Managing and modeling the price reduction effect in mobile telecommunications traffic

As needs for telecommunications services diversify, an increasingly wide range of services is becoming available in the market. Service price reduction is one strategy used by service providers to retain existing subscribers. A price reduction for one service, however, can affect the individual-level usage for other services. Price reductions can also be imposed on a service provider by regulation. For these reasons, understanding how price reductions affect service usage is of growing importance to the telecommunications industry for purposes of pricing and tariff development. In this paper, an individual-level usage model for telecommunications services is developed and the effects on usage of a price reduction are analyzed. The model is applied to age-stratified aggregate traffic data for a Korean mobile telecommunication service provider. Finally, a 0-1 integer programming model is proposed for choosing which market segment should be targeted with a price reduction to minimize revenue loss. These models can be applied to market segmentation and price reduction strategy.     

Infrastructure investment and optimal access regulation in the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization

In this paper, we compare the optimal access regulation under three different market configurations that approximate the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization. We show that in the first stage of market liberalization the regulator has to balance between static efficiency and investment and that the optimal access price may be above marginal cost. In the second stage, two different outcomes are possible. If entrants tend to underinvest, the regulator balances between static efficiency and investment. If entrants tend to overinvest, the regulator sets the access price as low as possible in order to prevent or limit infrastructure duplication. Interestingly, we find that in the third stage of market liberalization the regulator may decide to promote infrastructure duplication and to set the access price above the price in the first stage of market liberalization, even if telecommunications network operators tend to overinvest in infrastructure duplication.     

Quality-adjusted international price comparisons of mobile telecommunications services

Many countries' policymakers have conducted international price comparisons of mobile telecommunications services to prevent service operators from overcharging subscribers. However, those comparisons have become more complicated because of the escalation in service usage and telecommunications expenditures spurred by the proliferation of smartphones and broadband LTE wireless internet service networks. The basket-based methodologies that have been widely used for international price comparisons are also limited—first, because the baskets for comparison may not be representative of actual service usage patterns in some countries; second, because they are difficult to apply to highly differentiated service plans due to the significant increase in wireless internet service usage and widely used plans with unlimited voice call service and SMS/MMS; and third, because they cannot consider the quality of service, such as upload and download speed in various service environments, at all. As an alternative, this paper proposes a hedonic pricing model that accounts for service quality and its variation in potentially disruptive environments, as well as fixed charge for a mobile phone additional to the price of service plans. The model was used to derive quality-adjusted price indices of mobile telecommunications services for twelve cities in ten countries with broadband LTE wireless internet service. The empirical results confirmed that the price index of each city varied significantly across the specifications,—both within the United States and internationally—depending on whether the model was constructed to reflect service quality and its variation on roads, in buildings, and in subways. The price index of each city also varied depending on whether the subsidized price of a mobile phone was considered part of the monthly price of a service plan. These results have important implications for policymakers seeking to understand the ultimate level of mobile telecommunication service prices for their country in a global context.     

A Semiparametric Method for Estimating Local House Price Indices

Spatial autoregressive hedonic models utilize house prices lagged in space and time to produce local house price indices, for example, the spatial and temporal autoregressive (STAR) model might be used this way. This paper complements these models with a semiparametric approach, the Local Regression Model (LRM). The greater flexibility of the LRM may allow it to identify space–time asymmetries missed by other models. The LRM is fitted to 49,511 sales from 1972Q1 to 1991Q2 in Fairfax County, Virginia. The local price indices display plausible and significant variations over space and time. The LRM price indices in selected neighborhoods are shown to differ significantly from those in some other neighborhoods. A new method for estimating standard errors addresses an overlooked problem common to all local price indices: how to evaluate the amount of noise in the estimates. Out-of-sample prediction errors demonstrate that LRM adds significant information to the hedonic model.     

Profitability, productivity and price recovery patterns in the U.S. telecommunications industry

We undertake a study where we examine changes in the profitability, productivity and price recovery of firms in the U.S. telecommunications industry over a sixteen-year period. We assess the performance of thirty-three major companies in the local-exchange sector over six time periods 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 and 1990, using a performance analysis model which disaggregates the profitability measure into two components: productivity and price recovery. We demonstrate the computation of performance using this technique. Our study indicates that the opening up of markets has had a significant impact on different dimensions of performance in the telecommunications industry, also validating a number of theoretical assumptions about the impact that industry changes are expected to have on firms.     

