中国的银行业竞争结构对国际贸易影响的区域收敛性

本文通过建立内生经济增长理论模型,利用我国1996～2009年30个省份的面板数据,建立空间面板数据模型考察银行业竞争结构对国际贸易影响的区域差异性。研究结果表明,在控制银行业竞争结构、外商直接投资水平等差异后,各省份国际贸易的增长符合条件β收敛假说,表明省际间银行业竞争结构差异是造成各省份对外贸易差异的原因,缩小省际间银行业结构差异,加快落后地区中小银行的发展,提升银行业的竞争力度有利于国际贸易差距的减小。本文为通过改善银行业的结构关系可以促进内陆开放经济高地建设提供了理论及实证依据。     

Convergence of interest rate pass-through in a wider euro zone?

This study investigates interest rate pass-through convergence for the eight Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) that joined the European Union. Based on a unifying empirical pass-through model that allows for thresholds, asymmetric adjustment, and structural changes, we find that the pass-through in many CEECs has become faster over time and is generally more complete than in the euro zone. We find evidence for convergence across CEECs with market concentration, bank health, foreign bank participation and monetary policy regime as conditioning factors. No convergence of the CEEC pass-through is found vis-à-vis the heterogeneous euro zone.     

Distortionary lobbying

We study the role of partisan committee members in an information aggregation setup à la Feddersen and Pesendorfer. Based on their analysis we show that interest groups may impose a huge welfare loss on society because their activities distort political outcomes more than would be needed in order to achieve their own objectives. In an information acquisition framework à la Mukhopadhaya/Persico we argue that uninformed interest groups may instead improve the quality of some committee decisions. We thank participants of the WZB conference on “Interest groups and economic performance”, an anonymous referee, and in particular Ashish Chaturvedi, Kai Konrad, and Ami Glazer for useful comments.     

论构建企业集团财务控制体系应注意的问题

针对我国企业集团现状,文章提出了企业集团财务控制应采取的模式,并着重论述了我国构建企业集团财务控制体系过程中应注意的事项。     

ON THE SOURCES OF HETEROGENEITY IN BANKING EFFICIENCY LITERATURE

This study reviews the empirical literature on banking efficiency by conducting a meta‐regression analysis. The meta‐dataset consists of 1661 observations retrieved from 120 papers published over the period 2000–2014. While the role of study design and method‐specific characteristics of primary studies is evaluated, the focus concerns regulation in banking. The results are fourfold. First, parametric methods always yield lower levels of banking efficiency than non‐parametric studies. Second, banking efficiency is higher in studies using the value‐added approach rather than the intermediation method. Third, efficiency scores also depend on the journal's ranking and on the number of observations and variables used in the primary papers. Finally, regulation matters: primary papers focusing on countries with a liberalized banking industry provide higher values for efficiency scores.     

银行效率DEA分析的可信度检验

近年来涌现出大量基于DEA方法的银行效率这一热点问题的研究成果,但是由于DEA方法自身的局限性,诸如对效率值的估计偏低且离散程度较大,以及不能方便地检验结果的显著性等等问题,使其研究的结果受到影响;而Bootstrap技术是基于对经验数据及其相关估计的重复抽样来提高估计置信区间和临界值精度的统计技术,可有效地克服DEA方法结果可信度的这种内在依赖性。本文给出了基于Boot-strap技术的DEA方法来计量银行效率的手段,提高了效率分析结果的可信度,并对我国四大国有商业银行的效率进行了对比性实证分析。     

Contagion risk in the Czech financial system: A network analysis and simulation approach

This paper examines the potential for contagion within the Czech banking system via the channel of interbank exposures of domestic banks, enriched by a liquidity channel and an asset price channel, over the period March 2007 to June 2012. A computational model is used to assess the resilience of the Czech banking system to interbank contagion, taking into account the size and structure of interbank exposures as well as balance sheet and regulatory characteristics of individual banks in the network. The simulation results suggest that the potential for contagion due to credit losses on interbank exposures was rather limited. Even after the introduction of a liquidity condition into the simulations, the average contagion was below 3.8% of the remaining banking sector assets, with the exception of the period from December 2007 to September 2008. Activation of the asset price channel further increases the losses due to interbank contagion, showing that the liquidity of government bonds would be essential for the stability of Czech banks in stress situations. Finally, the simulation results for both idiosyncratic and multiple bank failure shocks suggest that the potential for contagion in the Czech banking system has decreased since the onset of the global financial crisis.     

THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS IN FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION

This article describes thinking on the institutions of financial supervision and regulation prior to the current crisis and goes on to examine what lessons have been learnt subsequently. It concludes that the problem is not so much that central banks needed to be more closely involved in supervision at the outset but that many countries did not have satisfactory schemes in place for resolving problems in large institutions. Central banks and governments were then forced into ad hoc measures that could have unfortunate implications for moral hazard in the future unless fundamental problems are addressed.     

Around the world with Irving Fisher

This paper aims to show why Irving Fisher's own data on interest rates and inflation in New York, London, Paris, Berlin, Calcutta, and Tokyo during 1825–1927 suggested to him that nominal interest rates adjusted neither quickly nor fully to changes in inflation, not even in the long run. In Fisher's data, interest rates evolve less rapidly than inflation and change less than inflation over time. Even so, the “Fisher effect” is commonly defined as a point-for-point effect of inflation on nominal interest rates rather than what Fisher actually found: a persistent negative effect of increased inflation on real interest rates.     

Banking and sovereign debt crises in a monetary union without central bank intervention

We analyze the conditions of emergence of a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis within a monetary union in which: (i) the central bank is not allowed to provide direct financial support to stressed member states or to play the role of lender of last resort in sovereign bond markets, and (ii) the responsibility of fighting against large scale bank runs, ascribed to domestic governments, is ensured through the implementation of a financial safety net (banking regulation and government deposit guarantee). We show that this broad institutional architecture, typical of the Eurozone at the onset of the financial crisis, is not always able to prevent the occurrence of a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis triggered by pessimistic investors’ expectations. Without significant backstop by the central bank, the financial safety net may actually aggravate, instead of improve, the financial situation of banks and of the government.     

Forecasting banking crises with dynamic panel probit models

Banking crises are rare events, but when they occur, their consequences are often dramatic. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the toolkit of early warning models that is available to policy makers by exploring the dynamics and exuberances embedded in a panel dataset that covers 22 European countries over four decades (from 1970Q1 to 2012Q4). The in- and out-of-sample forecast performances of several (dynamic) probit models are evaluated, with the objective of developing common vulnerability indicators with early warning properties. The results obtained show that adding dynamic components and exuberance indicators to the models improves the performances of early warning models significantly.     

Convergence in games with continua of equilibria

In game theory, the question of convergence of dynamical systems to the set of Nash equilibria has often been tackled. When the game admits a continuum of Nash equilibria, however, a natural and challenging question is whether convergence to the set of Nash equilibria implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we introduce a technique developed in Bhat and Bernstein (2003) as a useful way to answer this question. We illustrate it with the best-response dynamics in the local public good game played on a network, where continua of Nash equilibria often appear.     

Convergence to competitive equilibria and elimination of no-trade (in a strategic market game with limit prices)

The strategic market games literature contains many results that predict Walrasian equilibria in the competitive limit. However, they usually come at the expense of ad hoc assumptions that rule out “pathological” no trade equilibria. This paper studies a strategic market game with limit prices. The set of Nash equilibrium allocations of this game converges to the set containing all competitive equilibria and no-trade, when players are replicated. Moreover, two rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies eliminate the no-trade equilibria. Hence, replication paired with two rounds of iterated dominance gives a clean prediction of competitive equilibrium.     

Rent control with reputation: theory and evidence

Rent-control policy is modeled as an implicit contract between voters of a community and suppliers of rental housing. It is shown that if residents can make an ex ante commitment to never adopt rent controls they will do so. When precommitment is not possible there are conditions under which a policy of never adopting rent controls is not self-enforcing. Under such circumstances a state-invariant ceiling price is shown to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium rent-control policy. The model is tested using data for New Jersey where local option regarding the choice of rent control policy was declared constitutional in the early 1970s. Probit analysis is used to determine whether predictions of the model are supported by an investigation of factors leading to imposition of rent controls by 64 of the 245 communities in the sample.     

