Some notes on trichotomous choice discrete valuation

For some respondents, the bid offered by the dichotomous choice format used in the discrete choice technique can in fact be the true optimum. In this case the correct answer is neither yes or no, but indifferent. We shall show results from a trichotomous choice format and analyse whether it produces welfare measures with narrower confidence intervals than the dichotomous technique. Another well known problem in contingent valuation (CV) studies is that the volume of the good to be purchased from hypothetical markets is not, in many cases, defined in precise terms. We show how the trichotomous choice technique can be used to test for possible vagueness in the volume of the project to be valued.     

Modelling the Effect of Chronic Wasting Disease on Recreational Hunting Site Choice Preferences and Choice Set Formation over Time

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a prion disease that affects deer, elk and other cervid wildlife species. Although there is no known link between the consumption of CWD affected meat and human health, hunters are advised to have animals from CWD affected areas tested and are advised against consuming meat from CWD infected animals (Government of Alberta 2010). We model hunter response to the knowledge that deer in a wildlife management unit have been found to have CWD in Alberta, Canada. We examine hunter site choice over two hunting seasons using revealed and stated preference data in models that incorporate preferences, choice set formation, and scale. We compare a fully endogenous choice set model using the independent availability logit model (Swait in Probabilistic choice set formation in transportation demand models. Dissertation, MIT, 1984) with the availability function approach (Cascetta and Papola in Transp Res C 9(4):249–263, 2001) that approximates choice set formation. We find that CWD incidence affects choice set formation and preferences and that ignoring choice set formation would result in biased estimates of impact and welfare measures. This study contributes to the broader recreation demand literature by incorporating choice set formation, scale and temporal impacts into a random utility model of recreation demand.     

Potential welfare and the sum of individual compensating or equivalent variations

We investigate under which conditions the sign of the sum of both the individual compensating and equivalent variations correctly indicates changes in potential welfare. Our results reproduce exactly those of Chipman and Moore for the National Income Test, which did not rely on individual measures of welfare directly related to consumers' preferences:

• 1.(i) a necessary and sufficient condition for the new test to be valid is that individual preferences are identical and homothetic; and
• 2.(ii) if the distribution of income is constant and preferences are homothetic, then the new test is valid only if preferences are also identical.

     

Term limits and pork barrel politics

We develop a dynamic model of democratic politics in which both potential office holders and the electorate have heterogeneous ideologies. Voters have incomplete information about candidate ideologies, so they must use information from previous positions taken in office to make informed re-election decisions. We characterize the effects of term limits on the evolution over time of the ideological positions taken by office holders and derive the implications for voter choice and welfare. Contributions of our paper include:

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We detail how pork provision by more senior incumbents interacts with term limits to affect electoral outcomes. Pork provision—transfers of resources from districts with junior legislators to districts with more senior legislators—induces voters to be more forgiving of extreme location by incumbents, especially incumbents in small or poor districts. Pork provision can explain why re-election probabilities in Congress exceed those for governors.

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Term limits reduce voter welfare when all that matters are the ideological positions taken by the office holder.

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Term limits may be advantageous when senior incumbents can extract benefits for their constituencies at the expense of districts with more junior representatives. Large or rich districts especially value term limits when there is substantial pork provision.

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We characterize the welfare of all voters, not just the median voter.

     

Enforcement and environmental quality in a decentralized emission trading system

Should the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating tradeable emissions allowances be appointed to a unique supranational regulator or decentralized to several local regulators? To answer this question, we develop a two stage-two country game where environmental regulators set the amount of emission allowances and the level of monitoring effort to achieve full compliance while the regulated firms choose actual emissions and the number of permits to be held. Various, possibly conflicting, spillovers between countries arise in a decentralized setting. We show that decentralization is socially harmful if no asymmetry among institutional settings is introduced and can be suboptimal even when decentralization features lower monitoring costs than a centralized setting. Lower monitoring costs are therefore necessary, but not sufficient, to justify decentralization. Also, our analysis reveals that welfare can be higher under decentralization even if the corresponding environmental quality is worse than under centralization. Indeed, better environmental quality is sufficient but not necessary for higher welfare under decentralization. Finally, we discuss how these results can provide a theoretical rationale for the recent evolution of the EU ETS design.     

