Political hazards and entry modes of Chinese investments in Africa

Africa has achieved the fastest growth rate of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) recently. Yet heightened political hazards present substantial challenges to foreign firms in Africa. This study examines the entry strategies that firms may take to mitigate such hazards by exploring the relationship between political hazards and entry mode choices in Africa. We further consider how an investing firm’s host country experience and foreign aid provided by its home country government to host countries in Africa can influence this relationship. In a sample of listed Chinese firms’ investments in Africa from 2000 to 2014, we find that Chinese firms tend to use the joint venture mode when political hazards are high in an African country. This relationship is weakened when they accumulate host country experience and when the Chinese government’s foreign aid to an African country increases. Our findings point to firm-level strategies to mitigate political hazards as well as instruments available to home country governments to help their multinational firms operating in host countries characterized by unstable political environments.     

Institutional and resource configurations associated with different SME foreign market entry modes

This study explores the different configurations of internal and externally sourced resources utilized by SMEs, as well as host and home country institutional influences (hereafter abbreviated to ‘internal and external resources’, and ‘host and home country institutions’, respectively) across different foreign market entry modes in a B2B setting. Specifically, this research illustrates the different relative representations of internal vs external resources and host vs home institutions associated with different entry modes, including non-investment/contractual and early-stage investment modes. The different configurations resulting from our study are tentatively explained in the context of prevailing theoretical perspectives, namely, the resource-based view, institutional theory, and SME internationalization. Our research extends the existing literature on SME internationalization by identifying that different resource-institutional configurations are associated with different foreign market entry modes.     

Firm capabilities and technology ladders: sequential foreign direct investments of Japanese electronics firms in East Asia

This paper investigates how investments in capabilities offer platforms for the upgrading or downgrading of overseas subsidiaries' activities along a ‘technology ladder’ in response to macroeconomic changes. By analyzing panel data on Japanese electronic firms in East Asia from 1988 to 1994, the empirical results confirm the importance of capabilities at host country, parent company, and local subsidiary levels in sequential foreign investment decisions. The results show that subsidiary capabilities offset macroeconomic factors influencing location decisions of multinational corporations. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Acquisitions versus greenfield investments: international strategy and management of entry modes

This paper adds an important explanatory variable to the well‐established list of factors shown to influence the choice between foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments: the international strategy followed by the multinational company (MNC) in question. The MNC's international strategy is subsequently linked to the management of the two different entry modes by showing that differences in strategy are reflected in different headquarters—subsidiary relationships for acquisitions and greenfields. Some aspects of this relationship are also shown to change over time, a process that is mediated by the MNC's strategy. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Economies of scale,strategic advertising and fully credible entry deterrence

Recent work on entry deterrence has emphasized the distinction between a monopolist’s reversible and irreversible preentry strategic moves (e.g., limit pricing) will not credible deter a rational potential entrant. Dixit (1980) and other have demonstrated, however, that irreversible preentry capacity investments can result in credible deterrence. In this paper, we examine preentry advertising investments which irreversibly alter postentry demand conditions. Using an infinite horizon model, we show that preentry investments in advertising may result in credible deterrence even for the extreme case where an entrant expects a collusive postentry price, and the monopolist ceases all advertising at the moment of entry.     

JOINT VENTURE BUY‐OUTS UNDER UNCERTAINTY*

This paper provides a theory of joint venture buy‐outs in the presence of demand uncertainty. In an infinite horizon framework with demand uncertainty, we consider a foreign firm's decision on whether to form a joint venture or to open a fully owned subsidiary. Without the possibility of future share adjustment, the foreign firm enters the market through a joint venture if the host‐country firm helps to reduce the uncertainty significantly. Consequently, the firm enters at an earlier point in time compared to the situation in which opening a fully owned subsidiary is the only option to the firm. The possibility of future share adjustment in the joint venture further increases the incentive to speed up foreign investment. Although the possibility of share adjustment results in a joint venture buy‐out and can reduce the future profits of the host‐country firm, it may increase host‐country welfare by attracting foreign investment at an earlier point in time. We show the implications of learning in the joint venture.     

