Outsourcing and Wage Inequality in a Dynamic Product Cycle Model

This paper constructs a dynamic North–South trade model with outsourcing and endogenous innovation. Production of high quality goods is first performed in the North (Northern phase), then split between the North and the South (Outsourcing phase), and finally shifted to the South (Southern phase). This cycle is reignited whenever a Northern firm innovates a higher quality product. We find that an increase in the fraction of outsourced production raises the Northern skill premium unambiguously, while raising the Southern skill premium if and only if the skill intensity of outsourced production is higher than that of local Southern production.     

A Schumpeterian North–South Growth Model of Trade and Wage Inequality*

The paper presents a dynamic general‐equilibrium model of interindustry North–South trade that is used to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on the Northern wage distribution. Both countries have a low‐tech sector where consumer goods of constant quality are produced by use of unskilled labor. The North also has a high‐tech sector that employs skilled labor and features a quality‐ladder model structure with endogenous growth. Both innovation and skill acquisition rates are endogenously determined. In a balanced trade equilibrium, it is found that Southern‐originated (Northern‐originated) trade liberalization leads to an increase (decrease) in Northern wage inequality both between skilled and unskilled workers and within the group of skilled workers. The endogenous change in the Southern terms of trade determines the direction of change in unskilled wages in both the North and the South.     

North–South trade and income inequality

This paper investigates the effects of North–South trade on international income inequality. While empirical studies suggest that trade liberalization encourages income convergence and reduces the per capita income gap between poor and rich countries, North–South trade is shown to increase the income gap between the two regions. On the other hand, trade liberalization by either region increases the welfare of both regions, and does not necessarily reduce the gap in “real income” or utility.     

南方最优知识产权保护水平与南方企业自主创新

构建了一个扩展的南北贸易模型,讨论了南方知识产权保护的决定因素及其对南北双方福利的影响。在模型中,南方政府内生决定知识产权保护水平,北方厂商内生决定研发投资水平和市场竞争策略,南方厂商内生决定自主创新或模仿。研究发现:南方的最优知识产权保护水平与北方存在差异;当南方厂商模仿北方厂商的技术时,南方执行最严格的知识产权保护对北方福利和南方福利都造成损害;当南方厂商的创新效率较高时,严格的知识产权保护能激励南方厂商进行自主创新、改善南方福利。     

Economies of Scale, International Capital Mobility, and North-South Inequality

This paper develops a model of North-South trade with a continuum of goods, external economies of scale and international capital mobility. The North-South wage gap must exceed any difference in labor quality for South to overcome the established external economies in North. In equilibrium North retains the goods with the largest external economies and South specializes in the remaining goods. While Northern product innovation leads to the production of additional goods in South, it is possible for South to experience a terms-of-trade deterioration, a reduction in foreign investment, and an increase in wage and income inequality.     

Globalization,socio-institutional factors and North–South knowledge diffusion: Role of India and China as Southern growth progenitors

Nexus between income inequality and technology capture is explored in a global CGE model to explore the ricochet effect of technology transmission and its capture. In particular, the model shows that exogenous technology shock from developed North, vehicled via trade, transmits to developing Souths and induces productivity growth. This spillover capture, aided by human capital based adoptive capability, better governance and institution, causes increase in income and welfare and subsequently, leads to decline in income inequality. Dynamism of Southern Engines of Growth – India and China – caused them to emerge as ‘core’ South. Thus, triangular innovation diffusion between dynamic and peripheral South is also simulated to show how the backward or peripheral South could catch up via South–South Cooperation in a declining North–South trends in trade. This accrual of benefits could lead to sustained productivity growth and consequential relief of incidence of poverty in low-income countries.     

North–South technology transfer in unionised multinationals

We study how incentives for North–South technology transfers in multinational enterprises are affected by labour market institutions. If workers are collectively organised, incentives for technology transfers are partly governed by firms' desire to curb trade union power. Higher union bargaining power in the North leads to more technology transfer along two different dimensions – skill upgrading of Southern workers and quality upgrading of products produced in the South – possibly to the extent that the utility of Northern workers decline. Policies to raise the wage levels of Southern workers might spur technology transfer if wages are initially very low, but have a dampening effect on North–South technology transfer once the Southern wage level has surpassed a certain threshold level. These conclusions are reached in a setting where a unionised multinational multiproduct firm produces vertically differentiated products in Northern and Southern subsidiaries.     

