Which institutional investor types are the most informed?

We examine the informativeness of quarterly disclosed portfolio holdings across four institutional investor types: hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds and private banking firms. Overweight positions outperform underweight positions only for hedge funds. By decomposing holdings and stock returns, we find that hedge funds are superior to other institutional investors both at picking industries and stocks and that they are better at forecasting long‐term as well as short‐term returns. Furthermore, our results show that hedge funds, mutual funds and pension funds are able to successfully time the market. The outperformance of hedge funds is not explained by a liquidity premium.     

How do passive funds act as active owners? Evidence from mutual fund voting records

The rise of passive institutional investors in the U.S. stock market raises questions about the governance implications to their portfolio firms. While the existing literature documents positive governance changes when passive institutional ownership displaces retail ownership, it remains unclear how passive institutional ownership approaches corporate governance differently than their active peers. This paper compares the proxy voting behaviors between same-family passive and active mutual funds with identical investment styles. We find that passive funds are not more likely to vote in favor of governance reforms than active funds. We also provide suggestive evidence that besides voting, the influence of passive funds on corporate governance also operates through a “behind the scenes” channel.     

Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms

We examine the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. Existing evidence shows that stock price informativeness is low in China, and attributes this to firms’ lack of disclosure incentives under the weak investor protection institutional environment. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors to monitor firms, and thus serve as an external governance mechanism to improve corporate transparency. However, the impact of mutual funds in China can also be moderated by state ownership of listed firms, which reduces firms’ dependence on outside investors for capital. Indeed, we find that mutual fund ownership is positively related to share price informativeness, but this effect is less pronounced among state-controlled firms. The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual funds contribute to the corporate information environment of emerging economies but further privatization of listed firms would be needed to realize greater benefit.     

HEDGE FUNDS: WHAT DO WE KNOW?

Hedge funds are attracting increased attention because of their reputation for earning superior (risk-adjusted) returns. Hedge Fund Research Inc. estimates that in 2001 there were about 7,000 hedge funds with investor capital of about $600 billion. And yet the diversity of hedge funds, combined with a general lack of transparency, makes the hedge fund industry something of a "black box."
This article provides an overview of the legal structure of hedge funds, the various fund investment strategies, and the existing research on overall hedge fund performance. Without uniform and comprehensive reporting requirements, it is difficult to ascertain the size and scope of hedge fund investments. Nonetheless, current research provides persuasive evidence that hedge funds earn positive risk-adjusted returns, on average, in contrast to their counterparts in the mutual fund industry. In an attempt to explain these higher returns, the authors begin by noting that hedge funds are subject to considerably less regulation than other investment institutions because their client base is limited to wealthy individuals and institutions. Hedge funds can thus employ investment strategies that mutual funds and pension funds are prohibited from pursuing, such as short selling, high leverage, derivatives, concentrated holdings, and limited redemptions. As a result, the funds may be able to earn excess returns by operating in illiquid and specialized markets where there is a shortage of arbitrage capital. At the same time, and perhaps even more important, hedge funds are in a better position than conventional mutual funds to attract skilled managers because of their use of performance-based incentive fee structures.     

Hedge funds and optimal asset allocation: Bayesian expectations and spanning tests

This paper analyzes the contribution of hedge funds to optimal asset allocations between 1993 and 2010. The preferences of specific institutional investors are captured by implementing a Bayesian asset allocation framework that incorporates heterogeneous expectations regarding hedge fund alpha. Mean-variance spanning tests are used to infer the ability of hedge funds to significantly enhance the mean-variance efficient frontier. Further, a novel democratic variance decomposition procedure sheds light on the dynamics in the co-movement of hedge fund returns with a set of common benchmark assets. The empirical findings indicate that portfolio benefits of hedge funds are time-varying and strongly depend on investor optimism regarding hedge funds’ ability to generate alpha. In general, allocations to hedge funds improve the global minimum variance portfolio even after controlling for short-selling restrictions and minimum diversification constraints. However, due to dynamics underlying the composition of the aggregate hedge fund universe, the factor structure of hedge fund returns has become more similar to the benchmark assets over time.     

