Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy

Brennan and Hamlin [(2002) Constitutional Political Economy 13(4): 299–311] noted that expressive voting still holds at the constitutional phase. The argument, when taken to its necessary conclusion, proves quite problematic for Constitutional Political Economy. Veil mechanisms following Buchanan induce expressive voting at the constitutional phase, removing the normative benefits ascribed to the hypothetical unanimity principle. If the constitution is authored by a small group and the veil is thereby removed, instrumental considerations come to bear and the authors of the constitution establish themselves as Oligarch.     

Political Learning: The Neglected Precondition of Constitutional Reform

This paper analyses the claim of constitutional economics that liberal economic policy requires far-reaching constitutional reform. The paper starts with a restatement of this claim and reinforces the rationale of the currently most influential variants of constitutional economics as represented by contractarian constitutional economics (Brennan, Buchanan), on the one hand, and Hayek s evolutionary theory, on the other. However, these constitutional proposals have shortcomings because the institutional preconditions of constitutional reform are not sufficiently reflected. Instead, I argue that, in face of economic crisis, a revision of in-period politics requires no more collective rationality than constitutional reform does. As a consequence, the introduction of new constitutional rules depends on political learning. The article concludes that constitutional rules in the sense of CPE can stabilise political learning but they cannot replace it.     

Taxes or Fees? The Political Economy of Providing Excludable Public Goods

This paper provides a positive analysis of public provision of excludable public goods financed by uniform taxes or fees. Individuals differing in preferences decide, using majority rule, the provision level and financing instrument. The decisive voter has median preferences in a tax regime, but generally has above median preferences in a fee regime. Numerical solutions indicate that populations with uniform or left‐skewed distributions of preferences choose taxes, while a majority coalition of high‐ and low‐preference individuals prefer fees when preferences are sufficiently right skewed. Public good provision and welfare under fees exceeds that under taxes in the latter case.     

Heterogeneous Dynasties and the Political Economy of Public Debt

We consider a small open overlapping generations economy with descending altruism. Heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that each parent procreates a fixed proportion of selfish children. Altruistic parents can recognize the type of each child. There is no Ricardian equivalence and an active public intergenerational transfer policy is attractive to altruistic dynasty members, although there may be no unanimity among them. We display reasonable conditions for indirect preferences to be single-peaked and we apply the median voter theorem. We then describe political equilibrium paths and discuss their compatibility with the steady path of an underlying closed economy with autonomous labor productivity growth.
JEL classification : D 31; D 64; D 72; D 91; H 63     

Political Economy and Islamic Politics: Insights from the Indonesian Case

It is argued in this study that the trajectory of Islamic politics in Indonesia has been shaped within larger processes of state formation and socio-economic and political changes associated with the advance of the market economy and the pressures of globalisation. It incorporates the Indonesian case into a vast and well-developed debate that has hitherto focused on North Africa and the Middle East. As such it offers a distinct interpretation that goes beyond the prevailing understanding of Islamic politics in Indonesia as the product of conflicts over ideas, doctrine or culture or the institutional requisites of authoritarianism or democracy. Specifically, it is proposed that Islamic politics has been underpinned variously by the conservatism of small propertied interests, the populism of marginalised urban and small town middle classes and the ambitions of the upper middle classes and business. While these dynamics are found across much of the Muslim world, the political outcomes have been diverse. We show that the Indonesian trajectory has been greatly influenced by the failure of Islamic politics to establish effective cross-class alliances behind the banners of Islam and the ability of the secular state to effectively establish its own apparatus of populist politics.     

Deregulation and Productivity: The Case of Spanish Banks

This paper deals with measuring total factor productivity (TFP) growth of financial institutions incorporating different types of deregulatory measures. TFP growth is decomposed into external, scale, and markup components. The external component is further dissected into deregulation and technical change components. The TFP growth relationship is included as an additional equation in estimating the cost system. The empirical model uses panel data on Spanish banks (savings and commercial banks). We find that deregulations contributed positively to TFP growth for both savings and commercial banks. Furthermore, domestic (European) deregulations had a greater effect on TFP growth of savings (commercial) banks. JEL Classification: D24, D40, G21Lozano-Vivas acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER grant n° BEC2002-02852. The authors thank an anonymous referee, the editor of the JRE and seminar participants at the XI International Tor Vergata Conference on Banking and Finance: Monetary Integration, Markets and Regulation (Rome, Italy) and at the Asian Pacific Productivity and Efficiency Conference (Taipei, Taiwan) for numerous suggestions. A previous version of this paper was distributed as working paper E2004/24, CentrA.     

