地方政府竞争模式选择:制度竞争胜于资源竞争

地方政府竞争模式各不相同,该文把其概括为资源模式和制度模式。在资源竞争模式下,注重对生产要素的争夺和占有、强调对产业竞争力的培养;而在制度竞争模式下,不断进行制度创新并降低制度成本,减少"制度腐败",促进地方政府间相互信任。因此,地方政府竞争模式必须由资源模式向制度模式转变。     

Sequential Equilibrium and Competition in a Diamond–Dybvig Banking Model

Within the framework of a Diamond–Dybvig model [J. Polit. Econ.91(1983), 401–419], but with explicitly modelling the autarky choice during the planning period, we demonstrate that a mixed strategy bank run equilibrium that does not rely on sunspots may coexist with the sunspot run equilibrium previously studied in the literature. In a version of the model with multiple banks, there exist sequential equilibria that imply positive profits. However, the zero-profit contract in which runs never occur can be supported as the unique equilibrium outcome if the agents play pure strategies only and their beliefs are restricted to be consistennt with a forward induction argument.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, G21     

Noncooperative Equilibrium and Chamberlinian Monopolistic Competition

This paper addresses the existence of equilibrium for a nonatomic Bertrand game in a Chamberlinian environment. We reformulate O. Hart′s model (Rev. Econ. Stud. 52, 1985, 529–546) as a nonatomic game and show that under dispersion of tastes and continuity of the tastes density, there exists a pure-strategies ε-equilibrium where prices exceed marginal cost. Unlike Hart′s model there is no need to impose uniformity (or even independence) on the distribution of the m-tuple of differential commodities that consumers care about. Moreover, demand curves are allowed to vary across firms and in equilibrium firms may earn profits. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: B21, D43, L13.     

我国连锁超市区域竞争状态与发展战略

本文通过对我国六大经济区限额以上连锁超市的门店数、营业面积、从业人员、销售额等规模指标和店效、坪效、人效等绩效指标进行分析,揭示连锁超市在我国的发展已经表现出明显的层级市场竞争格局——由东部向中部、西部扇形递减。并通过对各区域市场竞争特点的分析,提出各区域市场的战略方向选择：“一级区域市场”以战略转移为主;“二级区域市场”以做大做强为主,“三级区域市场”以积极发展为主。     

The Choice of Technology and Equilibrium Wage Rigidity

In this general equilibrium model, firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose increasing returns technologies to maximize profits. Capital and labor are the two factors of production. The existence of efficiency wages leads to unemployment. The model is able to explain some interesting observations of the labor market. First, even though there is neither long-term labor contract nor costs of wage adjustment, wage rigidity is an equilibrium phenomenon: an increase in the exogenous job separation rate, the size of the population, the cost of exerting effort, and the probability that shirking is detected will not change the equilibrium wage rate. Second, the equilibrium wage rate increases with the level of capital stock. Third, a higher level of capital stock does not necessarily reduce the unemployment rate. That is, there is no monotonic relationship between capital accumulation and the unemployment rate.     

论竞争、垄断与规制的动态均衡

通过对以往竞争、垄断和规制理论的系统梳理与批判,提出了竞争与垄断之间存在着内在转化趋势的假说,详细阐释了二者相互转化机制,并把规制作为二者转化过程中的外生因素来处理,界定了规制有效的条件,主要结论如下:其一,竞争与垄断客观上存在着互相转化的趋势,市场结构总是处于二者的中间状态;其二,规制对竞争与垄断间的相互转化起着调节或制约作用;其三,在竞争-垄断-规制动态均衡中,竞争的激励作用和潜在进入者打破垄断的强烈动机会促进技术进步和生产效率的提高,从而使得市场经济效率在长期中螺旋式上升。     

Public Input Competition under Stackelberg Equilibrium: A Note

This paper examines the Stackelberg equilibrium for public input competition and compares it with the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Given two asymmetric regions, we show that under the Nash equilibrium the more productive region tends to spend more on public input, which results in this region attracting more capital than the less productive region. The comparison of the two equilibria reveals that the leader region obtains a first‐mover advantage under the Stackelberg setting. This suggests that if regions interact with each other sequentially as in the Stackelberg equilibrium, then the regional disparity that is due to the heterogeneity of productivity is likely to be mitigated or enlarged, depending on which region performs the leadership role in the competition process.     

竞争优势与优势竞争:后发地区的发展定位与竞争战略

当前 ,中国地区经济非均衡发展十分突出。后发地区经济发展的现实和发展目标的实现 ,对国家整体经济发展和社会政治稳定具有重要战略作用。本文在运用迈克尔·波特(Michael.E .Porter)竞争理论的基础上 ,结合了发展经济学的相关理论 ,对后发地区的发展定位与竞争战略进行了分析 ,构建了一个竞争发展的分析框架。作者认为 ,解决我国地区经济非均衡发展的核心是后发地区的发展 ,而后发地区的发展定位和竞争战略选择 ,既应具有现实和实现的基础 ,也必将对后发地区的经济发展具有重要作用。在其发展定位层面 ,应使之更趋实际 ,实现比较优势向竞争优势转变 ;在其战略选择层面 ,应在实效的基础上 ,使竞争优势与优势竞争相结合 ,构建起有效的竞争体系 ,促进后发优势的实现 ,最终实现其发展的目标。     

国有企业民营化的竞争与均衡模型

在现实经济中,处于转型经济中的政府通常保留一定的被私有化企业的股份.在生产差别产品的双寡头模型里,我们考察了部分国有对企业投资和产出行为的影响机制.从而得出结论:政府所保留股份的最适宜份额取决于产品市场的竞争.并进一步探讨了在哪种情况下把两个公司出售给唯一买主是更可取的.本文的理论模型有助于更好地理解和解决在我国市场经济和特型经济条件下的国有大中型企业重组,国有资产的战略性退出以及明晰现代产权制度等问题.     