On the interpretation of ‘green’ NNP measures as cost-benefit rules

In this paper we consider the possibility of using green welfare change measures as the basis for cost-benefit analysis of new projects. Such green welfare change measures look very similar to what one would expect a cost-benefit analysis of the entire economy to look like. It is shown that although green welfare measures contain the shadow prices needed in the evaluation of a small new project, one must account for changes in these prices.We are grateful to two referees for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper     

National product related welfare measures in the presence of technological change: Externalities and uncertainty

The purpose of this paper is to discuss under what conditions welfare can be measured by observables related to the national product (or Hamiltonian along the optimal trajectory). Under nonattributable technological or environmental change, welfare will depend on time itself, meaning that the Hamiltonian along the optimal trajectory will be a biased measure of welfare. This result will also hold if we make the time dependence of welfare endogenous, by replacing technological change will externalities that are not internalized during optimization. On the other hand, if we take the externalities fully into account, then the Hamiltonian will represent the appropriate measure of welfare. Similar results also hold in the case of uncertainty, where we show that a generalized Hamiltonian provides a welfare measure, and that the deterministic measures are special cases of their stochastic counterparts.     

External and internal consistency of choices made in convex time budgets

We evaluate data on choices made from convex time budgets (CTB) in Andreoni and Sprenger (Am Econ Rev 102(7):3333–3356, 2012a) and Augenblick et al. (Q J Econ 130(3):1067–1115, 2015), two influential studies that proposed and applied this experimental technique. We use the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) to test for external consistency relative to pairwise choice, and demand, wealth and impatience monotonicity to test for internal consistency. We find that choices made by subjects in the original Andreoni and Sprenger (Am Econ Rev 102(7):3333–3356, 2012a) paper violate WARP frequently; violations of all three internal measures of monotonicity are concentrated in subjects who take advantage of the novel feature of CTB by making interior choices. Wealth monotonicity violations are more prevalent and pronounced than either demand or impatience monotonicity violations. We substantiate the importance of our desiderata of choice consistency in examining effort allocation choices made in Augenblick et al. (Q J Econ 130(3):1067–1115, 2015), where we find considerably more demand monotonicity violations, as well as many classical monotonicity violations which are associated with time inconsistent behavior. We believe that the frequency and magnitude of WARP and monotonicity violations found in the two studies pose important confounds for interpreting and structurally estimating choice patterns elicited through CTB. We encourage researchers employing CTB in present and future experiments to include consistency tests in their design and pre-estimation analysis.     

Trade,product variety and welfare: a quantitative assessment for mainland China

We calculate a variety of welfare gains for Mainland China, following the approach of Romer (1994 Romer, P. 1994. New goods, old theory, and the welfare costs of trade restrictions. Journal of Development Economics, 43(1): 5–38. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), who emphasized that proper modelling of the impact of trade restrictions on the number of available product varieties is crucial for quantifying the welfare impact of trade liberalization. The empirical work presented relies on direct measures of product variety calculated from highly disaggregated trade data. The emerging conclusion is that freer trade has indeed boosted welfare.     

Unemployment and Welfare Participation in a Structural VAR: Rethinking the 1990s in the United States

A report by the Council of Economic Advisers (1997 Council of Economic Advisers. May 1997. “Explaining the decline in welfare receipt, 1993–1996”. May, Washington, DC Executive Office of the President [Google Scholar]) is the first of a group of studies, known as caseload studies, analysing the relationship between the US unemployment rate and the welfare participation rate, with special regard to the 1990s. We examine this relationship in a structural VAR model over the period of 1960–2000 and find that the unemployment rate does not help to predict the welfare participation rate while the converse is more likely to hold. These results are robust to state and year heterogeneity over a period of unprecedented positive correlation between unemployment and welfare participation, i.e. 1990–1998. Further, we find that a shock to the welfare participation rate has a contemporaneous impact on the unemployment rate while the converse is less likely to hold. The main conclusion is that several caseload studies may be based on the wrong assumption that the unemployment rate is an exogenous explanatory variable of the welfare participation rate.     

