Firm performance,corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan

This study examines the effects of firm performance and corporate governance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in an emerging market, Pakistan. Using a more robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach for a sample of non-financial firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange over the period 2005–2012, we find that both current- and previous-year accounting performances has positive influence on CEO compensation. However, stock market performance does not appear to have a positive impact on executive compensation. We further find that ownership concentration is positively related with CEO compensation, indicating some kind of collusion between management and largest shareholder to get personal benefits. Inconsistent with agency theory, CEO duality appears to have a negative influence, while board size and board independence have no convincing relationship with CEO compensation, indicating board ineffectiveness in reducing CEO entrenchment. The results of dynamic GMM model suggest that CEO pay is highly persistent and takes time to adjust to long-run equilibrium.     

创始人身份、绩效水平波动如何交互影响CEO更替——基于美国上市公司数据

创始人CEO身份是CEO解聘的影响因素之一.本文采用美国上市公司面板数据,探索了创始人CEO身份及组织绩效对于CEO解聘的影响关系.研究发现,创始人CEO相较于非创始人CEO更不容易被解聘;绩效的降低会促使非创始人CEO的解聘.相反,创始人CEO在绩效良好的情况下更易被解聘的原因并非绩效良好,而是来自于董事会及组织内部的因素起主要作用.本文深化了在绩效水平波动的情况下,对创始人CEO和非创始人CEO解聘这一战略决策过程的解读和理解,具有理论和现实意义.     

Enhancing board effectiveness

Like any other job, board work is associated with specific competencies. Competencies are the combination of knowledge, skills, personal characteristics, and behaviors needed to perform a job or task effectively. Boards are only as strong as their weakest member. Board education should focus on improving the knowledge and skills of the board and individual members and on overall board performance. Assessment of individual board member performance is designed to evaluate the trustee's knowledge of board roles and responsibilities and the expectations of board members. Board effectiveness is built through competency-based board member recruitment and selection; board member education and development; and evaluation of board, board member, and meeting performance.     

CEO知识禀赋对探索性创新的影响研究

知识经济背景下,知识成为企业实现探索性创新的重要战略资源。然而现有理论对具有不同特征的知识如何影响探索性创新的内在机理尚不明晰。基于此,以我国创业板科技创业企业为研究对象,考察了CEO知识禀赋对探索性创新的影响,并基于资源依赖视角研究了董事会社会网络对CEO知识禀赋与探索性创新关系的调节作用。结果表明：CEO任期和行业内工作背景对探索性创新具有积极影响,董事会社会网络正向调节CEO任期、行业内工作背景与探索性创新的关系。     

公司治理、经验学习与企业连续并购——基于我国上市公司并购决策的经验证据

文章以2004-2008年我国上市公司的1 480起并购事件为样本,运用事件历史分析方法研究了公司治理和经验学习对企业连续并购行为的影响。研究发现:(1)并购管理程序熟练程度和以往并购绩效反馈都会增加连续并购决策的发生概率;(2)国有股权、管理层持股比率的增加、CEO和董事长两职合一会促进企业连续并购的发生,而具有较高独立性的董事会则可能会降低企业并购的发生概率;(3)国有股权、管理层持股比率、董事会领导结构和董事会独立性会强化经验学习对并购决策的影响效果。     

董事会领导结构与公司治理——基于上市公司CEO更换的实证研究

本文研究了不同业绩水平下董事会领导结构与CEO更换之间的关系。研究发现,在业绩很好的公司中,CEO兼任董事长有利于避免不正常的CEO强制更换;在业绩一般的公司中,CEO兼任董事长则为业绩较低的CEO提供了保护;在经营亏损的公司中,这一保护不再发生作用。基于不同业绩水平下CEO更换的实质,本文认为,代理理论和现代管家理论在公司治理实践中是相容的,从而为研究两者的关系提供了一个新的框架。此外,本文的研究还为我国的公司治理改革提供了一些有意义的启示。     

企业CEO继任的经验研究与展望

CEO继任是企业的重要战略决策之一.国外研究结果显示,CEO继任的发生机制主要存在辞职、解聘和其他突发情况;而继任绩效效果的研究结果却大相径庭,继任后的企业绩效形成机制多与继任者的行动、能力和社会力量相关;新任CEO继任后的过渡管理也具有一些很重要的技巧.当前,中国很多大型企业面临高层管理人员计划性或非计划性更新,借鉴和把握西方国家CEO继任的经验和趋势.可以提高我国CEO继任的成功率和有效性.     

