Bank performance and executive compensation: a managerial discretion perspective

This study investigates how the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation is affected by the degree of an executive’s managerial discretion. Managerial discretion is captured by two industry-specific attributes: a bank’s strategic domain, and its regulatory environment. Executive compensation is found to be more related to bank performance in a context of high managerial discretion than in a context of low managerial discretion. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How sensitive is executive compensation to organizational size?

Prior empirical research has documented a large cross-sectional correlation between the level of executive pay and firm size. In contrast, this paper examines the association between percentage changes in executive compensation and percentage changes in organizational size. We analyze compensation and size data for executives at several levels of the corporate hierarchy for a sample of 303 firms. Our results indicate that the correlation between compensation and size is much smaller, although still statistically significant, in changes than in levels. This suggests that changes in an executive's compensation are not primarily driven by changes in organizational size.     

欧洲呼吁对玩具中重金属和CMR物质采取更严厉的限制措施

12月15日,近日欧洲议会议员呼吁欧盟更新欧盟玩具安全指南,对于玩具中的重金属以及归类为具有致癌、诱变、毒性（CMR）物质能引入更严格的限制措施。欧盟表示有必要采取这项建议。欧盟副主席Tajani称,目前欧盟科学家正在搜集相关证据以证实甲酰胺是否存在风险,以便更好采取措施通过欧盟玩具指令的修订提案。     

Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes

A model of the determinants of chief executive (CEO) compensation is presented and tested. Based on a sample from the leisure industry, the study finds that CEO pay has complex links to several factors: firm size, complexity, performance, CEO power, board vigilance, and the CEO's human capital. The study includes a separate examination of CEO salary and bonus, as well as a test of pay determination across McEachern's (1975) ownership categories.     

Corporate tournaments and executive compensation: Evidence from the U.K.

This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy

We use survey data to investigate the determinants of executive pay in a sample of Italian firms. To the best of our knowledge this is the first empirical study on the compensation of Italian executives. Our key hypothesis is that the characteristics of the Italian capital market, corporate governance and the specific relationship between banks and firms imply a low fraction of incentive pay over total compensation and a low sensitivity of incentive pay to firm performance. We find evidence that supports this hypothesis. We estimate that an increase of real profits per firm by 1 billion lire increases the pay of upper and middle managers by only 31 thousand lire, more than the increase found for lower management (6 thousand). Furthermore, pay–performance sensitivity is higher in foreign-owned firms, in listed firms, and in firms affiliated to a multinational group.     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The influence of lead indicator strength on the use of nonfinancial measures in performance management: Evidence from CEO compensation schemes

Nonfinancial measures (NFMs) are a common feature of strategic performance management frameworks. We examine the role of one widely used NFM: customer satisfaction, in one aspect of strategic performance management: CEO compensation schemes. Drawing on agency theory precepts, we hypothesize that the extent to which firms link CEO compensation to customer satisfaction is influenced by satisfaction's ability to act as a leading indicator of future profitability (lead indicator strength). We further hypothesize that the extent to which customer satisfaction's lead indicator strength influences the weighting of satisfaction in CEO compensation schemes has a positive influence on future shareholder value. Our empirical results offer strong support for both hypotheses and extend research on the use and efficacy of NFMs in CEO compensation schemes. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Chief executive scanning emphases,environmental dynamism,and manufacturing firm performance

Chief executives must allocate their scarce time for scanning efforts among relevant domains of their firms' external environment and their firms' internal circumstances. We argue that high‐performing CEOs vary their relative scanning emphases on different domains according to the level of dynamism they perceive in their external environments. The concepts of dominant logic and sector importance were used to develop predictions about which external domains and which internal domains should receive relatively more or less scanning emphasis in external environments that, overall, are more dynamic or more stable. A field survey of 105 single‐business manufacturing firms evaluated CEOs' scanning emphases and firm performance. Results indicated that, for dynamic external environments, relatively more CEO attention to the task sectors of the external environment and to innovation‐related internal functions was associated with high performance. In stable external environments, however, simultaneously increased scanning of the general sectors in the external environment and efficiency‐related internal functions produced higher performance. These relationships were strongest between relative scanning emphases among domains and sales growth. We discuss the implications of these results for researchers and practitioners. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Changes in executive compensation following an environmental shift: the role of top management team turnover

In this study we examine the changes in executive compensation at the top management team (TMT) level following an environmental shift. Using the context of deregulation in the airline industry, we find that: (1) a dramatic environmental change that heightens managerial discretion leads to greater pay level and performance sensitivity of TMT compensation; and (2) the greater the magnitude of turnover among TMT members following the environmental shift, the greater the compensation change. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms

Drawing on social comparison theory, this study examines the relationship between politically connected boards and top executive pay. Moreover, given the socialist orientation of China, tests are also carried out to establish the relationship between politically connected directors and pay dispersion across the firm. We find a negative association between politically connected boards and top executive pay. We also find that politically connected boards are negatively associated with pay dispersion, i.e., the higher the number of political directors on the board the smaller the gap between top executive pay and average employee pay. Finally, our study shows that politically connected directors weaken the pay‐performance link. These findings have important theoretical, policy, and managerial implications. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Structure and process of diversification,compensation strategy,and firm performance

This study tests six hypotheses on the extent to which a match between compensation and diversification strategies affects firm performance. Using both archival and survey data, results generally support the notion that a firm's compensation strategies make a greater contribution to firm performance if these are attuned to extent and process of corporate diversification. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for future research on compensation-diversification strategy relations and their interactive effect on firm performance.     

