高校教师个人所得税的纳税筹划

随着高校教师收入水平的不断提升,国家税务总局明确提出将高等院校作为个人所得税征管的重点。高等院校应根据高校教师收入的特点,设计合理的薪酬体系、福利制度,在合理合法的限度内尽可能降低高校教师的税收负担。本文简要阐述了高校教师收入及其薪酬体系的基本情况,在此基础上提出了高校教师个人所得税纳税筹划的途径,希望能在一定程度上降低高校教师的税收负担。     

Observable Contracts as Commitments: Interdependent Contracts and Moral Hazard

A large literature examines the use of observable and unrenegotiable agency contracts as commitments. These analyses generally impose an ad hoc restriction that contracts cannot be contingent on one another. I relax this restriction and obtain a folk theorem. Unlike earlier folk theorems in this area, the present result applies to agency relationships that have hidden-action problems. Using an example, I also demonstrate that there are settings in which interdependent contracts support a strictly larger set of equilibrium outcomes than do independent contracts. The result highlights the critical need for careful thought about restrictions placed on the set of feasible contracts.     

Contracts with Wishful Thinkers

In a setting with a wishful thinking agent and a realistic principal, the paper studies how incentive contracts should be designed to control for both moral hazard and self‐deception. The properties of the contract that reconcile the agent with reality depend on the weight the agent attaches to anticipatory utility. When this is small, principal and agent agree on full recollection. For intermediate values the principal bears an extra cost to make the agent recall bad news. For large weights, the principal gives up on inducing signal recollection. We also extend the analysis to the case in which the parameter of anticipatory utility is private information.     

Contracts and on-the-job search

The paper studies a matching model with on-the-job search, transferable utility and heterogeneous agents. Matched agents can set the conditions under which a given match can be dissolved. It is shown that matched agents use sign-off fees to extract all capital gains from trade when a third agent is contacted. In equilibrium, this redistributes wealth towards less able individuals, reduces the likelihood that any given match will be rejected and, given the conditions, it yields efficiency. Although externalities arise when a match is formed and when turnover occurs, the decentralized outcome is efficient when the production function is sub-modular and the difference in abilities is big enough. The results obtained may provide theoretical support for the type of contracts used in some markets, such as sports markets.     

The Use of Forward Contracts for Hedging Currency Risk

This paper derives an optimal rule for hedging currency risk in a general utility framework. Ex ante hedging performance of the forward markets is examined using the optimal hedge ratio derived from the utility model and an optimal rule derived from another model (excess return per unit risk) suggested in the hedging literature. Results of this study indicate a naive (one-to-one) hedge performs similarly to the optimal hedge ratios under either model. An implication of this study is that financial managers of multinational firms should simply follow a one-to-one rule when hedging foreign exchange risk in the forward markets.     

Optimal Debt Contracts with Renegotiation

This paper sutudies the role of debt in committing a seller not to trade at a low price. We consider a discrete-time finite-horizon buyer–seller relationship. The seller makes an upfront relationship-specific investment, which is financed with debt. Debt then is repaid gradually to mitigate the hold-up risk. Even though debt is renegotiable, under the assumption that with a small probability renegotiation may fail and may lead to inefficient liquidation, debt still can be used as a commitment device. We solve for renegotiation proof dynamic debt contracts that are optimal for the seller and show that debt is repaid over the entire course of the relationship with declining repayments .     

Interim Information in Long-Term Contracts

We study how long-term contracts condition on a natural flow of information that reduces asymmetric information over time. If such interim information is verifiable, optimal contracts achieve the first best. Under nonverifiability, the optimal contract depends on the signal's accuracy and timing. Introducing signal manipulation as a parameterization of verifiability reveals a trade-off between accuracy and manipulability. Signals that are accurate, received early, or hard to manipulate enable the principal to extract all rents and adjust allocations closer to the first best. Imprecise, late, and manipulable signals affect only future allocations and leave rents to efficient types.     