The Rise of Agency Capitalism and the Role of Shareholder Activists in Making It Work

The past 50 years have seen a fundamental change in the ownership of U.S. public companies, one in which the relatively small holdings of many individual shareholders have been supplanted by the large holdings of institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, and bank trust departments. Such large institutional investors are now said to own over 70% of the stock of the largest 1,000 U.S. public corporations; and in many of these companies, as the authors go on to note, “as few as two dozen institutional investors” own enough shares “to exert substantial influence, if not effective control.” But this reconcentration of ownership does not represent a complete solution to the “agency” problems arising from the “separation of ownership and control” that troubled Berle and Means, the relative powerlessness of shareholders in the face of a class of “professional” corporate managers who owned little if any stock. As the authors note, this shift from an era of “managerial capitalism” to one they identify as “agency capitalism” has come with a somewhat new and different set of “agency conflicts” and associated costs. The fact that most institutional investors hold highly diversified portfolios and compete (and are compensated) on the basis of “relative performance” provides them with little incentive to engage in the vigorous monitoring of corporate performance and investor activism that could address shortfalls in such performance. As a consequence, such large institutional investors—not to mention the large and growing body of indexers like Vanguard and BlackRock—are likely to appear “rationally apathetic” about corporate governance. But, as the authors also point out, there is a solution to this agency conflict—and to the corporate governance “vacuum” that has been said to result from the alleged apathy of well‐diversified (and indexed) institutional investors: the emergence of shareholder activists. The activist hedge funds and other specialized activists who have come on the scene during the last 15 or 20 years are now playing an important role in supporting this relatively new ownership structure. Instead of taking control positions, the activists “tee‐up” strategic business and financing choices that are then decided upon by the vote of institutional shareholders that are best characterized not as apathetic, but as rationally “reticent”; that is, they allow the activists, if not to do their talking for them, then to serve as a catalyst for the expression of institutional shareholder voice. The institutions are by no means rubber stamps for activists' proposals; in some cases voting for the activists' proposals, in many cases against them, the institutions function as the long‐term arbiters of whether such proposals should and will go forward. In the closing section of the article, the authors discuss a number of recent legal decisions that appear to recognize this relatively new role played by activists and the institutions that choose to support them (or not)—legal decisions that appear to confirm investors' competence and right to be entrusted with such authority over corporate decision‐making.     

Hedge fund incentives,management commitment and survivorship

Management ownership in hedge funds sends conflicting signals—signals which reduce investors’ perception of survivorship risk. We document that decisions on management ownership are purposely self-selected. Such decisions are most likely motivated by unique incentive mechanisms imbedded in hedge funds. We examine the impact of managerial ownership decisions on fund survivorship risk by accounting for unobserved fund manager motivations that affect both ownership decisions and survivorship risk. Our findings suggest that the conventional argument that having management commitment can reduce survival risk (and therefore align the interests between managers and investors) is significantly overstated. These results are robust to using alternative ownership measures and controlling for different samples.     

Are better governed funds better monitors?

Using Morningstar mutual fund stewardship grade data, we find that the governance mechanisms of mutual funds play a key role in their monitoring of portfolio firms and in their investment decisions. Mutual funds with better governance practices tend to vote responsibly on corporate governance proposals of their portfolio firms and also provide better return performance. Furthermore, these funds tend to avoid investing in poorly governed firms. The results suggest that funds with quality governance are more likely to act in the interest of their investors, and that costs associated with funds' monitoring of their portfolio firms do not adversely affect their return performance.     

Institutional Investors and Firm Efficiency of Real Estate Investment Trusts

This study investigates the effect of institutional ownership on improving firm efficiency of equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), using a stochastic frontier approach. Firm inefficiency is estimated by comparing a benchmark Tobin??s Q of a hypothetical value-maximizing firm to the firm??s actual Q. We find that the average inefficiency of equity REITs is around 45.5%, and that institutional ownership can improve the firm??s corporate governance, and hence reduce firm inefficiency. Moreover, we highlight the importance of heterogeneity in institutional investors??certain types of institutional investors such as long-term, active, and top-five institutional investors, and investment advisors are more effective institutional investors in reducing firm inefficiency; whereas hedge funds and pension funds seem to aggravate the problem. In sub-sample analysis, we find that these effective institutional investors can reduce inefficiency more effectively for distressed REITs, and for REITs with high information asymmetry, and with longer term lease contracts. Lastly, we find that the negative impact of institutional ownership (except for long-term institutional investors) on firm inefficiency reduces over time, possibly due to strengthened corporate governance and regulatory environment in the REIT industry.     

