Corporate Opacity and Cost of Debt for Family Firms

This paper uses a sample of Chinese firms to examine the impact of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and firms’ cost of debt. We find that family control is associated with a lower cost of debt on average, and a negative impact exists mainly in firms with relatively low corporate opacity. We further provide evidence that the moderating effect of corporate opacity becomes more pronounced when investors’ perception of controlling families’ moral hazard of expropriation is higher. Our results are robust to alternative opacity proxies and controlling for endogeneity of family control using the instrumental variable method. Our study highlights that controlling families are heterogeneous in their impact on the shareholder–debtholder relationship in family firms, and debtholders view corporate opacity as an important reference in assessing the extent of potential agency conflicts in China.     

Corporate commitment to climate change action,carbon risk exposure,and a firm's debt financing policy

Motivated by the rising consensus that corporate engagement in climate change actions holds the key for society's transition into environmentally resilient economy, the study examines whether a firm's commitment to climate change action and its carbon risk exposure shape the firm's debt financing policy. Based on insights drawn from signaling, corporate reputation, and agency theories, we develop models that link corporate commitment to climate change actions and a firm's carbon risk exposure with its debt financing decisions. Using data drawn from S&P 500 companies, for years 2015 to 2019, we find a robust evidence that firms that engage in higher levels of commitment to climate change actions issue a higher proportion of debt with longer terms to maturity, even after controlling for their carbon risk exposure. However, we do not find a robust evidence corroborating an association between firms' carbon risk exposure and their debt financing policy. These findings are consistent with arguments that high-commitment firms enjoy positive reputation, better credit rating, and reduced agency and information asymmetry costs, allowing them to gain easier access to long-term debt markets.     

Integrated Thinking and the Transparency of Tax Disclosures in the Corporate Reports of Firms

The purpose of our study was to link two global corporate developments, namely integrated thinking and the transparency of tax disclosures. The International Integrated Reporting Council's long‐term vision is for integrated thinking to be embedded in mainstream business practice, facilitated by integrated reporting. The development of the transparency of tax disclosures was driven by tax avoidance practices of multinational companies. The vision of embedding integrated thinking into mainstream business and the increased focus on the transparency of tax disclosures have developed independently, but thus far there has been no serious consideration of how they may be related. We argue that there is a natural relationship between these two developments. We use PwC's (2014) framework for measuring the transparency of tax disclosures and apply the framework to the corporate reports of a sample of 45 large firms. We use regression analysis to test the association between the transparency of tax disclosures in corporate reports and integrated thinking and find them to be positively associated.     

公司治理与代理成本——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文利用上市公司的数据,分析了公司治理与代理成本之间的关系。结果发现:股权集中度国家股比例、董事会规模、监事会规模、治理环境、公司透明度、企业规模与代理成本显著负相关;股权制衡度、领取报酬的董事比例、领取报酬的监事比例、董事会会议次数、股东大会会议次数与代理成本显著正相关;高管持股、独立董事比例、监事会会议次数、两职分离与代理成本无显著关系;财务杠杆率与代理成本的关系是混合的;国有上市公司和民营上市公司的公司治理与代理成本之间的关系与总样本基本一致。     

Outside Directors on Korean Boards: Governance and Institutions

Drawing on institutional theory, this study examines the factors that pressured Korean firms to appoint outside directors to their boards. While this practice could be considered to be a management innovation in Korea, in the Anglo‐American corporate governance system it has long been used as one of several mechanisms to mitigate agency costs between management and shareholders. As such, this response by Korean firms, following the 1997–98 currency crisis in Asia, could be seen as an example of corporate governance convergence on the Anglo‐American model, where higher levels of outside director representation on the board are the norm. We examine the antecedents of having a higher proportion of outside directors on Korean boards. Our findings indicate that larger firms that are under stricter control by the government have higher representation of outside directors on the board. We also find a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of outside directors and business group affiliation, poor prior firm performance, higher levels of debt and foreign ownership.     

