Short-run efficiency in the labor-managed firm

This paper examines the short-run comparative statics of resource allocation in a labor-managed firm when workers are free to adjust work hours but not membership in a competitive market environment. It is found that the workers might encounter difficulties in attaining their utility-maximizing choices of work hours, but with the acceptance of a simple collective-choice decision rule, each worker's optimum becomes the Pareto-optimum.     

On the labor-managed firm in a competitive environment

A risk-neutral median voter in a labor-managed firm (LMF) facing an increase in the demand for its product will prefer to maintain employment and secure his job to the prospect of a higher dividend accompanied by the risk of unemployment. It is argued that LMFs with fixed employment and output will lose out in competition with flexible-output profit maximizing firms. Partnerships with a small membership in high-human-capital industries will be most likely to survive in a competitive environment.     

The effect of production uncertainty on the labor-managed firm

The effects of production uncertainty on the behavior of the labor-managed, cooperative firm are examined and it is shown that they generally differ from the case of certainty and the case of the entrepreneurial, profit-maximizing firm. In particular, it is shown that the risk-averse (risk-seeking) cooperative will have a larger (smaller) ratio of labor to nonlabor input employed in production than the risk-neutral cooperative.     

A two-period model of the competitive socialist labor-managed firm

This paper investigates the role of price expectations in the short-run supply response of the competitive socialist labor-managed firm. The insights gained from the analysis of the two-period model presented in this paper are used to clarify the role of price expectations in the literature on labor-managed firms. It is found that the type of price expectation assumption, made implicitly or explicitly, affects the slope of the firm's short-run supply curve.     

On the economic theory of the labor-managed firm in the short run

This paper proposes a short-run utility-maximizing theory of the labor-managed firm (LMF), and shows how four previous theories can be derived from it. It is argued that one of the models, by Horvat, should be viewed as a type of satisficing theory for the LMF. In contrast to the theory of the conventional capitalist firm, it is the satisficing variant that provides efficient resource allocation. This paper also shows why comparative-static analysis may not be as accurate a predictor of short-run behavior of the LMF as it is for the profit-maximizing firm. Consideration is given to microeconomic policy in a socialist labor-managed economy.     

Efficiency,incentives, and individual labor supply in the labor-managed firm

Parallels are drawn between the approach to the theory of individual labor supply used by Sen (“Labor Allocation in a Co-operative Enterprise.” Rev. Econ. Stud.33: 361–371, Oct. 1966) and approaches of more recent contributions. The paper considers questions of comparative statics in a general model and attempts to distinguish between behavior in labor-managed firms and profit-maximizing firms. Diagrammatic analysis is used for a simple case where income effects are absent. Questions of efficiency and comparative statics are studied in the short run (membership fixed) and in the medium term (membership variable). Finally an incentive scheme to promote efficiency is described.     

On the theory of the competitive labor-managed firm under price uncertainty

The short-run behavior of a labor-managed firm under competitive assumptions and price uncertainty is analyzed assuming risk aversion. It is compared with its behavior under certainty and the behavior of a capitalist-managed firm under price uncertainty. It is shown that a risk-averse labor-managed firm employs more labor than a risk-neutral labor-managed firm. Generally, uncertainty is seen to have greater impact on the behavior of a labor-managed firm than on the behavior of a capitalist-managed firm. Except under constant risk aversion, the behavior of a labor-managed firm under price uncertainty is less predictable than that of a capitalist-managed firm.     

The socialist labor-managed firm and bank-financed investment: Some theoretical issues

Under a labor-managed system of the Yugoslav type of 1965–1971, the process of capital formation is subject to special difficulties, linked to the structure of property rights. Workers possess neither permanent nor transferable claims on capital assets but are, nevertheless, required by law to maintain the value of the firm's initial capital stock and of any additions to it. The law is intended to protect the nation's capital stock but is ill designed for this purpose. Its immediate effect is to reduce the collective's willingness to undertake bank-financed investment, and thus it promotes inefficient intertemporal allocation.     

