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1.
Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of
account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of
fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative
prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply
or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals
have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is
subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive
cash balances.
Received: March 29, 1996; revised version: February 25, 1997 相似文献
2.
Summary. A sunspot equilibrium (SSE) is based on some extrinsic randomizing device (RD). We analyze the robustness of SSE. (1) We say that an SSE allocation is robust to refinements if it is also an SSE allocation based on any refinement of its RD. (2) We introduce two core concepts for analyzing the robustness of SSE in the face of cooperative-coalition formation. In the first, the blocking allocations are based on the RD that defines the SSE. In the second (stronger) core concept,
coalitions select their own RDs. For the convex economy with restricted market participation, SSE allocations are robust under
each of the definitions and the cores converge on replication of the economy to the set of SSE allocations. For the economy
with an indivisible good, SSE allocations are not always robust. We provide examples of each of the following: (i) an SSE allocation that is not robust to refinement, (ii)
an SSE allocation that is in neither core, (iii) an SSE allocation that is in the first core, but not in the second, and (iv)
a core that does not converge upon replication to the set of SSE allocations.
Received: July 31, 1995; revised version August 30, 1996 相似文献
3.
Summary. This paper introduces the framework of rational beliefs of Kurz (1994), which makes the assumptions of heterogeneous beliefs
of Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Morris (1996) more plausible. Agents hold diverse beliefs that are “rational” in the sense
of being compatible with ample observed data. In a non-stationary environment the agents only learn about the stationary measure
of observed data, but their beliefs can remain non-stationary and diverse. Speculative trading then stems from disagreements
among traders. In a Markovian framework of dividends and beliefs, we obtain analytical results to show how the speculative
premium depends on the extent of heterogeneity of beliefs. In addition, we demonstrate that there exists a unique Rational
Belief Equilibrium (RBE) generically with endogenous uncertainty (as defined by Kurz and Wu, 1996) and that the RBE price
is higher than the rational expectation equilibrium price (REE) under some general conditions
Received: March 15, 2001; revised version: April 26, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are deeply grateful to Mordecai Kurz for his constant encouragement and inspiring guidance over the years. We wish
to express our gratitude to an anonymous referee for the very valuable comments provided. We also thank Kenneth Arrow, Peter
Hammond, Roko Aliprantis and Nicholas Yannelis for their helpful suggestions and Academia Sinica and the National Science
Council of the R.O.C. for their indispensable support.
Correspondence to: H.-M. Wu 相似文献
4.
5.
Social Security and personal saving: 1971 and beyond 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Feldstein (1996, 1974) reported that Social Security in the U.S.A. reduced personal saving (“saving”) in 1992 (1971) by $416
($61) billion. I reestimate his life-cycle consumption specification using data from the latest NIPA revision, correct his
calculations, and find that the implied reduction in 1992 (1971) saving is now $280 ($22) billion, 48% (16%) of actual net
private saving, with a standard error of $114 ($14) billion. If structural breaks around WWII and the 1972 Social Security
amendments (which raised real per capita SSW by 22%) are allowed, and the market value of Treasury debt included in the specification, the reduction in 1971 and 1992
saving attributable to Social Security is at most 0.55 times its standard error, and 12% of net private saving. I then reestimate
the preferred specification of Coates and Humphreys (1999), allowing for these structural breaks and relaxing other restrictions.
The implied effect of Social Security on saving is again statistically zero.
First version received: September 2000/Final version received: September 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank Les Oxley for pointing out that correcting for AR(1) residuals is not a categorical imperative but a cultural
relative, in which case common factor restrictions are crucial. 相似文献
6.
Michael Kosfeld 《Economic Theory》2002,20(2):321-339
Summary. The paper explores a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents from an infinite population stochastically
adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of playing perturbed best-response, it is assumed that
agents follow a rule of ‘switching to better strategies with higher probability’. This behavioral rule is related to bounded-rationality models of Rosenthal (1989) and Schlag (1998). Moreover, agents stay
with their strategy in case they successfully coordinate with their local neighbors. Our main results show that both strict
Nash equilibria of the coordination game correspond to invariant distributions of the process, hence evolution of play is
not ergodic but instead depends on initial conditions. However, coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium occurs with
probability one whenever the initial fraction contains infinitely many agents, independent of the spatial distribution of
these agents.
Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: June 21, 2001 相似文献
7.
