On the theory of optimal government behaviour

A small politico-economic model of the U.S. is presented. Optimal policies for a vote-maximising government and an ideology-maximising government are derived. Different assumptions concerning the expectation formation mechanism and the discount rates of voters and government are employed. Though the structure of the cycle depends on the specific assumptions, it turns out that in most cases it is advantageous for the government to produce a ‘political business cycle’. Therefore it is asked how voters can force government to choose the socially optimal policy.     

SMEs and public procurement policy

In this paper, we characterize an optimal procurement policy as a mechanism design problem when an allotment of the contract is available, i.e., when a government faces both SMEs and large firms for carrying out a heterogeneously divisible project. Our model allows us to analyze all procurement policies (set-asides, favoritism, non-discriminatory rules), taking into account both efficiency and distributive arguments and derive a normative framework. We show that set-asides are not generally optimal, whatever the industrial preferences of the government are, while the optimal preferential treatments of firms implies complex non-linear rules. We prove that the optimal policy can be implemented using a modified Vickrey-type auction. We also consider that the firms can reduce their cost by a non observable effort, and exhibit the specific impact of cost reduction incentives on the optimal policies.Received: 24 September 2001, JEL Classification: D44Pierre-HenriMorand : I am grateful to the anonymous referees for comments. The usualdisclaimer applies.     

Can asymmetric punishment deter endogenous bribery

This paper studies the effects of asymmetric punishment of bribery on both bribery and compliance with regulations. The bribe amount is decided via Nash bargaining and regulatory compliance and whistle-blowing are strategic decisions. Moreover, investigations of bribery and noncompliance occur in a manner that may be interdependent. We show that, under symmetric punishment, inducing whistle-blowing has no effect on the frequency of bribery. When the bribery and noncompliance investigations are independent, a switch from symmetric to asymmetric punishment either makes no difference or induces more nonharassment bribery. Only when bribery detection increases the chance of noncompliance detection and asymmetric punishment leads to whistle-blowing for both types of entrepreneurs, can the shift succeed in reducing noncompliance. The result is robust to the case where legalization of bribe-giving is not feasible for nonharassment bribes.     

Credibility and Monitoring: Outsourcing as a Commitment Device

We analyze an environment plagued by double moral hazard where the agent’s effort level and the principal’s precision in monitoring are not contractible. In such an environment, the principal tends to over‐monitor thereby inducing low effort. To ease the latter problem, the principal may choose to increase monitoring costs by outsourcing the activity. As a result equilibrium monitoring is reduced and incentives become more powerful. This choice is particularly likely when the worker’s effort is an important factor in determining output.     

Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort

We consider a principal who is keen to induce his agents to work at their maximal effort levels. To this end, he samples n days at random out of the T days on which they work, and awards a prize of B dollars to the most productive agent. The principal’s policy (B, n) induces a strategic game Γ(B, n) between the agents. We show that to implement maximal effort levels weakly (or, strongly) as a strategic equilibrium (or, as dominant strategies) in Γ(B, n), at the least cost B to himself, the principal must choose a small sample size n. Thus less scrutiny by the principal induces more effort from the agents.The need for reduced scrutiny becomes more pronounced when agents have information of the history of past plays in the game. There is an inverse relation between information and optimal sample size. As agents acquire more information (about each other), the principal, so to speak, must “undo” this by reducing his information (about them) and choosing the sample size n even smaller.     

Convertible tranche in securitization

It is essential to motivate a banker in order to diligently screen borrowers if the banker has the option to securitize its loans and sell part of it to outside investors. Based on theoretical analysis and experimental research, we propose that issuing a convertible tranche in securitization can not only motivate a banker to exert greater effort to screen loans, but also lead to higher prices for selling tranches. A convertible tranche can also increase the sale proportion of the loan pool under the condition of ensuring socially optimal effort, thereby increasing more social surplus than a static tranche. The optimal convertible proportion is positively related to the natural proportion of high-default-risk borrowers, the borrowers’ default possibilities, and the screening cost. The value of the convertible option is higher in an economic downturn. Consequently, not only should regulators formulate policies on the convertible proportion under consideration of the economic state, but also adopt a counter-cyclical policy.     