R&D investment decision and optimal subsidy

This article assumes that a firm facing technological uncertainty must decide whether to purchase R&D capital at each instant. R&D capital exhibits both irreversibility and externality through the learning‐by‐doing effect. The combination of irreversibility and uncertainty drives agents to be more prudent; the maxim 'better safe than sorry' applies. This maxim is more important if uncertainty is greater, technology progresses at a lower pace, the externality is stronger, or a catastrophic event is less likely to occur. A firm ignoring the externality will both invest later and disinvest earlier than a social planner who internalizes the externality. An equal rate of investment tax credits should be given to both costlessly reversible investments and irreversible ones, and the same rate of taxation should be imposed on disinvestment.     

OPTIMAL PRICING AND QUALITY CHOICE WHEN INVESTMENT IN QUALITY IS IRREVERSIBLE

This paper examines the price and quality choice of a single product, risk-neutral monopolist who can delay irreversible investments required for market entry. It is shown that the price and quality she chooses at entry increase with uncertainty about the size of future demand. In a Stackelberg leader-follower game, the leader and follower pre-commit immediately up to a certain level of uncertainty. In this case the leader produces the higher quality good. When uncertainty is higher than this threshold, the follower will wait and enter the market later with a higher quality good.     

Relational mechanisms,formal contracts,and local knowledge acquisition by international subsidiaries

This research focuses on relational and contractual mechanisms and examines their impact on foreign subsidiaries' acquisition of tacit and explicit knowledge from local suppliers. Using survey data from 168 foreign subsidiaries operating in China, this study finds broad support for the proposed analytical framework. When the foreign subsidiary and supplier share common goals, the foreign subsidiary acquires greater levels of both explicit and tacit knowledge; trust between the two parties promotes the acquisition of greater levels of tacit than explicit knowledge. However, access to the local supplier network through the focal supplier enables the foreign subsidiary to acquire greater levels of explicit but not tacit knowledge. Formal contracts play a complementary role in knowledge acquisition: contracts enhance the acquisition of explicit knowledge and further strengthen the effects of relational mechanisms on tacit and explicit knowledge acquisition. Overall, these findings provide important implications for foreign subsidiaries regarding how to acquire local knowledge in host countries through both formal and informal mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm non‐market capabilities and the effect of supranational institutional safeguards on the location choice of international investments

Research Summary : We investigate the extent to which firms rely on supranational institutional safeguards versus their non‐market capabilities to offset the risks of investing abroad. We argue that firms with non‐market capabilities are insensitive to supranational institutional safeguards when choosing the location of their international investments. We show that supranational agreements between an investor's home and host nation, operationalized as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), increase the likelihood of investment, but there is substantial firm heterogeneity with respect to this relationship. Firms with various forms of non‐market capabilities are not sensitive to BITs, whereas other firms are more likely to invest under BITs. We advance the understanding of how firm non‐market capabilities can substitute for supranational institutional arrangements in addressing risks associated with host country institutional weaknesses. Managerial Summary : The risk of expropriation is one of the main concerns companies have when investing abroad. Because of this, many countries implement bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to safeguard foreign investments, alleviate foreign investor concerns, and promote investments. We show that only those companies without political competence or political connections favor countries with BITs when choosing where to invest. Companies with political competence or political connections, on the other hand, ignore BITs and apparently rely on their ability to influence governments whenever their foreign investments face expropriation threats. As a result, politically connected or competent companies can enter markets most of their competitors lacking these capabilities shy away from. They can, therefore, do business in environments in which they face less competition.     