A note on asymmetric and mixed strategy equilibria in the search-theoretic model of fiat money 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Randall Wright 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):463-471
Summary. The simple search-theoretic model of fiat money has three symmetric Nash equilibria: all agents accept money with probability
1; all agents accept money with probability 0; and all agents accept money with probability y in (0,1). Here I construct an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium, payoff-equivalent to the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium,
where a fraction N in (0,1) of agents always accept money and 1-N never accept money. Counter to what has been conjectured previously, I find N > y. I also introduce evolutionary dynamics, and show that the economy converges to monetary exchange iff the initial proportion
of agents accepting money exceeds N.
Received: September 10, 1997; revised version: April 24, 1998 相似文献
8.
Frederic Palomino 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):683-700
Summary. The paper studies informational properties of three types of imperfectly competitive markets: a one-signal speculative market
(OSS market) in which agents have only private information about the fundamental value (v) of the risky asset traded, a two-signal speculative market (TSS market) in which agents have private information about both
v and the asset supply, and a market in which agents are endowed with both information about v and shares of the risky asset traded. In this last market (JA market), agents have joint activities: they trade for both
speculative and hedging purposes. It is shown that (i) the JA market and the OSS market are the most and the least efficient, respectively, and (ii) the levels of informational efficiency in the three markets are inversely correlated with the intensities with which traders
use their private information about the fundamental value of the asset.
Received May 28, 1999; revised version: May 28, 1999 相似文献
9.
Javier Díaz-Giménez 《Economic Theory》1997,10(3):463-482
Summary. I study the role played by uninsured idiosyncratic risk and liquidity constraints in the propagation of aggregate fluctuations.
To this purpose, I compare the aggregate fluctuations of two model economies that differ in their insurance technologies only.
In one of these model economies liquidity constrained households vary their holdings of a nominally denominated asset in order
to buffer an uninsured idiosyncratic shock to their individual production opportunities. In the other economy every idiosyncratic
component of risk can be costlessly insured. I find that the limited insurance technology implies fluctuations in output that
are 20% larger, fluctuations in hours relative to output that are 9% larger, fluctuations in consumption relative to output
that are 18% smaller, and a correlation of hours and productivity that is 15% smaller than those that obtain under the full
insurance technology.
Received: March 6, 1996; revised version August 15, 1996 相似文献
10.
Ma (in Econ. Theory 8, 377–381, 1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econometrica 58, 1475–1480, 1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always
reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented –
and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 – is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that
even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric.”
We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. B. Klaus’s and F. Klijn’s research was supported by Ramón y Cajal
contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The work of the authors was also partially supported through the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (BEC2002-02130 and SEJ2005-01690) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626 and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA). 相似文献
11.
Milan Zafirovski 《Forum for Social Economics》2001,31(1):27-58
This paper makes a proposal for reintroducing sociological or social economics into contemporary economic science. Such a
reintroduction is proposed to be substantive, by analyzing the social structuring of the economy, and formal, by including
sociological/social economics in the current (JEL) classification system of economic disciplines (code A.15). Both epistemological
and ontological arguments can be presented to support the proposal. Epistemological arguments invoke the presence of essential
components of sociological economics in the development of economic thought, and ontological arguments stress the role of
social factors in economic life. In this paper I present primarily epistemological (theoretical-methodological) arguments
for sociological economics, and secondarily ontological ones. I show that the present designation, sociology of economics,
is something different from sociological or social economics in that the former refers to economic epistemology (knowledge)
and the latter to economic ontology (reality). I conclude that, in addition to a sociology of economic science, we need a
sociology of economic life.
There is nothing surprising in the habit of economists to invade the sociological field. A major part of their work—practically
the whole of what they have to say on institutions and on the…[social] forces which shape economic behavior—inevitably overlaps the sociologist’s preserves. In consequence, a no man’s land or
everyman’s land has developed that might conveniently be called economic sociology … [or sociological economics] (Schumpeter 1956:134).
The author is grateful to two anonymous referees for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this article. 相似文献
12.
Summary. We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used (ex ante, interim, ex post) and
on how agents share their private information, i.e., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge information,
or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions and identify several efficiency
concepts which maintain (coalitional) Bayesian incentive compatibility.
Received: March 25, 1996; revised September 5, 1996 相似文献
13.
Summary. Using a general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes the equilibrium provision of a pure public bad commodity (for
example pollution). Considering a finite economy with one desired private good and one pure public “bad” we explicitly introduce the concept of Lindahl equilibrium and the Lindahl prices into a pure public bad economy. Then, the Lindahl provision
is analyzed and compared with the Cournot-Nash provision. The main results for economies with heterogeneous agents state that
the asymptotic Lindahl allocation of the pure public bad is the null allocation. In contrast, the asymptotic Cournot-Nash
provision of the public bad might approach infinity. Other results were obtained in concert with the broad analysis of the
large finite economies with pure public bad commodities.