A North–South model of outsourcing and growth

In this paper, I formulate a simple North–South R&D‐based growth model where final goods firms in the North endogenously determine the range of international outsourcing of intermediate goods to the South. I show that a fall in the trade cost (through trade liberalization) of intermediate goods in the North: (i) reduces the wage of the North relative to that of the South; (ii) increases the outsourced variety of intermediate goods in the North; and (iii) stimulates Northern R&D activity and economic growth in both countries. By conducting welfare analysis, I also show that a decline in the trade cost of intermediate goods in the North improves welfare in the South more than in the North.     

A Model of Technology Gap,Product Cycle,and the Process of Catching up Between the North and the South*

The paper presents a multi-product two-country overlapping generations model of trade and innovation. We show that for a low level of innovation (unitation) in the South, firms in the North innovate at a level which guarantees a long-term technological gap between the North and the South. However, a high innovation level in the South leads to a situation where the South can catch up the North in a finite time. This model differs from the existing literature in two major aspects. a) Except for the head start of the North we assume that the North and the South are identical with respect to factor endowment and their ability to develop new goods. b) It is general enough to explain both the product cycle phenomena and the catching-up process.     

Vertical specialization in North–South trade: Industrial relocation,wage and welfare

This paper presents a North–South trade model with vertically linked industries and examines how declining costs of trade across stages of production encourage vertical specialization and affect wages and welfare. As trade costs fall below a threshold, the production of all final goods relocates to the South and vertical specialization emerges. In some industries, production of intermediate goods also relocates against comparative costs because of benefits of co‐location, and further declines in trade costs lead to reshoring. A country may temporarily lose from falling trade costs, but both countries can be better off after trade costs fall sufficiently.     

Trade and Personal Distribution of Wealth and Income: Beyond the Stolper–Samuelson Theorem

The effect of international trade on personal distribution of wealth and income is examined via the Stolper–Samuelson Theorem. It is shown that free trade between North and South increases (decreases) wealth and income inequality in the North (South). A concept of three classes – lower, middle and upper – is developed. It is shown that North–South free trade in goods leads to a middle class squeeze in the North and a middle class expansion in the South.     

Technology transfers and the clean development mechanism in a North–South general equilibrium model

This paper analyses the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world-economy comprising two regions; North (Annex I) and South (non-Annex I). In a cooperative equilibrium, a technology transfer from the North to the South is clearly desirable from the perspective of a ‘global social planner’, since the welfare gain for the South outweighs the welfare loss for the North. However, if the regions do not cooperate, then the incentives to introduce the technology transfer appear to be relatively weak from the perspective of the North; at least if we allow for Southern abatement in the pre-transfer Nash equilibrium. Finally, by adding the emission reductions associated with the Kyoto agreement, our results show that the technology transfer leads to higher welfare in both regions.     

Trade,Growth, and Environmental Quality*

This paper examines linkages between international trade, environmental degradation, and economic growth in a dynamic North–South trade game. Using a neoclassical production function subject to an endogenously improving technology, North produces manufactured goods by employing labor, capital, and a natural resource that it imports from South. South extracts the resource using raw labor, in the process generating local pollution. We study optimal regional policies in the presence of local pollution and technology spillovers from North to South under both non‐cooperative and cooperative modes of trade. Non‐cooperative trade is inefficient due to stock externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet do not benefit North. Both regions gain from improved productivity in North and faster knowledge diffusion to South regardless of the trading regime.     

North–South asymmetry,unilateral environmental policy and carbon tariffs

This paper focuses on the potential impact of a carbon tariff on carbon emissions, North–South trade and welfare. We use a North–South trade model, where North implements a unilateral environmental policy on domestic carbon-intensive industries followed by a carbon tariff on imports from South. Unlike the existing studies, we allow asymmetry in clean production technologies and marginal environmental damage. We show that a carbon tariff can reduce the global carbon emission via the use of a more advanced clean production technology in North, which increases the firm profit and welfare. However, improvement in welfare of North is associated with a decrease in global trade flows and welfare of South. We find that, in the presence of asymmetry in clean production technologies between North and South, a carbon tariff introduced by the North can eliminate carbon leakage, but the exports of South decrease below the pre-unilateral environmental policy level and hence North can potentially use a carbon tariff for trade protectionism in the name of reducing carbon leakage in South.     