Chief executive scanning,environmental characteristics,and company performance: An empirical study

Chief executives in 50 manufacturing companies were interviewed about the perceived strategic uncertainty in six environmental sectors, and the frequency and mode of scanning used for each sector. The findings suggest that customer, economic and competitor sectors generated greater strategic uncertainty than technological, regulatory and sociocultural sectors. When sector uncertainty was high, executives reported greater frequency of scanning and greater use of personal information sources. Chief executives in high-performing companies scanned more frequently and more broadly in response to strategic uncertainty than their counterparts in low-performing companies.     

Product diversification,performance criteria and compensation at the corporate manager level

The paper describes a test of the Galbraith and Nathanson (1978) model of stages of development. In particular, Galbraith and Nathanson hypothesized that in highly diverse firms: (1) performance criteria are more objective, (2) bonus is a larger proportion of total compensation, and (3) bonus allocation decisions are based more on an objective ‘formula’ of performance evaluation than on the discretion of the firm President or Chief Executive Officer. The study compared the three variables across three diversification groups (high, medium, low), based on Rumelt's (1974) classification (single product, vertically integrated, dominant, related, unrelated, and conglomerate). The study used written surveys of corporate managers in Fortune 1000 manufacturing firms.     

An inventory reservation problem with nesting and fill rate-based performance measures

In many inventory settings companies wish to provide customer-differentiated service levels. These may, for example, be motivated by differences in the perceived customer lifetime value or by specific contractual agreements. One approach to provide differentiated service levels is to reserve some portion of the available inventory exclusively for specific customer classes. Existing approaches to inventory reservation are typically based on the assumption that a company can assign a customer specific revenue or penalty cost to any order or unit of demand filled or unfulfilled. In practice, however, it is usually extremely difficult to accurately estimate (especially long term) monetary implications of meeting or not meeting customer demand and corresponding service level requirements. The research presented in this paper addresses the problem of setting appropriate inventory reservations for different customer classes based on fill rate-based performance measures. We model a single period inventory reservation problem with two customer classes and nesting. We develop exact expressions for two conflicting performance measures: (1) the expected fill rate of high priority customers and (2) the expected loss in the system fill rate induced by inventory reservation. With these expressions a decision maker can analyze the tradeoff between the loss in overall system performance and the higher expected fill rates for prioritized customers. We provide analytical insights into the effects of nesting and the impact of relevant problem parameters on these two performance measures. The analytical insights are illustrated and highlighted through a set of numerical examples. Although we limit our analysis to a single period inventory reservation problem, we expect that our results can be utilized in a wide range of problem settings in which a decision maker has to ration a perishable resource among different classes of customers.     

Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: main effects and interactions with financial performance

We test the effects of stakeholder management on CEOs' salaries, bonuses, stock options, and total compensation. We also examine the extent to which the interaction of stakeholder management and financial performance determines compensation. Using a longitudinal database of 406 Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that stakeholder management is relevant to boards of directors when setting CEO compensation. Specifically, we found a significant, negative main effect of stakeholder management on CEO salaries. Further, we found that stakeholder management typically reduces the rewards CEOs may get for increasing levels of financial performance. In tandem, these results indicate that CEOs may jeopardize their personal wealth by pursuing stakeholder‐related initiatives. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top management team compensation: the missing link between CEO pay and firm performance?

In this research we discuss the relationship between CEO and top management team (TMT) member compensation, and explore the implications of TMT pay for firm performance. Specifically, we suggest that firm performance may benefit due to agency and group behavioral issues when top management team member pay is aligned—alignment is defined as the degree to which TMT member pay reflects (1) shareholder interests and (2) key political and strategic contingencies within the firm. In support of our theorizing, we found CEO pay to be related to TMT pay; TMT compensation, in turn, predicted performance (i.e., return on assets and Tobin's q) when aligned with shareholder interests and internal contingencies. Moreover, the effect of CEO pay on future firm performance was dependent on top team pay. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ceo selection,succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis

This study seeks to extend and unify a set of research issues relating to CEO selection, succession, compensation, and firm performance. The study offers a model of these issues from a combined agency and organizational perspective, and tests the model using archival data and perceptual data from survey responses from 118 CEOs of the largest U.S. corporations. The results suggest that several CEO issues are significant predictors of variation in firm performance, supporting the paper's arguments for (1) a reinterpretation of the insiderfoutsider CEO distinction, (2) the relevance of CEO succession planning, and (3) the importance of CEOs' perceptions of the linkage between their personal wealth and firm wealth.