Job and wage mobility with minimum wages and imperfect compliance

We propose a job search model with minimum wage regulations and imperfect compliance to explain the doubling of the mean and variance of hourly earnings of white males during the first 18 years of labor market experience. The model encompasses job mobility and on‐the‐job wage growth as sources of wage dynamics, and is estimated by simulated generalized method of moments using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths 1979. Our estimates provide a good fit for the observed levels and trends of the main job and wage mobility data, and for the increase in the mean and variance of wages over the life cycle, as well as for the fall in the fraction of workers paid below the minimum wage. Job mobility explains 40–50% of the observed wage growth. Increases in the minimum wage and/or compliance deliver small effects on the wage distribution and the nonemployment rate. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Noncompliance and the effects of the minimum wage on hours and welfare in competitive labor markets

This paper shows that increases in the minimum wage rate can have ambiguous effects on the working hours and welfare of employed workers in competitive labor markets. The reason is that employers may not comply with the minimum wage legislation and instead pay a lower subminimum wage rate. If workers are risk neutral, we prove that working hours and welfare are invariant to the minimum wage rate. If workers are risk averse and imprudent (which is the empirically likely case), then working hours decrease with the minimum wage rate, while their welfare may increase.     

Examining policy configurations as conditions for long-term unemployment and non-standard employment in OECD countries using fuzzy-set analysis

This paper investigates how particular configurations of institutional conditions cause high rate of long-term unemployment and non-standard employment rate for 18 OECD countries during the period of 2001–2008. The paper aims to investigate how employment protection legislation (EPL), unemployment benefit and statutory minimum wages are associated with long-term unemployment and non-standard employment. Using the fuzzy-set analysis, the paper examines how the combination of policies matters in causing long-term unemployment and/or non-standard employment. The result suggests that a low level of statutory minimum wage can lead to high levels of non-standard employment in combination with either strict EPL for permanent workers or weak EPLs for temporary workers. The long-term unemployment rate is suggested to be high when there is strict EPL for temporary workers in combination with high levels of statutory minimum wage. This paper highlights the importance of examining multiple policies as configuration.     

Some deadweight losses from the minimum wage: the cases of full and partial compliance

This paper highlights the social costs from non-price rationing of the labour force due to the minimum wage. By short-circuiting the ability of low reservation-wage workers to underbid high-reservation wage workers, the minimum wage interferes with the market's basic function of grouping the lowest cost workers with the highest productivity firms. The present paper models the deadweight loss that society bears when high reservation-cost workers displace low reservation-cost workers. When firms can evade part or all of the minimum wage, an extra deadweight loss arises. Firms with high evasive ability but low productivity may displace firms with low evasive ability but high productivity.     

Youth minimum wage reform and the labour market in New Zealand

This paper analyses the effects of a large reform in the minimum wages affecting youth workers in New Zealand since 2001. Prior to this reform, a youth minimum wage, applying to 16–19 year-olds, was set at 60% of the adult minimum. The reform had two components. First, it lowered the eligible age for the adult minimum wage from 20 to 18 years, and resulted in a 69% increase in the minimum wage for 18 and 19 year-olds. Second, the reform raised the youth minimum wage in two annual steps from 60% to 80% of the adult minimum, and resulted in a 41% increase in the minimum wage for 16 and 17 year-olds over a two-year period. We estimate the impact of this reform by comparing average outcomes for these two groups of teenagers, before and after the change, to those for 20–25 year-olds, who were unaffected by the reform. We find no evidence of adverse effects on youth employment immediately following the reform, but some weak evidence of employment loss by 2003. We also find evidence of a 10–20% increase in hours worked following the reform for employed 16–17 year-olds, and up to a 10% increase for employed 18–19 year-olds, depending on the specification adopted. Combined, wage, hours, and employment changes lead to significant increases in labour earnings and total income of teenagers relative to young adults. However, we also find evidence of a decline in educational enrolment, and an increase in unemployment, inactivity, and benefit receipt rates, suggesting that while the minimum wage reform increased the labour supply of teenagers, this increase was not matched by as large an increase in employment.     

The adaptation of hospitality and retail firms to the NMW: a focus on the impact of age‐related clauses

A lower national minimum wage for 18‐ to 21‐year‐olds and the exclusion of all workers under 18 prompted fears of a distortion in the British labour market and an undermining of training initiatives. Empirical data collected from employers in two low paying sectors, revealing the full utilisation of young workers and under‐utilisation of training initiatives, ensure these fears are not justified and that the government's basis for the lower rate cannot be substantiated.     

