伊朗回购合同模式下作业者投资回收面临的挑战及应对策略

伊朗回购服务合同是目前所有油气合作模式中风险最大的服务合同之一。回购合同的作业者必须按照回购合同条款,先期垫付执行合同所需的投资,而且只有在项目建成投产移交后,才能进入商业回收阶段,作业者才能定期从产品销售收入中回收投资成本、操作费用、固定报酬和银行利息;在回收过程中,还面临着诸如产量、回收模式和回收途径等困难和挑战。本文主要说明伊朗回购合同作业者商业回收的具体流程,结合当前伊朗面临的国际、国内形势,分析回收过程中所面临的挑战,提出了一系列有效的应对策略,以确保中国企业在伊朗的投资及收益能够顺利实现。     

伊朗回购合同模式下回购审计分析

按照伊朗回购合同的要求,作业者须按照回购合同条款,先期垫付执行合同所需的投资,而且这些投资须经过伊朗国家石油公司(NIOC)审计后,方可作为投资成本,计息回收。本文基于工作实践,从作业者的角度阐述了NIOC对回购合同项目的审计经验,包括财务系统各项功能的完善、预付款记账科目的选择、财务费用的成本控制、固定资产标准的确定、账务凭证及付款资料的完备、采办程序的严格遵守、采办合同及订单条款的严格执行、合同执行进度的控制及跟踪、人事政策的及时确定、人力成本发生合理合规性的控制以及回购合同条款细节执行等方面的审计经验。这些经验有助于作业者保证投资成本能够得到及时确认和回收。     

伊朗油气回购合同执行中的风险及对策分析

近十多年来,伊朗采用回购合同的模式与外国公司进行油气合作。回购合同项目在执行过程中存在多方面的风险,主要包括：合同超期风险,成本和报酬回收风险,实际支出超过回购合同规定的资本成本上限的风险,地质和产量风险,钻井和设施建设等方面的技术风险,以及由于伊朗受到国际制裁给项目执行带来的风险。伊朗对回购合同的执行控制很严格,在目前复杂的国际政治环境下,执行合同的难度加大,因此承包商需要认真研究回购合同合作模式,分析执行过程中的各种风险,确定相应策略,力争得到伊方的认可,实现伊朗国家石油公司（NIOC）和承包商的双赢。     

伊朗回购合同项目的财务管理策略

伊朗油气资源丰富,但在欧美制裁加剧之下,西方石油公司纷纷退出伊朗油气市场,这给中国石油公司的大举进入创造了前所未有的机遇。然而,伊朗国际政治环境恶劣,战争风险客观存在,执行回购合同的阻力较大。从财务管理与会计核算的角度看,在执行回购合同过程中,需要积极探索有效的财务管理手段,细化会计核算体系,做好资金管理、财务成本管理、税费核算等工作,不断提升科学管理水平。     

伊朗新石油合同与回购合同差异及对经济效益的影响

针对伊朗推出的新石油合同,主要从合同关系、合同期、主体开发方案、投资、工期、产量、报酬费计算与成本回收、作业权等方面分析了与回购合同的差异.伊朗新石油合同与回购合同对于承包商经济效益的影响是不同的,对比分析工期、投资、油价、产量因素对项目内部收益率的影响可以看出,针对超投资、超工期、油价下降、产量下降的风险,伊朗新石油合同的内部收益率下降程度均低于回购合同,能取得比回购合同更好的经济效益,具有较强的抗风险能力.在回购合同下,内部收益率对投资变动最为敏感;在新石油合同下,内部收益率对产量变动最为敏感.     

伊朗新石油合同模式投资效果对比分析

伊朗政府推出的新石油合同与回购合同相比有了很多变化.对于伊朗原油开发项目,假定并选取投资参数,运用折现现金流量法,计算对比回购合同和新石油合同两种模式下的承包商投资效益,结果显示,承包商的内部收益率、净现值、投资回收期等指标,新石油合同略好于回购合同.回购合同模式下承包商的资金压力远高于新石油合同模式.低油价形势下,新石油合同的成本报酬回收风险相对较低.两种合同模式下,承包商均无法从高产量、高油价中分享到超额收益;在油田欠产、低油价时需承担投资效益受损的风险.产量、投资、实际油价、投标油价依次是影响新石油合同承包商效益的敏感因素;投资、产量、实际油价依次是影响回购合同承包商效益的敏感因素.新石油合同的承包商能从增产激励、高油价中分享部分超额收益,更愿意在项目执行过程中控制成本,节约投资.     