企业核心竞争力和非核心竞争力竞争追随与均衡

企业核心和非核心竞争力追随会导致其竞争力升级和竞争力趋同。构建了企业核心和非核心竞争力竞争追随模型,讨论了在竞争追随条件下的核心和非核心竞争力的发展追随规律。     

An Estimable Model of Supermarket Behavior: Prices, Distribution Services and Some Effects of Competition

In this paper we present and estimate a simple model of supermarket behavior that has several attractive properties: It permits the incorporation of the (distribution) services provided by a supermarket as an output of supermarkets and a determinant of demand for supermarket products; it generates, as a special case, one of its main competitors in the supermarket literature – the so called full price model of services; and, it can be estimated with a unique data set originally constructed by the Economic Research Service of USDA. The main results of the analysis are three. First, the aggregate demand for a supermarket's products depends critically on distribution services: at the substantive level, a 1% increase in these services increase quantity demanded by 0.4%; at the methodological level, the restrictions on the parameter values implied by the model are critical in the evaluation of functional forms for demand. Second, supermarkets exhibit constant marginal costs with respect to the quantity of output or turnover and substantially declining marginal costs with respect to (distribution) services, which implies substantial multiproduct economies of scale. Third, in response to an exogenous increase in competition those supermarkets that have adopted newer formats such as superstores and that employ newer technology such as optical scanners choose prices and (distribution ) services in ways that increase consumer welfare, whereas those that do not have these characteristics choose prices and services in ways that lower consumer welfare.     

Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Electoral Competition Games: The Hybrid Case

This paper analyzes the traditional unidimensional, two‐party electoral competition game when parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the election, but also in the policy implemented after the contest. In spite of having discontinuous payoffs, this game, referred to as the hybrid election game, is shown to be payoff secure and reciprocally upper semi‐continuous. Conditional payoffs, however, are not quasi‐concave. Hence, the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (psne ) is ensured only if parties have homogenous interests in power. In that case, an equilibrium not only exists, but it is also unique. Instead, if parties have heterogeneous motivations, depending upon the relationship between the electoral uncertainty, the aggregate opportunism, and its distribution across parties, a psne may or may not exist. The mixed extension, however, is always better reply secure. Therefore, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium does indeed exist.     

Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition*

We consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique Bertrand–Nashequilibrium. The high‐price firm has a nonvanishing market share, however, and intuition suggests that observed prices may be positively related to this market share. This relationship is implied by a model in which players make noisy (logit) best responses to expected payoff differences. The resulting logit equilibrium model was used to design an experiment in which the high‐price firm's market share varies. The model accurately predicts the final‐period price averages. A naive learning model predicts the observed differences in the time paths of average prices.     

绿色产品：企业参与国际竞争的必然性选择

21世纪是绿色经济时代,企业要求发展,就应实施绿色战略,开发绿色产品。文章赍绿色产品的发展状况、绿色产品开发的意义及开发绿色产品的总体思路三方面作了分析和探讨。     

Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games

I explore the idea that people care about the justifiability of their decisions in the context of two-person extensive games. Each player justifies his strategy  s  with a belief  b  of the opponent's strategy, which is consistent with the play path and maximally plausible (according to some exogenous criterion). We say that  s  is justifiable if against the ex post criticism that some other strategy  s'  outperforms  s  against  b  , the player can argue that playing  s'  would have exposed him to similar criticism in the opposite direction. Under a simplicity-based plausibility criterion, this concept implies systematic departures from maximizing behaviour in familiar games.     

论APEC服务贸易的自由化进程——不完全竞争条件下的一般均衡分析

原文出处:本文译自作者于1997年9月向美国国际贸易委员会经济学办公室提交的工作论文:Liberalizing APEC Trade in Services:A General Equilibrium Analysis with Imperfect Competition一、引言(一)服务贸易服务业在每一个国家都是一个重要的行业,在大多数国家它都占到GDP的50%到80%。集体而言,由于服务业是几乎所有国家中最大的行业,所以,把服务业说成是其他行业生产中重要的中间投入也就不奇怪了。服务业还在国际贸易中起着日益重要的作用。虽然,在过去,服务曾经被认为是不可交易的,但现在,国际服务贸易已成为世界贸易中发展最快…     

Financing Higher Education: A General Equilibrium Public Choice Approach*

A public choice approach is used to examine the level of a tax-financed grant chosen by a cohort, allowing for a wide range of interdependencies, including the goverment's budget constraint The existence of an externality is necessary, but not sufficient, for support of a grant It is shown that a majority voting equilibrium exists. Comparative static analyses are carried out using a minimum of assumptions about the structure of the model An increase in government expenditure for non-higher education purposes is associated with an increase in the preferred grant while an increase in private returns to education reduces the grant     

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments

This paper investigates the impact of political lobbying on the choice of environmental policy instruments. It is argued that the prevalence of pollution emission standards over more efficient policy instruments may result from rent seeking behaviour. The model further predicts that when an emission standard is used to control pollution, rival political parties have an incentive to set the same standard. There is therefore a convergence of policies. Moreover, it is shown that emission taxes are more likely to be supported and proposed by political parties which represent environmental interest groups. This feature appears to accord with the observed support for environmental taxes by Green parties in Europe, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere.