Founder management and the market for corporate control for IPO firms: The moderating effect of the power structure of the firm

This study draws on agency and stewardship theory to evaluate the relationship between alternative governance regimes (founder versus non-founder CEO) adopted at the time of going public on post-IPO economic outcomes in the market for corporate control. We find that the presence of founder CEOs reduces the likelihood of post-IPO change of control but enhances target IPO firm wealth by increasing acquisition premiums. Additionally, we examine whether measures of CEO power over the board moderate the relationship between founder management and target IPO firm wealth. Our results suggest that CEO duality is the most effective instrument of CEO power available to founder CEOs to positively influence target firm wealth. Further, we find that while founder CEOs utilize power derived from CEO duality to increase acquisition premiums, non-founder CEOs use board leadership power to expropriate shareholder wealth.     

The Effects of CEO Founder Status and Stock Ownership on Entrepreneurial Orientation in Small Firms

This paper studies how governance drives entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in small firms. We argue that founder status and ownership create powerful personal incentives for small firm CEOs to engage in behaviors that influence EO. Integrating stewardship theory and the principal‐principal branch of agency theory, we test our hypotheses on a sample of 339 Swedish firms, and find that CEO founder status is significantly and positively associated with EO, while CEO stock ownership significantly but negatively predicts EO. We additionally test two boundary conditions that show that the founder‐CEO's prior managerial experience in start‐up firms positively moderates the founder‐EO relationship, while contrary to expectations, CEO ownership diversification has no effect on the negative association between ownership and EO. Thus, our study adopts a corporate governance perspective to explain how variations in EO across small firms are driven by the goals and motivations of its leader. Our research also shows that in small, private firms the balance of power is tipped in favor of the CEO rather than the board of directors. Finally, we underline the importance of adopting alternative theoretical lens like stewardship and principal‐principal agency, given that traditional principal‐agent problems are largely mitigated in the small firm context.     

Founder CEOs,personal incentives,and corporate social irresponsibility

This study integrates organizational identity (OI) theory and upper echelons theory to explore the impact of CEOs’ founder status on corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). We theorize that compared with other CEOs, a founder CEO is more likely to generate a high degree of OI with the firm, which will drive the founder CEO to actively avoid CSI that may damage the positive image and long-term development of the firm. Furthermore, we argue that CEO duality and CEO ownership will strengthen the aforementioned relationship by increasing the possibility of founder CEOs generating a high degree of OI. Conversely, CEO underpayment will weaken the relationship between founder status and CSI by decreasing the possibility of founder CEOs generating a high degree of OI. We obtained empirical evidence in support of our arguments from a large Chinese private listed company dataset. Overall, this study’s theory and evidence clearly show that founder status and personal incentives can jointly shape CEOs’ CSI decisions, thereby providing useful insights for corporate shareholders and government agencies to better prevent and govern firms’ CSI.     

Do founders matter? A study of executive compensation,governance structure and firm performance

This study compares founder-CEOs and professional CEOs in newly public firms in terms of executive compensation, governance structure, and firm performance. The paper applies a series of decomposition methods to separate founders' extrinsic characteristics from their intrinsic endowments. The paper finds that founder CEOs tend to earn smaller incentive compensation and smaller total compensation than professional CEOs. Founder-managed firms are associated with higher financial performance and are more likely to survive than professional managed firms. Firms with founder-CEOs are associated with even higher financial performance when the position of CEO and chairperson of the board is combined.     

TMT Departures and Post‐IPO Outside Director Additions: Implications for Young IPO Firms’ Survival and Performance

We draw on resource‐based logic to argue that relatively stable TMTs and boards are beneficial for young IPO firms because of the need to maintain and develop valuable firm‐specific capabilities and psychological attachment of pre‐IPO TMTs. Using panel data from 272 young IPO firms, we find that pre‐IPO TMT member exits negatively affect young IPO firms’ survival and performance. This negative effect is greater when more post‐IPO outside directors are added. We also find that the above interaction is positively and negatively associated with survival and performance when TMT ownership declines substantially and when firms have a founder CEO, respectively.     

Domestic versus foreign listing: Does a CEO's educational experience matter?

Where to list an initial public offering (IPO) is a critical decision for an entrepreneurial firm. Our study investigates IPO location choice between home country and foreign country by examining a sample consisting of the entire population of 1479 Chinese private issuers during the period from 2005 to 2014. We enrich upper echelons theory by bringing in the insights of imprinting theory. Our results indicate that the sources of imprint − prestigious domestic education and foreign education − influence CEOs' preference for an IPO location. More specifically, CEOs with prestigious domestic degrees tend to list their firms in China whereas CEOs with foreign degrees tend to list outside China. Given that the imprinting effects of education have a lasting influence on CEOs, despite subsequent environmental changes, long tenures allow such effects to be imparted to other top management team members. Another finding is that when the CEOs are also the founders, there are two separate imprinting effects.     

