Indivisible commodities and the nonemptiness of the weak core

We consider a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the weak core in a finite exchange economy where every commodity is available only in integer quantities. We show that if the aggregate upper contour set is discretely convex, then the weak core is nonempty. In addition, we give two sufficient conditions for the aggregate upper contour set to be discretely convex. One is that every upper contour set of every agent is M^?${\text{M}}^{?}$-convex. The other is that the number of commodities is two and every agent’s preference relation is weakly monotone and discretely convex.     

Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory

In a committee where cooperative voting occurs, effectivity functions describe the blocking power of coalitions. It is a binary relation that says for each coalition T and each subset of outcomes B whether or not T can force the final outcome within B. The corresponding cooperative stability notion generalizes the familiar core of a simple game. We study those effectivity functions yielding a non-empty core for all preference profiles, of which additive effectivity functions are an example. This proves to be closely related to implementation by means of the strong equilibrium concept.     

Elections and strategic positioning games

We formalize the interplay between expected voting behavior and strategic positioning behavior of candidates as a common agency problem in which the candidates (i.e., the principals) compete for voters (i.e., agents) via the issues they choose and the positions they take. A political situation is defined as a feasible combination of candidate positions and expected political payoffs to the candidates. Taking this approach, we are led naturally to a particular formalization of the candidates' positioning game, called a political situation game. Within the context of this game, we define the notion of farsighted stability (introduced in an abstract setting by Chwe 1994) and apply Chwe's result to obtain existence of farsightedly stable outcomes. We compute the farsightedly stable sets for several examples of political situations games, with outcomes that conform to real-world observations.Received: 18 May 2001, Accepted: 22 January 2002, JEL Classification: C7, D7, D8Myrna H. Wooders: http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/Economics/wooders/An earlier version of this paper was completed while the first author was visiting the Department of Economics, University of Exeter. The first author gratefully acknowledges Exeter's support and hospitality. Similarly, the second author gratefully acknowledges the support and hospitality of the Centre for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) of the University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium and of the University of Cergy-Pontoise, France. Both authors are indebted to Amrita Dhillon, John Duggan and Gilat Levy for helpful comments about references. Both authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Large economies and two-player games

We characterize the core and the competitive allocations of a continuum economy as strong Nash equilibria of an associated game with only two players.     

Learning and communication in sender‐receiver games: an econometric investigation

This paper compares stimulus response (SR) and belief‐based learning (BBL) using data from experiments with sender–receiver games. The environment, extensive form games played in a population setting, is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games. Both the SR and BBL models fit the data reasonably well in games where the preferences of senders and receivers are perfectly aligned and where the population history of the senders is known. The test results accept SR and reject BBL in games without population history and in all but one of the games where senders and receivers have different preferences over equilibria. Estimation is challenging since the likelihood function is not globally concave and the data become uninformative about learning once equilibrium is achieved. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

众核处理器核间通信的研究

随着时代的发展,计算机已经得到了广泛的应用,并逐渐成为人们生产生活中不可或缺的部分。单核处理器,由于其内部结构和频率功耗等因素的影响,已无法满足人们对处理器的要求,所以,多核处理器、众核处理器应运而生。本文针对众核处理器核间通信的现有结构特点—数据等待、每个核负担大、功耗大等缺点,提出了一种适应于异构众核处理器的核间通信结构—总线中间缓存(B-MM)结构,大幅度减少核间通信的等待情况,并且尽可能的简化每一个核的内部结构使其功能专一,提高其工作效率,进而提高众核处理器的性能。最后通过Modelsim SE仿真平台实验,验证了其可行性。     

Opportunity fairness and equal income Lindahl equilibrium

In this paper we propose a concept or opportunity fairness for economies in which there are public goods and establish its equivalence with the concept of an equal income Lindahl equilibrium.     

Strategic complementarities and nested potential games

This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player.     

Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games

A sharing game is a very simple device for partially reconciling an organization’s goal with the interests of its members. Each member chooses an action, bears its cost, and receives a share of the revenue which the members’ actions generate. A (pure-strategy) equilibrium of the game may be inefficient: surplus (revenue minus the sum of costs) may be less than maximal. In a previous paper, we found that for a wide class of reward functions, no one squanders at an inefficient equilibrium (spends more than at an efficient profile) if the revenue function has a complementarity property. In the present paper, we examine the “opposite” of the complementarity property (Substitutes) and we study a class of finite games where squandering equilibria indeed occur if Substitutes holds strongly enough. Squandering equilibria play a key role when one traces the effect of technological improvement on a sharing game’s surplus shortfall. We then turn to the question of choice among reward functions in a principal/agents setting. We find that if we again assume complementarity then strong conclusions can be reached about the reward functions preferred by “society”, by the players (agents), and by the principal.     

Estimation of finite sequential games

I propose a new estimation method for finite sequential games that is efficient, computationally attractive, and applicable to a fairly general class of finite sequential games that is beyond the scope of existing studies. The major challenge is the computation of high-dimensional truncated integration whose domain is complicated by strategic interaction. This complication resolves when unobserved off-the-equilibrium-path strategies are controlled for. Separately evaluating the likelihood contribution of each subgame-perfect equilibrium that generates the observed outcome allows the use of the GHK simulator, a widely used importance-sampling probit simulator. Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate the performance and robustness of the proposed method.     

The equal pay act: Responsibilities and rights

The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA) requires that men and women receive equal pay for equal work. Plaintiffs who claim discrimination on the basis of the EPA may settle out of court, or may bring legal action in the courts. Employers possess specific rights under the law, and can defend themselves against charges of discrimination through a number of “employer defenses.” These defenses involve providing that pay differences are based on seniority systems, merit systems, production systems, or “any other factor other than sex.” This article will also discuss the impact of court decisions that have further honed the responsibilities and rights of both employees and employers under the EPA.     

Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

This paper makes the observation that a finite Bayesian game with diffused and disparate private information can be conceived of as a large game with a non-atomic continuum of players. By using this observation as its methodological point of departure, it shows that (i) a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE) exists in a finite Bayesian game with private information if and only if a Nash equilibrium exists in the induced large game, and (ii) both Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal BNE exist in finite Bayesian games with private information. In particular, it shows these results to be a direct consequence of results for a version of a large game re-modeled for situations where different players may have different action sets.     

Learning and decision costs in one-person games

This paper reports the results of a two-part data analysis of learning in a repeated costly decision experiment. In the first part we test payoff dominance under the hypothesis of expected payoff maximization. We utilize a dynamic probability distribution over decisions for each player, characterizing what each player has learned about the payoff function by the moments from these distributions. In the second part, we test the hypothesis of expected payoff maximization for players in each treatment group. Expected payoff maximization is supported but payoff dominance is not. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regularity and robustness in monotone Bayesian games

This paper defines regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with one-dimensional actions and types. It analyzes the robustness of equilibria with respect to perturbations. It also proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium.     

Power and efficiency in production pillage games

A pillage game is a formal model of Hobbesian anarchy as a coalitional game. The technology of pillage is specified by a power function that determines the power of each coalition as a function of its members and their wealth. A coalition can despoil any other coalition less powerful than itself. The present paper studies the problem of achieving an efficient allocation of resources when the required reallocation changes the distribution of power. For example, land redistribution may increase total production, but may also deprive the original owners of the power they need to compel compensation. In this case the original owners would block the redistribution. Previous work on pillage games has focused on the stable set (von Neumann–Morgenstern solution) as a representation of a stable balance of power. However, the balance of power is typically too delicate to support all efficient allocations. The present paper shows that for a large class of power functions, a recently developed extension of the stable set, called the legitimate set, can be rich enough to support all efficient allocations.      

Managerial delegation games and corporate social responsibility

In a duopoly in which firms universally engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, this paper shows that, in contrast to the main tenet of the received managerial delegation literature, if the CSR sensitivity is sufficiently high: (a) when both firms delegate output decisions to managers, at the equilibrium profit (resp. consumer welfare) is higher (resp. lower) than when firms are pure CSR; (b) in a managerial delegation game, asymmetric multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria emerge in which one firm delegates and the rival does not. These results hold under both the “sales delegation” and “relative profits” manager's bonus schemes.