The distribution of changes in manufacturing employment and the impact of the minimum wage

That employment for workers in durable goods industries is more sensitive to the pace of economic activity than for non-durable goods employees is not a surprising result. What is noteworthy about the conclusions of this study, however, is the manner in which increases in the minimum wage have altered the distribution of employment and sensitivity to short-run changes in employment of production workers in manufacturing industries. By focusing on the distribution of employment and how that distribution changes over the cycle, estimates of some aspects of the impact of the minimum wage that have not previously been analyzed have been developed.The evidence indicates that increases in the minimum wage over the period 1947–1975 have had a significant impact on employment patterns. Minimum wage legislation has had the effect of decreasing the share of projected employment and increasing vulnerability to cyclical changes in employment for the group of workers most ‘marginal’ to the work force low-wage industry employees. Hence, as a result of increased minimum wages, low-wage industry employees are able to obtain fewer jobs during periods of normal employment growth and their jobs are less secure in the face of short-run employment variations.Minimum wage legislation has undoubtedly resulted in higher wages for some of the relatively-low-productivity workers who were able to obtain employment than these workers would have received in its absence. The cost in terms of lost employment opportunities and cyclical vulnerability of jobs, however, has apparently been borne most heavily by low-wage industry employees. The primary beneficiaries of the shifts in the pattern of employment shares occasioned by minimum wage increases were high-wage industry workers, particularly in the ordnance, food, tobacco, and petroleum industries.     

Minimum wages and employment in Swedish hotels and restaurants

This paper considers the effects of union-bargained minimum wages on transitions into and out of employment in the hotels and catering industry over the period 1979–99. This industry is characterised by a high fraction of unskilled labour input, high worker turnover and binding minimum wages. The empirical approach identifies workers affected by real minimum wage increases and decreases, respectively. Job separations and accessions for the treatment groups are then contrasted to the outcomes for control groups, with wages marginally above those of the treatment groups. Unlike previous studies, this paper also considers same-period transitions for same-wage workers who are unaffected by minimum wage changes. This procedure should help to control for unobserved differences between high- and low-wage workers and is made possible by the diversified minimum wage structure of the industry. According to the results, job separations tend to increase with rising minimum wages (except for teenagers during 1993–98). The evidence regarding accessions is less conclusive.     

The effect of the minimum wage for tipped workers on firm strategy,employees and social welfare

Millions of workers derive much of their income from tips and are subject to the “tipped minimum wage” that differs from the regular minimum wage. This article examines the implications of the tipped minimum wage and shows that increasing it may lead restaurants to adopt a compulsory service charge in lieu of tipping to extract the economic rent enjoyed by waiters under tipping. Because servers are better off with tipping, this implies that increasing the tipped minimum wage in an attempt to increase servers' income may achieve the opposite result. Moreover, increasing the tipped minimum wage may reduce social welfare.     

Estimating the effects of the minimum wage in a developing country: A density discontinuity design approach

This paper proposes a framework to identify the effects of the minimum wage on the joint distribution of sector and wage in a developing country. I show how the discontinuity of the wage distribution around the minimum wage identifies the extent of noncompliance with the minimum wage policy, and how the conditional probability of sector given wage recovers the relationship between latent sector and wages. I apply the method in the “PNAD,” a nationwide representative Brazilian cross‐sectional dataset for the years 2001–2009. The results indicate that the size of the informal sector is increased by around 39% compared to what would prevail in the absence of the minimum wage, an effect attributable to (i) unemployment effects of the minimum wage on the formal sector and (ii) movements of workers from the formal to the informal sector as a response to the policy.     

Minimum wage effects in a developing country

The available empirical minimum wage literature, which is mostly based on US evidence, is not very useful for analyzing developing countries, where the minimum wage affects many more workers and labour institutions and law enforcement differ in important ways. The main contribution of this paper is to present new empirical evidence on minimum wage effects for a large developing country, Brazil. Using a monthly household survey panel from 1982 to 2004 I find evidence of a wage compression effect for both the formal and informal sectors. Furthermore, I find no evidence of employment effects in either sector.     

Minimum wages,wages and employment in various sectors in Honduras

This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of minimum wages on labor markets of developing countries, where there are often multiple minimum wages and compliance is weak. We examine how changes in more than 22 minimum wages over 1990–2004 affect employment, unemployment and average wages of workers in different sectors, defined by coverage under the legislation. The evidence suggests that minimum wages are effectively enforced only in medium and large-scale firms, where a 1% increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase of 0.29% in the average wage and a relatively large reduction in employment of ? 0.46%. We find that public sector wages emulate minimum wage trends but the higher cost of labor does not reduce employment there. There are no discernable effects of minimum wages on the wages of workers in small-firms or the self-employed; yet, higher minimum wages may create more unemployment. We conclude that (even under our upper bound estimate of the effect on the wages of workers) the total earnings of workers in the large-firm covered sector fall with higher minimum wages in Honduras, which warrants a policy dialogue on the structure and level of minimum wages.     

The effects of multiple minimum wages throughout the labor market: The case of Costa Rica

This paper investigates the effects of legal minimum wages on employment and hours worked among workers covered by minimum wage legislation as well as those for whom it does not apply (the uncovered sector) in Costa Rica. This country's large uncovered sector and complex minimum wage policy, which has for decades set numerous wages throughout the wage distribution, provide a stimulating counterpoint to the U.S. framework for the analysis of the impact of minimum wages. Using 1988–2000 micro data, we find that a 10% increase in minimum wages lowers employment in the covered sector by 1.09% and decreases the average number of hours worked of those who remain in the covered sector by about 0.6%. We do not find a significant impact on hours worked in the uncovered sector. Finally, we show that despite the wide range of minimum wages, the largest impact on the employment of covered sector workers is in the lower half of the skill distribution.     