Endogenous Imitation and Technology Absorption in a Model of North–South Trade

Abstract

This paper considers the transfer of technology from the North to the South that occurs through trade in high-technology goods and explicitly models the ‘reverse-engineering’ process that allows the South to assimilate new technologies. A key finding of this study is that the South's rate of growth is dictated by the size of the country's human capital, which determines its absorptive capacity and its ability to assimilate knowledge from the North. We find that while a Southern country that is poor in human capital can only imitate, Southern countries that possess sufficiently large human capital endowments, beyond a certain threshold, signal the onset of innovation. We also find that the North enjoys a higher rate of innovation and growth with trade than without. North's gains are the highest when it trades with a human-capital ‘poor’ South, because imitation increases South's demand for Northern intermediates. But trade with the Southern countries that are human capital rich (and therefore involved in innovation), dampens their demand for Northern imports, adversely affecting North's growth. The model predicts growth convergence between the North and a South that is well passed the threshold for innovation.     

Asymmetric Country-of-Origin Effects on Intraindustry Trade and the International Quality Race

A model of North–South intraindustry trade in quality differentiated products is proposed to examine the role of country-of-origin reputation in determining the competitive edge of emerging industries. It is shown that if consumers rationally harbor negative expectations about the quality of Southern products, economic progress in either the North or the South shifts the terms of trade against Southern exports, and worsens Southern producers' incentive to produce high-quality products. In addition, the paper illustrates the role of income redistributive policies in shifting consumer's demand in favor of Southern high-quality products.     

Labor standards, labor-management bargaining and international rivalry

Using the labor union's bargaining power as an indication of government policy on labor standards issues, we analyze the competition between a domestic (North) firm and a foreign (South) firm, and their relationship with optimal labor standards (LS). First, we show that the optimal level of LS is higher when labor unions are employment-oriented than when they are not. Second, it is higher under free trade than under the optimal tariff system if labor unions are employment-oriented. Third, ‘a race to the bottom’ of LS occurs in the case of wage-oriented unions. Fourth, the North's imposing a tariff to force the Southern government to raise its LS is effective only if the Southern union is wage-oriented. In order to raise Southern LS, both countries may need some deeper form of economic integration, if the North does not want to abandon its free trade system.     

North–South terms‐of‐trade trends from 1960 to 2006

The composition of exports of developing countries is increasingly dominated by manufactured goods. This has not changed the fact that their major trading partners continue to be the developed countries. In order to properly assess the distribution of gains from trade, there is a pressing need to analyze the movements in the terms of trade of developing countries with respect to the developed ones. A statistical analysis of the North–South terms of trade reveals that the terms of trade have turned against the South since the 1960s. However, the terms‐of‐trade deterioration is neither continuous nor evenly distributed over different country groupings. The existence of a structural break in the mid‐to‐late 1970s together with the greatest adverse terms‐of‐trade movements against the highly indebted and least developed countries attest the discontinuity and unevenness of this process.     

Skill distribution and income disparity in a North‐South trade model

Abstract. What are the impacts of free trade agreement on the welfare of different types of workers in a developed country? What is the impact of free trade on a developed country's income disparity? What is the effect of free trade on the skill distribution of a developed country? The objective of this paper is to address the above questions in a two‐sector general‐equilibrium North‐South trade model in which both countries produce one final good and one high‐tech intermediate input. The final good is produced with the use of a high‐tech intermediate input and unskilled workers. Horizontally differentiated skilled workers produce the high‐tech intermediate input. Each country is populated by a continuum of unskilled workers with differential potential ability. Workers in the North and South can acquire skills by investment in training or education. Thus, skill distribution in the North and South is determined endogenously in the model through a self‐selection process. I characterize two different types of equilibria: a closed‐economy equilibrium without trade and a free trade equilibrium. Then, I investigate the impact of free trade, in the presence of training costs, on the skill distribution within each country, income disparity, and social welfare. JEL classification: D63, F10, J31     

Optimum tariffs and patent length in a model of North–South technology transfer

We study a developing country's choice of optimum tariffs and patent length in a theoretical model of trade and technology transfer. A Northern firm chooses whether to export or produce a new good in a Southern country. In the absence of patent protection, a high tariff is required to induce FDI. This reduces Southern welfare when the good is imported. The Southern government can combine a positive patent length with tariffs to reduce this loss and induce FDI. Thus Southern countries may have an incentive to protect patents, although never to the same extent as Northern countries.