On the efficiency of markets for managers

Summary. This paper examines the efficiency of the outside labor market in inducing optimal managerial behavior in the presence of learning. It shows that the incentives provided by the market can be more efficient than the original analysis of Holmstr?m [6] would suggest. Moreover, under a mild additional assumption, the existence of an -efficient equilibrium can be guaranteed if a manager is patient. This result supports Fama's [4] original idea that the outside labor market can be efficient in disciplining top managers. These results also suggest that the empirically documented low levels of explicit incentives for managers might be due to the presence of implicit incentives provided by the outside market. Received: March 18, 1997; revised version: April 19, 2000     

Imperfectly competitive factor markets and price normalization

A two-sector general equilibrium model with imperfectly competitive labor markets is set up. Noncooperative equilibria with wage setting at the sectoral level are shown to depend on the choice of price-normalization rule even though all agents behave fully rationally. Hence, imposing rationality is not sufficient to deprive the choice of price-normalization rule of its importance. It is argued that the importance of the choice of price-normalization rule may follow from the strategic interaction of agents and not from imperfectness of competition per se, and some examples are provided.     

Allowing communities to trade in imperfectly competitive pollution-permit markets

Citizens and organizations representing them play an increasingly important role in markets for environmental quality, but much remains to be learned about how their participation affects these markets. We analyze the effects of allowing a community of citizens to trade pollution permits in an imperfectly competitive permit market. Allowing the community to trade directly reveals its preferences, which enhances welfare. However, community participation may also exacerbate distortions due to market power, even though the community itself trades competitively. Including the community in permit distribution may exacerbate market power distortions by affecting a dominant trader’s propensity to participate in the permit market. Second, the community’s demand/supply for permits may be more inelastic than other traders and worsen distortions due to market power. We illustrate in an example that these negative effects on competition can dominate the positive effect from preference revelation through the market place.      

Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets

Conventionally, rent-seeking activities have been considered to deteriorate social welfare and to distort resource allocation. This paper examines whether rent-seeking behavior can improve social welfare by focusing on the welfare effects of firms’ competitive lobbying efforts when governments can impose market entry regulation against foreign firms. We demonstrate that competitive lobbying efforts can improve social welfare when such lobbying efforts are directed to reduce market entry barriers. In addition, social welfare can be maximized when the government shows the maximum sensitivity to the foreign firm's political contributions while maintaining competitive market structure. Moreover, it is shown that the dominant strategy for a domestic firm is to allocate more resources to R&D sectors while it is optimal for foreign firms is to exert more efforts in lobbying to reduce the market entry barriers when a government makes political economic approach in market entry regulations.     

The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information

This paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information. Using the definition of second-best efficiency proposed by Harris and Townsend (1981) for environments characterized by informational assmmetry, the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined. We find an analogue to the First Optimality Theorem: A Miyazaki-Wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation.     

德班致力实现最佳运行

２０世纪９０年代,南非社会经历了快速的变化。独裁专制体制迅速垮台,取而代之的是基于广泛民主的社会架构。尽管专制时代的一些残余依然存在,但是民主潮流浩浩荡荡,势不可挡。 民主体制已经在地方政府这一层次上得到确认。经过民主选举的负责任的市政会已经开始运作。所有的政府职员都以发展的方式服务于社会,而不是象过去那样只有少数选民才能享受到服务。变革不仅表现在种族歧视制度向非种族歧视制度的转变,而且表现在政府传统职能的转变。以往,政府的职能主要集中在两个方面,一是提供服务,特别是诸如电力、自来水、环境卫生、…     

Best Practice In Durban

During the 1990's South African society experienced a period of rapid transformation. Authoritarian, exclusivist structures and practices have comecrashing down, only to be replaced by social formations based on democratic and inclusivist principles. Whilst the remnants of the past still remain,in general terms an irreversible transition to democracy has occurred.This has certainly been so at the level of local government where democratically elected and accountable local councils have been p…     

Bargaining and markets: complexity and the competitive outcome

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 63-78) consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade. They show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome. Here, I consider Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences, together with the standard payoff in the game, then every equilibrium is stationary/Markov and induces the unique competitive price. Thus, I demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome.     

The competitive nature of the Arab Middle Eastern banking markets

The competitive nature of the Arab Middle Eastern (AME) banking markets during the 1990s is the focus subject of this study. Using banks data from nine AME countries, and utilizing the so-called Rosse-Panzar test to quantitatively appraise the dominant competitive conditions in these markets between 1993–97, this study concluded that banking markets have been operating in the region under conditions of monopolistic competition. An important finding revealed by this study is that in the AME region, where two distinct economic spectrums dominate the markets, banking sector in the oil-producing countries (Gulf States) appears to be less competitive than its counterpart in non-oil countries. The authors would like to convey special thanks to the Vicerrectorado de Investigacin of UNED University, which provided financial support to publish this article, as a result of a presentation at the IAES Conference held in Athens in 2001.     

