Party Politics and the Political Economy of Ghana’s Oil

Ghana’s status as a new oil producer raises questions about the developmental effects of resources, and the role of political institutions in these processes. The conundrum this paper addresses is the rather limited impact of oil exploitation in Ghana despite the country’s strong democratic record and internationally acclaimed oil governance legislation. The reasons for this lie in the nature of elite-based political coalitions and we root our analysis of Ghana’s hydrocarbons in the political settlements literature, which moves us beyond the ‘good governance’ approaches so often linked to ‘resource curse’ thinking. We also move beyond the instrumentalism of political settlements theory to examine the role political ideas play in shaping resource governance. We argue that inter-coalitional rivalry has generally undermined the benefits of Ghana’s oil but that a crude interests-based interpretation is insufficient to explain differences between these coalitions.     

A Political Economy Application of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons”: The Greek Government Debt Crisis

The tragedy of the anticommons unfolds when separate social agents—be they private owners of a property who intend to use the property for their own economic benefit or political actors who pursue their political objectives—do not hold effective rights to use their economic or political power for their own purposes without consent of the other players of the economic or political game. I shall discuss the Greek government debt crisis and the Eurozone countries’ policies toward Greece within the analytical framework of the tragedy of the anticommons in this paper. I do not intend to dig deep into the structure and long-term trends of public and private finances in Greece. I shall only show that the successive bail-out programs of the Eurozone countries were doomed to fail because of these countries’ competitive and non-cooperative approach to the Greek financial problems. I shall also show that a coordinating agency, say the IMF, can foster the coordinated outcome only under strict informational conditions.     

Political economy and the ‘modern view’ as reflected in the history of economic thought

This paper focuses on the transition from classical political economy to ‘modern’ economics, a central aspect of which is the ascent of the conception of ‘theory’ as a mere instrument of research. We analyse how this transitional phase was perceived and interpreted in representative, more or less contemporaneous histories of economic thought: those by Luigi Cossa in 1880, by John Kells Ingram in 1915 (originally published in 1888), and by Charles Gide and Charles Rist in 1915. Despite their differences, all authors share the same conception of the structure of scientific laws, as well as the view that economics must be separated from liberalism.     

Depoliticisation,the Management of Money and the Renewal of Social Democracy: New Labour's Keynesianism and the Political Economy of ‘Discretionary Constraint’

Pointing to its radical underpinnings in so-called ‘Open Marxism’ and its theory of the state (one that subsumes the state in the capital relation), this article critically scrutinises Peter Burnham's thesis of ‘depoliticisation’ as a dominant accumulation strategy and regime. The article identifies ambiguities around Burnham's depiction of New Labour in power as committed to depoliticisation. It addresses these by drawing a distinction between regime of accumulation and mode of regulation, characterising New Labour's political economy in terms of the latter as a form of depoliticised Keynesianism framed by ‘discretionary constraint’. Contra-Burnham, the article points to the continued efficacy of Keynesian and social democratic political agency in the context of a dialectic of depoliticisation and repoliticisation focused on the role and power of the state. This dialectic is symptomatic of the contested regulation of capitalism around the defence of the value of money, on the one hand, and its broader management and redistribution, on the other.     

The Political Economy of Policy Reform in the Philippines: 1992–1998

Accurately measuring Turkey's informal sector is important for policymaking. We utilize household income‐expenditure surveys to examine this sector's income underreporting. The Pissarides‐Weber approach hypothesizes that data would reflect such underreporting as “excess food consumption”. Our results suggest informal sector members spend more than their formal sector counterparts with comparable reported income levels. Using this information, we estimate the average size of the true informal sector to be about 1.25 times the official estimate. The informal sector accounts for around 83% of officially reported disposable income. Therefore, true Turkish disposable income is (25%)?(83%), roughly 21% larger than the officially estimated magnitude.     

The ‘Value’ of Europe: The Political Economy of Culture in the European Community

During the 1970s and 1980s the “cultural sector” became one of the primary motors for wealth creation in the European Community. At the European and national scales, a group of actors helped transform Europe's vast array of practices and services (tourism, heritage, books, audio-visual products, etc.) into “cultural industries” and pushed the EC to develop a common cultural policy to support these industries. Documenting these changes at the European scale, I argue that the perceived impact of cultural policy for particular national economic competitiveness was also significant. Italian MEPs and members of Italy's national government were especially important, as they fought to protect the country's historical heritage and promote tourism. France pushed the strongest and I show how that country's efforts were primarily intended to protect its audio-visual and publishing industries from the EC internal market's liberalisation policies, which were vocally supported by Britain because they would have served that county's national economic interests.     

