Adjusting the measurement of US manufacturing productivity for air pollution emissions control

We estimate a distance function and derive producer shadow prices for SO₂ and PM-10 emissions. The shadow prices are used to adjust a traditional measure of total factor productivity growth in order to account for the reallocation of inputs from production of the marketed output to pollution abatement activities. Adjusted total factor productivity growth rates are calculated for the two-digit SIC manufacturing industries in the United States for 1970–1996. The results indicate that including the “output” of pollution abatement activities has a measurable effect on the productivity of many industries in the manufacturing sector.     

The relationship between inflation and its variability: International evidence from the 1970s

This paper reexamines the empirical relationship between the average level of inflation and its variability. Based on a sample of 40 diverse economies, our results suggest that no one group of countries was able to avoid the decreased inflation predictability associated with higher levels of inflation during the 1970s. In contrast, previous research showed that Highly Industrialized countries, as a group, were able to control inflation variability during the period 1950–1970. Our results also suggest that the “threshold” level of inflation appears to have risen substantially during the 1970s. Whereas previous research suggested an upper bound of the threshold at about a four percent rate of inflation, the evidence from the 1970s indicates that the threshold may have risen to about a nine percent inflation rate.     

Unwrapping some euro area growth puzzles: Factor substitution, productivity and unemployment

In this paper, we estimate a long run supply-side system incorporating a CES production function with time-varying factor-augmenting technical progress for the euro area over the period 1970–2005. We find that the elasticity of substitution lies below unity at 0.7, that labor-augmenting technical progress is dominant in the long run while capital-augmenting technical progress plays an important role in the interim period. Importantly, we also find evidence of a structural break in the pattern of biased technical progress towards the end of the 1990s. Our results help to solve two puzzles in Europe’s recent growth experience which differ markedly from the US experience. The first is related to the effects of the IT boom in the 1990s on productivity growth in Europe. The second puzzle concerns the changes in the “Okun’s law” relationship, linking growth to the reduction of unemployment, which are observable in Europe since the late 1990s.     

Public and private inputs in aggregate production and growth: a cross-country efficiency approach

In a cross section of OECD countries, we replace the macroeconomic production function by a production possibility frontier, total factor productivity being the composite effect of efficiency scores and possibility frontier changes. We consider, for the periods 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 one output – GDP per worker – and three inputs – human capital, public physical capital per worker and private physical capital per worker. We use a semi-parametric analysis, computing Malmquist productivity indexes, and we also resort to stochastic frontier analysis. Results show that private capital is important for growth, although public and human capital also contribute positively. A governance indicator, a nondiscretionary input, explains inefficiency. Better governance helps countries to achieve a better performance. Nonparametric and parametric results coincide rather closely on the movements of the countries vis-à-vis the possibility frontier and on their relative distances to the frontier.     

Explaining the US–EU productivity growth gap: Structural change vs. intra-sectoral effect

This paper proposes a decomposition of labour productivity growth in the EU15 and the the US since the mid 1990s. The results suggest that the EU's relative slowdown is due to modest “pure” gains of productivity within sectors.     

How Robust is the Growth-Openness Connection? Historical Evidence

Previous literature has established a positive correlation between openness to international trade and GDP per capita growth for developed and developing economies in recent decades. However, looking at historical evidence from 1870 to the present, this paper finds no support for a positive growth-openness connection before 1970. In fact, the correlation is negative for the period 1920–1940. Cross-country growth regressions estimated for the period 1920–1990 suggest that the positive correlation between openness and growth is only a recent phenomenon. The paper provides useful conclusions regarding the robustness not only of the openness variables but also of other growth determinants.     

Is more mobility good?: Firm mobility and the low wage–low productivity trap

This paper explores the possibility that unregulated FDI flows are causally implicated in the decline in labor productivity growth in semi-industrialized economies. These effects are hypothesized to operate through the negative impact of firm mobility on worker bargaining power and thus wages. Downward pressure on wages can reduce the pressure on firms to raise productivity in defense of profits, contributing to a low wage-low productivity trap. This paper presents empirical evidence, based on panel data fixed effects and GMM estimation for 37 semi-industrialized economies that supports the causal link between increased firm mobility and lower wages, as well as slower productivity growth over the period 1970–2000.     

Forecasting money demand with Jorgenson's Lag and Tobin's q

The poor forecasting record of time-series money-demand equations is generally attributable to shifts in public behavior, to the omission of important arguments, and to the inadequate specification of the functional form of the relationship. This paper explores the latter two problems by deriving the demand function from Tobin's model of asset markets, by incorporating Tobin's “q” as an argument, and by basing the adjustment process on Jorgenson's rational distributed-lag model. These modifications produce reasonably stable equations that forecast well throughout the 1970s.     

