供应链的“牛鞭效应”及其解决办法

“牛鞭效应”在供应链管理中是一种相当普遍的现象。丈章首先对供应链中“牛鞭效应”的研究文献进行回顾;然后以现有研究为基础,总结出“牛鞭效应”的主要来源——需求预测修正、配给博弈、订货批量决策、价格波动;最后针对“牛鞭效应”的各个来源提出应对措施。     

信息共享对牛鞭效应的影响分析

供应链上最终用户的需求信息随着向上游的前进过程波动程度越来越大,这种供应链中的"牛鞭效应"降低了供应链的运作效率。文章在需求ARIMA(0,1,1)模型下,研究由一个生产商和一个零售商组成的简单供应链系统中,信息共享对牛鞭效应的影响。分析得出信息共享可以减轻牛鞭效应,最后通过实例分析验证信息共享对牛鞭效应的抑制作用。     

供应链管理中的“牛鞭效应”及对策分析

"牛鞭效应"是在供应链中,每一个供应链节点企业的信息都有一个信息的扭曲,并且这种扭曲程度沿着供应链向上游不断扩大,使订货量的波动程度沿供应链不断扩大。为尽量弱化"牛鞭效应"对供应链的影响,近年来,国内外许多学者对此进行了研究。本研究在对"牛鞭效应"原因分析的基础上,提出了几点消除"牛鞭效应"的对策。     

供应链中信息的共享对牛鞭效应的影响

本文用啤酒游戏的结果定性地比较分析信息共享对供应链中牛鞭效应影响,认为信息共享能够减少供应键中信息的波动和放大,但并不能消除供应链中的牛鞭效应,而且信息共享对供应链的上游比下游更为有利,因此供应链的上游应采取激励措施来促进信息的共享.     

信息共享条件下的牛鞭效应降低方法

牛鞭效应是供应链管理中一个常见的现象，在寻求解决降低和消除供应链中这一现象中，普遍提出了信息共享来降低和消除牛鞭效应。即使在信息共享的条件下，我们依然不能完全消除牛鞭效应，以及供应链中各个主体的危害。本文从lee，etc．在解释供应链存在的需求预测所带来的牛鞭效应原因出发，寻找信息共享条件下降低牛鞭效应的可行途径。     

供应链节点变化对牛鞭效应影响的系统动力学仿真研究

利用系统动力学专用软件VENSIM，对“啤酒游戏”进行仿真分析。研究当供应链上节点增加时“牛鞭效应”的变化情况，比较了二级、三级、四级供应链各节点企业订货率的波动情况。结果表明供应链结构本身是造成“啤酒游戏”中“牛鞭效应”的内在原因。     

基于牛鞭效应的供应链信息共享价值研究

基于牛鞭效应模型对供应链共享价值进行了量化分析,并对传统供应链(非信息共享)与现代物流供应链(信息共享)的牛鞭效应进行了比较,结果表明信息共享条件下牛鞭效应得到了有效的控制。     

供应链中的牛鞭效应解决策略

牛鞭效应是指需求信息在从供应链下游传向上游的过程中发生的放大现象。牛鞭效应存在的原因主要在于供应链中的信息沟通问题和供应链的一些固有的属性。本文提出了减小牛鞭效应的一些措施,指出关键在于供应链各成员相互合作、建立起战略性伙伴关系、共享供应链中的需求信息。     

基于牛鞭效应的供应链信息共享价值研究

基于牛鞭效应模型对供应链共享价值进行了量化分析,并对传统供应链(非信息共享)与现代物流供应链(信息共享)的牛鞭效应进行了比较,结果表明信息共享条件下牛鞭效应得到了有效的控制.     

信息共享减弱供应链中的牛鞭效应的机理分析

首先通过数量模型分析了牛鞭效应产生的机理与影响因素，定量分析了在需求信息共享和非共享情况下对供应链牛鞭效应的影响。结果表明，通过在供应链的各个阶段共享需求信息，虽然不能消除牛鞭效应，但可以显著地减少牛鞭效应。     

两个下游企业情况下供应链中间产品转移价格突变分析

论文假设在上游有一个供应商、下游有两个分销商的二级供应链中。上游企业供给中间产品给下游分销商。在中闯产品单一定价和差别定价两种定价方式下．分别构建了中闯产品转移价格的非线性模型。在单一定价策略下,运用尖点突变模型研究了转移价格的突变行为：在差别定价策略下,运用双曲脐点突变模型研究了转移价格的突变行为。     

Wholesale price discrimination: Innovation incentives and upstream competition

In intermediate good markets where there are alternative supply sources, wholesale price discrimination may enhance innovation incentives downstream. We consider a vertical chain where a dominant firm and a competitive fringe supply imperfect substitutes to duopoly retailers which carry both varieties. We show that a ban on price discrimination by the dominant supplier makes uniform pricing credible and reduces retailers’ incentives to decrease the cost of acquiring the competitively supplied variety, leading to higher upstream profits and lower downstream welfare. Our analysis complements existing results by identifying a novel channel through which wholesale price discrimination can improve dynamic market efficiency.     

