A Note on Auction Quotas with a Foreign Duopoly*

A country importing a good from foreign duopolists may improve its welfare by imposing a quota on the good at the free trade quantity and giving a fraction of the quota licences to the duopolists while auctioning off the rest.     

Enforcing Domestic Quality Dominance through Quotas*

We study duopoly competition between a domestic and a foreign firm who first choose their quality and then compete in prices in the domestic market. As is well known, the free‐trade equilibrium exhibits quality differentiation and indeterminacy of the quality leader. We show that an import quota can enforce, as the unique subgame‐perfect equilibrium outcome, the quality ranking that favors the domestic producer and thereby can increase domestic welfare.     

Technological Upgrading under Tariffs and Equivalent Quotas*

This paper compares the effect of tariffs and that of equivalent quotas on the domestic firm’s production technology choice when it competes with a foreign firm in the domestic market. It is shown that under Bertrand price competition, the ranking of technology under tariff protection and quota protection is ambiguous, as it depends on the relative strength of the strategic vs output effects. The equivalent quota regime can generate a higher‐technology (implying a lower production cost) choice than the tariff regime if the strategic effect dominates the output effect. In contrast, the technology level is necessarily higher under the tariff regime than under the equivalent quota regime when the firms engage in Cournot quantity competition.     

Tariffs vs Quotas in a Model of Trade with Capital Accumulation*

This paper examines the equivalence among price‐modifying and quantity‐fixing international trade policies in a differential game. We employ two well‐known capital accumulation dynamics for firms, due to Nerlove and Arrow and to Ramsey, respectively. We show that, in both cases, open‐loop and closed‐loop Nash equilibria coincide. Under the former accumulation the tariff‐quota equivalence holds, while, in general, it does not under the latter. Moreover, in the Ramsey model, the country setting the trade policy (weakly) prefers a quantity‐equivalent import quota to the adoption of the tariff. These results are not a consequence of the equilibrium concept we adopt (with and without market power), but directly follow from the interplay between market power and the properties of accumulation dynamics.     

The Effect of Quotas on Domestic Product Price and Quality

A quota on foreign competition generally leads to quality upgrading (downgrading) of the low-quality (high-quality) firm, an increase in average quality, a reduction of quality differentiation, and a reduction of domestic consumer surplus, irrespective of whether the foreign firm produces higher or lower quality. Effects of a quota on industry profits and domestic welfare depend on the direction of international vertical differentiation. If the foreign firm produces low quality, both firms prices and profits rise but domestic welfare falls. This describes well some major effects of a Japanese Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) in the U.S. auto market and relevant empirical findings. If the foreign firm produces high quality, foreign profits will fall. Since domestic consumer surplus falls only unsubstantially, domestic profit gains lead to an increase of domestic welfare.I am grateful to Jim Gaisford, and Konrad Stahl, seminar participants at the Universität Mannheim and at the ZEW, and an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions. As Senior Fellow at the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI), Bonn, I gratefully acknowledge its continued support.     

Reciprocal Dumping with Product Differentiation*

This paper examines if international trade can reduce total welfare in an international oligopoly with differentiated goods. We show that intra‐industry trade, i.e. “reciprocal dumping,” can result in lower total surplus than autarky in a Cournot model for any degree of product differentiation. Moreover, trade can reduce welfare compared to autarky in a Bertrand model when the local markets are sufficiently competitive and products are sufficiently close substitutes. Otherwise it unambiguously increases welfare.     

Innovation by Heterogeneous Leaders*

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model in which leaders and followers conduct research and development (R&D) activities and in which leaders have different‐sized quality leads over their followers, and thus have different profit flows. We show that leaders with larger quality leads make smaller R&D investments; this result is consistent with the actual behaviors of some previous leader firms, such as Sony and Eastman–Kodak. Moreover, we show that subsidizing the R&D of followers can promote the aggregate R&D of leaders, because promotion of followers' R&D decreases (increases) the number of leaders with larger (smaller) quality leads and smaller (larger) R&D investments.     

Tariffs,Quotas, and Forward Contracts under Asymmetric Information*

We consider optimal trade policy for a large country with private information. We show that the optimal tariff leads to a signaling equilibrium with higher tariffs and lower welfare than under complete information, whereas the optimal import quota replicates the complete information equilibrium and thus is superior to the tariff. We also show that, with the tariff, the country may be better off being uninformed. Finally, we show that if the importing nation cannot commit to its tariff, the use of futures contracts together with the dynamically consistent tariff leads to the same equilibrium as under complete information with commitment.     

Heterogeneous Matching with Transferable Utility: Two Labor Market Applications*

A labor market model under search frictions is developed, where participants are heterogeneous in productivity and the decision of which type of agents to match with is endogenized. Two applications are studied. It is observed that countries with high (low) unemployment tend to exhibit low (high) wage dispersion. And there is evidence showing that individual and firm characteristics have more explanatory power for the French than for the American wage data. Matching patterns can account for these two observations. In the absence of a minimum wage, I thus provide a theory of endogenous wage compression.     

Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Apprenticeship Training*

The relatively small average wage effects of employer and occupation changes after apprenticeship training mask large differences between occupation groups and apprentices with different schooling backgrounds. People who change employer and occupation within industrial occupations enjoy large wage advantages, whereas apprentices in commerce and trading occupations, as well as in construction and crafts occupations, face wage losses from an occupation change. The differences between the firms that provide the apprenticeship training are found to be small or insignificant. In this paper, we reconcile the differences between previous findings by comparing and replicating the empirical estimation strategies used. This demonstrates that selectivity in occupations and changes, unobserved heterogeneity between occupations, and sample selection do matter.     

