具有转移成本市场中的企业策略性行为分析研究

在很多市场上,消费者在不同品牌的产品之间转换消费将面临转移成本,即使在功能相同的产品之间进行转换消费,转移成本也会存在。文章主要是在动态博弈的框架下研究转移成本存在对企业的策略性行为和社会福利的影响。在产量竞争模型中,研究表明随着转移成本的变化,在位企业可以封锁、阻止或容纳进入,当进入发生时,社会福利增加。在引入产品差异而建立的价格竞争模型中,在位企业可能阻止或容纳潜在竞争企业的进入,但不能封锁进入,不管何种情况发生,社会福利都不会恶化。从公共政策的角度看,政府应该鼓励进入。文章的研究结果部分否定了Klemperer（1988）进入导致社会福利的恶化的研究结论。     

产品差异、转移成本和市场竞争

文章通过在豪泰林空间差异模型的基础上结合转移成本构建的博弈模型,主要研究转移成本和产品差异的存在对于企业价格竞争和策略性行为的影响。文章发现纯策略价格均衡是否存在以及在位企业容纳还是遏制竞争对手的潜在进入,都依赖于转移成本相对于产品差异程度的大小。     

市场竞争、创业型雇员进入与竞争政策的福利评价

基于创业型雇员内源式进入视角,笔者构建了内部市场进入模型,并对雇员前向进入阻止及竞争政策效果进行了福利评价。研究发现,降低市场进入壁垒未必能促进市场竞争甚至会侵害社会福利;当存在创业型雇员前向进入风险时,雇员的能力差异会影响在位企业雇佣决策和福利水平。竞争政策的制定需充分考虑行业技术属性,高技术制造业和研发服务业应强化创业型雇员的诚信和知识产权保护,而提高雇员内源式进入违约成本并加大侵权惩罚力度对创建民族品牌和履行社会诚信义务意义重大。     

中国轿车市场差异化进入壁垒探析

对于在位企业而言,进入壁垒对于保持其竞争优势至关重要。产品差异化是在位企业构建进入壁垒的重要手段之一。本文通过一个两阶段动态博弈模型,分析了在位企业通过合理的产品差异化程度设置进入壁垒的问题,进而从产品差异化的角度解释了轿车市场的进入壁垒问题。轿车产品通常具有较大的差异。产品的差异性一方面使得在位企业拥有竞争优势,另一方面有使得进入者可能在产品空间中找到理想的位置进入。为了达到遏制进入的目的,在位企业应当合理地设置自己的产品线,使得自己的产品保持合理的差异程度。合理的差异化程度将使得进入者在进入之后面对相近的替代产品的竞争无法达到规模经济的产量。而且,通过对中国轿车市场销量排行榜的分析,找到了支持理论模型的经验证据。     

在位者产能投资及其进入阻止效应失灵的多维分析—— 基于中国乘用车产业的经验证据

产业组织的理论和实证研究表明在位者对过剩生产能力进行投资,会在产量竞争中取得先动优势,预期价格和利润下降会使进入者面临更高的进入壁垒,从而使产能投资具有进入阻止效应.本文从理论模型、计量检验和案例分析三个维度出发,分析中国乘用车制造企业的产能投资行为.两阶段博弈模型证明,需求不确定和在位者数量增加会导致进入阻止成为一种公共产品,不利于产能投资发挥进入阻止效应;基于Logit回归的检验发现,在位者的前一期投资没有体现出进入阻止效应;案例研究表明,由于缺乏有效的协调机制,能力和动机存在明显差异的在位者,也未能利用产能策略维持已有市场地位和减少大规模进入所产生的负面效应.     

我国银行业进入壁垒浅析

不同的产业组织理论学派对进入壁垒的理解不同,理论分歧较大。从定义来看,结构主义学派的基本立足点是相对于行业中的在位厂商来说的,进入者处于劣势的程度,而反应这种程度的则正是进入壁垒的高度或进入壁垒本身。而效率学派与可竞争市场理论的定义主要是以在位厂商与进入厂商问存在需求、成本不对称性为立足点,进入壁垒是指进入厂商必须承担而在位厂商不必承担的成本。     

基于战略性进入壁垒的企业应对策略研究

进入壁垒使得新进入市场的厂商必须承担一些在位厂商并不承担的成本。在位厂商有意识地利用低价格、过度生产能力设计、“抢占”手段等战略行为来构筑战略性进入壁垒。应对战略性进入壁垒,我国企业可采取协同竞争策略、产品差别化策略、利用“搭便车”效应和垂直约束策略。     

