产权、管理与企业绩效

20世纪90年代中期以来，关于企业困境问题，社会上流行着管理论和产权论两种对立的观点。本文评价了两者的观点及其改革主张后，指出双方的偏颇，认为产权与管理是密切相关的，而非对立的，并从产权安排与管理制度以及产权运行与管理活动两个层次论述了产权与管理的关系。产权安排决定管理制度，体现为管理制度；管理制度则服从和依赖于产权安排，但体现产权安排；产权运行即为管理活动。在此基础上，本文提出一个关于产权、管理与企业绩效的分析框架。     

Valuing Stakeholder Governance: Property Rights,Community Mobilization,and Firm Value

Research summary : While research has shown that good stakeholder relations increase the value of a firm, less is known about how specific types of stakeholder governance affect firm value. We examine the value of one such governance mechanism—community benefits agreements (CBAs) signed by firms and local communities—intended to minimize social conflict that disrupts access to valuable resources. We argue that shareholders evaluate more positively CBAs with local communities with strong property rights and histories of institutional action and extra‐institutional mobilization because these communities are more likely to cause costly disruptions and delays for a firm. We evaluate these arguments by analyzing the cumulative abnormal returns associated with the unexpected announcement of 148 CBAs signed between mining companies and local indigenous communities in Canada. Managerial summary : With firms across many industries facing escalating costs associated with social conflict, new tools are emerging to help firms mitigate these risks by seeking the support of the local communities in which they operate. Community benefits agreements (CBAs) are contracts in which a community provides consent for a new investment in return for tangible benefits, such as local hiring and revenue sharing. We argue that although CBAs are costly for the firm, they are particularly valuable when communities can cause costly disruptions and delays for a firm. Our study of investor reactions to the announcement of 148 CBAs signed between mining companies and local indigenous communities in Canada shows that investors value more CBAs signed with communities with strong property rights and histories of protest. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Merger Incentives and the Failing Firm Defense

The merger incentives between profitable firms differ fundamentally from the incentives of a profitable firm to merge with a failing firm. We investigate these incentives under different modes of price competition and Cournot behavior. Our main finding is that firms strictly prefer exit of the failing firm to acquisition. This result may imply that other than strategic reasons, like economies of scale, must be looked for to understand why firms make use of the failing firm defense. However, when products are sufficiently heterogenous, we find that (i) the failing firm defense can be welfare enhancing and (ii) a government bail‐out increases total welfare when the number of firms is sufficiently low.     

国有控股、最高决策者激励与公司绩效

国内研究认为股权结构、董事会和高管激励对公司绩效有影响，而上市公司“国有一股独大”的国情使前两者不会有实质性作用；对于后者的研究则忽略了最高决策者在公司中的重要性。本文以1993—2002年数据为样本，研究国有股代理人(董事长和总经理)激励对公司绩效的影响。发现董事长是公司最高决策者，除政治激励能显著改善绩效外，最高决策者金钱激励、国有股权性质、两职合一、债权人治理等都和绩效没有显著关系；意味着只有将政治激励所附带的财富效用降低到一定程度，金钱激励才可能成为有效治理机制。     

Firm Heterogeneity,New Investment and Acquisitions

This paper presents a model of investment in which heterogeneous firms choose between new investment and acquisitions. New investment involves purchasing a new plant for an existing variety. Acquisitions involve purchasing a plant and a variety from a selling firm. Using a variable‐elasticity demand system, I show that if varieties within a differentiated industry are imperfect substitutes, mid‐productivity firms invest. As varieties approach perfect substitutability, high‐productivity firms invest. For both cases, within the region of investing firms, the most productive choose acquisitions over new investment. In analyzing firm‐level data from Compustat, I find evidence that supports these predictions.     

The Geography of Real Property Information and Investment: Firm Location,Asset Location and Institutional Ownership

Using a sample of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), we show that institutional investors exploit location‐based information asymmetries by overweighting firms headquartered locally and those with greater economic interests in the investor's home metropolitan statistical area (MSA). This asset allocation strategy is associated with superior portfolio performance. In a difference‐in‐difference‐in‐differences analysis of investor headquarters relocations, we find that investors tend to increase their ownership of REITs that have property holdings in the market to which the investor relocates. Our findings highlight the importance of understanding the relation between information advantages and the geography of firm's operations, as well as the implications on ownership patterns and portfolio construction.     