The dividend policies of all-equity firms: A direct test of the free cash flow theory

This paper finds support for Jensen's (1986) hypothesis that dividends and debt are substitute mechanisms for controlling the agency costs of free cash flow. We find that dividend payout ratios of a sample of all-equity firms are significantly higher than those of a control group of levered firms. Further, within the group of all-equity firms, firms with lower managerial holdings have higher payout ratios. These results hold after controlling for free cash flow and growth rates. Overall, our evidence suggests that dividends and managerial ownership are substitute mechanisms for reducing agency costs in all-equity firms.     

Ownership Structure and Accounting Information Content: Evidence from France

This paper investigates how family and bank ownership affect the accounting information content of French firms. In Continental Europe, the existence of block‐holders triggers specific corporate governance issues, including the transparency of financial reporting. Our test results for the clean surplus model show that book value carries a significantly greater weight for family‐controlled firms. This finding is attributed to their lack of incentive to report timely and relevant earnings to outside (minority) investors. In contrast, bank owners are under more market pressure to achieve earnings persistence through the use of accounting accruals. Bank ownership is also associated with higher levels of debt. These results are consistent with findings that in code law countries, insiders dominate as a source of finance, and financial reporting is aimed at creditor protection.     

公司治理与债务成本——来自深交所A股上市公司的经验证据

本文以2002-2005年间深圳证券交易所1525家A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了公司治理结构与上市公司债务成本的关系。研究发现,第一大股东持股比例、董事会独立性与总债务成本和银行贷款债务成本显著负相关。表明第一大股东、独立董事能有效降低债权人面临的代理冲突。研究还发现,高管持股比例和控制人类型对总债务成本和银行贷款债务成本具有不同影响。     

Credit rating changes and debt structure

Through examination of the relationship between rating levels and subsequent annual net debt changes, Kisgen (2006) provides support for the Credit Rationing – Capital Structure (CR-CS) hypothesis which maintains that “+” or “−” notch firms are more likely than non-notch firms to reduce net debt levels to increase the likelihood of a beneficial rating change. We add to the credit rating literature by focusing on quarterly net debt changes over the two years before and after rating changes to provide evidence that notch firms are generally not associated with lower net debt levels, greater net debt reductions, or higher probability of upgrades than non-notch firms before rating changes. Instead, notch firms with CW announcements are associated with relatively greater net debt level increases beginning three quarters before rating changes and these increases continue for firms both without and with CW announcements after the rating change. Further, in analysis of the strength of upgrades (UP) relative to downgrades (DOWN) at the time of rating change, we show that the UP/DOWN ratio is more a function of the presence of prior CreditWatch (CR) announcements than notch status. Firms without and with CW announcements exhibit UP/DOWN ratios of 0.8455 and 0.3628, respectively, with no significant differences in these ratios between notch and non-notch firms.     

Determinants and Economic Consequences of Non-financial Disclosure Quality

This paper examines the determinants and economic consequences of non-financial disclosure quality, which is measured according to the ratings of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure provided by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in the Netherlands. We find that firms with better CSR performance, greater external financing needs, and stronger corporate governance tend to provide higher quality CSR disclosures. In return, these firms gain greater analyst coverage, higher levels of institutional ownership, greater stock liquidity, higher valuations in SEOs, and lower yields to maturity in bond issuances. These benefits apply largely to firms with strong CSR performance. Collectively, our findings suggest that higher quality CSR disclosures deliver economic benefits.     

