实力、良好竞争优势以及完善治理机制的公司,受金融海啸的冲击程度较小,其投资支出在金融危机中表现出较强的抗跌性.     

公司治理与企业财务困境——基于股权结构角度的实证分析

现实中许多企业往往过于追求经营绩效而忽略了对企业财务风险的适度关注.尤其是近年来,一系列知名企业陷入财务困境、轰然倒塌的案例更是频频发生.究其根源,在于公司治理机制的失效.而作为公司治理基础的股权结构是影响企业财务风险、可能导致企业陷入财务困境的关键因素.本文从股权集中程度、控股股东性质和股东活跃程度三个方面描述股权结构,采用Altman(1968)的Z指数作为财务困境度量指标,利用1999～2006年中国上市公司的数据研究了股权结构和企业财务困境之间的关系.结果表明股权结构确实能影响企业财务风险.股权集中程度及股东活跃程度越高,企业面临财务风险及陷入财务困境的概率越低,而国有企业面临财务风险及其陷入财务困境的概率则显著高于非国有企业.     

基于公司治理结构的财务控制模式选择

公司治理结构是公司制度的核心,良好的公司治理结构是提高企业经营管理效率的基本要素。科学、有效的内部控制制度,是现代企业实现其经营管理目标的有力保证。公司治理能促使财务控制有效运行,是保证财务控制功能发挥的前提和基础,是实行财务控制的制度环境。财务控制在公司治理中担当的是内部管理监控系统的角色,加强和完善企业财务控制,应从完善公司治理出发完善企业财务控制环境,财务控制作为管理当局为履行管理目标而建立的一系列规则、政策和程序,与公司治理有着密不可分的关系。     

Corporate Governance,Investment, and Firm Valuation in Asian Emerging Markets

We investigate the effects of corporate governance and family ownership on firm valuation through investment efficiency in Asian emerging markets. Using 3 years of time series data from the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia corporate governance score for 10 Asian emerging markets, we find that good corporate governance leads to better or more efficient investment decisions and eventually to higher firm value. We also find that investors reward firms for improvement in corporate governance. The findings do not hold for Asian firms with a family or concentrated ownership structure. The results are not driven by changes in accounting standards in these markets.     

宏观经济环境、公司治理与财务困境研究

考察宏观经济环境与公司治理结构对公司陷入财务困境的影响,首先应从财务困境定义出发,界定困境公司组和非困境公司组,利用Logistic模型检验公司治理结构对公司财务困境的影响;其次应综合分析宏观经济环境与公司治理结构对公司陷入财务困境的影响。研究表明:公司治理结构、大股东侵占与公司陷入财务困境的可能性显著相关;同时,宏观经济环境对于公司陷入财务困境也有一定的影响,特别是公司对于工业增加值和实际利率水平等变化越敏感,就越容易受到弱化的公司治理结构的影响而陷入财务困境。     

财务会计信息与公司治理

财务会计系统不但给公司控制机制提供直接的财务信息,而且还提供股票价格中反映的所有间接信息。会计治理研究中的一个基本目标是为财务会计提供的信息,在多大程度上减缓由所有权和经营权两权分离所带来的代理问题,以及减少信息不对称问题提供证据。本文着重探讨财务会计信息在公司治理机制中的作用,公司治理机制对财务会计信息反作用的互动研究,并提出了公司治理的对策。     

企业债务融资结构与公司治理

企业债务是一种融资工具，而债务融资结构则对公司治理效应产生影响。本主要分析了企业债务期限结构、债务分布结构和债务优先结构，以及各种债务结构之间的协调配置对公司治理的影响。     

公司治理、财政补贴与企业预算松弛

本文选择2011-2017年沪深两市主板民营上市企业为研究对象,重点研究了财政补贴和公司治理对预算松弛的影响,并进一步分析了公司治理在财政补贴与预算松弛关系中的作用,研究发现:财政补贴与预算松弛之间显著负相关;公司治理水平越高,预算松弛程度越低;公司治理显著增强了财政补贴与预算松弛之间的相关性。     

公司财务治理框架分析

公司财务治理是公司治理的核心，其内容包括财务信息的生成和呈报机制及其背后的财权配置。依据对财务信息的影响力，将公司治理的利益主体划分为两类，并论述了两类利益主体的财务治理框架，同时探讨了内部人控制的产生机制、政府的制度供给及其在公司财务治理中的作用等相关问题。     

管理层语调、媒体报道与企业财务危机预测——基于年报前瞻性信息的分析

本文以2007—2017年A股上市公司年报中前瞻性文本信息为研究对象,分析了媒体报道对管理层语调与企业财务危机预测关系的调节效应。研究发现,前瞻性信息中管理层净乐观语调与企业未来是否发生财务危机显著负相关,而媒体报道能够提升管理层语调在财务危机预测方面的价值。进一步研究发现,在机构投资者持股比例低时,媒体报道的促进提升作用更加明显。     

公司治理结构与财务危机关系研究综述

本文介绍了引发公司陷入财务危机的内因——公司治理结构,从理论角度分析了公司治理结构对财务危机的影响,并从公司内部经营管理、股权结构、董事会结构等方面,回顾了国内外学者对公司治理结构与财务危机关系的研究,得出了对我国启示的相关结论。     