Received: July 26, 2001; revised version: March 12, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are indebt to Nicholas Yannelis and anonymous referee for their valuable comments and suggestions.
Correspondence to: B. Shitovitz 相似文献
14.
Summary. Convergence of the cores of finite economies to the set of Walrasian allocations as the number of agents grows has long been
taken as one of the basic tests of perfect competition. The present paper examines this test in the most natural model of
commodity differentiation: the commodity space is the space of nonnegative measures, endowed with the topology of weak convergence.
In Anderson and Zame [12], we gave counterexamples to core convergence in L
1, a space in which core convergence holds for replica economies and core equivalence holds for continuum economies; in addition,
we gave a core convergence theorem under the assumption that traders' utility functions exhibit uniformly vanishing marginal
utility at infinity. In this paper, we provide two core convergence results for the commodity differentiation model. A key
technical virtue of this space is that relatively large sets (in particular, closed norm-bounded sets) are compact. This permits
us to invoke a version of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem for compact subsets of an infinite-dimensional space. We show that,
for sufficiently large economies in which endowments come from a norm bounded set, preferences satisfy an equidesirability
condition, and either (i) preferences exhibit uniformly bounded marginal rates of substitution or (ii) endowments come from
an order-bounded set, core allocations can be approximately decentralized by prices.
Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: January 14, 1997 相似文献
15.
Ashvin Varada Rajan 《Economic Theory》1997,10(2):373-379
Summary. We present a unified mathematical framework within which, among others, pure exchange economies with a finite set of agents,
as well as those with a continuum of traders may be studied simultaneously. We prove that the reasoning presented by Balasko
(1975) on the equilibrium set for finite economies generalizes very naturally to our setting. His results may therefore be
recovered as a special case of those presented in this note.
Received: April 9, 1996; revised version August 19, 1996 相似文献
16.
Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous
and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem
stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social
value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because
of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems
often studied in macroeconomics.
Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due
to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful
comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235
“Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization
for public policy and industry regulation”).
Correspondence to: C. Le Van 相似文献
17.
18.
Jean-Pierre Drugeon 《Economic Theory》1998,12(2):349-369
Summary. This article reexamines the role of consumption in growth and emphasises the external effects of aggregate consumption, viewed
as consumption standards, as an additional impediment in the growth process. These external effects raise the productivity of the individuals and
are positively related to their valuation of the future. Conditions are established under which this results in a marginal
value of wealth that is an increasing function of consumption. This brings new types of multiple steady states, local indeterminacies
and cyclical motions. Imposing extra homogeneity restrictions, balanced growth solutions with endogenous impatience emerge.
The possibility of multiple convergent paths is univocally related to endogenous discount effects. A comparison with a benchmark
planning economy indicates an excessive value for the rate of time preference and emphasises its insufficient adaptation to
future utility in a stationary setting. Discrepancies along the transition path that rest on endogenous impatience versus
fixed discount appear in a non-stationary environment when the competitive balanced growth solution is indeterminate.
Received: May 5, 1996; revised version: May 19, 1997 相似文献
19.
Licun Xue 《Economic Theory》1998,11(3):603-627
Summary. We analyze strategic social environments where coalitions can form through binding or nonbinding agreements and actions of
a coalition may impose externalities upon the welfare of the rest of the players. We define a solution concept that (1) captures
the perfect foresight of the players that has been overlooked in the literature (e.g., Harsanyi [10] and Chwe [6]) and (2) identifies the coalitions
that are likely to form and the “stable” outcomes that will not be replaced by any coalition of rational (and hence farsighted)
players. The proposed solution concept thereby offers a notion of agreements and coalition formation in complex social environments.
Received: February 12, 1996; revised version: March 3, 1997 相似文献
20.
Summary. We provide rankings across uncertain outputs generated by agents functioning within the Principal-Agent paradigm. For agents who are identical except for their productivity, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for an agent to be preferred is that her output dominates that of lower agents in the sense of First Degree Stochastic Dominance (FDSD) at every level of effort. Sufficient conditions are based on Blackwells ranking of information systems and involves a characterization of FDSD using stochastic matrices. Our conditions for ranking outputs extends earlier results concerning the value of information within the agency framework. We also show how our techniques can be adapted to rank agents even if the first-order approach for determining optimal contracts fails to hold.Received: April 2, 1996; revised version: October 30, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献