Carbon Trading Reporting: The Case of Spanish Companies

Policy makers, scientists, industry leaders, and academicians all have debated how to restrain global warming and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Three main methods are used: command and control laws and regulations, carbon taxes, and cap and trade schemes. Recognizing the consequences of global warming, all Scandinavian countries introduced a carbon emissions tax in the 1990s. They also ratified the Kyoto Protocol that ran from 2005 through 2012. The European Union (EU) instituted a carbon trading scheme (Emissions Trading System (ETS)) in February 2005 when Kyoto became operative. The three Scandinavian EU members had two methods in place during the 2005–08 period to encourage GHG reduction: taxing and trading. Norway, not in the EU, used just taxes. The other EU members, including Spain, applied just the carbon trading ETS scheme to encourage compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. The fundamental issue addressed is this one: Did publicly held firms headquartered in Spain adequately report participation in the EU carbon emissions trading mechanism? Data to answer this question were obtained from the 2011 and 2012 annual reports for domestic Spanish public companies that received tradable emissions permits. In addition to assessing investor-owned firms’ disclosure posture, the specific method of reporting about carbon emissions permits, whether companies used, banked, or sold the permits granted by the government, also is reviewed. This empirical research effort reports on a complete survey of all available data for the two financial reporting periods that concluded the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol.     

The Powers of The Central Governments and the Problems of Enlarging and Deepening the European Union: An Essay of Constitutional Political Economy

In this paper we present an adaptation of Buchanan and Tullock’s model in order to apply it to the constitutional choices regarding the assigning of powers to a supranational authority. The outcome of the economic-political model developed in this paper demonstrates that there are constraints in the supply of integration, suggesting that the enlargement and deepening of the European Union will have to be based on federalist conceptions. The authors should like to thanks seminar participants at European Public Choice conference (Belgirate 2002) and ECSA-C conference (Toronto 2002) where earlier versions of the paper have benefited from constructive suggestions. The authors assume the sole responsibility for any errors remaining in this version.     

Rate of Return Regulation: The Case of Spanish Ports

An original model is put forward in this article to explain and consider the behavior of some of the most important public services in Spain. The cost function approach and the input distance function approach are used to estimate the existence of overcapitalization as a result of rate of return regulation. The results show that overcapitalization generated by this regulation is too significant not to be taken into account.     

The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

Economic and Political Solutions to Social Problems: The Case of Second-hand Smoke in Enclosed Public Places

This article utilises a case study of the problem of second-hand smoke in enclosed public places to examine economic and political solutions to social problems. The responses of economic actors to this problem are examined via review of a number of pre-existing case studies of private arrangements in bars and restaurants prior to the introduction of smoking bans. The responses of political actors are examined via a study of the legislative process that led to the ban on smoking in enclosed public places introduced in England in 2007. This empirical evidence supports the view that economic decision-making leads to a plurality of different accommodations of different preferences, suggestive of inter-subjective learning, whereas political decision-making leads to exclusive, all-or-nothing solutions indicative of an adversarial approach to decision-making and the imposition of one group's preferences on the whole population.     

The Political Economy of Social Security

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity. In such a setting, a redistributive pay-as-you-go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is higher than the rate of population growth. The workers with medium wages (not those with the lowest wages) and the retirees form a majority which votes for a positive level of social security. This level depends on the difference between the rates of population growth and interest as well as on the redistributiveness of the benefit rule.     

The Political Economy of Argentina's Debacle

In this paper I argue that political economy considerations and, in particular, the identity of the reformers, are central to understanding the Argentine crisis that culminated in sovereign default in January 2002. During the 1990s, the main political parties remained attached to populism, and no strong party emerged at the center of the political spectrum. This had two effects in the reform process. First, it severely deteriorated it (efficiency, corruption), reducing the support of the population. Second, when a series of shocks hit the economy the anti‐reform camp tried to undo most reforms, and thus convey a message to the population about the “right” model of the world.