Access Regulation and the Timing of Infrastructure Investment

This paper examines infrastructure investment incentives under a system of 'regulation by negotiation'. We demonstrate that an appropriately specified access pricing rule can induce private firms to choose to invest at a socially optimal time. The optimal regulatory regime allocates investment costs to the access provider and seeker based on their relative use-values of the facility. It is superior to an unregulated environment because it commits firms ex ante to an access charge that allows for sunk cost recovery. In addition, we show that when the time that access is sought is flexible both replacement- and historical-cost asset valuation methodologies can lead to optimal investment incentives. However, when seeker timing is restricted, historical cost can give rise to distorted incentives.     

Regulating Private Infrastructure Investment: Optimal Pricing for Access to Essential Facilities

This paper analyzes optimal pricing for access to essential facilities in a competitive environment. The focus is on investment incentive issues arising from regulation under complete information. To that end, examining the provision of a natural monopoly infrastructure with unlimited capacity, it is shown that the fixed component of a regulated access price can be structured so as to induce a race between market participants to provide the infrastructure. An appropriate pricing formula can ensure that a single firm chooses to invest at the socially optimal time (taking into account producer and consumer surplus) despite the immediate access granted to rivals and the non-existence of government subsidies. Under the optimal pricing formula, firms choose their investment timing based on their desire to pre-empt their rivals. This pricing formula is efficient (a two part tariff), implementable ex post, and robust to alternative methods of asset valuation (replacement or historical cost). When firms are not identical, the access pricing formula resembles, in equilibrium, a fully distributed cost methodology.     

Access Prices for Rail Infrastructure

Separation of railway infrastructure, a natural monopoly, from a contestable train operator industry raises policy options for setting the infrastructure access fee and for regulation of the infrastructure supplier. Marginal cost, average cost. Ramsey prices and multipart tariff rules for access fees are assessed. Recognizing the importance of train operator entry decisions, a single access fee per gross tonne kilometre based on a mark-up of marginal cost is favoured. An independent regulator and the use of price ceilings on the infrastructure supplier are proposed.     

Delegating Infrastructure Projects with Open Access

This paper provides a simple model that examines a firm's incentive to invest in a network infrastructure through coalition formation in an open-access environment with a deregulated retail market. A regulator faces a dilemma between inducing an incentive for efficient investment and reducing the distortion generated by imperfect competition. We show that, in such a case, the degree of the cost-reducing effect of the investment is crucial from a welfare point of view. In particular, when network investment through coalition formation creates a large (small) cost-reducing effect, the regulator can (should not) delegate an investment decision to firms with an appropriate level of access charge.     

Quantitative Analysis of the Investment in Chinese Urban Infrastructure

The proper amount, the suitable structure and the tentative sources of urban infrastructure investment are the main focuses of urban policy makers. Firstly the amount of urban infrastructure investment is combinatory forecasted based on historical statistic databases of China. Then the interrelationship of urban infrastructure investment with GNP and the whole society investment in fixed assets are analyzed to work out quantitative coherent relationship. Finally the paper analyses the present and the future development trends of investment structure and capital resource respectively.     

论基础设施投资的产出弹性研究——以江苏省为例

文章以江苏省为例,选用江苏省1990年～2004年的数据用生产函数法,通过计算基础设施投资的产出弹性研究基础设施建设对区域经济的影响。     

政府对农业生产基础设施投资效应分析

当前中国农业正处于由传统农业向现代化农业转轨的过渡期，农业和农村发展仍然处在艰难的爬坡阶段．需要大量资金投入，在基础设施建设方面更是如此。中国财政支农支出增幅不到位，农业基础设施脆弱，农业生产基础设施发展滞后一直是中国农村经济发展的瓶颈，应切实加强农业生产基础设施建设，加强政府对农业生产基础设施投资。以加快社会主义新农村建设。     

农村基础设施投资与农村发展研究述评

农村基础设施具有公共物品的特征,典型地应由公共部门提供。大量研究表明农村基础设施投资对农村发展具有正效应,然而对引起正效应的具体联系和因果关系的研究较少,所以除了建议增加公共基础设施投资之外,很难提出更多的具体政策建议。本文对农村基础设施与农村发展的主要文献进行了系统的梳理,将农村基础设施对农村发展的影响划分为宏观经济效应、微观经济效应和分配效应三种,并展望了该领域的研究前景。     

论以城市政府作为基础设施投资主体的合理性

在城市基础设施多元投资新格局下,城市政府由传统的唯一投资者,演变为多元投资主体之一。要重新界定政府投资的合理性,有必要从城市政府投资地位、投资范围、投资方式等三个方面进行分析。应当建立“一主多元”的投资格局;政府投资范围应界定在非经营性资产和未能得到合理回报的经营性资产;重视城市政府投融资方式在融合与分离上的创新。     

基础设施与制造业发展关系研究

本文从历史与实证的角度 ,以中国改革开放 2 0年的实践为案例 ,用计量分析的方法测算基础设施与制造业发展之间的相互关系及相互影响的方向及程度 ,在此基础上提出了促进基础设施与制造业协调发展的建议     

Ownership,Access, and Sequential Investment

We extend the property‐rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their investment costs. Along with this cost‐sharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property‐rights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary.     