The Corporate Governance Premium,Returns, and Mutual Funds

Mutual funds with a preference for strong corporate governance (CG) have performance similar to mutual funds with a preference for weak CG. We find a direct relation between overall mutual fund CG preference and the corporate governance premium (CGP). Furthermore, the investment preferences of mutual funds forecast the change in the CGP. We provide evidence that the investment activities of institutional investors can affect stock performance, and that shifts by institutional investors in CG preference impact the appearance of the CGP.     

Portfolio manager ownership and fund performance

This paper documents the range of portfolio manager ownership in the funds they manage and examines whether higher ownership is associated with improved future performance. Almost half of all managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the absolute investment is modest. Future risk-adjusted performance is positively related to managerial ownership, with performance improving by about 3 basis points for each basis point of managerial ownership. These findings persist after controlling for various measures of fund board effectiveness. Fund manager ownership is higher in funds with better past performance, lower front-end loads, smaller size, longer managerial tenure, and funds affiliated with smaller families. It is also higher in funds with higher board member compensation and in equity funds relative to bond funds. Future performance is positively related to the component of ownership that can be predicted by other variables, as well as the unpredictable component. Our findings support the notion that managerial ownership has desirable incentive alignment attributes for mutual fund investors and indicate that the disclosure of this information is useful in making portfolio allocation decisions.     

Portfolio Distortions Among Institutional Investors: Evidence from China

The behavior of institutional investors often deviates from established personal or social norms; this deviation may reflect either an informational advantage or a psychological bias. In this paper, we investigate the reasons Chinese mutual funds hold lottery-type stocks, which are characterized by low average returns and high risk. We find that funds at the aggregate level do not exhibit a propensity to gamble, but when they do gamble, they earn abnormal returns on lottery-type investments. Gambling-related outperformance is greater among held firms with characteristics that enable fund managers to obtain more informational advantages. Our results suggest that portfolio distortion is driven by the ability of managers to capitalize private information rather than by behavioral bias.     

A comparative performance of conventional and Islamic unit trusts: Market timing and persistence evidence

It is expected that the returns and resistance of Islamic mutual funds will be different from conventional mutual funds as the former have limited choices for portfolio diversification. This article analyses the performance of conventional and Islamic unit trusts for the period February 1995 to July 2012 in the Malaysian market, one of the most developed Islamic mutual fund markets. The performance analysis is based on four parameters: (i) risk-adjusted returns of unit trusts; (ii) market timing abilities; (iii) selection performance; and (iv) persistence. The results of this study suggest that the returns of both conventional and Islamic unit trusts have outperformed the market throughout the sample period. The results for market timing and selectivity are mostly the same for both categories of funds. However, Islamic unit trusts seem to have better resistance to market downturn than conventional unit trusts. The results of this research can be used by investors to identify funds or create portfolios that are more suitable for a recessionary scenario and for fund managers to better manage their portfolio performance during times when markets are likely to fall. The findings in this article are highly relevant for policymakers, investors and fund managers to determine policy matters, deciding on investment and marketing strategy for Islamic mutual funds.     

Polynomial goal programming and the implicit higher moment preferences of US institutional investors in hedge funds

Polynomial goal programming (PGP) is a flexible method that allows investor preferences for different moments of the return distribution of financial assets to be included in the portfolio optimization. The method is intuitive and particularly suitable for incorporating investor preferences in higher moments of the return distribution. However, until now, PGP has not been able to meet its full potential because it requires quantification of “real” preference parameters towards those moments. To date, the chosen preference parameters have been selected somewhat “arbitrarily”. Our goal is to calculate implied sets of preference parameters using investors’ choices of and the importance they attribute to risk and performance measures. We use three groups of institutional investors—pension funds, insurance companies, and endowments—and derive implied sets of preference parameters in the context of a hedge fund portfolio optimization. To determine “real” preferences for the higher moments of the portfolio return distribution, we first fit implied preference parameters so that the PGP optimal portfolio is identical to the desired hedge fund portfolio. With the obtained economically justified sets of preference parameters, the well-established PGP framework can be employed more efficiently to derive allocations that satisfy institutional investor expectations for hedge fund investments. Furthermore, the implied preference parameters enable fund of hedge fund managers and other investment managers to derive optimal portfolio allocations based on specific investor expectations. Moreover, the importance of individual moments, as well as their marginal rates of substitution, can be assessed.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AN EMERGING MARKET: THE CASE OF ISRAEL