All-Units Discounts in Retail Contracts

All-units discounts in retail contracts refer to discounts that lower a retailer's wholesale price on every unit purchased when the retailer's purchases equal or exceed some quantity threshold. These discounts pose a challenge to economic theory because it is difficult to understand why a manufacturer ever would charge less for a larger order if its intentions were benign. In this paper, we show that all-units discounts may profitably arise absent any exclusionary motive. All-units discounts eliminate double marginalization in a complete information setting, and they extract more profit than would a menu of two-part tariffs in the standard incomplete information setting with two types of buyers. All-units discounts may improve or may reduce welfare (relative to menus of two-part tariffs) depending on demand parameters .     

Termination Clauses in Long-Term Contracts

Many long-term contracts incorporate a termination clause. This paper argues that when agents have hidden information, such a clause has a beneficial incentive effect—it enables a principal to screen agents' private information at a lower cost. In a two-period model, this paper characterizes the optimal long-term contract with a termination clause, which specifies that the principal will switch agents in the second period when the first-period cost is high. The analysis delineates how the optimality of this clause depends on the intertemporal cost correlation structure, on the limits to agents' liability, and on the principal's degree of commitment.     

Optimal Contracts for Long-Term Decisions and the Threat of Dismissal

This paper studies a simple agency model where an agent's decision can affect his or her own future payoffs as well as the principal's. The threat of dismissal becomes an important part of an incentive scheme even if the principal can use the performance-based wage contract. However, if the agent's future payoffs depend on the past realized performance, but not on the past decision directly, or if the agent is risk-neutral, it is not optimal to use the threat of dismissal. As the agent's discretion over his future payoffs increases, the principal relies more on the threat of dismissal but less on the wage contract.     

新版《劳动合同法》大讨论（上）

一项事关劳动者权益的法律草案——《劳动合同法(草案)》在4月24日至27日期间,被第三次提交全国人大常委会审议。草案在去年3月曾向全社会公开征求意见,一个月内立法机关收到19万多件意见,关于法律天平在劳动者和用工单位之间如何权衡取舍,曾引发激烈争论。这些声音来自劳动者和企业对切身权益的维护,其反映出的观点和问题可以帮助立法者更完善法律的各个方面。为此,本刊组织了一场关于《中华人民共和国劳动合同法(草案)》的讨论会。     

Market-Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information

In this paper, a dominant firm and competitive fringe supply substitute goods to a retailer who has private information about demand. We show that it is profitable for the dominant firm to condition payment on how much the retailer buys from the fringe (market-share contracts). The dominant firm thereby creates countervailing incentives for the retailer and, in some cases, is able to obtain the full-information outcome (unlike in standard screening models, where the agent earns an information rent in the high-demand state and output is distorted in the low-demand state). Our results have implications for fidelity rebates, all-units discounts, and competition policy. Although some crowding out of the fringe may occur when demand is low, we show that market-share contracts need not be harmful for welfare.     

Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure

A model of vertical integration is studied. Upstream firms sell differentiated inputs; downstream firms bundle them to make final products. Downstream products are sold as option contracts, which allow consumers to choose from a set of commodities at predetermined prices. The model is illustrated by examples in telecommunication and health markets. Equilibria of the integration game must result in upstream input foreclosure and downstream monopolization. Consumers may or may not benefit from integration.     

Limited Liability and Bonus Contracts

This paper studies the nature of incentive contracts between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent under the constraint that the agent's liability is limited. A necessary and sufficient condition is derived for the existence of a first-best contract under this constraint, and a bonus-based contract is shown to be the most efficient contractual form. Implications of bonus contracts are also discussed.     

浅议物资采购合同的审查

工程院校物资管理专业的毕业生走上工作岗位后,经常面临审查物资采购合同这样的真实任务。本文主要从合同审查的意义,内容和注意事项等几个方面进行阐述,以期对读者有所帮助。     

Option Contracts in Supply Chains

This paper considers optimal contracts in supply chains that consist of   n ≥ 2  firms and face a potential investment hold-up problem. We show that option contracts may solve the incentive problems. First, we provide case-study evidence for the use of option contracts in the semiconductor industry. As our second contribution, we generalize the earlier option contract approach by introducing continuous quantities. Third, we extend the setting to n parties. For long supply chains, the first-best allocation can be achieved if there is a particular order of renegotiations .