The theory of the labor-managed firm from the membership's perspective with implications for marshallian industry supply

The partial-equilibrium literature on labor-managed (L-M) firms argues that the property-rights structure inhibits economic efficiency and induces perverse responses to price parameters in the short run. But recent general-equilibrium literature demonstrates equivalence of equilibria between L-M and capitalist market economies with the relevant welfare results therefore applying to the L-M economy. Once the L-M firm's maximand is modified to incorporate members' property rights, the short-run industry supply curves of the two economics, under quasi-market conditions consistent with recent Yugoslav reforms, are seen to be equivalent. Hence, the property-rights structure in the L-M economy is compatible with efficiency and normal short-run price responses.     

Regulation effects on resource allocation of a utility-maximizing firm

The literature on the effects of rate of return regulation on the allocation of resources was mostly devoted to the classical case of a profit-maximizing monopolist. An attempt is made in this paper to extend the analysis to a firm who maximizes a utility function with profits and revenue as arguments. We prove that a meaningful presentation of the regulation effects implies the formulation of two constraints. Whether the firm over-or undercapitalizes depends on whether the constraint is imposed as an upper or a lower limit. The higher the profit motive the higher the capital-labor ratio and the marginal rate of substitution between labor and capital.     

Optimal risk shifting vs efficient employment in Illyria: The labor-managed firm under asymmetric information

Using an optimal contract framework, the recent literature showed how labor-managed firms (LMFs) can reach efficient employment, internal risk sharing, and risk shifting to outside investors if all information is public. This paper analyzes the LMF under asymmetric information between members and investors. Sections 2 and 3 explore one-period arrangements in a way which parallels the recent work on optimal wage-employment contracts in capitalist firms. Our main result is that, contrary to the Coase theorem, the two specifications of property rights entail different allocations of risk and employment. Section 4 shows how long-term arrangements ease the conflict between optimal employment and risk shifting.     

Cooperation in a fixed-membership labor-managed enterprise

Conditions are examined under which we can ensure efficiency in a fixed-membership labor-managed firm when the preferences of members over labor and income are unknown. The main result is the derivation of a necessary and sufficient condition on technology that ensures that we can find some reward scheme that gives efficient outcomes. Some commonly suggested reward schemes are examined and it is shown that assumptions that have been used to simplify previous analysis are, in fact, critical to many of the results that have been obtained.     

Information and incentives in labor-managed economies

The incentive problems that result in labor-managed economies from attempting to eliminate the inefficient allocation of labor due to this institutional arrangement are discussed. Games are searched for such that, at an equilibrium, firms have revealed truthful information and labor is allocated efficiently. It is shown that such games do not exist if output is not observable, and even if aggregate deficits or surpluses are permitted. By contrast, if output is observable, balanced games exist in which it is dominant strategy for each firm to be truthful.     

Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time consistency of environmental policy

This paper considers location decisions of a monopolist, who faces a tax on its emissions in the home country, under ex post that is, time consistent, and ex ante, that is precommitment, environmental policies. We show that the monopolist will relocate more often under ex post optimal emission taxes. A government which cannot commit to an ex ante emission tax and sets its tax ex post after abatement effort has been chosen, is unable to affect the monopolist’s location decision, because it cannot commit to strategically reduce its tax level in the first stage. Domestic welfare is often higher under ex post emission taxes whenever the monopolist relocates under both policy regimes. Otherwise, welfare is higher under government commitment to an ex ante emission tax level. Thus, government commitment to a policy is not always welfare improving.     

Random capital service in labor-managed and profit-maximizing firms

The labor-managed firm and the profit-maximizing firm may experience random production due to a variety of fundamental sources of uncertainty. This paper demonstrates that the nature of the source of uncertainty leads to alternative specifications of the problem and to different conclusions. The specific source of uncertainty modeled in this presentation is random capital failure in the labor-managed firm and in the profit-maximizing firm. In each case, the choice of primary capital, reserve capital, and labor is considered.     

A note on the allocation of time

A multi-commodity model in which time as well as nominal income is necessary in the process of consumption is analyzed. Duality theory is used to provide a counter example to the ‘Linder Theorem’ that a rise in real wages will decrease consumption of some good if it is more time intensive than the weighted average of the time intensity of all other commodities.