Despite significant capital-market reforms in the mid-1980s, the Israeli government and banks continue to play an unusually dominant role in Israeli financial markets. Israeli banks operate as merchant banks and, through pyramid structures of ownership, control large segments of manufacturing, construction, insurance, and services. In addition, the banks dominate all facets of the capital market, including underwriting, brokerage, investment advice, and the management of mutual and provident funds.
Because of this dominance by the banks, several important mechanisms of corporate governance are missing. There is no effective market for corporate control; institutional investors have little incentive to monitor corporate managers; and those managers in turn have little incentive to improve firm performance and increase shareholder value.
To be sure, there has been an impressive wave of IPOs on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) in the 1990s. But those firms' stocks have substantially underperformed the market since going public, and many "higher-quality" Israeli firms have chosen in recent years to list their securities on the NASDAQ and not at home. The main reason the most promising Israeli firms go public in the U.S. is because that is where U.S. and other foreign investors want to buy them; such investors want the assurances that come with the U.S. corporate governance system.     

Corporate governance and hedge fund activism

Recently, the mainstream media have paid considerable attention to hedge funds behaving as agents of corporate change. We study this phenomenon using a unique dataset of hedge fund activism for the period 1994–2005, and find evidence that hedge fund activists improve both short-term stock performance and long-term operating performance of their targets. The most dramatic changes in performance accrue to targets where activists seek corporate governance changes and reductions in excess cash. Additionally, hedge funds themselves benefit from activism: the risk-adjusted annual performance of hedge funds seeking changes in corporate governance is about 7–11% higher than for non-activist hedge funds and hedge funds pursuing less aggressive activism. These results imply that hedge funds can facilitate long-lasting changes in corporate governance, cash flows, and operating performance that benefit target firm shareholders and hedge fund investors alike.     

Incentives and risk taking in hedge funds

We study how incentive fees and manager’s own investment in the fund affect the investment strategy of hedge fund managers. We find that loss averse managers increase the risk of the fund’s investment strategy with higher incentive fees. However, risk taking is greatly reduced if a substantial amount of the manager’s own money (at least 30%) is in the fund. Using the Zurich hedge fund universe, we test the relation between risk taking and incentive fees empirically. Hedge funds with incentive fees have significantly lower mean returns (net of fees), while downside risk is positively related to the incentive fee level. Fund of funds charging large incentive fees achieve relatively high mean returns, but with significantly higher risk as well.     

A unique view of hedge fund derivatives usage: Safeguard or speculation?

We study the common equity and equity option positions of hedge fund investment advisors over the 1999–2006 period. We find that hedge funds' stock positions predict future returns and that option positions predict both volatility and returns on the underlying stock. A quarterly tracking portfolio of stocks based on publicly observable hedge fund option holdings earns abnormal returns of 1.55% through the end of the quarter. Net of fees, hedge funds using options deliver higher benchmark-adjusted portfolio returns and lower risk than nonusers. The results suggest that hedge fund positions reflect significant timing and selectivity skill.     

Hedge fund seeding with fees-for-guarantee swaps

This paper introduces a new instrument in the context of hedge fund seeding, which we call fees-for-guarantee swap, with the aim of alleviating the early-stage funds (ESF) managers' financial constraint caused by severe asymmetric information between investors and managers. The swap plays a role in enhancing the ESFs manager's credibility by swapping part of her fees for an insurance on the behalf of seeding investors, whom would be fully refunded once the fund defaults. We set up a dynamic continuous-time framework within which closed-form prices for seed capital, guarantee costs and other claims have been derived. Our numerical findings indicate that incentive compensations, managerial ownership and hedge funds liquidation risks not only inhibit ESFs managers' risk-shifting incentive but align interests among ESFs manager, seeder and insurer as well.     

Exploring the transitional behavior among value and growth stocks

Unlike the corporate funds in the US, mutual funds in many countries such as China and Germany operate under a different governance arrangement and are thus called “contractual funds.” The governance structure of contractual funds allows shareholders of fund management companies, rather than the fund investors, to be responsible for asset management decisions. Therefore, a fund’s governance attributes may be especially important in driving its performance. Using a comprehensive governance data covering Chinese mutual funds, this paper finds that the governance and organizational structures of Chinese fund management companies significantly influence the performance of their affiliated funds. In particular, while a larger stake from the top1 shareholder significantly improves the performance of affiliated funds, the presence of multiple largest shareholders reduces their performance. Moreover, fund management companies that offer fewer fund products and charge higher management fees tend to perform better. Finally, more institutional holding in a fund appears to function as an external supervisory surrogate for internal board governance to help improve fund performance.