The impact of minimum wages on wages,work and poverty in Nicaragua

In this paper we use an individual- and household-level panel data set to study the impact of changes in legal minimum wages on a host of labor market outcomes including: a) wages and employment, b) transitions of workers across jobs (in the covered and uncovered sectors) and employment status (unemployment and out of the labor force), and c) transitions into and out of poverty. We find that changes in the legal minimum wage affect only those workers whose initial wage (before the change in minimum wages) is close to the minimum. For example, increases in the legal minimum wage lead to significant increases in the wages and decreases in employment of private covered sector workers who have wages within 20% of the minimum wage before the change, but have no significant impact on wages in other parts of the distribution. The estimates from the employment transition equations suggest that the decrease in covered private sector employment is due to a combination of layoffs and reductions in hiring. Most workers who lose their jobs in the covered private sector as a result of higher legal minimum wages leave the labor force or go into unpaid family work; a smaller proportion find work in the public sector. We find no evidence that these workers become unemployed.Our analysis of the relationship between the minimum wage and household income finds: a) increases in legal minimum wages increase the probability that a poor worker's family will move out of poverty, and b) increases in legal minimum wages are more likely to reduce the incidence of poverty and improve the transition from poor to non-poor if they impact the head of the household rather than the non-head; this is because the head of the household is less likely than a non-head to lose his/her covered sector employment due to a minimum wage increase and because those heads that do lose covered sector employment are more likely to go to another paying job than are non-heads (who are more likely to go into unpaid family work or leave the labor force).     

Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets - a new role for the minimum wage

We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns on investment while only firms bear the costs, investment is inefficiently low. A binding minimum wage can achieve the first-best level of investment, both in the short run for a given number of firms and in the long run when the number of firms is endogenous.     

最低工资对正规部门、非正规部门工资和就业的影响

本文根据是否遵守最低工资标准,将劳动部门分为正规部门和非正规部门。利用中国健康与营养调查（CHNS）微观数据,运用固定效应模型和Multinomial Logit模型,本文实证研究了2004年以来,最低工资对正规部门和非正规部门工资和就业的影响。研究发现：最低工资每提高1%,正规部门工资会增加0.5%,非正规部门平均工资下降统计不显著,而处于最低工资线附近的非正规部门劳动者工资下降0.77%;最低工资提高使得失业者向非正规部门流动,而非正规部门劳动者向正规部门流动,最终将有利于劳动者在正规部门就业。因此,政府在制定最低工资制度时应全面考虑最低工资标准作用效果的部门差异。     

Setting the minimum wage

The process leading to the setting of the minimum wage so far has been overlooked by economists. There are two common ways of setting national minimum wages: they are either government legislated or the byproduct of collective bargaining agreements, which are extended erga omnes to all workers. We develop a simple model relating the level of the minimum wage to the setting regime. Next, we exploit a new data set on minimum wages in 68 countries having a statutory national minimum level of pay in the period 1981–2005. We find that a Government legislated minimum wage is lower than a wage floor set within collective agreements. This effect survives to several robustness checks and can be interpreted as a causal effect of the setting regime on the level of the minimum wage.     

The Significance of the Living Wage for US Workers in the Early Twenty-First Century

This article provides an introduction to the importance of the living wage for low-wage workers in the United States. Described as a wage based on an estimation of the official poverty threshold for a family of four, the living wage, as an alternative to the minimum wage, is based on the notion that people working at full-time jobs, and their families, should not have to live in poverty. After discussing the emergence and growth of living wage campaigns in the United States, this essay discusses the coverage and provisions of living wage statutes, the economic effects of living wage ordinances as well as additional benefits provided to workers and unions from living wage statute implementation. The article concludes that due to the current economic conditions in the United States, the struggle to attain a living wage will become increasingly relevant in the coming years.     

A theory of minimum wage compliance (or voluntary recognition of unions)

An urn-ball matching model of the labor market is used to develop a theory of minimum wage compliance or voluntary recognition of unions. Workers can direct their search but, in the absence of wage commitment from the firms, they have no basis to do so. The default means of wage formation in one-on-one matches is Nash bargaining. When there are multiple applicants competition drives the workers down to their continuation value. By attracting more applicants, a binding wage floor provides a means for firms to increase matching rates and improve match quality. An otherwise poorly enforced minimum wage acts as a commitment device for the payment of more generous wages.     

The effect of minimum wage hikes on employment: Evidence from regional panel data from Romania

Minimum wage hikes aim to increase the income of low-wage workers and improve their labour market participation. However, there are concerns that large increases may reduce employment, especially in countries where minimum wages increased quickly and whose competitiveness depends, at least partly, on low production costs. This study examines the employment effect of large increases in the minimum wage in Romania between 2008 and 2016. It uses regional (NUTS III) data and dynamic panel methods. The results do not support the hypothesis that minimum wage hikes reduce employment. They are robust to the use of different econometric methods, plausible variations of the specification and definitions of the key variables. Moreover, the results suggest insignificant effects even for low wage, less developed or high unemployment regions.