Corporate Social Performance and Economic Cycles

This paper examines the influence of CEO career horizon problems on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We assume that as CEOs are getting older, they tend to disengage in CSR due to their shorter career horizons. We further argue that high levels of industry-level discretion (ILD) and blockholder ownership amplify the negative effects of CEO age on CSR. Using a panel sample of US-based firms over 2004–2009, we do not find the main effect of CEO age on CSR, but find support for the moderating effects, such that CEO age is negatively associated with CSR when there are high levels of ILD and blockholder ownership. Therefore, results suggest that CEO career horizon problems matter for CSR when (1) CEOs have sufficient discretion over the firm’s strategic decisions and (2) outside blockholders put more pressure on CEOs to engage in financial earning management.     

Family Control,Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Publicly Traded Firms

We examine the unique nature of agency problems within publicly traded family firms by investigating the earnings management decision of dominant family owners relative to non-family. To do so, we draw upon literature demonstrating that family owners are loss averse with respect to the family’s socioemotional wealth, or the affective endowment derived from firm ownership and control. Our theory and findings suggest that potential reputational consequences of earnings management lead family principals to engage in less of this practice relative to non-family firms, and that founder family firms are less likely than non-founder family firms to use earnings management. Moreover, the family-firm effect varies with the firm size, the degree of CEO entrenchment, and the firm’s stock structure. We provide important insights regarding differences between family and non-family principals in the use of unethical accounting practices, thereby extending agency theory and advancing an underdeveloped research area.     

Financing decisions as a source of conflict in venture boards

Governance scholarship has suggested that venture boards should be structured so as to stimulate internal conflict. However, structure is a weak predictor of board effectiveness. Moreover, conflict can be dysfunctional, especially when it is focused on relationships rather than tasks. We show that venture boards experience more relationship conflict when they make financing decisions that involve devaluation of the venture and that this effect is moderated by whether the CEO is a founder. Our findings should prompt venture governance scholars to reconsider the importance of board structure, the value of board conflict and the behavior of founder- versus non-founder CEOs.     

Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China

This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to demonstrate these effects. Our results also indicate that corporate governance mechanisms influence the magnitude of punishment. We find that CEOs of privately controlled firms, firms that split the posts of CEO and chairman, and CEOs of firms located in developed regions suffer larger compensation penalties for committing financial fraud. Finally, we show that CEOs at firms that commit fraud are more likely to be replaced compared to those at non-fraud firms.     

Outward foreign direct investment of publicly listed firms from China: A corporate governance perspective

This study examines the influence of key corporate governance factors on the internationalization decisions of emerging economy (EE) firms. By integrating the resource-based view and agency theory, it investigates the effects of controlling owner identity, non-controlling shareholder ownership, and the interactions of these with CEO power, in order to reveal their individual and joint effects on the outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) propensity of EE firms. This empirical study of 224 Chinese publicly listed firms found positive effects of ownership of domestic institutional investors and foreign corporations on the OFDI propensity of the firms, which were moderated by the power of the CEOs in these firms.     

Just about money? CEO satisfaction and firm performance in small family firms

This paper examines how family ownership and family ties influence the relative importance of economic and non-economic goals on the CEO’s satisfaction with the firm. Using a sample of small high-tech family and non-family firms, we show that the influence of past firm economic performance on CEO satisfaction is weaker in the case of CEOs leading a family firm. Our results also suggest that this influence becomes weaker as the family firm transitions into subsequent generations. However, contrary to our expectations, we were not able to find a differential effect of firm performance on CEO satisfaction between CEOs who belong to the controlling family and those who do not.     

Inventor Chief Executive Officers and Firm Innovation

Using a novel, manually collected dataset, we find that firms whose chief executive officer (CEO) is an inventor experience significantly better innovation outcomes, as measured by patents and future citations. We obtain these results in models with firm fixed effects, in difference‐in‐difference analysis of transitioning CEOs that controls for the CEO fixed effects, and among firms with founder CEOs. Firms led by an inventor CEO also exhibit greater tolerance for failure as indicated by a greater number of both highly cited and uncited patents, and engage more in explorative search strategies that exploit new technological trajectories. Stock market, however, seems unable to fully capture the positive impact of inventor CEOs on future innovation: firms whose CEO transitions to be an inventor experience positive abnormal stock returns, especially during the early years following the transition.     

