Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines

The recently issued revision of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, like its predecessors and mirrored by similar guidelines throughout the world, devotes substantial attention to the market definition process and the implications of market shares in the market that is selected. Nevertheless, some controversy concerning the revised Guidelines questions their increased openness toward more direct, economically based methods of predicting the competitive effects of mergers. By contrast, this article suggests that, as a matter of economic logic, the Guidelines revision can only be criticized for its timidity. Indeed, economic principles unambiguously favor elimination of the market definition process altogether.     

Geographic Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: A Retrospective Analysis

Since the initial Merger Guidelines in 1968, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have revised their merger enforcement screen over the course of six versions. This article examines the evolution of the geographic market component of the Guidelines and the economic implications of changing standards of market delineation on merger enforcement. Using an illustration from the beer industry, we chronicle the development of geographic market definition and its varying effects on merger enforcement over the past 50 years.     

Antitrust Versus Regulatory Merger Review: The Case of Electricity

This paper focuses on the implications of multi-agency review of electricity mergers. It highlights fundamental differences between regulatory and antitrust merger enforcement procedures–ranging from standards of review to data collection, economic analysis, and remedies. Such disparities potentially introduce costly and potentially conflicting redundancy into the merger review process. Illustrative examples are drawn from a number of cases, including apparent inconsistencies across applicant-filed analyses in FERC merger cases. Absent the delegation of competition analysis to the antitrust agencies, the paper makes the case for harmonizing review across regulators and antitrust enforcers.     

转运与电力市场运营模式浅析

在电力市场商业化运营中确定输电价格时,需要把转运与电力市场运营模式之间的关系弄清楚。为此,该文根据中国的实际国情,运用经济学的市场竞争理论,分析了转运与电力市场运营模式之间的关系,并对中国电力市场的目标和实现过程进行了预测,有利于指导对输电价格方面的研究。     

审计市场中的合并、产业专用化投资和价格竞争

本文从产业组织的角度，分析了审计市场的合并、产业专用化和价格竞争等竞争行为，并进一步探讨了这些行为对审计质量和社会福利的影响。本文认为，审计质量的信号传递机制推动了产业中的合并行为，而审计产业的专用化投资行为在于策略性地阻止进入。由于审计产品的异质性、信任品特性以及强大的买方谈判能力使得审计市场存在激烈的价格竞争，而合并和产业专用化投资有助于事务所降低成本。因而，审计市场的竞争提高了社会福利。     

浅析居民生活用电市场de开拓

我国电力买方市场的形成,使各电力公司迫切需要解决同样一个问题,即如何开发电力市场,电力营销因而提上日程。居民生活用电市场在整个电力市场中占有举足轻重的地位,其重要性日益增强,本文通过分析研究开发居民生活用电市场的必要性及其影响需求的因素,提出了开拓这一电力市场的若干途径与措施。     

多经企业:从电力的走向市场的--以云南滇能集团(控股)公司为例

云南电力集团有限公司(以下称云电集团)基于自身的内部资源和外部条件,经过战略思考,广泛论证,于2001年开始正式实施二次创业发展战略。主业增长和有限相关多元化发展是这一战略的基本内容。本文将通过对云南滇能集团(控股)有限公司(以下称滇能集团)发展历程的回顾,探讨在新的电力体制格局下,电力企业开展多元化经营的基本取向。滇能集团是依托云电集团原有多经企业由职工持股会控股组建的,成立的初衷就是整合资源,组建龙头企业,形成合力,实现产业化、规模化发展,全面提升传统电力企业多种产业的整体素质和市场竞争力。经过三年多的快速发展…     

Economics at the FTC: Deceptive Claims,Market Definition,and Patent Assertion Entities

In 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposed common carriage regulation—so-called Title II requirements—on previously unregulated broadband Internet service providers. The regime shift was premised on the FCC’s findings that such rules had demonstrably yielded economic gains. This paper evaluates the FCC’s empirical arguments and finds them uncompelling. Adjustments for inflation or general economic trends eliminate the effects cited by the FCC. Moreover, contrary to the Commission’s assessment, mobile services and broadband markets have shown notable growth in response to deregulatory events that reduce Title II requirements.     

Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: Monopoly Cases and Alternative Approaches

Despite the well-known Cellophane fallacy, the Merger Guidelines' market-delineation paradigm, which examines the effects of price increases above the prevailing level, has substantial utility in many monopoly cases. For monopoly cases in which the Guidelines' approach is not appropriate due to the Cellophane fallacy, no modification of that approach appears to solve the problem is a useful way. More direct methods for assessing monopoly power are likely to be preferable to structural analysis in many monopoly and merger cases.     