基础设施产业投融资市场化研究

基础设施具有双重属性,即公益性与竞争性并存。这一特性决定了基础设施并非只能由政府独家垄断经营,私人资本完全可以进入基础设施领域。为此,我们主张基础设施产业投融资应尽快走向市场化。可以断言,基础领域市场化对我国经济发展将产生多重积极意义。目前,基础领域市场化应重点解决以下几个问题：放宽准入限制;推进基础领域企业的公司化改造;拓宽企业融资渠道;真正实行招投标制以及按经济原理制定管理价格和有效发挥政府的法律监督和产业规划功能等。     

Research on Strengthen Investment in Rural Infrastructure Construction

Based on clarifying the definition of rural infrastructure, this paper specifically introduces backwardness of rural infrastructure in Enshi City, Hubei Province. Then it summarizes successful experiences of Korean ＂New Village Movement＂. From a new angle, the paper talks about measures to strengthen investment in rural infrastructure construction. It expects an early realization of ＂the development of production, peasants living a rich and comfortable life, civilized custom, clean and tidy villages, and democratic management＂ of the new socialist rural areas.     

高校基建投资控制探究

随着我国对高等教育需求的日益增长,高等教育招生规模不断扩大,满足教学、科研、居住需要的高校配套基础设施建设显得越来越不足,依据计划经济条件下单一化由政府投资进行高校基础设施建设,目前已成为高校扩大办学规模的障碍,在引入多元化资金进行高校基础设施建设、逐步实行市场经济管理模式的今天,高校基建投资控制还未真正得到人们的高度重视,成为一个值得探索、研究的课题。     

中国电信投资经济效应的实证研究

本文研究了电信投资对我国经济增长的贡献以及贡献值变化的趋势。利用我国2000—2005年31个省市的数据,建立和估计了两者之间的系统结构方程。结果发现我国电信投资对我国经济增长的边际贡献平均为2.376%,比其他社会基础投资高6.758%,但电信投资的边际贡献呈现下降趋势。分区域考察的结果表明,电信投资及其贡献存在着明显的区域非均衡,在西部对生产率的促进作用远远高于东部和中部;我国西部应加大对电信的投资,东部需要调整投资结构,而中部则应采取措施刺激电信消费。本文在同类研究中取得了一定突破,和Roller与Waverman(2001)的研究结论相反,得出的实证结论与他们在网络效应和边际贡献方面的理论预测相反,对制定电信投资决策具有指导作用。     

Opportunity Cost Model of Infrastructure Access Charges for Chinese Railways

For the suppliers of concerned services, theories about infrastructure pricing： SAT （Stand Alone economists such as Laffont, Tirole, etc. developed Test）, ECPR （Efficient Component Pricing Rule）. Especially, Sidak, Spulber, put forward M-ECPR （Market Efficient Component Pricing Rule） method for bottleneck infrastructures. In this article, we bring the M-ECPR principles into the study of Chinese railways pricing of its network infrastructures. Combined with our Engineer Model and Opportunity Cost Model, we analyzed the special conditions faced by Chinese railways, and developed a model for sharing infrastructure fees among freight and passenger transportations. Engineer Model split Variable Cost （VC） and Fixed Cost （FC） into freight and passenger activities, and Opportunity Cost Model take the insufficient supply of infrastructure capacity into consideration. Of course, the subsidy from the government greatly affected the price standard for bottleneck facilities, or so-called network infrastructures.     

外商直接投资、基础设施建设与中国经济增长

笔者借鉴Dipankar模型,将外商直接投资引入到产品生产和基础设施生产函数中,分析了如何更好地利用外资这一问题.研究发现:在保持用于产品生产的资本一定的条件下,将引进的外资更多地运用于国内基础设施的积累,有利于产出的进一步增加.对我国的实证检验支持了这一结论.我国的基础设施比较落后,因而需要将外资更多地投入到基础设施建设当中,加强基础设施的建设,从而更大程度上促进经济增长.