The Political Economy of Price Cap Regulation

The last decade has witnessed a dramatic substitutionof price cap regulation for rate-of-return regulationin the telecommunications industry. The 1996Telecommunications Act empowers state regulators toset the terms of competitive entry in local telephonemarkets. We investigate whether the form of regulationendogenously affects the regulator's behavior withrespect to competitive entry. The evidence revealsthat regulators in price cap jurisdictions tend to setmore liberal terms of entry in comparison withregulators in rate-of-return jurisdictions. Thissuggests that price cap regulation suffers fromincomplete contracting, undermining the potentiallysuperior incentive properties of this importantregulatory reform.     

Consumer behavior towards on-net/off-net price differentiation

This paper explores how consumers react towards price differentiation between on-net and off-net calls in mobile telecommunications - a pricing policy that is common in many mobile telecommunications markets. Based on a survey of 1044 students it is demonstrated that some consumers may suffer from a "price differentiation bias", i.e., a fair number of consumers may overestimate the savings that result from reduced on-net and/or off-net charges, as they do not appear to weigh the prices with the probabilities of placing off-net and on-net calls. This may help to explain why it have been the smaller operators in various countries who have introduced on-net/off-net price differentiation. The paper also discusses the implications that such a consumer bias may have for market competition.     

The transformation of the mobile telecommunications industry in Pakistan: A developing country perspective

This paper offers a rare insight into the reality of the mobile telecommunications market transformation in Pakistan. Our analytical framework treats the mobile telecommunications market as a complex socio-technical system. Specifically, we define the telecommunications market as being composed of technology standards and three sets of social actors that include government institutions, network and service providers, and users. In the case of Pakistan, these social actors together determine the adoption of standards and services, and thus shape the trajectory of the market change. Our case study provides evidence that a pro-competition policy is imperative for mobile telecommunications development in developing countries, and an independent regulator is critical in promoting technological innovation.     

Competition in Turkish mobile telecommunications markets: Price elasticities and network substitution

This paper estimates demand elasticities for Turkish mobile telecommunications markets. In contrast to most other studies, firm-level data is used to estimate dynamic panel data models including instrumental variable techniques. Both short- and long-run elasticities are calculated, yielding a long-run price elasticity of −0.72 for the post-paid market and of −0.33 for the pre-paid market. The short-run price elasticity is estimated to be −0.36 for the post-paid market and −0.20 for the pre-paid market. In addition, there is evidence of fixed-to-mobile traffic substitution for consumers who use pre-paid cards.     

The impact of regulation on the retail prices in fixed-line telephony across the European Union

This paper estimates reduced-form models for incumbent prices in the fixed telecommunications industry using data for European Union (EU) countries from 1998 to 2002. The regulation of fixed-line telephony has a significant impact on prices for residential consumers. Liberalization of the telecommunications industry decreased retail prices by about 8.2%. The introduction of carrier pre-selection and number portability had a negative impact on price levels. The estimation results also suggest that a 1% decrease in termination charges on the incumbent network led on average to a 0.17% decrease in the cost of usage basket for residential consumers. Furthermore, in the pricing regressions for incumbent local and national calls at peak and off-peak times interconnection charges are significant only in the estimation of national peak prices. A 1% decrease in single transit interconnection charges on the incumbent network led to a 0.31% decrease in incumbent national prices at peak times, as calculated for the average prices in the EU in 2002.     

Telecommunications models: Planning for regional development in LDCs

The aim of telecommunications policy in the less developed countries should be to contribute to general development goals, but the links between economic development and telecommunications are not clearly understood. The authors suggest a dual approach to this problem. First, this involves the construction of models of demand based on the interaction between regional economic development and telecommunications use. Second, corporate models are required to explore the feasibility of particular supply strategies. The progress of practical work in these areas is described and includes the results of some specific research in Kenya.     

Regional structure and telecommunications planning

The general role of telecommunications in economic development has been recognized, but there remain some important specific issues in matching telecommunications planning to development goals. The author suggests a new approach, based on models relating regional structure to telecommunications demand. Data, which are readily available, on populations in places and rural areas within a region are used to derive a regional structure composed of places and the links between them. These links are found to be very closely related to telecommunications demand. This article suggests that telecommunications and development planners in the Third World should pay particular attention to ensuring that all the links between places in a region are served, and that the models presented here could form the basis for suitable planning criteria.     

Pricing of telecommunications services

Recently many scholars have argued that society's welfare would be increased if the price of local telephone service were increased, and the prices for toll and enhanced telecommunication services reduced. In this paper we argue that the telecommunications policy literature has largely ignored the impact of varying technical standards on the cost-of-service. Consequently, the marginal cost of exchange service has been overstated. We also show that most work in this area has overstated the elasticity-of-demand for toll services. Taking into account quality and the appropriate elasticities, we conclude that no clear welfare gains will be achieved by raising the price of exchange service.     