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? ICT,INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT,AND BRITAIN'S PRODUCTIVITY RECORD REVISITED

Despite the apparent importance of the "knowledge economy," U.K. macroeconomic performance appears unaffected: investment rates are flat, and productivity has slowed. We investigate whether measurement issues might account for this puzzle. The standard National Accounts treatment of most spending on "knowledge" or "intangible" assets is as intermediate consumption. Thus they do not count as either GDP or investment. We ask how treating such spending as investment affects some key macro variables, namely, market sector gross value added (MGVA), business investment, capital and labor shares, growth in labor and total factor productivity (TFP), and capital deepening. We find: (a) MGVA was understated by about 6 percent in 1970 and 13 percent in 2004; (b) instead of the business investment/MGVA ratio falling since 1970 it has been rising; (c) instead of the labor share being flat since 1970 it has been falling; (d) growth in labor productivity and capital deepening has been understated and growth in TFP overstated; and (e) TFP growth has not slowed since 1990 but has been accelerating.     

Stochastic convergence of per capita carbon dioxide emissions and multiple structural breaks in OECD countries

This research applies an innovative panel data stationarity testing procedure developed by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. [Carrion-i-Silvestre, J.L., Barrio-Castro, T.D. and Lopez-Bazo, E., 2005. Breaking the panels: An application to the GDP per capita, Econometrics Journal 8, 159–175.], which has the advantage of recognizing multiple structural breaks and the presence of cross-section dependence in order to re-investigate the hypothesis that per capita carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions stochastically converge for 21 OECD countries from 1950 to 2002. Remarkably, the evidence clearly indicates that the panel dataset of relative per capita CO₂ emissions is stationary after the structural breaks and cross-sectional dependence are introduced into the model. These findings offer strong policy implications for governments, regardless of whether they are in “convergent group” or “divergent group” countries. We also find that the structural breaks in the 1960s and over the 1970–1982 period are associated with time periods of fossil fuel becoming the main source of productivity, higher oil prices, and the development of nuclear power.     

Will East Germany Become a New Mezzogiorno?

Despite massive regional policy efforts, GDP per capita in Southern Italy has only briefly converged on Northern Italian levels in the 1960's. Failure of convergence since then is associated with a policy switch from investment toward income maintenance, with reduced wage sensitivity to regional labor market conditions and with increases in rent-seeking opportunities and corruption. East Germany's early experience of rapid wage and income, but not productivity, convergence raised fears that aMezzogiornoscenario could be repeated. Since then, however, investment and productivity have risen while wage setting has become more flexible. Given East Germany's greater “social capability” for growth, and provided that investment continues to be encouraged, the prospects for convergence are now more promising.J. Comp. Econom.,June 1997,24(3), pp. 241–264. Magdalen College, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 4AU, United Kingdom; University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom; and School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, London WC1H 0XG, United Kingdom.     

University education in future studies— a mark III critique: Part II

In 1970 an initial survey was made of futures courses at university level based on forty courses that could be located in the United States and Canada [Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 2, 133–148 (1970)]. This was replicated during 1970–1972 on approximately 200 North American courses and reported changes in the field at the Third World Future Research Conference in Bucharest, September 1972 (Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change, 4, 387–407 [1973]). A third interation was funded by the World Institute Council and published in abstracted form with their permission here. The conclusions to be drawn from some six years of analysis of such courses, and drawn especially from the specifics of the 300 courses in the third iteration, can be lumped under five main headings: (1) All disciplines are to some degree finally alerted to the future implications of both their research and their teaching. (2) There remains still much “froth and nonsense” in futures courses. How to control this and encourage lively creativity is a complex problem-especially since the intellectual image of futurism today is not that high! (3) There appears to be no reliable sociocultural change theory backing future studies and there is precious little solid theory backing future studies and there is precious little solid theory in the field itself-offset by some progress in methodology. (4) Despite these strictures, if all future-oriented courses in American/Canadian universities were lumped together (future Studies per se; technology forecasting/assessment; policy sciences; peace studies; demography; environmental/ecology courses; general systems theory/system analysis/system dynamics; mathematical modelling and game theory; eschatology; utopian literature and science fiction; even black studies and women's courses) the total might approach 5000 and it is still growing, as is popular and academic understanding of the necessity “to plan ahead” in this period of human malaise. (5) Informal education of varied worth, from free swinging communes to middle management cram courses conducted by think-tanks, may turn out to be more useful in future-oriented advanced education than that which takes place in formal “walled” traditional institutions.     

Electrification and energy productivity

Energy productivity is crucial for sustainable development. We use cointegration analyses to investigate the effect of electricity on energy productivity in Swedish industry from 1930 to 1990. Electricity augmented energy productivity in those industrial branches that used electricity for multiple purposes. This productivity effect goes beyond “book-keeping effects,” i. e. it is not only the result of electricity being produced in one sector (taking the energy transformation losses) and consumed in another (receiving the benefits).     

A tale of two states: Maharashtra and West Bengal

In this paper we study the decline of West Bengal relative to Maharashtra, historically two of the most important states of India. In 1960, West Bengal's per capita income exceeded that of Maharashtra, the third richest state at the time. By 1993, it had fallen to just 69 percent of Maharashtra's per capita income. We employ a “wedge” methodology based on the first order conditions of a multi-sector neoclassical growth model to ascertain the output and factor market sources of the divergent economic performances. Our diagnostic analysis reveals that a large part of West Bengal's development woes can be attributed to: (a) low sectoral productivity, especially in manufacturing and services; and (b) sectoral misallocation in labor markets between the manufacturing sector and the other sectors of the economy. We also present evidence on the labor market, the manufacturing sector, and public infrastructure that suggest a systematic worsening of the business environment in West Bengal during this period.     