Product Quality With Heterogeneous Consumers and Linear Pricing

This paper considers a linear‐pricing monopolist that conducts vertical product differentiation. Previous analyses consider customers who either have unit demand or firms who conduct nonlinear pricing. In this paper, customers’ opportunity cost of time generates a demand for quality. Customers differ in either their demand, income or taste for quality. Differences in income and taste for quality are sources of vertical differentiation. The presence of quality distortion and the variety that may exhibit it are dependent on the functional form of the customer types’ demand.     

基于产品类别层次的品牌感知效用研究

品牌感知效用是一个多维度概念,可以分为四个基本维度:产品功能效用、产品象征效用、品牌功能效用和品牌象征效用,而品牌象征效用又可以分为个人识别、社会识别和地位表达三个亚维度。这个结论对企业进行品牌形象塑造和品牌差异化战略有重要参考意义。     

异质性条件下产品创新的最优市场结构研究

何种市场结构更有利于创新是经济学领域长期争论的话题。与传统文献的视角不同,本文从产品异质性的角度出发,同时兼顾原产品间以及新产品与原产品间的不完全替代性,构建理论模型分析不同类型的市场结构对于产品创新的影响。研究发现:那些产品差异度小、或者创新产品潜在利润高、或者创新产品对原产品的替代度低的产业,行业垄断程度越高越有利于创新;那些产品差异度大、或者创新产品潜在利润低、或者创新产品对原产品的替代度高的产业,行业竞争程度越高越有利于创新;那些参数处于中度值的产业,市场结构与创新的关系则呈倒U型结构。本文的最后对如何有效利用产业政策促进产品创新进行了分析,并对中国创新的市场结构进行了反思。     

集成情境的产品品类生命周期特征知识管理模型

在消费市场瞬息万变和分销资源日益稀缺的今天,如何根据产品品类所处生命周期阶段的差异性,来实现产品品类间分销资源的合理配置,已经成为众多企业关注的焦点。在阐述产品品类生命周期特征知识管理模型的基础上,定义了销售量、市场占有率和销售利润率3类知识“情境”,建立了基于情境认知的产品品类生命周期特征知识推理规则,并结合某零售企业日化产品品类的销售数据进行了实证研究。     

Tax Reform,Delocation, and Heterogeneous Firms*

The standard international tax model is extended to allow for heterogeneous firms when agglomeration forces are important, enabling us to study the relocation effects of taxes that vary according to firm size. We show that allowing for heterogeneity permits a given tax scheme to have an endogenously different effect on the location decision of small and big firms, with the biggest firms being endogenously more likely to relocate in reaction to high taxes. We show that a reform that flattens the tax–firm–size profile can raise tax revenue without inducing any relocation.     

Heterogeneous beliefs and learning in forward looking economic models*

We study a class of forward looking economic models with heterogeneous agents in a bounded rationality setting. The agents employ the same recursive learning rule to update beliefs but are characterized by different memory parameters. The peculiarity of the learning mechanism is that the learning rate is not vanishing in the limit. Differently from what is obtained in the case of a vanishing learning step, i.e., the stability conditions in the heterogeneous agents case are those of the representative agent model, we show that heterogeneity matters for the expectational stability of a stationary perfect foresight equilibrium and that the stability parameter restrictions with heterogeneous agents are stronger than in the case of homogeneous agents.     

Product Market Reform and Innovation in the EU*

European Union countries have implemented widespread reforms to product markets to stimulate competition, innovation, and economic growth. We provide empirical evidence that the reforms carried out under the EU Single Market Programme (SMP) were associated with increased product market competition, as measured by a reduction in average profitability, and with a subsequent increase in innovation intensity and productivity growth for manufacturing sectors. Our analysis exploits exogenous variation in the expected impact of the SMP across countries and industries to identify the effects of reforms on average profitability, and the effects of profitability on innovation and productivity growth.     

Multinationals,Information Update,and Product Adaptation *

This paper develops a dynamic model of decision making by multinational firms. The firm chooses between exporting and producing abroad when it expands the market. Bayes learning is incorporated into this model in addition to fixed cost and transport cost Production in a foreign country gives the firm new information about the demand function. This information is applied to adjust the firm's expectation as well as output choice in the future. This process not only reduces the risk encountered by a firm in a foreign market, but also increases acceptance of the product which the firm manufactures. This paper concludes even if producing abroad loses money in the first period, the firm may still choose to set up plants in foreign countries rather than exporting, due to the dynamic information advantage associated with going multinational. [F23,F21]     

Multiple Equilibria and Minimum Wages in Labor Markets with Informational Frictions and Heterogeneous Production Technologies*

It is often argued that a mandatory minimum wage is binding only if the wage density displays a spike at it. In this article, we analyze a model with search frictions and heterogeneous production technologies, in which imposition of a minimum wage affects wages even though, after imposition, the lowest wage in the market exceeds the minimum wage. The model has multiple equilibria as a result of the fact that the reservation wage of the unemployed and the lowest production technology in use affect each other. Imposition of a minimum wage may improve social welfare.