基于网络外部性的产品差异化与兼容性选择

本文研究了网络外部性与转移成本存在下的新进入企业的产品差异化与兼容性选择问题,并考虑了在位企业的兼容性动机。研究结果表明:对于新进入企业而言,只存在两种策略组合,即(最大差异化,不兼容)和(最大差异化,兼容);在位企业是偏好兼容的。     

企业社会责任标准国际化背景下企业进入策略研究*

本文通过构建博弈模型，对企业社会责任（CSR）标准国际化背景下企业进入策略进行研究。本文发现，企业最优进入策略受到进入成本影响，当进入成本较低时所有企业都适合选择进入高CSR标准市场，当进入成本较高时所有企业都不适合选择进入，当成本介于两者之间时适合部分企业选择进入。在对社会福利的分析中还发现，当进入是企业最优策略时，无论是部分进入还是全部进入，企业承担更高的社会责任能同时提升企业利润和社会福利水平。     

论品牌扩散与市场进入壁垒

本文基于中国日化用品行业应用扩展的Hotelling模型分析了在位企业可以利用品牌扩散战略在扩大市场份额、遏制竞争者进入的同时,成功阻止潜在竞争者的进入。     

Entry regulation and social welfare with an integer problem

This paper elaborates on Salop (1979) who showed that the number of firms at free-entry equilibrium is excessive from the viewpoint of social welfare (excess-entry theorem). This paper considers an integer problem of the number of firms entering the market. We find that the excess-entry theorem does not hold true if the marginal production cost is increasing, while it holds true if the marginal production cost is constant. This result warns against the use of the excess-entry theorem for rationalizing entry regulation such as the notorious Japanese Large-Scaled Retail Act restricting the new entry of retailers.     

技术进步对外资进入影响的实证分析

随着全球经济形势的飞速变革,科学技术水平对经济发展的影响作用愈加明显.通过对中国各省市面板数据进行实证分析,以探讨中国不断提高的技术水平对外资进入的作用方向.研究结果发现:技术水平对外资进入具备显著的抑制作用,且技术水平越高其对外资进入的抑制作用越强,两者具备显著的正相关关系,表明随着中国先进技术水平的不断提高对于外资的依赖程度将不断降低.研究结论对提升中国外资进入质量及完善外资引进政策有一定帮助.     

Equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model

We examine welfare implications of the equilibrium number of entering firms in a spatial price discrimination model. In contrast to Salop [Salop, S., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141–156.], the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient from the normative viewpoint.     

Short-term jobs and long-term job loss of large supermarket entry

This paper examines the effects of emerging supermarkets on local employment at the city level. Using a panel dataset for the period between 2000 and 2006, we find that entry of supermarkets largely increases employment in the wholesale and retail sector and other related sectors in the year of entry, but the positive effect on employment on the wholesale and retail sector only persists for a short period of time. It reverses two years later, due possibly to exits or contracting of small retailers. Further evidence from another dataset at the community level supports this explanation.     

Entry Deterrence and Entry Accommodation Strategies of a Multiproduct Firm Regulated with Dynamic Price Cap

In this paper we study the way a multiproduct firm, regulated through a dynamic price cap, can develop a price strategy that uses the regulatory policy to deter entry. We consider a firm that initially operates as a monopolist in two markets but faces potential entry in one of the markets. We conclude that the regulated firm can have the incentive to block the entry. This strategy leads to the reduction of the price in both markets. However, the final effect of the entry deterrence strategy on total consumer surplus is not always positive.     

Excess Entry in the Absence of Scale Economies

It is well-known that with free entry, more firms than is socially optimal typically enter provided there are economies of scale. This paper investigates the possibility of excess entry in the absence of scale economies We thank Simon Anderson, Tom Holmes, the late Arijit Mukherji, and Xavier Vives for helpful comments. We also thank the participants at the July 2001 Australasian Meetings of the Econometric Society in Auckland, June 2002 University of Melbourne-National University of Singapore Symposium and seminar participants at the University of Sydney and University of New South Wales for useful suggestions. We are especially thankful to an anonymous referee whose meticulous comments have helped us to improve the paper     

INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE‐CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE‐ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.     

WOULD YOU LIKE TO ENTER FIRST WITH A LOW‐QUALITY GOOD?

Using a two‐period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is socially efficient.     

Uber and the Persistence of Market Power

Entry into the taxi industry involves few risks. Entrants have lower costs than the incumbents, sunk costs are small, and modern technology makes it easy to hail a cab using the Internet. Despite large scale entry and low barriers to entry, monopoly power persists. The persistence of monopoly power illustrates that new technologies may not quickly eviscerate monopoly power.