优化合同提高国际油气投资效益

<正>伊朗具有丰富的油气资源。回购合同是伊朗开展油气领域对外合作的主要合同类型。这种类型的合同实际上是一种风险投资工程服务合同。而目前伊朗的回购合同又可细分为三种类型,分别是开发油田的回购合同、勘探区块的回购合同和勘探开发一体化的回购合同。在回购合同模式下,项目运行受到资源国政府及其国家石油公司的层层监控,特别是在伊朗这个特殊的国家以及所处的特殊历史阶段,投资者的自主决策非常有限。勘探开发方不仅需要承担项目开发所需要的全部资金,还要承担因原油产量不足而不能收回全部投资和报酬费的风险以及各种可能的惩     

伊拉克石油技术服务合同模式再析

伊拉克石油技术服务合同是国际油气开发和管理的一种重要模式.根据技术服务合同项目运行5年多来的管理实践和作业经验,对技术服务合同的关键内容和核心机制进行了较为深入和细致的梳理研究,包括管理架构设置,合同高峰产量目标,项目采办程序、审批及原产地,限产补偿机制,成本回收和提油销售安排以及当地法律遵守几个方面,为中国石油企业及其他企业进入伊拉克油气市场、开展投资项目提供借鉴和参考.     

伊朗回购合同关键经济商务条款分析

伊朗的回购合同中,开发油田的回购合同最具典型性.本文结合多个已签订的回购合同样本以及多次与伊朗谈判、交流的结果,就与伊朗进行回购合同谈判时的一些关键经济商务条款进行了分析,该分析有助于快速谈判时对风险的把握.本文分析的关键经济商务条款包括:合同收益率、资本投资上限、成本回收上限、银行费用、报酬费/资本成本(R/C)、产量测试、实际报酬费调整、投资/回收剖面形状和开发生产计划.     

伊朗回购合同模式下的采购策略探讨

伊朗对于外国投资者开发伊朗油气资源的项目,均采用回购合同的合作模式。在回购合同模式下,物资采购有着审批环节多、部分物资采购受限、要求利用本地资源的比例较高、项目总体计划工期紧以及风险较大的特点。按照有利于降低采购风险、利用本地资源、提高采购效率和控制采购成本的原则,回购合同承包商可根据具体情况,分别采用集中采购、本地采购、联合采购和间接采购的策略。伊朗的国际政治环境的复杂性与回购合同的特殊性,决定了在伊朗回购合同模式下采购活动的特殊性的策略。回购合同承包商在确定采购策略时,需要对当地的政治、社会、自然环境等进行全方位的充分调研,结合回购合同特点和伊朗当地的资源状况、政策法规、国际环境以及承包商在其他国家的实践经验,制定出合理的采购策略。     

Prognose der Kraftstoffpreisentwicklung und ihrer Auswirkungen auf die Nachfrage nach Bahntransportleistungen in Österreich

Due to increasing crude oil consumption, especially of the fast growing Asian economies, decreasing production rates of several oil fields and increasing exploration costs, the oil price reached a new all time high in July 2008. The present world wide economic crisis caused a sharp decrease of the oil prices, nevertheless, prices will rise again with economic recovery. In this paper, long term projections of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and future contracts notations are employed to estimate oil price development until the year 2020. We estimate the price transmission of crude oil prices to Austrian retail diesel and gasoline prices and combine the estimation results with long term projections of the crude oil price. These projections are used to analyze the effect of rising oil prices on Austrian railway demand. The effect of increasing mineral oil taxes with the aim of an increasing internalisation of the external costs of road traffic on railway demand is discussed.     

回购合同模式及其经济评价方法研究

在国际油气勘探开发合作项目中，资源国与承包商之间新兴的回购合同（BUY-BACK）在中东一些国家得到应用。文章介绍了回购合同的主要内容，通过举例对回购合同进行经济评价，并对回购合同的经济评价提出了一些建议。     

伊拉克石油工业发展现状及最新投资环境变化

战后伊拉克石油产量恢复增长,原油出口量逐年回升,三大油田项目实现初始产量目标,艾哈代布油田顺利投产。2010年10月,伊拉克举行了第三轮油气田招标。随着中标油田的进一步开发,未来伊拉克的油气产量将大幅攀升,但由于受欧佩克可能限产、基础设施薄弱、出口能力不足以及油田开发建设条件等因素影响,预计伊拉克政府在2017年使原油产量增加到1200万桶/日以上的计划难以实现。目前,伊拉克正处于石油工业重建的历史转折期,政局前景未明,安全形势依然严峻,国际石油公司可能面临重新谈判合同的新形势;但同时,伊政府计划大力发展国内基础设施,大力发展天然气和炼油行业,外国石油公司在伊的机遇大于挑战,可择机参与配套基础设施项目。从长期看,伊拉克油气产量增长将给世界石油市场带来显著影响和冲击,伊拉克将在世界油气格局中发挥更加重要的作用。     