Do the Right Thing: The Imprinting of Deonance at the Upper Echelons

This study expands the application of deonance theory into organizations’ upper echelons by examining how CEOs imprinted with a sense of duty can influence managerial decision-making. We hypothesize an imprint of bounded autonomy, an ought-force that constrains their decision-making and understanding of behavioral freedom, influences duty-bound CEOs to self-report errors in past financial reporting. We test deonance theory propositions of instrumentality for behavioral expansion, namely loss avoidance and gain attainment, related to institutional ownership concentration and CEO equity ownership. We use CEOs that are graduates of U.S. service academies as a proxy for duty-bound executives and find firms they lead are more likely to issue a financial restatement to correct a previous reporting error. This finding is robust to alternate explanations such as being error-prone, earnings management, auditor oversight, and risk behaviors. We also find evidence that deonance may be subject to behavioral expansion. The likelihood of issuing a restatement decreases as institutional ownership concentration and CEO equity ownership increases. This study shows imprinted deonance within the C-suite influences important organizational outcomes.

     

Founding Family Firms,CEO Incentive Pay,and Dual Agency Problems

This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by examining relations between family involvement and CEO compensation. Using a panel of 362 small U.S. listed firms, we analyze how founding families influence firm performance through option portfolio price sensitivity. Consistent with the dual agency framework, we find that family firms have lower CEO incentive pay, which is further reduced by higher executive ownership. Interestingly, such incentive pay offsets the positive impact that families have on firm valuation. Collectively, our results show that, compared with nonfamily firms, lower incentive pay adopted by family firms due to lower agency costs mitigates the direct effect of family involvement on firm performance. Once accounting for CEO incentive pay, we do not observe performance differences between family and nonfamily firms.     

An Empirical Study of the Impact of CEO Characteristics on New Firms' Time to IPO*

An initial public offering (IPO) is one of the most critical events in the life of a firm. As the IPO market continues to attract attention from both entrepreneurs and investors, research examining the relationship between the firm's characteristics and its IPO performance is growing. In this paper, we use the upper echelon perspective to empirically examine the relationship between the firm's chief executive officer (CEO) and the firm's time to IPO, a relationship that has so far received little attention. Using data obtained from 237 IPOs in the U.S. software industry, we found that the CEO's prior executive experience, network, and age are significantly related to the new firm's time to IPO. This study extends the understanding of the important role of the CEO in the IPO and provides investors greater insight into those variables that influence the speed with which firms go public.     

Does the origin of a succession CEO matter in the market value of innovation? Disentangling the origin of internal CEOs

This study complements previous research regarding CEO origin and family businesses by incorporating upper echelons theory with the perspective of family effect as well as disentangling CEO origin to provide a better understanding of how external, unrelated internal, and family succession CEOs affect innovation performance. We further reveal how a family founder helps improve the value of innovations undertaken by family heirs. The results show that firms with unrelated internal succession CEOs experience higher (lower) stock market reactions to innovation announcements than those with family (external) succession CEOs. Founders serving on the board reduce the negative effect between family heirs and innovation performance. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Influences on Strategic Planning Processes among Irish SMEs*

In this study we argue that the approach to strategy formation reflects organizational and individual influences. The study, based on questionnaire responses from 359 firms, examines a number of organizational and individual factors influencing the type of strategy formation process adopted. The constructs of strategic posture, organization structure, management ownership, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) experience are measured. Three models predicting strategy formation approaches are explored. First, an organizational model emphasizing the impact of strategic posture and organization structure is analyzed. Second, a model is tested dealing with CEO and top management team characteristics reflecting the effects of agency costs and experience base. Finally, an integrative model combining both organizational and individual factors is evaluated. The results highlight the importance of organizational factors and show, for instance, that entrepreneurial firms tend to adopt more formal strategic planning approaches, while conservative firms adopt more incremental approaches. In addition, both management shareholding and CEO experience are negatively related to formal strategic planning activities.     

CEO regulatory focus and myopic marketing management

This study details the mechanisms on how CEO regulatory focus affects the salience of the gains versus losses involved in myopic marketing decision-making, and how such CEO psychological attributes interact with internal equity-based compensation, external pressure from equity analysts, and environmental turbulence to affect firms’ myopic marketing management propensities. We find that when faced with short-term earnings pressure to meet earnings expectations and when time is no longer a resource, predominantly promotion-focused are more likely to engage in myopic marketing management to benefit from the temporary stock price increase, which comes from meeting or beating earnings expectations. Conversely, predominantly prevention-focused CEOs are less prone to such short-termist actions which results in long-term value loss. For the moderating variables, we find that: (1) equity-based compensation tends to attenuate myopic marketing tendencies of promotion-focused CEOs but have no impact on prevention-focused CEOs, (2) whether equity analysts improve monitoring or aggravate short-term earnings pressure depends on the CEO’s regulatory focus, and (3) environmental turbulence does not increase the myopic marketing management tendencies of predominantly promotion-focused CEOs but rather intensifies the relunctance of prevention-focused CEOs to take short-termist actions. We further find that myopic marketing management mediates the impact of CEO regulatory focus on future firm performance. These findings have important implications for firms and boards when selecting new CEOs and structuring the compensation of existing CEOs. Firms need to simultaneously consider the fit between the CEOs’ regulatory focus, firms’ needs, the business environment, as well as CEO compensation structure.