The effect of own-firm and other-firm experience on foreign direct investment survival in the United States, 1987–92

We argue that foreign firms operating in a host country generate information spillovers that have potential value for later foreign direct investment. We test two predictions. First, we expect foreign direct investments by firms with experience in a host country to be more likely to survive than investments made by first-time entrants. Second, foreign direct investments will be more likely to survive the greater the foreign presence in the target industry at the time of investment, subject to two contingencies. The first contingency is that the relationship will be weak or nonexistent among firms with no experience in the host country, because these firms have difficulty evaluating and taking advantage of the information spillovers. The second contingency is that the presence of other foreign firms will not affect investment survival among firms that already have a presence in the target industry and undertake expansion. These firms already possess general information about the target industries and are unlikely to gain additional benefit from information spillovers. We find supportive evidence based on the survival to 1992 among 354 U.S. investments undertaken by foreign firms in manufacturing industries during 1987. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of host country long term orientation on subsidiary ownership and survival

This paper examines the role which the long term orientation (LTO) dimension of host country culture plays in transforming multinational corporations’ (MNCs’) focus from transaction cost to transaction value in the context of MNC subsidiary ownership and survival. We used a sample of 10,236 overseas subsidiaries established by 1,291 Japanese MNCs in 29 host countries with varying levels of LTO to test our hypotheses. Results first showed that LTO has a direct positive effect on ownership levels. Second, we observed that there were positive interactions between LTO and cultural distance, and between LTO and geographic distance, on ownership levels. Third, we found that there were positive interactions between LTO and subsidiary ownership level, and between LTO and cultural distance, on subsidiary survival. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed in terms of the vital role LTO plays in determining whether transaction value or transaction cost considerations prevail in MNCs’ ownership strategies, and how MNCs can better take advantage of host country LTO and improve the survival likelihood of their subsidiaries.     

Ownership strategy of Japanese firms: transactional,institutional, and experience influences

We compare the effects of transactional, institutional, and experience influences on the ownership strategies of Japanese investors. Our theoretical development suggests that the equity position of a foreign investor should increase as the specificity of the assets transferred to the foreign affiliate increases, but a lower equity position should be assumed when the foreign investor requires complementary assets to establish a foreign entry. International experience and a strong institutional environment also should lead to increases in the equity position of the foreign investor. These relationships were tested with data on more than 1000 Japanese investments in nine countries of East and South‐East Asia. The results demonstrate that experience and institutional factors were the most important influences on the ownership position taken in the foreign investment, while transactional factors had a much less important and a more ambiguous role. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pricing policies of multinational enterprises : Host country regulation and welfare

This paper examines host country price-regulation policies towards a foreign subsidiary. The analysis considers two prices, namely the transfer prices charged to the subsidiary, and the market price of the subsidiary's products. It is shown that host countries should regulate both of these prices. Regulation of the transfer price alone may induce an increase in the subsidiary's market price and cause a loss of host country welfare. Regulation of both prices is more efficient for it enables the host country to attain a higher level of welfare and allows the foreign firm to earn the same level of profits as would regulation of only one of those prices.     

Shareholder valuation of foreign investment and expansion

This study analyzes when different foreign investment location choices are value creating for firms at different stages of international expansion. I argue that because direct investment in developing countries is riskier than in advanced countries, shareholders may not value a firm's investment in developing countries until that firm has experience from previous international investments and capabilities to better manage and hedge the higher levels of risk and uncertainty. Using a panel of 191 U.S. manufacturing firms and their foreign investments over a 20‐year period (1981–2000), the empirical results show that firm investments in advanced and developing countries are valued differently by shareholders, depending on the firm's prior international expansion, the firm's capabilities and experiences, and the knowledge intensity of the firm's industry. These results highlight the importance of considering firm location decisions, prior experiences, and resources when analyzing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of political events on Japanese foreign direct investments

This article presents the findings of an investigation of the impact of conflictive and cooperative political events in 62 host countries on Japanese foreign direct investments during the period 1965 to 1980. In addition, the study provides evidence of the relative importance of economic conditions and intergovernmental relationships as determinants of foreign direct investments by Japanese firms. It is argued that in analyzing the effect of political events on foreign direct investments, one must not only take into account the conflictive political conditions within the host countries, but also cooperative political developments and changes in intergovernmental relationships. The findings of this study are compared with the results of investigating the impact of political events on foreign direct investments by United States and German multinational firms. Similarities and differences are highlighted as well as their probable causes. As such, this study makes a contribution to the conceptualization of political risk in an international business context.Dr. Hans Schollhammer is Associate Professor and Chairman of the International Management Program, Graduate School of Management, UCLA; Dr. Douglas Nigh is Assistant Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State University, State College, Pennsylvania. The authors acknowledge with gratitude the financial support provided by the United States-Japan Friendship Commission for this research project.     