Corruption in PPPs,incentives and contract incompleteness

We analyze risk allocation and contractual choices when public procurement is plagued with moral hazard, private information on exogenous shocks, and threat of corruption. Complete contracts entail state-contingent clauses that compensate the contractor for shocks unrelated to his own effort. By improving insurance, those contracts reduce the agency cost of moral hazard. When the contractor has private information on revenues shocks, verifying messages on shocks realizations is costly. Incomplete contracts do not specify state-contingent clauses, thereby saving on verifiability costs. This makes incomplete contracts attractive even though they entail greater agency costs. Because of private information on contracting costs, a public official may have discretion to choose whether to procure under a complete or an incomplete contract. When the public official is corrupt, such delegation results in incomplete contracts being chosen too often. Empirical predictions on the use of incomplete contracts and policy implications on the benefits of standardized contracts are discussed.     

INFORMATION REVELATION AND BUYER PROFITS IN REPEATED PROCUREMENT COMPETITION*

I investigate how procurement costs are affected by the information that buyers reveal about sellers' behavior, in a setting with two sequentially offered contracts for which a seller's privately known costs are identical. Expected prices are lowest when sellers learn nothing until all contracts are allocated, are higher when they learn all sellers' price offers as contracts are allocated, and typically are even higher when they learn only the winner's identity, or the winner's identity and price offer. The results suggest that buyers engaged in repeated procurement may pay less by revealing minimal or extensive information, rather than an intermediate amount.     

Distribution contracts to support optimal inventory holdings under demand uncertainty

When suppliers produce products for which demand is uncertain, they face a problem of inducing downstream distributors to stock inventory levels that the suppliers prefer. This paper considers a wide array of alternative supply contracts, each of which consists of a mixture of constant per-unit wholesale prices, buy-back arrangements, and post sale payments contingent on sales made, such as revenue sharing or buybacks. We show that linear supply contracts specifying any combination of two of these three instruments can implement the vertical integrated outcome for a monopoly, thereby generating the supplier's preferred inventory configuration and price distribution. We extend our results to differentiated product oligopoly, demonstrating that each supplier obtains its preferred inventory configuration and price distribution, given the choices of its rival. Distributors choose optimal inventories from the suppliers' standpoint, even if suppliers do not know the distribution of demand uncertainty, and, given the perfect competition among distributors, all profits in the supply chain are captured by suppliers. Thus, suppliers are able to deal with demand uncertainty with remarkably little information about demand, and without the need to control dealer actions in detail. In particular, suppliers need not specify either dealer inventories or resale prices, but instead encourage distributors to order based on information in their possession and to set prices that generate desirable resale price dispersion.     

Agency Costs in Apartment Property Management Contracts

Because fees for property management services are based on gross rental collections rather than on net operating incomes, property managers may not always act in the best interest of property owners. This study is an examination of the agency costs that result from the conflict of interests between owners and managers. A nationwide proprietary sample of 242 apartment properties is analyzed to compare agency costs of four distinct types of ownership structures. Agency costs, measured as operating expenses per square foot, are found to be significantly higher for institutional owners than for noninstitutional owners, but not significantly higher in cases where no competition for property management services exists. We conclude that agency costs of property management contracts are significant and the fee provisions of standard property management contracts should be changed to better align the interests of managers and owners.     

The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales

In England and Wales, wholesale electricity is sold in a spot market partly covered by long-term contracts which hedge the spot price. Two dominant conventional generators can raise spot prices well above marginal costs, and this is profitable in the absence of contracts. If fully hedged, however, the generators lose their incentive to raise prices above marginal costs. Competition in the contract market could lead the generators to sell contracts for much of their output. Since privatisation the generators have indeed covered most of their sales in the contract market.     

Pricing Mortgage Originations

The general structure of observed mortgage loan contracts and the structure of firms in the industry can be explained in terms of competitive markets and rational expectations. It is not necessary to invoke disequilibrium, credit-rationing theories. Collateralization, covenants, downpayments, and other noninterest rate provisions in loan contracts are efficient mechanisms to control the conflict of interest between the borrower and lender. Finally, there are constraints lenders place on the range of contractual provisions offered because of interdependencies in payoffs across contracts and the costs they face associated with insolvency.     

航空燃油市场的发展趋势

国际航空燃油市场虽然持续供于求，但是中国持续出现需求缺口，我们调研了中国国内航空燃油生产商和分销机构等，采用规范和实证的分析方法，提出了一些重要结论：中国航空燃油生产和供给成本高，资源配置效率有待进一步提高，航空燃油需求继续旺盛，新世纪里的十年几需求缺口可能进一步扩大。