Are CEOs Replaced For Poor Performance? Effects of Takeovers and Governance on CEO Turnover

This article analyzes the risk of CEO turnover in US firms over the period 1993–2011. There is an increase in the CEO turnover rate and a 41% decline in median tenure. Where firm performance is poor, CEOs are increasingly replaced, either by the board or in the process of the firm being taken over. US corporate governance regulations had some success in mitigating the agency problem. In the wake of those reforms, CEO turnover outcomes are more strongly associated with firm performance. The declining CEO tenure may have structural impacts on CEO pay.     

首席信息官、企业领导者与企业数字创新

数字技术越来越普及，然而数字创新相关研究相对匮乏。基于注意力基础观，探讨企业数字创新前因。以2011—2018年我国上市公司为研究样本，实证研究结果表明：①设置首席信息官（CIO）的企业实施数字创新的可能性更大，数字创新绩效更好；②企业领导者（CEO）的商业关联能够显著提升CIO实施数字创新的可能性及数字创新绩效，CEO的政治关联没有显著调节作用。通过调查CIO和CEO的角色，深化对数字创新前因的理解，推动数字创新理论研究，为企业实施数字创新提供理论依据。     

公司丑闻、声誉机制与高管变更

本文以2003～2008年发生丑闻的公司高管为研究样本,实证检验了作为非正式制度约束的声誉机制对高管变更的影响。模型的回归结果显示,公司业绩、董事会特征以及股权集中度并不能有效解释丑闻公司高管变更的原因。相反,声誉惩罚却显著提高了丑闻公司高管变更概率,并分别将这些公司董事长和总经理变更的概率至少提高了8.02个百分点和2.46个百分点。进一步研究还表明,声誉惩罚显著降低了丑闻公司董事长变更后继续担任公司其他职位的概率。研究结论证实,在转型期的中国,作为非正式制度约束的声誉机制能够在改善公司治理方面发挥作用。     

Simultaneous board and CEO diversity: does it increase firm value?

There remain open questions regarding whether board of director ethnic and gender diversity increases or decreases firm value. Additionally, prior research has yet to examine the value effects of a diverse board in the presence of a gender/ethnic minority CEO. Using the KLD social ratings database, we examine 13?000 firm-years and provide robust evidence that board diversity increases firm value. However, we also show that any value added via board diversity is nullified when a diverse board operates in the presence of a female and/or minority CEO. Results suggest that a significant portion of the value in board diversity may come from gender/ethnic differences between the board members and the CEO. One implication of our study is that when hiring a CEO or electing directors relative gender/ethnic make-up is important.     

高管薪酬、公司治理与公司业绩——基于沪深两市上市公司的研究

以2005—2011年沪深两市1236至2107家上市公司为样本,通过研究高管薪酬、公司治理以及公司业绩之间的关系发现：独立董事在董事会的占比越大、CEO对董事会的影响力越大对高管薪酬具有显著的正向影响;而股权集中度、公司为国有控股、董事会持股董事会越多、监事会持股监事越多对高管薪酬具有显著的负向影响。并且因公司治理引起高管获得的超额薪酬与公司业绩具有显著的负相关关系。     

Co-opted directors and powerful CEOs: evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)

We explore the effect of co-opted directors on chief executive officer (CEO) power. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office and are found by prior research to represent a weakened governance mechanism. Our evidence reveals that co-opted directors lead to less powerful CEOs, consistent with the substitution effect. Because co-opted directors impose less stringent oversight, the CEO is able to exercise a great deal of latitude in running the firm. Therefore, it is less necessary for the CEO to command so much power where more directors are co-opted, hence leading to less powerful CEOs. In other words, co-opted directors substitute for strong CEO power. Crucially, we find that board co-option exhibits much more explanatory power than does board independence, which has been the primary measure of board effectiveness in the literature.     

Board effectiveness in Chinese fund management companies

With a generally weak investor protection environment and no governance voice in the fund management companies (FMC) to which their investment is entrusted, fund investors in China are left with the internal governance mechanisms to safeguard their interest. Using a panel data of 288 firm‐year observations covering more than 98% of FMC in China from the period between 2006 and 2010, the present paper examines the corporate governance challenges confronting the fledging Chinese fund management industry by analysing how key governance settings affect the performance of the board of directors in protecting the interest of fund investors. The results show that board effectiveness can be enhanced if a listed company is the controlling shareholder. In addition, having a female CEO or board chairperson and a small‐sized board may help to reduce investors’ fees. Other internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as shareholder concentration, having state‐owned financial companies as controlling shareholders and board independence, are found to exhibit no significant impact on the effectiveness of FMC boards.     