技术创新障碍及其提升机制的综述研究

随着现代科学技术和知识经济的发展,技术创新能力日益成为决定企业市场竞争力的重要指标。当前我国技术创新发展体系还不够成熟,存在一系列制约因素,主要包括体制因素、市场信息缺乏、消费者对于创新产品缺乏需求和信任以及技术创新高投入、高风险、高不确定性特征的约束。现阶段应继续在政策、法律等方面加大对企业创新的支持力度,并构建技术创新的服务和信息收集机制,促进企业技术创新能力的提升。     

Coordination and non-coordination risks of monetary and macroprudential authorities: A robust welfare analysis

This study compares a central bank’s leaning against the wind approach with a mix of monetary and macroprudential policies under parameter uncertainty in an estimated DSGE model with two financial frictions. We show that uncertainty of the economic environment is an essential constituent in properly designing macroprudential policy. Although coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies minimizes the policymakers’ Bayesian risk, coordination and non-coordination risks threaten the goals of both authorities. The former describes the situation where the authorities partly resign from implementing the monetary policy objectives to stabilize macroprudential risk. The latter is when conducting a non-coordinated macroprudential policy induces higher total Bayesian risk than when only the central bank minimizes the expected total welfare loss. The robust Bayesian macroeconomic rules show that when financial shocks shrink the banks’ or entrepreneurial net worth, a contractionary macroprudential policy should be combined with an expansionary monetary policy. However, if capital adequacy ratio or risk shocks strike the economy, such a conflict in macroeconomics policy instruments disappears, thus synchronizing both policies.     

加强新形势下企业纪检监察部门监督责任的策略分析

企业纪检监察部门肩负着党的纪律检查和企业行政监察职能,在党风廉政建设和反腐败工作中发挥着重要的监督作用。本文对当前企业纪检监察部门工作现状进行了分析,并有针对性地提出了解决对策,具有一定的借鉴意义。     

THE ECONOMICS OF TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE

Abstract. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that tax evasion is now fairly extensive throughout Western Europe and North America. Academic economists have shown considerable interest in various aspects of tax evasion. In this article we examine the literature on two particular issues. First, why do individuals evade their tax obligations and second, what policies should governments pursue in attempting to reduce or eliminate evasion? We concentrate on income tax evasion which has been the major preoccupation in the literature. We first show that the compliance costs of income tax evasion are quite substantial. We then examine theoretical attempts to model individual taxpayers behaviour. Here we find that it is extremely difficult to make unambiguous predictions concerning the effects of changes in important variables, such as income tax rates. Next, we review the empirical ‘evidence’ obtained from (i) attitudinal surveys, (ii) tax games, and (iii) econometric analysis of individuals’ tax returns. All of these studies are found to be flawed in certain major respects. Finally, we consider a number of policy options available to tax authorities. Given the difficulty of determining a socially optimal level of evasion, governments are likely to pursue suboptimal policies aimed at entirely eliminating tax evasion. However, even here there is considerable disagreement about the design of an efficient policy.     

Government policy and technological innovation—a suggested typology

Reports on the effects of government's role in stimulating technological development provide a mixed picture. Some policies have had the expected, stimulating effect and other policies have not. We suggest that specific characteristics of technologies that government has sought to stimulate have not been taken into account when governments formulated and implemented innovation policies. While technologies can be characterized according to more dimensions, we focus on two highly relevant characteristics. Technologies either develop in a discrete manner, independent of what specific knowledge has been developed in the past, or develop cumulatively. In addition, network effects may be present or absent in the market anticipated for the products for which a technology is used. A 2×2 typology of technological development ensues. We suggest that governments should consider developing policies to stimulate technological change keeping these characteristics in mind.     

土地市场中开发商行贿可能的定量判断

采用probit回归模型、线性回归模型以及引入工具变量的robust检验,对土地市场中开发商行贿的可能进行定量判断,研究发现:1.开发商行贿与其支付能力和拒绝能力的强弱分不开,支付能力与拒绝能力的组合,伴随着开发商对成本——收益的理性权衡,从而出现行贿的概率变化和程度变化;2.开发商行贿植根于土地市场政府管制的特定环境,政府管制使开发商行贿成为必然,而且管制的范围、官员自由裁量权的大小左右着贿金的金额和开发商的未来收益。     

Can the government create a vibrant cluster? Understanding the impact of cluster policy on the development of a cluster

Research has debated to what extent policy measures can facilitate or contribute to the development of clusters. This article contributes to this debate by questioning how the government can create a cluster that is self-organizing and vibrant but also maintain sufficient influence to continue using the cluster as a policy instrument. Taking the perspective of cluster members, the article investigates how members perceive the ambiguous role of the government in a government-supported cluster. It analyses to what extent cluster members value a government-supported cluster and whether they perceive the government as one that facilitates or hinders them in self-organizing the cluster. Empirical evidence is derived from a case study of a French cluster established as a result of a cluster policy initiative and which has recently been required to fulfil a new set of objectives by the same government. The findings suggest that government-supported clusters can self-organize if members are given the opportunity, but with the consequence that it becomes difficult for the government to fully control such clusters. To continue steering the cluster’s development, the government would have to leverage the technology gatekeepers’ power by designing policies that allow gatekeepers to translate government objectives into meaningful objectives for themselves.     

