SMOKE-FREE LAWS AND EMPLOYEE TURNOVER

This study examines how smoke-free laws influence turnover among restaurant workers. The study uses a unique data set of payroll records of a franchisee of a national full-service restaurant chain operating 23 restaurants in the state of Arizona, a state where several communities have adopted smoke-free laws. Municipal smoke-free laws did not, on average, have a statistically significant effect on the probability of employee separation in the years after implementation. These results suggest that training costs associated with employee turnover would not rise for full-service restaurants in municipalities that adopt smoke-free laws. ( JEL I18, J63)     

INVENTORY ACCOUNTING AND PROFIT EVALUATION

In an inventory model with exogenous sales, FIFO and LIFO criteria are formalized and compared with national account estimates for intermediate and finished good products. The model is simulated by utilizing manufacturing input and output prices for Italy (1970–88). LIFO and national account estimates of inventory are usually close and also imply reliable measures of output level and changes which can be shown by solving the quantity model. Conversely, FIFO exhibits larger profits and leads in real terms to unsatisfactory estimates of output changes.     

SALES MAXIMIZATION AND PROFIT MAXIMIZATION: A NOTE ON THE DECISION OF A SALES MAXIMIZER TO THE INCREASE OF PER UNIT COST

Abstract.  In this paper, the authors compare the behaviours of a sales revenue maximizer with that of a profit maximizer in their response to an increase of the per unit production cost or a per unit tax being imposed. A common mistake in currently used textbooks is pointed out, and a new proposition is proposed for replacing a false statement there.     

PROFIT SHARING AND EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Various arguments extol public encouragement of profit sharing and Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). Generally, advocates of public intervention cite externalities (market failure), provision of merit goods, or social transformation as bases for their arguments. To the extent that profit sharing and ESOPs increase productivity or reduce employer costs, no case exists for public intervention, since such advantages are internalized. Although Congress views retirement saving as a merit good, deferred profit sharing and ESOPs are no more deserving of public subsidy on that basis than are other forms of saving, such as pensions. Finally, the notion that ESOPs promote a social transformation by redistributing equity is untenable. One can make a case for government efforts to spread data and information about these plans. The potential macro stabilizing effects of profit sharing—but not ESOPs—provide a rationale for a tax subsidy to the former.     

文化要素与经济增长

狭义地说,文化是世代相传下来的、规则化的"惯例",以及一套价值观念和相应伦理规范的"信仰"。关于文化对经济增长的作用机制,大致可以从三个方面给出初步解释:文化要素影响企业家职业选择和企业管理者选择机制,影响企业层次生产率,进而影响总生产率和经济增长;文化作为知识资产,以其特有的方式进入总生产函数,决定了经济增长率和增长路径;经济和文化的共生演进,将成为服务经济时代的典型化事实,并影响经济增长方式和经济竞争方式。     

PROFIT SHIFTING AND TRADE AGREEMENTS IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS*

Do new rationales for trade agreements arise once imperfectly competitive markets are allowed? We consider several trade models that feature imperfectly competitive markets and argue that the basic rationale for a trade agreement is, in fact, the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive markets. In all of the models that we consider, and whether or not governments have political–economic objectives, the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the inefficient terms‐of‐trade‐driven restrictions in trade volume. We also show that the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination continue to be efficiency enhancing in these settings.     

SUNK COSTS AND PROFIT TAXATION: A SOURCE OF TAX NON-NEUTRALITY

This Paper uses a two-period Von Stackelberg model to study the effects of profit taxation on the behaviour of a monopolist, when the entry of a potential competitor is threatened. A barrier to entry, consisting of a sunk cost, is assumed. If the potential competitor decides to enter, thus making a loss, deduction is allowed in the following period. This model shows that these tax deductions can make profit taxation be distortive.     

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR PROFIT SHARING, GAINSHARING, ESOPs, AND TQM

Empirical evidence suggests that profit sharing, gainsharing, employee ownership, worker participation, and Total Quality Management (TQM) may increase productivity and firm performance. Nevertheless, one needs to ground the case for government intervention in support of each of these programs on arguments concerning externalities or merit goods. This paper argues that no one yet has offered a convincing case of this nature. It also discusses the U.S. government's support for ESOPs and suggests reasons for its disappointing results in the hope that future policy experiments will not repeat these mistakes.     

NON‐UNIFORM STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND AGGREGATE PROFIT CREATION EFFECT

This paper illustrates a new theoretical case for a strategic R&D policy in a two‐country third‐market international oligopoly model. Asymmetric treatment of domestic firms through a non‐uniform R&D policy can create aggregate profits without a foreign retaliation concern and further improve national welfare in addition to what a uniform policy accomplishes. This effect occurs when the conventional Brander–Spencer incentive is entirely absent as well as when the uniformly optimal R&D policy initially prevailed. The superiority of non‐uniform policy to uniform‐policy is not guaranteed, however, when the number of firms becomes endogenous.     

PROFIT TAX AND FIRM MOBILITY IN A THREE‐COUNTRY MODEL

We construct a three‐country model that incorporates international relocation by imperfectly competitive firms and examine both the effects of each country's profit tax reduction on the consumption and welfare of all countries, and the incentive for the countries to decrease the profit tax. In such a model, both the terms of trade and international relocation of firms offer the key to understanding the impacts of one country's profit tax policy. In particular, we note that the relocation of firms from the other two countries is positively related to the wage incomes of the third country through a shift in labour demand, and the terms‐of‐trade improvement is not only positively related to the wage incomes, but also negatively related to profit incomes through a shift in world consumption demand. We show that (i) in a three‐country world economy, regardless of the reduction's source, the profit tax reduction of each country leads to relocation of firms away from foreign countries toward its own economy and deteriorates the terms of trade of its economy and (ii) this becomes a ‘beggar‐thy‐neighbour’ policy in the sense that it lowers the welfare of the other foreign countries.