New financial markets: who gains and who loses

Summary. We evaluate the effects of new financial markets in a two-period incomplete markets model with heterogenous agents. For analytical tractability, we focus on the special case where utility is exponential and risks are normally distributed. We provide a complete characterization of life-cycle consumption and portfolio choice. The effect of new financial markets on individual welfare equals the sum of what we call the portfolio effect and the price effect. The portfolio effect is proportional to the square of the difference between the average exposure to the new asset in the economy and an individual investors exposure adjusted for risk aversion. The portfolio effect is always positive and measures the improved ability of investors to transfer consumption across states. The price effect captures the effect on individual welfare of changes in asset prices. We show that new financial markets drive down the prices of all assets which raises the interest rate and thus affects the ability of investors to transfer consumption across time. The price effect is positive for net savers but can be negative for net borrowers. For net borrower households, the price effect can wipe out the portfolio effect and lead to welfare reductions.Received: 24 July 2003, Revised: 22 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D31, D52, G11, G12.Paul Willen: Thanks to Viral Acharaya, Alberto Bisin, Steve Davis, John Geanakoplos and a thoughtful anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to seminar audiences at Stanford, Berkeley and at the 2001 Stony Brook workshop on incomplete markets for comments and suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge research support from the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago.     

Extending the Learning-By-Exporting Hypothesis: Introducing a Credit Constraint

This paper develops a theoretical framework which can be used to examine policy implications from the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. This work builds on previous theoretical literature by introducing a credit constraint. When credit is available, the analysis suggests that supporting a learning sector via an export subsidy is not necessarily advised to improve social welfare. The learning sector’s goods may be over-produced (relative to another non-tradable sector goods) when consumers can borrow freely for their consumption. If the learning sector’s goods are over-produced, social welfare will be improved via a tax on production.

Learning from private and public observations of othersʼ actions

We study the diffusion of dispersed private information in a large economy, where agents learn from the actions of others through two channels: a public channel, such as equilibrium market prices, and a private channel, for example local interactions. We show that, when agents learn only from the public channel, an initial release of public information increases agents? total knowledge at all times and increases welfare. When a private learning channel is present, this result is reversed: more initial public information reduces agents asymptotic knowledge by an amount in order of $\log (t)$ units of precision. When agents are sufficiently patient, this reduces welfare.     

Is there an economic system based on sovereignty of each consumer?

Conclusion One could add to these examples and show that systems based on consumer sovereignty can range from some historical realizations oflaissez-faire all the way to certain conceivable forms of (Lange) socialism. In every case an analysis of the individual incentive systems that fuel and of the welfare rationale that shapes the economic and political structures would be required before actual systems could be classified in a welfare relevant sense.Pareto optimality and actual or planner-simulated perfect competition certainly cannot be mandatory if systems based on consumer sovereignty are to exist. Freedom of consumers as a group regarding their choice of political and economic constitution and freedom of action for each individual who is protected by the Pareto criterion within some statistical confidence interval under each constitution suffice for consumer sovereignty. As long as the government remains demonstrably representative of the qualified majority in constitutional questions and respectful of all voters in its parliamentary processes, the consumer-predilected scope of government activities may differ from case to case, but the welfare basis is the same.In a second-best world, consumers and their representatives may even choose to delegate many or most allocative decisions to the executive branch of government, if they see no superior and feasible alternative. Extreme caution is justified if it is feared that such voluntary delegation of powers may prove irreversible; yet systems based on consumer sovereignty can take varying forms. In general, ideological labels, or terms based on characteristic details, institutional parameters, or formal organization are therefore insufficient for systems classification on the welfare basis which may well be regarded as the single most important respect in which economic systems can differ.     