Learning about monetary policy rules when the cost-channel matters

We study how monetary policy may affect determinacy and expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium when the cost channel of monetary policy matters. Focusing on instrumental Taylor-type rules and optimal target rules, we show that standard policies can induce indeterminacy and expectational instability when the cost channel is present. A naïve application of the traditional Taylor principle could be misleading, and expectations-based reaction function under discretion does not always induce determinate and E-stable equilibrium. This result contrasts with the findings of Bullard and Mitra [2002. Learning about monetary policy rules. Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 1105–1129] and Evans and Honkapohja [2003. Expectations and stability problem for optimal monetary policies. Review of Economic Studies 70, 807–824] for the standard new Keynesian model. The ability of the central bank to commit to an optimal policy is an antidote to these problems.     

Task assignment,incentives and technological factors

In this paper, we examine the allocation of tasks between a principal and an agent considering their incentives to provide effort, their different abilities in handling tasks, and transmission costs. We focus our attention on two tasks: the first may be handled by the principal or by the agent, whereas the second is necessarily carried out by the agent. Under a fully decentralised organisation, the agent performs both tasks, whereas, under partial delegation, the principal handles the first task and transfers the outcome to the agent who handles the second task. Assuming technological complementarities, from our analysis it emerges that, if there is imperfect observability of effort, full delegation is better at eliciting effort by the agent in the second task, whereas, in comparison with partial delegation, it lowers effort in the first task. Although with contractible effort, the choice between the two organisational forms depends only on transmission costs and on the relative ability of its members, when moral hazard problems are taken into account, the organisational choice is related to the relative importance played by the two tasks in production. If the agent's task is relatively important in production, full delegation, encouraging a higher level of effort in this task, may be optimal, even if technological factors favour partial delegation. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

政府采购促进自主创新的经济学分析

自主创新是关系我国社会经济发展大局的问题,自主创新能力直接决定国家经济竞争力。政府可以采取多种政策措施促进自主创新,政府采购以其独特的优势在理论上和实践上被证明是一种十分有效的政策手段。本文从经济学的角度对政府采购促进自主创新的机理进行分析,试从理论上说明政府采购是促进自主创新的较好的政策手段,并从公共管理理论、政府干预理论、技术创新理论追溯了政府采购促进自主创新的理论渊源。     

江苏省与兄弟省市政府科技投入水平比较

文章通过对江苏省政府与兄弟省市政府的科技投入水平进行统计分析和比较后,指出了江苏省地方财政科技拨款存在的问题,提出了充分发挥江苏省科技经费投入效用应采取的措施.     

THE ROLE OF SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS IN MULTIPLIER ANALYSIS

Multiplier analysis based upon the information contained in Leontief's inverse is undoubtedly part of the core of the input–output methodology and numerous applications and extensions have been developed that exploit its informational content, both at the national and regional levels. Nonetheless there are some implicit theoretical assumptions whose policy implications need to be assessed. This is the case for the ‘excess capacity’ assumption, which implies that resources are available as needed to adjust production to new equilibrium states. In an actual economy, however, new resources are often scarce and always costly. When supply constraints intervene, the assessment of the effects of government demand policies may be substantially different from that of the standard Leontief multiplier matrix. Using a closed general equilibrium model that incorporates supply constraints, we perform some simple numerical exercises and proceed to derive two ‘constrained’ multiplier matrices, based upon the implicit Jacobian matrix, that can be compared with the standard ‘unconstrained’ Leontief matrix.     

Entrepreneurship and regional competitiveness: The role and progression of policy

Regions have gained a position at the forefront of the economic development policy agenda. However, the regional approach to economic strategy remains contested. This paper tests the extent to which regional policy in less competitive regions is accounting for issues relating to entrepreneurship and enterprise development as a tool for improving regional competitiveness. It does so by examining policies undertaken by the UK Labour government 1997–2010, drawing on interviews with policy makers and an analysis of relevant policy documents. This paper finds that entrepreneurship policy at the regional level is multidimensional, with policies broadly ranging from those that are either economically or socially driven. Although there is a considerable policy activity in these areas across less competitive regions, enterprise policy making remains relatively undifferentiated across the regions. There are a number of evolutions in regional policy occurring, especially a shift from policies relating to the facilitation of clusters to those focused on developing regional innovation ecosystems. It is found that regional policy makers are under pressure to measure short-term outputs at the expense of long-term nurturing. The paper also finds that there is a tension between using enterprise policy as a tool for improving regional competitiveness or for addressing economic and social disadvantage.     

A study on the incentive compensation structure with payroll tax: A continuous-time principal-agent model

This paper studies a case when the government levies a payroll tax on the employee (agent) of an enterprise. We use a continuous-time principal-agent framework to analyze the impact of the tax on the employee’s working strategy and derive an incentive compensation scheme. The agent is supposed to be aware of his pre-tax and after-tax salary. Under the theory of behavioral economics, loss caused by taxation is taken into consideration. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of principal’s profits is derived. By exploiting the HJB equation, we get several properties of the optimal contract. We also perform comparative statics to show our results. The model suggests that the agent’s utility loss enlarges as the tax rate increases. However, an increase in the tax rate does not always decrease principal’s profits.