Democracy,rule of law,and corporate governance—a liquidity perspective

This study examines whether and how democracy and rule of law—two overarching country-level governance variables—influence corporate governance. Given that corporate liquidity (cash holdings) is a good channel for examining the quality of corporate governance, the effects of democracy and rule of law on corporate governance can be identified using the liquidity approach. A review of 67 countries from 1996 to 2010 demonstrates that democracy and rule of law indeed have bearings on corporate governance. More specifically, results indicate that firms are more inclined to hoard cash to take advantage of growth opportunities when the level of democracy is higher or rule of law is stronger, suggesting that agency costs are lower and interests of managers and shareholders are more aligned under such circumstances. In addition, the negative effect of debt issuance and dividend payment on cash is more pronounced when the level of democracy is higher or rule of law is stronger, suggesting that these two approaches become more effective in reducing agency costs and transitively cash holdings under such circumstances. Moreover, the positive effect of democracy and rule of law on corporate governance appears to be reinforced when rule of law is stronger and the level of democracy is higher, respectively. Furthermore, higher level of economic development helps reap the benefit of democracy and rule of law in terms of improving corporate governance and reducing agency costs.     

Institutional quality and corporate financing decisions around the world

We investigate the influence of the recent comprehensive institutional quality dimensions of Karolyi (2015), such as market capacity, operational efficiency, foreign accessibility, corporate transparency, legal protection, and political stability, on financing decisions of firms across 56 countries between 2000 and 2015. We find that stronger institutional quality or lower fundamental risks in a country ease firms' access to long-term debt, and equity financing. We attribute our results to institutional environments influencing financing decisions by shaping the severity of market frictions, such as agency conflicts and information asymmetry, and transaction costs. As a result, we conclude that any improvement in a country's institutional environment will boost firms' access to long-term financing, and thus longer-term investments that promote countries' economic growth will be more feasible. Our findings are robust to potential endogeneity issues.     

The effect of corporate governance on credit ratings: Evidence from China's bond market

This paper examines the association between firms’ corporate governance and credit ratings (both bond ratings and issuer ratings) in China. In addition to considering the financial attributes of bond issuers, we ask to what extent do credit rating agencies consider the corporate governance attributes of issuers? In concept, bondholders are concerned with the financial effects of how corporate governance resolves the agency conflicts between bondholders and managers, majority and minority shareholders, and shareholders and bondholders. We find that corporate governance affects bond issuer credit ratings in China. After controlling for firms’ financial attributes, we find that issuer ratings are positively related to dual‐listing, whether the firm is a state‐owned enterprise, the ownership of the second to the tenth largest shareholder; and negatively related to the relative scale of audit fees. We attribute the positive association between dual‐listing and credit rating to higher quality and transparency of information reported by the dual‐listed firm. The value to bondholders of the implicit government guarantee of debt payments more than offsets the negative association between firm value and being an SOE. Bond rating agencies expect that the change in agency costs with a reduction in the ownership of the largest shareholder benefits bondholders. To credit rating agencies, the scale of audit fees (relative to total assets of the accounting firm) signals interest binding between the client firm and the accounting firm that threatens the independence of auditing and the quality of financial reporting. We also find that bond‐specific attributes: collateral and issue size, are positively related to bond credit ratings.     

Debt,lock-in assets and corporate restructuring

Why do some firms refuse to sell assets that are worth more to another firm? This paper shows that the presence of debt could cause an ex post overinvestment agency problem. In contrast to Myers' underinvestment problem, which is concerned with debt and growth assets, the model in this paper analyzes the role of debt and alternate users of assets in place. This type of agency problem is of interest because it is inherently related to the important recent corporate finance phenomenon of restructuring.     

Does audit report information improve financial distress prediction over Altman's traditional Z‐Score model?