Money,price dispersion and welfare

Summary. We introduce heterogeneous preferences into a tractable model of monetary search to generate price dispersion, and then examine the effects of money growth on price dispersion and welfare. With buyers search intensity fixed, we find that money growth increases the range of (real) prices and lowers welfare as agents shift more of their consumption to less desirable goods. When buyers search intensity is endogenous, multiple equilibria are possible. In the equilibrium with the highest welfare level, money growth reduces welfare and increases the range of prices, while having ambiguous effects on search intensity. However, there can be a welfare-inferior equilibrium in which an increase in money growth increases search intensity, increases welfare, and reduces the range of prices.Received: 25 July 2003, Revised: 12 December 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E31, D60.B. Peterson, S. Shi: We thank Gabriele Camera, Aleksander Berentsen and an anonymous referee for useful suggestions. We have also received valuable comments from the participants of the workshop at Michigan State, the Purdue Conference on Monetary Theory (2003) and the Midwest Macro Meeting (Chicago, 2003). Shi gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Bank of Canada Fellowship and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The opinion expressed here is the authors own and does not reflect the view of the Bank of Canada.Correspondence to: S. Shi     

On the Asymmetry of the Vagueness Band in Willingness to Pay Answers

The NOAA panel for Contingent Valuation opened up the question of the possibility of using trichotomous choice discrete formats in CV studies. In this paper we show how the trichotomous choice format can be used for testing the successfulness of the project definition in the questionnaire. We shall define the vagueness band around the true outcome of the project to be valued and we allow it to be asymmetric. It is shown how this asymmetry can be modelled and estimated. We also show how these new models are generalisations of ordinary ordered probit/logit models.     

Does “No” mean “No”? A protest methodology

In this paper, we propose a method of identifying and truncating protesters in Contingent Valuation surveys. We propose using a system of Willingness to Pay (WTP) questions that value multiple goods and that use both discrete choice and open-ended questions coupled with multiple questions about protest beliefs administered to the entire sample. Protesters can then be identified because they reject all bids, declare zero on all open-ended questions, and hold protest beliefs. The proposed procedure has been empirically tested on an air pollution data set from Poland, where 27 of the sample was identified as protesters. The adjustment for protesters increased the estimated WTP values by a factor of more than 3.

Insurance and rural welfare: what can panel data tell us?

Assessing the scope for insurance in rural communities usually requires a structural model of household behaviour under risk. One of the few empirical applications of such models is the study by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993 Rosenzweig, MR and Wolpin, K. 1993. Credit market constraints, consumption smoothing, and the accumulation of durable production assets in low-income countries: investment in bullocks in India. Journal of Political Economy, 101: 223–44. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) who conclude that Indian farmers in the ICRISAT villages would not benefit from the introduction of formal weather insurance. In this article we investigate how models such as theirs can be estimated from panel data on production and assets. We show that if assets can take only a limited number of values the coefficients of the model cannot be estimated with reasonable precision. We also show that this can affect the conclusion that insurance would not be welfare improving.     

The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets

We study the welfare effects of different types of pre-arrangements (as identified in Sönmez in J Econ Theory 86:148–156, 1999) under the intern-optimal and hospital-optimal stable mechanisms in matching markets. First, both mechanisms are manipulable via Type-2 pre-arrangements. Regarding the welfare consequences, they might cause inefficient outcomes to arise, and the welfare effects on each side are ambiguous in the sense that there might be agents from each side, apart from pre-arranging ones, being better and worse off. Then, for Type-1 pre-arrangements, due to Kojima and Pathak (Am Econ Rev 99(3):608–627, 2009), we know that the intern-optimal stable mechanism is immune to this type of manipulations. In contrast to this result, the hospital-optimal stable mechanism turns out to be manipulable. More interestingly, they do not result in inefficient outcomes, and the welfare effects on each side are unambiguous: All hospitals (interns) are better (worse) off.