Conflict in the labor market: Seniority rules and unemployment

This paper examines the macroeconomic implications of two labor-market institutions that play an important role in worker-management interactions: seniority-based layoffs and majority voting on wage proposals. Together, these make the median worker, rather than the marginal worker, the important decision maker for wage and employment outcomes. Since he is risk-averse, he will trade off higher wages for greater security of employment; therefore, the equilibrium level of unemployment will be much less than 50%, but higher than the conventional natural rate of unemployment. Median-worker behavior helps to explain both the greater frequency of excess supply than excess demand (59.4% versus 40.6% of the time since 1890) and the wage concessions of 1981–1983. A new Phillips curve is derived which incorporates systematic influences of the size of the labor force (to correct for the inappropriate measure of excess supply) and Tobin's “q” variable (to measure the risk of unemployment for the median worker). With U.S. data for 1957–1983, this new Phillips curve has a higher explanatory power than the traditional one. Additional forces that influence wages and employment in this setting are identified: firms have an incentive to bargain actively over wages rather than accept union demands passively and senior workers have a “social contract” with junior workers that reduces the extent to which the former exploit the latter.     

The impact of knowledge accumulation and geographical spillovers on productivity and efficiency: The case of U. S. shipbuilding during WWII

This paper examines the productivity and efficiency experience of World War II Liberty ship builders using two complementary paradigms which can be viewed as alternative specifications of the endogenous growth model introduced by Romer (1986) and the stochastic frontier production model introduced by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977). We develop modifications in the endogenous growth model to allow for learning as well as spatial spillovers by relating productivity growth to cumulative productive experience (the ‘learning curve’) and to worker experience as it is transferred and utilized across different geographical regions. We also consider the relative impact of both proximal and distant simultaneous production on productivity growth. We then utilize a framework in which the efficiency component of productivity growth is explicitly considered using a stochastic frontier model wherein contributions to productivity growth introduced in the endogenous growth model are formally modeled as determinants of efficiency change.     

Technological Progress, Job Creation, and Job Destruction

New technology embodied in capital equipment can be adopted either through destruction of existing jobs and the creation of new ones or by renovation, updating the job's equipment. Under the assumption that the destruction of jobs generates worker layoffs, we show that higher productivity growth induces lower unemployment when renovation costs are low, but that the response of employment to growth switches from positive to negative as the cost of updating existing technology rises above a unique critical level. The effects of idiosyncratic productivity differences and cross sector mobility on the aggregate relationship between growth and unemployment are also studied.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D92, E24, J41, J63, J64.     

Energy and capital inputs: cornerstones of productivity growth in Mexico: 1965–2004

Gross domestic product per remunerated labor (GDP/L), known as the Mexican average productivity, grew very rapidly from 1965 to 1979; it increased at an average annual rate of 3.7%. But from 1979 through 2004, productivity stagnated with an average annual growth rate of only 0.19%. The hypothesis is that from 1965 through 1979, productivity increased rapidly because of concomitant growth in the utilized capital and energy per worker and the improvements in technology. After 1979, the productivity growth came to a standstill because of a slowdown in investment and stagnation in the utilized capital and energy per worker due to the sharply rising energy prices. The tool chosen to test this hypothesis is an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function characterized by technical change embodied in the gross investment in new machinery and equipment. The estimation of this model shows energy as a cornerstone of productivity growth independent of capital and new technology.     

Trade and the Transmission of Technology

This paper integrates earlier studies on the link of productivity and research and development (R&D) in different industries of a closed economy with the more recent emphasis on R&D-driven growth and international trade in open economies. In this framework, technology in the form of product designs is transmitted to other industries, both domestically as well as internationally, through trade in differentiated intermediate goods. I present empirical results based on a new industry-level data set that covers more than 65 percent of the worlds manufacturing output and most of the worlds R&D expenditures between 1970 and 1991. The analysis considers productivity effects from R&D in the domestic industry itself, from R&D in other domestic industries, as well as in the same and other foreign industries. I estimate strong productivity effects both from own R&D spending and R&D conducted elsewhere. The contribution of R&D in the industry itself is about 50 percent in this sample. Domestic R&D in other industries is the source of 30 percent of the productivity increases, and the remaining 20 percent are due to R&D expenditures in foreign industries.     

Profit sharing and firm size: The role of team production

This paper presents a model showing that profit sharing is subject to the 1/N problem in the case of independent worker productivity but not in the case of interdependent worker productivity. This implies the role of firm size on the likelihood of profit sharing will differ by the nature of the underlying technology. We test this implication using German establishment data and using a proxy for interdependent worker productivity. The results conform to the theory showing that firm size is associated with reduced profit sharing use when technology is independent but not when technology is interdependent.