我国外资政策调整的影响分析与政策建议

改革开放以来,外商直接投资以空前的速度在我国发展起来,迄今为止,我国已成为世界上接受外商投资最多的国家之一。但是,由于许多国家竞相调整外资政策,向外国投资者提供更多优惠,各国之间的引资竞争日趋激烈,今后吸收外资的总体形势不容盲目乐观。本文回顾了我国外商投资的发展历程,分析了取消外资企业优惠政策可能带来的负面影响,并对外资政策的调整提供了一些政策建议。     

Political capabilities,policy risk,and international investment strategy: evidence from the global electric power generation industry

Whereas conventional wisdom holds that multinational enterprises (MNEs) invest less in host countries that pose greater policy risk—the risk that a government will opportunistically alter policies to expropriate an investing firm's profits or assets—we argue that MNEs vary in their response to host‐country policy risk as a result of differences in organizational capabilities for assessing such risk and managing the policy‐making process. We hypothesize that firms from home countries characterized by weaker institutional constraints on policy makers or greater redistributive pressures associated with political rent seeking will be less sensitive to host‐country policy risk in their international expansion strategies. Moreover, firms from home countries characterized by sufficiently weak institutional constraints or sufficiently strong redistributive pressures will seek out riskier host countries for their international investments to leverage their political capabilities, which permit them to attain and defend attractive positions or industry structures. We find support for our hypotheses in a statistical analysis of the foreign direct investment location choices of MNEs in the electric power generation industry during the period 1990–1999, the industry's first decade of internationalization. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Formal governance mechanisms, relational governance mechanisms, and transaction-specific investments in supplier-manufacturer relationships

This study addresses the question of how to design governance mechanisms so that local suppliers are encouraged to make transaction-specific investments in foreign manufacturing firms. Suppliers' transaction-specific investments can increase the efficiency of production for foreign manufacturing firms operating in a host country. However, it can be difficult to induce suppliers to make specialized investments, because of the numerous hazards associated with such investments. Basing its conclusions on the results of a survey of Taiwanese firms using Chinese suppliers, this study examines the effectiveness of both formal governance mechanisms (i.e., contractual agreements and financial commitments) and relational governance mechanisms (i.e., calculative and benevolent trust) in inducing suppliers to make specialized investments. We find that both formal governance and relational governance mechanisms affect suppliers' tendencies to make specialized investments. Additionally, we find that calculative trust acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and transaction-specific investments.     

MNC foreign investment and industrial disasters: The moderating role of technological,safety management,and philanthropic capabilities

Research Summary: We investigate how industrial disasters can discourage FDI and how MNCs' technological, safety management, and philanthropic capabilities can moderate these effects. Using two unique panel data sets of entry and expansion of U.S. wholly‐owned manufacturing subsidiaries overseas, we found that industrial disasters are associated with reduced foreign entry of wholly‐owned subsidiaries in the disaster industry, but not for all firms in the host country experiencing the disaster. We also found that MNCs' technological, safety management, and philanthropic capabilities can, in some cases, positively moderate the negative relationships between industrial disasters and the foreign entry and expansion of wholly‐owned subsidiaries. Additionally, three‐way interactions with government stability suggest that technological and safety management capabilities substitute government stability in managing industrial disasters, while philanthropic capability complements government stability. Managerial Summary: How can MNCs' technological, safety management, and philanthropic capabilities overcome the effects of industrial disasters such as chemical spills and explosions in host countries? Our results show that industrial disasters are associated with reduced foreign entry of wholly‐owned subsidiaries in the industry in which the industrial disaster occurs, but not for other firms operating in the country experiencing the disaster. However, an MNC's technological capability can, in general, lower the negative consequences of industrial disasters in both the entry and expansion of its wholly‐owned subsidiaries. Regarding the institutional quality of a host country, the results imply that MNCs should develop philanthropic capability when the government stability of the host country is strong, and develop technological and safety management capabilities when the government stability is weak.