企业网络与企业边界理论

在对现有企业边界理论进程重新梳理之后，我们从管理理论中抽象出经济学意义上的企业网络概念。在此基础上，我们对企业的类型进行了重新分类，并界定了每种企业的边界以及相应的经济含义．希望对进一步理解企业和市场的关系提供新的研究视角和思路。     

企业主体性产权理论的构建 --相关和自主统一的属性所有权

企业是市场经济活动的主体，应该具有其主体属性，并且正是其主体属性决定它的主体地位和作用，并形成主体性产权。但是，学术界缺乏对这个问题的研究，主要是因为受西方经济学传统的限制，要突破这种限制必须把经济学与管理学结合起来进行研究，以构建企业主体性产权理论。企业主体性产权是其相关属性产权与自主属性产权的统一。企业相关属性及其产权是基础和结果，主要说明企业主体性产权的共性；企业自主属性及其产权是原动力和境界，主要说明企业主体性产权的个性。它们的互补和统一突出地体现在企业家及其产权上。企业主体性产权的目的是在防止“蛋糕”缩小的同时把“蛋糕”做大，其核心是基于相互关系的约束而进行自主创造的激励，其模型的运行特点是协同一自主创造。企业主体性产权理论的应用，可以保证和促使中国企业循着超越自然历史发展。     

Cumulative Investment and Spillovers in the Formation of Technological Landscapes

In this paper, the evolution of product differentiation in industries is modeled as the result of a cumulative cost-reduction process subject to spillovers in a differentiated oligopoly. Our results suggest that the long-run outcome is dependent on the intensity of spillovers and the shape of their diffusion function. With weak spillovers, firms dig their niche over time, differentiation remains important and cost-reduction keeps going. By contrast, if spillovers are strong and have a concave diffusion function, firms gradually use more similar technologies. This standardization process involves less and less investment. For spillovers of intermediate strength, complex technological landscapes may arise.     

Firm Investment Behavior and Collective Bargaining Strategy

Using survey data on labor union coverage at the firm level, this paper examines union-nonunion differences in investment activity among 706 U.S. companies during the 1970s. Consistent with a model of union rent seeking, firm-level collective bargaining is associated with significantly lower physical capital and R&D investment, even after controlling for firm and industry characteristics. Deleterious union effects on investment are considerable throughout the 1972–80 period, but they vary across industries. Without significant changes in collective bargaining power or strategies, diminished investment activity by unionized companies is likely to exacerbate the already considerable decline in U.S. union coverage     

知识产权、交易效率与经济发展

近年来,知识产权与经济增长的关系,知识产权制度对经济发展的贡献度,已日益成为国内外学界、业界重点关注的问题。本文基于交易效率的角度,运用中国经济发展的实际数据,实证分析了知识产权保护水平强度对经济发展的影响。研究认为,交易效率的提升是经济发展的推动力;没有交易效率的提升,就没有持续协调的经济发展。知识产权保护的前提是提高交易效率,否则这种保护将不利于经济发展。     

知识产权、基本要素与技术标准化合作

技术标准是高技术等产业竞争与合作的基本要素；知识产权是技术标准化竞争与合作的基本要素；在技术标准化过程中，基本知识产权起着关键作用，决定标准化联盟及其结构．而主导企业的知识产权战略也影响重大。研究这些机理及其规律对于在我国发展自主知识产权，推动高技术产业的标准化合作，促进产业技术进步具有重要意义和深刻启示。     

不完全合约理论的逻辑悖论与企业理论的创新

主流企业理论是企业的合约理论，而合约的“不完全性”又是其逻辑前提。例如：委托代理理论、股东至上论、剩余控制权的“独享”或“分享”论等都离不开合约的“不完全性”命题。但是，这些理论之间是存在矛盾的。研究发现，矛盾根源于“不完全合约”理论自身存在逻辑上的“悖论”。进一步分析发现，合约理论的“悖论”又根源于企业产权理论中的“两权分离”说。本文提出“资本分裂”说，以解决“两权分离”导致的矛盾。“资本分裂”说要求对企业的本质及其相关企业理论做重新解释，进行企业理论创新。     

Incentives in the Asian Context: Theory and Preliminary Evidence

Incentive design for productivity gains has become important for Asian organizations in recent years. This paper introduces the theory of incentive design to an Asian audience while extending the agency theoretic approach to control. Hypotheses derived from this theory were tested in 61 retail stores in Singapore. The results show that employee skills, output measurability and task uncertainty impact incentive design. The results indicate that agency theory may be applicable across cultures. Implications for the Asian context, and its adaptation in terms of behavior, are discussed.     