Board structure,ownership, and financial distress in banking firms

This investigation pursues a new direction in the analysis of financial distress in banking firms. The research was inspired by recent research on corporate governance and the need to understand the internal processes behind the financial decisions that result in bank failures. The analysis examined the relationship between the ownership and structure of the board of directors and the internal control mechanism that influences the survival of the firm. The following aspects of ownership and governance are investigated: ownership by directors and officers, ownership by the CEO, number of directors, percentage of inside directors, and CEO duality. The influence of board structure and ownership on the probability of financial distress was explored with a sample of approximately 300 banking firms. The empirical tests indicated a lower probability of financial distress when one person is both the CEO and chairman of the board, but the other factors did not have a significant effect.     

高管团队异质性、团队冲突与企业绿色绩效——差异化CEO领导风格调节下的整合分析框架

基于高阶梯队等理论，从高层管理团队异质性等要素整合分析视角切入，在探讨高层管理团队驱动企业绿色绩效作用机制的基础上，尝试构建差异化CEO领导风格调节下高管团队（TMT）异质性、团队冲突与企业绿色绩效的理论模型；通过层次回归分析、Bootstrap等方法实证检验异质性高层管理团队的作用机理和边界。研究结果显示：①TMT异质性、任务冲突能显著提升企业绿色绩效，且任务冲突在TMT异质性与企业绿色绩效的关系中起部分中介效应，而关系冲突显著降低企业绿色绩效。多元化构成的高层管理团队拥有更多差异化思想，这些观点通过高层管理团队成员不断分析整合后作用于绿色绩效，而成员间“对人不对事”的关系冲突会弱化该过程，进而对绿色绩效产生负向影响；②变革型CEO领导风格负向调节任务冲突与企业绿色绩效的关系，表明CEO适度简政放权，指导、关怀和保障高管团队成员充分表达观点非常重要。交易型CEO领导风格负向调节关系冲突与企业绿色绩效的关系，说明CEO通过奖惩激励，降低高层管理团队情绪冲突，提升团队凝聚，是推动绿色转型的重要举措。     

公司业绩、董事会特征与财务总监变更——来自深沪股市的经验数据

本文通过对2003-2006年四年期间我国深沪两市上市公司CFD变更的原因进行实证研究,构建从公司业绩、董事会特征,以及CFO特征分析CFO变更的研究框架.影响CFO变更的因素包括:公司业绩、董事会开会次数、董事长与总经理两职兼任、CEOO变更、审计意见类型、CFO年龄、CFO持股数,以及CFO任职期限.     

独立董事社会关系增进还是削弱了董事会的功能*——基于灰色董事行为的博弈分析

董事会在公司治理中的作用得到了代理理论和友好董事会理论的广泛且富有成效的论证,而最近的灰色董事理论则致力于分析独立董事与CEO之间的社会关系及其对董事会功用的影响。本文构建了一个统一的理论模型,分析了股东、董事会和CEO之间的三阶段博弈,考察了灰色董事的监督和建议功能。结果发现,CEO和董事之间的关系可以削弱对企业的监督行为,但会增强建议行为,且该建议功能随着CEO持股比例的增加而增加;大股东和董事之间的关系不仅不能解决委托代理问题,反而有可能加剧大股东对小股东的掏空行为。     

董事会领导权结构的性别效应与企业绩效

本文检验了董事会领导权性别结构究竟如何影响企业绩效,以及这种关系如何依赖于性别地位差异而发生变化.利用中国上市公司2014—2018年数据进行检验发现:在董事长和CEO两职分离的情形下,相对于董事会领导权同性结构,董事会领导权异性结构对企业绩效有正向影响;董事会领导权异性结构与企业绩效关系会受到性别地位的影响,具体来说,董事会领导权异性结构对企业绩效的正向影响,在"男上女下"的性别结构形式中更显著.进一步考虑企业的产权性质进行检验发现,"男上女下"性别结构对企业绩效的积极效应在民营企业中更显著.     

Managerial incentives, CEO characteristics and corporate innovation in China’s private sector

We use a unique World Bank survey of 1088 private manufacturing firms from 18 Chinese cities over the period 2000-2002 to empirically examine the roles of managerial incentives and CEO characteristics in a firm’s innovation activities. We look at both innovation effort (R&D intensity) and innovation performance measures such as new product sales. We obtain the following main results: (1) the presence of CEO incentive schemes increases both corporate innovation effort and innovation performance; (2) sales-based performance measures in the incentive scheme, as compared with profit-based performance measure, are more conducive to firm innovation; and (3) CEO education level, professional background and political connection are positively associated with firm’s innovation efforts. The main results are robust to endogeneity tests with instrumental variables. We also discuss some important policy implications.