国际化程度与民营企业公司治理结构

国际化企业如何调整公司治理结构以应对资本跨国界流动带来的经营复杂性难题？本文以2009—2012年中国民营上市公司为样本,研究发现：国际化程度使公司治理在薪酬机制、领导权结构以及独立董事方面出现了调整,而拥有管理权的控股股东在此基础上会选择有利于自己利益侵占动机的治理机制,这进一步调节了国际化与公司治理的关系。另外,考虑控股股东身份差异有助于深入理解民营企业国际化下公司治理机制的调整行为。     

Where Corporate Governance and Financial Analysts Affect Valuation

We examine whether corporate governance and financial analysts affect accounting-based valuation models for B and H shares traded by foreign investors in China and Hong Kong, respectively. We expect that better corporate governance and more effective analyst activity mitigate potential adverse effects on accounting valuation models generated by country-specific problems in accounting, auditing, and legal systems. We find that valuation models perform better for companies with a greater analyst following, smaller forecast errors, relatively high public ownership and a strong board structure. Valuation models and accounting numbers have only limited explanatory power and valuation role for companies with weak governance and less effective analyst performance. The findings are robust across various market value, return, unexpected return, and other accounting valuation models. The results are consistent with less informed foreign investor clienteles searching for signals of more effective analyst activity and better corporate governance mechanisms.     

公司治理与财务舞弊的研究分析

本文在对财务舞弊的国内外文献回顾与总结的基础上,剖析了国有企业改革、公司治理结构、政府行为缺失等影响因素,提出加强政府法律法规建设的完整和及时性,提高其行为透明度,完善公司内部和外部治理结构、建立监管理体系等,是解决我国企业财务舞弊问题的路径选择。     

The Formation and Development of Modern Firm Financial Governance Theory

This paper points out the drawbacks of traditional financial governance. After introducing Chinese and western economists＇ researches on firm financial governance theory, we put forward modern finn financial governance system, which is based on the core of finance-rights allocation. In our opinion, the theory of finance-rights is the important cornerstone of the theory of financial finance-rights theory. Financial governance structure system is the basic framework of the research of financial governance.     

公司治理结构与会计信息质量

会计信息系统的有效运作是完善公司治理的基础条件,而不健全的公司治理结构干扰了会计信息系统的正常运行,降低了输出的会计信息的质量。因此,完善公司治理与提高会计信息质量密切关联,相互影响,必须将两者有机地结合起来。优化企业股权结构,进一步完善公司治理结构的配置,科学评价管理者的经营业绩是完善公司治理与提高会计信息质量的重要措施。     

Corporate Governance and Financial Constraints on Strategic Turnarounds*

abstract The paper extends the Robbins and Pearce (1992 ) two‐stage turnaround response model to include governance factors. In addition to retrenchment and recovery, the paper proposes the addition of a realignment stage, referring specifically to the realignment of expectations of principal and agent groups. The realignment stage imposes a threshold that must be crossed before the retrenchment and hence recovery stage can be entered. Crossing this threshold is problematic to the extent that the interests of governance‐stakeholder groups diverge in a crisis situation. The severity of the crisis impacts on the bases of strategy contingent asset valuation leading to the fragmentation of stakeholder interests. In some cases the consequence may be that management are prevented from carrying out turnarounds by governance constraints. The paper uses a case study to illustrate these dynamics, and like the Robbins and Pearce study, it focuses on the textile industry. A longitudinal approach is used to show the impact of the removal of governance constraints. The empirical evidence suggests that such financial constraints become less serious to the extent that there is a functioning market for corporate control. Building on governance research and turnaround literature, the paper also outlines the general case necessary and sufficient conditions for successful turnarounds.     

我国公司治理中财权分配问题的探析

当前我国正处于经济体制的转轨时期,国有企业改革的深化面临许多公司财务治理问题。企业财权配置不合理,会严重损害股东的利益,同时导致公司严重的内部人控制问题,债权人的利益得不到保障。因此,财权配置的合理与否是影响财务资源配置效率的关键性因素,对财务治理体系各个部分均具有决定性影响。     

The Effect of Founding Family Influence on Firm Value and Corporate Governance

We examined a sample of 120 Norwegian, founding family controlled and non‐founding family controlled firms, to address two important research questions: (1) is founding family control associated with higher firm value; and (2) are there unique corporate governance conditions under which a founding family controlled firm can be more valuable? We find a positive association between founding family control and firm value for four alternative definitions of founding family control. We find that the association between founding family CEOs and firm value is stronger among younger firms, firms with smaller boards, and firms with a single class of shares. However, the impact of founding family directors on firm value is not affected by corporate governance conditions such as firm age, board independence, and number of share classes. We also find that the relation between founding family ownership and firm value is greater among older firms, firms with larger boards, and particularly when these firms have multiple classes of shares. Our results imply that founding family controlled firms are more valuable and governed differently than firms without such influence. Furthermore, our results also suggest that founding family CEOs can enhance firm performance when family influence does not create shareholder entrenchment or when their cash flow rights are more aligned with their control rights.