The Political Economy of Mobility Partnerships – Structural Power in the EU's External Migration Policy

The research on European Union (EU) external relations and the EU's own official discourse frequently portray the EU as a soft power that provides its neighbourhood with good governance principles. The European Mobility Partnerships (EU MPs) can be considered the most recent manifestation of this rhetoric. Studies on EU MPs reflect a narrow understanding of power. This paper aims to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the power dimension inherent in the EU's external relations. It develops a neogramscian theoretical framework to challenge the rhetoric of the EU as a soft power and normative hegemon. Drawing on semi-structured expert interviews and textual analysis of documents, it seeks to reveal whether and in what ways socio-economic power dynamics shape the EU MPs. This article argues that while, at the beginning, the design of the EU MPs as a policy tool has been very much influenced by neoliberal ideas such as the market-oriented liberalisation of mobility and the flexibilisation of labour, implementation is marked by the neo-mercantilist approach of restricting immigration and maximising the efficiency of readmission. Applying a critical political economy concept of power is helpful in understanding how market forces influence EU external migration policy, transcending a narrow understanding of power.     

Political pressures and the credibility of regulation: can profit sharing mitigate regulatory risk?

When price-cap rules determine the structure of prices for a long period, they suffer a credibility problem and introduce an element of risk especially if a firm’s profits are “too large”. Profit sharing may be seen as a device to pre-determine price adjustments and thus to decrease regulatory risk. We analyse the effects of profit sharing on the incentives to invest, using a real option approach. Absent credibility issues, a well designed profit sharing system may be neutral relative to a pure price cap. With regulatory risk, profit sharing is preferable to a pure price-cap one, if it intervenes for high enough profit levels.

The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions in Brazil: The Limits of the Inflation-targeting Strategy, 1999–2005

Abstract

This paper suggests that the time-inconsistency approach is inadequate to analyze the political economy of monetary policy in Brazil. The paper develops an alternative theory that emphasizes distributive conflict, and argues that building credibility with a fixed exchange rate and through inflation-targeting was not central for stabilization. A contested-terrain analysis of the Brazilian case suggests that the current monetary regime benefits financial or rentier interests while the manufacturing sector and workers bear the costs of this policy.     

Political incentives and the effectiveness of monetary policy: evidence from China’s city commercial banks

From the perspective of official-and-director (OAD), this article takes studies of the effect of monetary policy on bank loans to the heterogeneity of bank. We explore how political incentives affect the lending channel of monetary policy transmission, using a sample of China’s city commercial banks during 2006–2014. And we further analyse the role of OAD’s characteristics, including administrative rank and age. The results indicate that although tight monetary policy can reduce bank loans, the OAD can weaken this relationship, and the higher is the administrative rank of OAD, the larger is the effect. And the older is OAD, the larger is the effect. More importantly, the relationship between monetary policy and bank loan is insignificant in banks with OAD, implying that the lending channel of monetary policy is absent when considering the role of OAD.     

Historicising Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory,challenging the normative foundations of liberal International Political Economy

David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage is now two centuries old, but it remains at the heart of economists’ theories of international trade. It also continues to provide the underlying economic ethic for liberal International Political Economy (IPE). Ricardo’s numerical illustration of the mutually shared gains from specialisation and trade involved complementary structures of comparative advantage being exhibited by a productively superior hypothetical ‘Portugal’ and a productively inferior hypothetical ‘England’. Yet, the historical back-story of actual eighteenth-century trading relations between the two countries reveals Portugal’s repeated struggles to meet its treaty obligations to the English in the context of the European quest for empire. Those difficulties persisted even when it harnessed its (less profitable) commercial trade to (much more profitable) slave trading practices. Ricardo’s account of the purely mathematical logic of comparative advantage writes out of economic history the centrality of both imperial wars and African slavery to the early English and Portuguese experience of ‘free’ trade. Given this historical back-story, liberal IPE thus appears to be in urgent need of new normative foundations to decouple it from these highly illiberal economic processes.     