电价改革与市场风险防范

■改革开放以来我国电力工业的发展,电价改革功不可没。■电价改革必须从国情出发,因地、因网制宜。■电价改革必须把发、输、配、售四个环节统筹考虑,避免顾此失彼。■发电市场竞价模式的设立,要保证发电市场拥有必要的备用容量。■完善输配电价格机制,要保证电网建设具有一定的安全裕度。■要建立终端销售电价与发电市场价格的联动机制。■重视对专项服务价格和辅助服务价格的研究。     

电监会：法规建设与独立性——中国电力监管国际研讨会观点综述

一、关于法律法规建设完善的法律法规是有效监管的前提和基础。与会专家普遍认为,中国原有的电力法律法规是在国有国营的国家垄断体制和计划经济条件下形成的,社会目标的实现(如普遍服务等)和各类经济关系的确立,基本上依靠政府行政协调的力量,而不是依靠法律进行规范和约束。从法律法规制定的情况看,立法理念主要是为了保证国家电力设施及系统的安全,而不是为了规范产业中各主体的行为。随着政企分开、厂网分开和引入竞争机制,现有的法律基础已经发生了较大变化,相当多的法律条款已不适应新情况、新形势的需要,还有很多领域存在法律空白,必…     

电力市场中市场操纵力的成因及对策

在对目前我国发电侧电力市场类型进行判断的基础上,分析了电力市场中产生市场操纵力的原因,给出了市场操纵力的判别指标,提出了降低市场操纵力的措施,对于总结电力市场试点工作、设计未来的电力市场结构和市场规则具有普遍的指导意义。     

Mixed Oligopoly and Market Power Mitigation: Evidence from the Colombian Wholesale Electricity Market*

Using information on price bids in wholesale electricity pools and empirical techniques described in the literature on electricity markets, this study identifies the market power mitigation effect of public firms in the Colombian market. The results suggest that while private firms exercise less market power than is predicted by a profit-maximization model, there are marked differences between private and public firms in their exercise of unilateral market power. These findings support the hypothesis of the market power mitigation effect of public firms.     

Effect of Merger on Market Price and Product Quality: American and US Airways

Review of Industrial Organization - In this paper, I analyze the effect of the merger between American Airlines (AA) and US Airways (US) on market price and product quality. I use...     

The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales

In England and Wales, wholesale electricity is sold in a spot market partly covered by long-term contracts which hedge the spot price. Two dominant conventional generators can raise spot prices well above marginal costs, and this is profitable in the absence of contracts. If fully hedged, however, the generators lose their incentive to raise prices above marginal costs. Competition in the contract market could lead the generators to sell contracts for much of their output. Since privatisation the generators have indeed covered most of their sales in the contract market.     

Electricity Market Monitoring and the Economics of Regulation

Restructuring of wholesale electricity markets in the U.S. has brought new institutions known as Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) and Market Monitoring Institutions (MMI) that oversee competition in the energy markets that they operate. Both regulators and external observers have viewed MMIs as impartial observers intended to police these exchanges against the exercise of market power. The economics of regulation generally questions (but does not always reject) public interest interpretations on grounds that interest groups use politics and regulatory procedure to shape institutions to their advantage. MMIs in fact originated as a strategic move by California’s large utilities in connection with that state’s restructuring, intended to advantage them against competitors. The responses of MMIs to the economically efficient practice of “virtual bidding” in RTOs differed with the relative strengths of different interests in the governance of those organizations. As policy, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should re-examine its endorsement of MMIs and consider centralizing their functions.     

The European Single Market in Electricity: An Economic Assessment

The European single market in electricity has been promoted vigorously by the European Commission since 1996. We discuss how national electricity markets and cross-border electricity markets have been reshaped by the process. We examine the Commission’s own work on evaluating the benefits of the single market. We look at the wider evidence of impact on prices, security of supply, the environment, and innovation. We conclude that the institutional changes are extensive and there has been significant market harmonisation and integration. However, the measured benefits are difficult to identify, but likely to be small. This is partly because over the same period there has been a large rise in subsidised renewable generation that is driven by the decarbonisation agenda.

     

An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry

Using historical cost data, we simulate the California electricity market after deregulation as a static Cournot market with a competitive fringe. Our model indicates that, under the pre-deregulation structure of generation ownership, there is potential for significant market power in high demand hours, particularly in the fall and early winter months when hydroelectric output is at its lowest level relative to demand. The results also show that two of the most important factors in determining the extent and severity of market power are the level of available hydroelectric production and the elasticity of demand.     

实施多种营销策略 扩大电力市场占有率

供电企业营销的4项重点工作是增加销售电量、合理合法执行电价、及时回收电费和加强供电服务,其中增加销售电量扩大市场占有率最为关键。分析了当前制约销售电量增加的主要因素,提出了扩大市场占有率的多种营销策略和途径。     

区域电力市场:电改攻坚战--"打破垄断与区域电力市场建立模式研讨会"发言摘编

编者按：3月22日，本刊与《中国改革》杂志联合主办了“打破垄断与区域电力市场建立模式研讨会”。