We analyze empirically the usefulness of combining accounting and auditing data in order to predict corporate financial distress. Concretely, we examine whether audit report information incrementally predicts distress over a traditional accounting model: the Altman's Z‐Score model. Although the audit report seems to play a critical part in financial distress prediction because auditors should warn investors about any default risks, this is the first study that uses audit report disclosures for predicting purposes. From a dataset of 1,821 Spanish distressed private firms, we analyze a sample of distressed and non‐distressed firms and develop logit prediction models. Our results show that while the only accounting model registers a classification accuracy of 77%, combined models of accounting and auditing data exhibit considerably higher accuracy (about 87%). Specifically, our findings indicate that the number of disclosures included in the audit report, as well as disclosures related to a firm's going concern status, firms’ assets, and firms’ recognition of revenues and expenses contribute the most to the prediction. Our empirical evidence has implications for financial distress practice. For managers, our study highlights the importance of audit report disclosures for anticipating a financial distress situation. For regulators and auditors, our study underscores the importance of recent changes in regulation worldwide intended to increase auditor's transparency through a more informative audit report.     

Debt dependence and corporate performance in a financial crisis: evidence from the sub-prime mortgage crisis

This study examines the effect of corporate debt dependence on the differential impact of the sub-prime mortgage crisis on corporate performance. We find that the higher the debt dependence the greater the decrease in corporate performance from the pre-crisis to the crisis period. For high-debt firms, we find that the higher the new debt borrowed during the crisis period, the lower the corporate performance. However, we find no significant relation between new debt borrowed and corporate performance for low debt firms during the crisis period.     

Corporatisation and Corporate Governance in China's Economic Transition

China has sought to improve enterprise performance not through privatisation as in other transition economies, but through corporatisation as means of improving corporate governance. Actual governance practices of corporatised Chinese firms are however seriously defective, characterized by excessive power of CEOs, insider control and collusion, lack of safeguards for minority shareholders and weak transparency. These shortcomings are attributable to factors such as cultural and political traditions, uncompetitiveness of markets, poor legal enforcement, weak debt and equity markets, but above all to continued state dominance in ownership and control of the corporate sector and listed companies. Corporatisation, nevertheless, has created a regime conducive to implementing measures for improving corporate governance.     

Board gender diversity and transparency of environmental,social and governance disclosure: Evidence from Malaysia

This study aims to investigate the effect of board gender diversity on the transparency of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures in an emerging market such as Malaysia. Dataset is comprised of 568 firm-year observations from 78 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia. Ordinary least squares regression analysis of the data shows that ESG disclosure scores are significantly improved with the increasing presence of women directors on corporate boards. However, when the individual components are studied, the impact of board gender diversity varies. This study contributes to the limited but growing literature on ESG reporting quality and board gender diversity especially in emerging economies.     

关键审计事项披露与企业会计稳健性——基于准自然实验和文本分析的证据

关键审计事项披露对增强财务报告可信度、提高信息透明度以及提升企业会计信息质量具有重要意义。基于2014—2020年我国上市公司样本数据,采用多期双重差分法和文本分析方法,实证检验了关键审计事项披露对企业会计稳健性的影响。研究发现：关键审计事项披露提升了企业会计稳健性,且在非国有企业和净资产收益率小于6%的企业中正向影响更大;关键审计事项披露数量越多,关键审计事项结论性评述积极程度和关键审计事项审计应对力度越高,披露资产减值类和损益类关键审计事项对企业会计稳健性的提升越显著;进一步分析发现,这一效应在企业信息透明度较低以及审计监督效应较强的企业中更为明显;作用机制检验表明,关键审计事项披露通过提高市场感知的审计质量和报表盈余的审计质量提升了企业会计稳健性。     

Characteristics of firms that issue convertible debt versus convertible preferred stock

This study examines the characteristics of firms that issue convertible debt versus firms that issue convertible preferred stock. The findings are consistent with the agency, information asymmetry, optimal capital structure, financial distress, and tax benefits hypotheses. The findings also indicate that these two types of convertible securities are used to raise external capital by distinctively different groups of firms. First, convertible preferred stock issuing firms have larger nondebt tax shields and higher levels of financial, operating, and bankruptcy risks than convertible debt issuing firms. Second, firms that issue convertible debt have greater free cash flow (financial slack) and growth potential than firms that issue convertible preferred stock.