Trade Politics： A Brief Survey of International Political Economy

International political economy has already been shown to be powerful to explain the global trade growth. In this paper we offer a brief survey of international political economy of trade policy. In addition to this, we also try to address three questions： （1） How does electoral competition affect trade policy？ Suppose two parties compete for the power over trade policy, would the two parties choose the same tariff？. （2） We observe that the US tariffs decline over time, so do the declining U.S. tariffs lead to the fall of the Democratic vote share in the election？ （3） What is the relationship between trade globalization and political liberalization？ Put it another way, how does trade affect democracy？ And conversely, how does democracy affect trade？     

What Role Does the Political Environment Play in Economic Development? —A Case Study of Fujian Province

Uncertainty induced by the political environment affects investment risk, and thus affects investment decisions, which have a close relationship with economic development. This paper investigates the economic cost of political instability using the case study of the tense relationship across-Strait in China. We use a synthetic control method to better model the counterfactual analysis of this case study. The intense situation of the relations across-Strait has great influence on the economic development of Fujian province. Fujian province is the closest province in proximity to Taiwan and also possesses the greatest preferential policies for Taiwanese direct investment. The empirical results of this study reveal that during 2001-2008 Fujian province’s average annual loss in GDP per capita was 682.54 yuan. In other words, GDP per capita in Fujian has declined about 12.1 percent annually during this period compared with GDP per capita as calculated by the synthetic control method.     

How Low Can It Go? Analysing the Political Economy of Carbon Market Design and Low Carbon Prices

Despite the ascendency of carbon pricing as a key regulatory strategy for governing anthropogenic climate change, insufficient attention has been paid to the issue of price discovery in emission trading schemes, now the dominant form of carbon pricing globally. By analysing the political economy of carbon market design, this paper highlights a number of design features that are instrumental in depressing carbon prices across the world’s emission trading schemes, keeping them well below those considered necessary to spur deep emission reductions in order to avoid catastrophic global warming. In doing so, it advances critiques of carbon trading by illuminating the extent to which carbon markets manifest as expressions of specific power relations rooted in the political economy of advanced capitalism, with low prices ensuring minimal disruption to business as usual.     

Do Political Factors Cause the Regional Inequality in the Reform‐Era China?

We construct a political variable—the number of ministers of all national government departments born in each province weighted by provincial population—to examine its effect on economic growth in China during 1981–2010. We find that the lagged per capita political variable has a significant, positive effect on economic growth in both ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation. We also find that the lagged per capita political variable has a significant, positive effect on financial deregulation policies distributed across provinces, which offers a possible mechanism for the political variable to impact growth.     

Analysis of the Evaluation Mechanism of the Stride Development System of the Enterprise

on the basis of the self-organizing theories the thesis analyzes how enterprises realize the stride development through the technology stride. At First the thesis sets up the stride development system of enterprises and then the thesis reveals the mechanism that the technology stride will give rise to the stride development of ente~fises. In the end the thesis puts forward the enlightenment for the stride development of enterprises from the stride development system of enterprises.     

Is the Threat of Foreign Aid Withdrawal an Effective Deterrent to Political Oppression? Evidence from 53 African Countries

This article complements existing literature on the aid-institutions nexus by focusing on political rights, aid volatilities, and the post-Berlin Wall period. Our findings show that, while foreign aid does not have a significant effect on political rights, foreign aid volatilities do mitigate democracy in recipient countries. Such volatilities could be used by populist parties to promote a neocolonial agenda, instill nationalistic sentiments, and consolidate their grip on power. This is especially true when donors are asking for standards that the majority of the population in control does not want and political leaders are unwilling to implement them. Our empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period from 1996 to 2010. As a main policy implication, creating uncertainties in foreign aid for political rights enhancement in African countries may achieve the opposite results. We also discuss other implications, including the need for an “After-Washington” Consensus.     

On the Developing Strategy of Taiyuan in the Growing-up of the Middle Area

It is urgent that how the middle part of China plays its unique role during the development process of northeast, west and east area. This paper analyses the environment pollution problems caused by economic development of Taiyuan and points out that Taiyuan should accurately locate and seize the opportunities for the growing-up of the west area and make Taiyuan become one of the economic growth poles in the central China.     

Study on the Evaluation Method of the Performances of Corporation

This paper studies the evaluation method of the performances of corporation that was set up by the Financial Ministry in 1999, and then analyzes the advantages and the problems of the method. Finally, this paper studies the theoretical method of the evaluation of the performances of corporation.