Supply chain finance schemes in the procurement of agricultural products

Product, information, and finance flows are all interrelated within the modern supply chain; thus, it is now more than ever of paramount importance for practitioners to integrate procurement and financial decisions. This challenge is exemplified in many agricultural supply chains, where operational risks are significant and access to capital differs sharply across firms. We study three management tactics that some large food/beverage manufacturers – situated downstream in these chains – have used to meet the challenge: ordinary fixed price contracts (or soft tolling) with direct suppliers, hard tolling and contract farming where the manufacturer intervenes upstream, providing capital, and coordinating procurement decisions. We place these upstream intervention schemes in the theoretical context of supply chain finance (SCF) and model their application to a three-echelon agricultural supply chain. We perform a numerical study in order to understand how the structure of capital constraints in the chain may influence the manufacturer's choice of SCF scheme. The numerical study is based on a business case that reflects the barley–malt supply chain of Heineken N.V. Despite greater coordination opportunities, we show that upstream intervention is not necessarily preferable for the manufacturer. Nevertheless, the preferred SCF scheme can be inferred on the basis of relatively simple characterization of the capital constraints in the supply chain.     

基于SCOR模型的煤炭行业供应链绩效管理

当前煤炭行业产能充裕导致煤炭业市场格局结构性过剩,在需求相对稳定的情况下,煤炭价格受到挤压,为应对市场环境不利因素影响,企业应从供应链上下游对其绩效进行控制,应用供应链参考模型---SCOR模型为煤企制定行之有效的绩效评价指标,以实现企业供应链管理科学高效发展。     

Decision analysis and coordination of dual supply chain with retailer's offline return service and online reviews

Based on the centralized and decentralized decision-making cases, this study constructs a dual-channel supply chain game model that considers offline return service and online reviews, and explores the pricing decisions and benefits of supply chains under the dual influence of return service level and online reviews. The impact of return rate, return service level and perceived quality of online reviews on optimal supply chain decisions and profits are further analyzed. Finally, considering the phenomenon of double marginalization in the supply chain, this study coordinates the supply chain based on the benefit-sharing contract coordination model to achieve Pareto improvement. The research shows that: The manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, the optimal online selling price and the retailer's optimal offline price are positively correlated with the perceived quality of online reviews and the level of return service. Compared with the return service level, the perceived quality of online reviews has a greater impact on the overall profit of the supply chain. Under the dual influence of the perceived quality of online reviews and the level of return service, the supply chain profit in the centralized model is better than that in the decentralized model. The coordination model can effectively coordinate the supply chain. Moreover, when the sharing ratio of manufacturers is obviously lower than that of retailers, the coordination effect is better at this time.     

The role of control power allocation in service supply chains: Model analysis and empirical examination

In complex and competitive business environment, there have been many examples of supply chain members fighting for power. Therefore, researchers have begun focusing on the impact of control power allocation on the supply chain. This paper examines the allocation of power in different service supply chain relationships, analyzing the impact of service level on optimal control power allocation and comparing the differences between the optimal power distribution in service supply chains and that of manufacturing supply chains. We adopt a mathematical model building method to discuss this issue, verifying the theoretical perspectives through empirical studies of China's largest state-owned logistics company, the China Railway Company, and the private ownership enterprise, Tianjin SND Logistics Company. We also develop a conceptual model of the influence of control power on the performance of service supply chains, based on the modeling and case analysis. The conceptual model shows several results: the control power allocation determines the dominant structure of the supply chain; the service provider's wholesale pricing strategy and the service integrator's sales price strategy present different outcomes under various dominant structures of the supply chain, which will greatly affect the performance of the corresponding supply chain; and the relationship between the supply chain dominant structure and the price can be adjusted by the service level.     

物联网技术在服装业供应链管理中的应用研究

通过对物联网的特点和技术优势的描述,以及对服装业供应链存在问题的分析,探讨了物联网在服装业供应链管理中的应用系统结构模型,重点分析了RFID技术以及EPC技术在服装业供应链管理中的应用系统结构与特点,解决和消除了服装业供应链上下游环节之间的断层与间隙,实现无缝链接,推动服装业供应链的优化。     

基于订单生产的供应链价格与承诺交货时间决策和协调

针对订单生产需求受价格和承诺交货时间影响以及延期现象,建立由生产商和销售商组成的供应链价格与承诺交货时间决策模型。研究表明:最优承诺交货时间绑定在服务水平上,提高服务水平可以降低双重边际化效应;相对于集中决策,分散决策采用较高的价格和较短的承诺交货时间,其最优利润和最优需求较少;此外,采用收益分享方式构建了供应链协调模型,得出销售商收益分享比例处于某一范围内才能实现供应链的协调。     

上游占优的钢铁行业三级供应链模型与分析

本文研究了上游占优的三级供应链模型,并结合全球钢铁产业链进行分析比较。本文采用外包理论中买卖结构的土耳其模型为基本框架,运用博弈论的观点研究了供应链整体和成员之间的利润分配情况,最后模型分析结果揭示了全球铁矿石定价权之争的现实意义。     

Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation

This paper examines how discriminatory input pricing by an upstream monopolist affects the incentives that owners of downstream duopolists offer their managers. Regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price), owners of downstream firms induce their managers to be more profit‐oriented and to behave less aggressively when the monopolist is allowed to price‐discriminate than when he charges a uniform price. If the monopolist price‐discriminates, managerial downstream firms always earn more than owner‐managed profit‐maximizing firms. However, if the monopolist charges a uniform price, managerial downstream firms earn more than profit‐maximizing counterparts under price competition and earn less under quantity competition. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.