Information acquisition and welfare effect in a model of competitive financial markets

We analyze welfare effect of information acquisition for a model of competitive financial markets with diverse information and rational expectations. We show that in the fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, each agent’s gain from trade in ex ante utility decreases as more agents become informed. An implication of the result is that market efficiency and ex ante Pareto optimality are not compatible in competitive financial markets with diverse information and rational expectations. Our result can be viewed as complementary to the Grossman paradox, which shows that market efficiency and individuals’ incentives to acquire information are not compatible. This paper is the first step in a projected exploration of welfare effect of information acquisition in models with diverse information.     

Sustainable Tourism:Best Practice in Water Management

On the occasion of“World Water Day 2007”,“Water,the challenge of the century”was said by Jaques Diouf,director general of Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO)...     

Tax and subsidy incidence equivalence theories: experimental evidence from competitive markets

A basic tenet in microeconomics is tax incidence equivalence, which holds that the burden of a unit tax on buyers and sellers is independent of who actually pays the tax. By contrast, policymakers and the public often mistake statutory incidence for economic incidence. Using competitive laboratory markets, I test both tax incidence equivalence and an analogous theorem for subsidies. For sufficiently large markets, the results show strong support for both theories; there is little to no evidence, even in the short run, of the popular misperception that statutory incidence equals economic incidence. In smaller markets in which competitive forces are weaker and relative bargaining strengths may play a role, the evidence for tax incidence equivalence is weaker as minor price discrepancies may persist between markets.     

Assessing the relationship between the user-based market share and unit sales-based market share for pirated software brands in competitive markets

This article argues that in a competitive software market, in the presence of differential piracy and brand switching among the various brands within a software product category (e.g., spreadsheets), there may be no relationship between market estimates based on unit sales and the user base of a software brand (e.g., Lotus 1-2-3). Hence, marketing strategies developed for the software brand based on unit sales-based market share may be misleading. To support our argument and to quantify the relationship between unit sales-based market share and the user-based market share, we first extend a diffusion modeling approach for pirated software product categories to model the legal and illegal adoption dynamics of a software brand within a software product category. Second, to examine empirically the relationship between the user-based market share and the unit sales-based market share for a brand, we consider the diffusion of the major brands of two types of software product categories, spreadsheets and word processors, in the United Kingdom. Results indicate that in the product category of spreadsheets, for Lotus 1-2-3, the user-based market share was always less than the unit sales-based market share. On the other hand, in the product category of word processing software, the user-based market share for WordPerfect was always greater than the unit sales-based market share. Marketing implications of these results for Lotus spreadsheets, Novell WordPerfect, and the software industry are discussed.     

Empirical evidence for trends in capital markets

The random walk hypothesis of price formation in capital markets is tested against a price-trend hypothesis, using a new test statistic. Empirical results prove that commodity and currency prices are not random but exhibit price-trend behaviour.     

Stochastic stability for roommate markets

We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts have been proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core). An important implication of our results is that the set of absorbing matchings is the only solution concept that is core consistent and shares the stochastic stability characteristic with the core.     

Matching and bargaining models of markets: approximating small markets by large markets

Summary. We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: September 24, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

Subsidies for renewable energy in inflexible power markets

This paper analyses how short-term operational efficiency and the \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions of a power system depend on different subsidies for wind power and on the flexibility of the power system. This is analysed in the framework of a numerical power market model, calibrated to Danish data, where the start-up costs and other constraints in fossil-fuelled power plants are taken into account. The main conclusion is that flexibility is crucial for the costs of integrating wind power in an existing system. If thermal power plants are inflexible, subsidies for wind power should strive to increase the flexibility of the market by passing market signals to wind power. A subsidy that conceals market signals from wind power producers (a production subsidy) or disconnects wind power incentives from the market signals altogether (a fixed price) increases costs considerably. An inflexible power system should aim to introduce optimal subsidies (an investment subsidy) instead of production subsidies or a fixed price. The design of the subsidy scheme should take into account both the characteristics of the existing system and the characteristics of renewables.     

A model for international capital markets closure in an economy with incomplete markets and short sales

Using a two-country dynamic optimization model, we investigate the impact of exchange risk, incomplete information and short sales constraints on international portfolio decisions around market closure. Using optimal control theory, we provide solutions and simulation results. Our model can be applied to solve several problems in financial economics in the presence of market closure, information asymmetry and short sales constraints.