Delusions Regarding the Proper Role of Markets and Antitrust Policy

William Curran and Donald Wellington have criticized capitalism,neoclassical economics and antitrust policy. This article defendscapitalistic institutions against both the strong forms ofsocialism as practiced in the former Soviet Union and againstits milder forms as practiced in the welfare states of Europe.The article endorses some of Curran's and Wellington's concernsabout neoclassical economics, but recommends that neoclassicaleconomics be adapted to make it more useful for scientificresearch rather than abandoned outright. Some suggestions areoffered in this direction. The article totally rejects the notionthat antitrust policy can be a tool for correcting the ills ofcapitalism as Curran and Wellington see them, and argues that thegoal of antitrust policy should be to improve capitalism not todestroy it.     

The NCAA and the Rule of Reason

This brief essay considers the use of antitrust’s rule of reason in assessing challenges to rule-making by the NCAA. In particular, it looks at the O’Bannon case, which involved challenges to NCAA rules that limit the compensation of student athletes under the NCAA rubric that protects the “amateur” status of collegiate athletes. Within that rubric, the Ninth Circuit got the right answer. That outcome leads to a broader question, however: Should the NCAA’s long held goal, frequently supported by the courts, of preserving athletic amateurism be jettisoned? Given the dual role that colleges play, that is a complex question, which raises issues that are not only commercial but also educational. More important for the purpose at hand, is whether jettisoning amateurism in NCAA athletics is a suitable task for an antitrust tribunal. This paper argues that antitrust law is not an appropriate vehicle for addressing that issue. This does not mean that antitrust has no role to play in policing athlete compensation in NCAA schools. But it does suggest that that role be limited to addressing restraints on trade that occur within the rubric of amateur status—at least until such time as a more competent body decides whether amateurism in collegiate athletics is worth preserving.     

Multisided Platforms,Big Data,and a Little Antitrust Policy

Review of Industrial Organization - Commentators on both the right and the left ends of the political spectrum have called for new and more forceful approaches to antitrust enforcement with respect...     

Cartel overcharges: Survey and meta-analysis

The article presents a novel meta-regression analysis of the size of cartel overcharges from a sample of more than 800 observations collected from a wide variety of published sources. The analysis of a subsample of 395 cartel episodes finds that duration, legal environment, and organizational characteristics of cartels explain variation in overcharge rates to a greater extent than the type of publication or the method of calculation. Overcharges tend to be significantly higher for durable international cartels. Secular decline is observed as antitrust-enforcement regimes have stiffened.     

The Determinants of State-Level Antitrust Activity

While there has been a considerable literature exploring the determinants of antitrust enforcement in the United States, these studies have been based either on aggregate federal enforcement data over time (exploring cyclical influences) or cross-industry studies, usually for a single year or aggregated over several years. What has never been investigated is the pattern of state-level antitrust litigation. This is somewhat surprising, as this has been a major activity of many state attorneys general. In this paper, we explain state antitrust activity across states, examining a number of the economic and political determinants that have been proposed in the literature.     

Cartel formation and pricing: The effect of managerial decision-making rules

We experimentally investigate how the managerial decision-making process affects choices in a Bertrand pricing game with an opportunity to form non-binding cartels. To do so we compare the effects of three decision-making rules for the firm (decisions by CEOs, majority rule and consensus) to each other and to decisions in a benchmark consisting of single-individual firms. It has been argued elsewhere that groups behave more competitively than individuals. In this setting this predicts that for all three decision-making rules we should observe fewer cartels and lower prices. This is not what we find. For the formation of cartels, there are no differences across treatments. For prices asked, we find that first, cartels lead to higher prices in all treatments, despite the fact that they are non-binding. Second, the decision-making rules strongly affect the prices asked. One thing that stands out is that firms run by CEOs ask higher prices (i.e., defect less often from the cartel) than observed in the other treatments.     

Preface – Forensic Economics in Action: The Lysine Cartel

Review of Industrial Organization -     

Antitrust and Sales-Below-Cost Laws: The Case of Retail Gasoline

Numerous states have sales-below-cost (SBC) laws, often directed at specific products such as gasoline. Potential violations of state SBC laws occur when prices are less than the seller's cost of doing business, or some proxy thereof. The most commonly stated purpose of these laws is to protect small independent firms from predation by larger firms. This study offers empirical evidence on the impact of SBC laws on the retail gasoline market. The result indicate that SBC laws directed specifically at the retail gasoline market have resulted in higher retail margins.     

企业集团引发的反垄断难题

本文从企业集团的界定、性质和域外管辖权三个角度提出了其所引发的反垄断难题。本文的主要观点是企业集团作为一种企业间组织。兼有“企业性”与“市场性”二重属性：企业集团的“二重性”是导致企业集团垄断行为隐蔽性和复杂性的根本原因；处理企业集团的反垄断问题需要准确判断企业集团行为属性。本文通过案例研究．分析了美国和欧盟处理企业集团反垄断难题时的一些典型做法：提出了处理企业集团反垄断难题的基本原则。     

Introduction: Antitrust and Regulatory Update

Review of Industrial Organization -     

Whither the NCAA: Reforming the System

Intercollegiate athletics has long been caught in the ambiguous space between professional and amateur sport. As a hybrid and immensely popular system run by the NCAA, intercollegiate athletics has been critiqued as ethically hypocritical, educationally corrosive, materially exploitative, and economically unsustainable. Economic, political and legal pressure has been building over the last 10 years to reform the system. Such reform will ultimately require a choice between the professional and the amateur models, or a bifurcation whereby a select group of a few dozen schools chooses a professional paradigm while a thousand-plus schools opt for the official NCAA vision of academically centered amateur athletics. After considering the arguments for a market-oriented reform in the direction of professionalism, I argue for an educationally-based reform that is accompanied by a constrained and conditional antitrust exemption for the NCAA or an alternative governing body.     

Antitrust in High-Tech Industries

Recent economic growth has been led by high-technology industries (See Jorgenson, Ho & Stiroh (2005) for a summary of the research on the recent acceleration of productivity growth). Many firms in these industries have achieved a dominant market position, thereby attracting the attention of competition authorities, often resulting in major monopolization cases. Unfortunately, this attention has not resulted in improved market outcomes. In this paper, we evaluate the effect of Section 2 Sherman Act cases brought against IBM, AT&T, and Microsoft. We conclude that these cases had limited effect on consumer welfare because they did not stimulate entry or innovation. In these industries, competition authorities cannot expect to promote simply an expansion of output and lower commodity prices; rather they should focus their remedies on promoting innovation—new products that replace or compete with the dominant firm’s products.