企业理论的社会资本逻辑

本文在回顾以知识为基础的企业理论的基础上，提出了社会资本不仅是企业战略资源，也是企业的一种有效的治理机制。企业交易复杂性程度越高，社会资本治理存在的价值就越大。按照社会资本治理的逻辑，企业比市场更能有效地创造社会资本，更能充分有效地利用社会资本的价值；与之相适应，本文分析了企业制度安排从资本为基础转向以社会资本为基础的可能性与现实性。     

企业理论的演进逻辑及其发展方向

现代企业理论强调资本所有权(产权)的决定作用,因而企业治理遵循“资本雇佣劳动”的逻辑。但这一逻辑越来越受到理论和实践两方面的挑战,客观上需要一个替代的企业理论。实际上,一些新的“资本”范畴的提出,预示着新的企业理论的发展方向。纵观企业理论发展的历史,我们发现有其自身发展规律:物质资本的所有权决定论—资本所有权逻辑的否定—资本所有权逻辑的回归。这是一个完整的“否定之否定”的过程。企业理论的这一发展规律从企业理论中“市场”与“生产”的关系看,理论重心经历了“市场交易合约”到“生产中的资源”,再到“市场交易与生产结合”的过程。企业理论发展逻辑的最后一个环节尚处于萌芽之中,需要我们加以深入研究。     

资源型企业R&D投入与企业价值研究

在技术经济一体化的推动下,经济发展模式已从消耗自然资源的粗放式增长逐渐转变为依靠自主创新促进经济腾飞的模式。资源型企业应加大R&D投入,开展自主创新,试图增强持续发展的动力。如何检验资源型企业R&D投入的价值成为需要解决的问题,本文选取沪深两市资源型企业2007~2009年的R&D投入数据以及相关财务指标作为研究样本。基于R&D投入因素,通过对Fama-French三因子模型的改进,建立多元线性回归模型,检验企业R&D投入与公司价值的相关性。发现,资源型企业R&D投入会对资源型企业未来价值产生重大影响,对于上市公司,R&D投入可能带来公司价值的提升并反映到企业价值即股票市价当中。但是,R&D投入在带来公司价值提升的同时也能增加风险。从而提出进一步加大R&D投入,创新资源型企业已有的发展模式,坚持走创新研究,集约化发展道路;加快关于企业技术创新的财税政策体系改革,以优惠的税收政策带动企业持续R&D投入活动以及对R&D投入引入风险管理机制,完善信息披露制度等政策建议。     

家族企业所有者间控制权配置选择与演进

本文在现有研究基础上，引入家族性利他主义规则制度变量，探讨了投资者权益司法保护与家族性利他主义规则两类制度变量对家族企业所有者间控制权配置选择的影响。本文研究表明，两类制度变量约束下的投资者权益保护状况越好。则所有者间控制权或。股权配置可能的分散程度就越大。司法保护制度变量的状态决定了控制权或股权的分散配置是否能够突破家族的界限。并且上述结论对中国家族企业的未来演进具有现实的含义。     

Managerial Incentives: Implications for the Financial Performance of Real Estate Investment Trusts

In the face of informational asymmetry, REIT equity investors may bear the costs of agency. Hence, it is in shareholders' interests to pay incentive fees to induce managers to utilize their superior information and to take suitable actions that reduce these costs. In this paper, the relation between financial performance and fees paid, and between fees paid and contractual incentives, are examined to determine whether equityholder interests are being served by the decisions of REIT managers. The data reveal that fees paid and financial performance are positively related, indicating that financial performance is at least partially endogenous with respect to managerial action. Moreover, the evidence also suggests that the industry fee structure has changed over the period in a manner that appears to have reduced the agency costs borne by equityholders, and by the end of the sample period the fees paid in general seem to reflect incentives that are consistent with the wealth maximization goal of equityholders.