Demand for telecommunication services in developing countries

Living standards and economic growth in developing countries are invariably linked to the availability and use of telecom services. Effective policy decisions require the best estimates of the drivers of these services. In this paper, telecommunications demand is estimated in models for residential mainline and mobile telephone service for developing countries for the period 1996–2003. The paper tests for cross-price effects between mainline and mobile service and its findings have important policy implications. It finds residential monthly price elasticity to be insignificant for developing countries, but the connection elasticity is larger than generally found in the literature. Mobile monthly price elasticities are very large. A new and important empirical finding is that although wireline phones are substitutes in the mobile market, the contrary is not true—mobile phones are not substitutes in the wireline market, and in fact may be considered complements. This lack of symmetry has important implications for properly defining telecom markets. Universal service subsidies and competitive market initiatives should be reevaluated in light of the paper's elasticity estimates. Increased competition, income growth and enhanced education may be the ultimate universal service promoters.     

Financing and other issues in telecommunications development

Implementation of telecommunications infrastructure throughout developing countries is a prerequisite to national development. The fundamental question, argues Dr Parker, is how can developing countries pay for the capital investment in the necessary telecommunications equipment. The need is to encourage an institutional structure that can stimulate innovative, lower-cost appropriate rural telecommunications technologies without imposing excessive risks on the national telecommunications monopoly. With sucessful models to follow, it will be easier to achieve consensus between developing country borrowers, international lenders and telecommunications manufacturers.     

Telecommunications technology in rural health care

Areas of low population density present special problems with respect to the delivery of health services. In this article, an overview is given of some technological approaches to solving these problems. The author's remarks are based on several years of experience of managing a research programme in health care telecommunications, and, more recently, a review of selected Rural Health Initiative and Health underserved Rural Areas projects that utilize a combination of innovations involving telecommunications and computer technologies.     

Competitive behavior in the European mobile telecommunications industry: Pioneers vs. followers

This paper studies the relationship between competitive strategy and improvement in the competitive position of pioneers and followers in the mobile telecommunications industry. The analysis uses a panel of data comprising all the actions of European firms operating in the digital mobile telecommunications industry with GSM 900 and/or DCS 1800 networks. The results show that competitors gain market share when they follow competitive strategies that are different from those of other firms. The paper also finds that price reduction actions represent the best approach for followers, while differentiation actions are the most effective strategy for pioneers.     

Bertrand equilibrium with differentiated products considering fixed costs: Korean price regulation in the mobile telephone industry

In some industries such as telecommunications and electricity, the fixed costs are so high that competition is not sustainable without considering the fixed cost in pricing. The sustainability of competition is as important as enhancing competition when an industry is in the transitional period from being a monopoly owned or managed by the government to a competitive market structure driven by the market. A price competition model with asymmetric firms and product differentiation is considered in which firms compete with a normal profit constraint. The constraint is related to the sustainability of competition and can be realized through price regulation. With this constraint, firms gain only normal profit in equilibrium despite the asymmetry, and consumer surplus is maximized. The equilibrium is meaningful in defining the industry performance intended through the regulation. Moreover, the price regulation of the Korean mobile telephone market is considered to discuss any implications of this equilibrium.     

Various wholesale price equilibria for mobile virtual network operators

In this paper, various equilibria are analyzed according to the leader–follower relationship between vertically integrated incumbents when downstream entries are present. This analysis broadens our understanding of the incentives involved in deciding the wholesale price, which can be applied to explain the different situations of diffusion of mobile virtual network operators in the telecommunications market. Several implications are derived to facilitate effective policy formulation and management.     

On the determinants of non-market strategy: The separations mechanism and cost shifting in the telecommunications industry

This study examines the relationship between performance levels and the levels of cross-subsidy attained by local exchange carriers in the United States telecommunications industry. These cross-subsidies have been obtained by firms via their engagement in a separations mechanism, based on a cost allocation process, which telecommunications sector regulatory authorities use. Non-market strategies have assumed primacy in the activities of several sectors world-wide. Thus, understanding non-market strategic choices is important in the analysis of firms’ behavior and performance. Active engagement in the separations process is an important non-market strategy in the telecommunications industry, as a firm relatively successful in this activity can gain large cross-subsidies. The analysis establishes that less profitable firms obtain greater cross-subsidies. Once the profitability variable is decomposed into its two main components, which are productivity and price recovery, the impact of the profitability variable reduces. Firms which are relatively unproductive, as well as those unable to recover higher output prices, obtain relatively greater cross-subsidies. These results are inconsistent with the postulates of the strategic cost-allocation and behavior literatures but are consistent with x-inefficiency and rent-seeking perspectives of firms’ strategic actions.