Monetary policy with interest on reserves

I analyze monetary policy with interest on reserves and a large balance sheet. I show that conventional theories do not determine inflation in this regime, so I base the analysis on the fiscal theory of the price level. I find that monetary policy can peg the nominal rate, and determine expected inflation. With sticky prices, monetary policy can also affect real interest rates and output, though higher interest rates raise output and then inflation. The conventional sign requires a coordinated fiscal–monetary policy contraction. I show how conventional new-Keynesian models also imply strong monetary–fiscal policy coordination to obtain the usual signs. I address theoretical controversies. A concluding section places our current regime in a broader historical context, and opines on how optimal fiscal and monetary policy will evolve in the new regime.     

A characterization of Ramsey equilibrium in a model with limited borrowing

This paper considers a one-sector economic growth model with several infinitely-lived heterogeneous households, who differ both in the discount factors as well as preferences over consumption. Unlike the extreme form of borrowing constraint observed in the classical Ramsey model, recently surveyed in Becker (2006), we allow limited borrowing by the households and prove the existence of a perfect foresight equilibrium. We also show that irrespective of production technology employed by the firms, the capital stock sequence converges to the steady state stock and from some time onward all impatient households are in the maximum borrowing state, whereas the most patient household owns entire capital stock and the debts of all other households.     

The effects of interorganizational governance on supplier's compliance with SCC: An empirical examination of compliant and non-compliant suppliers

Often, there is a huge gap between the requirements of the Supplier Codes of Conduct (SCC) imposed by buyers from advanced economies and actual compliance with SCC in developing countries. It is difficult for reseachers to reach suppliers who have violated SCC, especially within a large sample, because few disclose SCC violations to the public. In this paper, however, we identified 108 non-compliant Chinese apparel and textile suppliers. Through the investigation of these non-compliant suppliers and their compliant peers, this paper tests the impacts of antecedent factors (price pressure, production complexity, and contract duration) and buyer's governance mechanisms (peer-to-peer and buyer-to-supplier) on the likelihood of a supplier's compliance with SCC. While the buyer-to-supplier governance does not show significant effects, the peer-to-peer governance demonstrates the likelihood of supplier's commitment to SCC. This research reveals that if buyer's governance efforts move away from threat and toward cooperation, supplier's compliance with SCC could be more sustainable.     

严监管与审计质量改善——基于证监会138号《新规》的自然实验

以沪深A股上市公司2016—2019年样本数据作为实验组,选取同期中国大陆在中国香港上市的由内资事务所及国际四大审计的三组公司（H股、红筹股和民营股）作为对照组,采用DID方法实证检验了严监管与审计质量改善的相关性。结果显示,严监管的《新规》导致会计师事务所面临更高的惩戒与诉讼风险压力,能够对会计师事务所强化法律责任与声誉管理起到积极作用,从而能够普遍改善会计师事务所的审计质量;进一步地,相较于小规模事务所,《新规》促进大规模事务所审计质量改善的效果更显著。     

Convergence rates of recombining trees for pricing options on stocks under GBM and regime-switching models with known cash dividends

In the literature there appear various kinds of binomial trees for pricing options on stocks under geometric Brownian motions (GBMs) with known cash dividends. The aim of this paper is to compare the performance of the existing binomial trees in aspect of the convergence rates, which are usually used to measure precisely how fast the approximate values converge to the exact one, and to give a theoretical proof of the convergence rates for the interpolation binomial trees which are based on a model that excludes the arbitrage possibilities. Also the paper extends the studies to the regime-switching models with known cash dividend payment.     

Behavior of the firm under rate-of-return regulation with two capital inputs

Traditional electric utility companies face a trade-off between building generation facilities that utilize renewable energy (RE) and non-renewable energy (non-RE). The firm's input decision to build capacity for either source depends on several constraining factors, including input prices, policies that promote or discourage RE use, and the type of regulation faced by the firm. This paper models the utility company's decision between RE and non-RE capital inputs. From the model, we derive the result that rate-of-return (ROR) regulation decreases the investment in RE capital relative to the unregulated firm. These findings suggest restructuring electricity generation markets, which removes the ROR on generating assets, can increase the relative use of RE. A second result of the model shows that the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) increases the investment in capital that requires RE as a source of electricity, as expected. This paper contributes to the literature on the substitution between renewable and non-renewable resources, by examining the policies that affect the investment in the two types of technologies. The model can also be applied to other regulated utilities, such as water or natural gas companies, with outputs that are produced from different types of capital.