The importance of the design of market-based instruments for CO2 mitigation: An AGE analysis for Spain

In the past few decades, economists have defended the use of market-based instruments (MBI) in environmental and climate policy. There have been many papers which have compared the costs of attaining environmental objectives with MBIs and with command and control instruments. However very few have compared different MBIs in examining these costs. This paper seeks to analyse various MBIs for CO₂ mitigation from the viewpoint of cost-effectiveness, using an AGE (applied general equilibrium) model for the case of Spain. A distinction is drawn between (1) quantity instruments, which represent different extents of a market for emission permits; and (2) price instruments, which represent different types of tax. Each instrument can affect different segments of the emission sources and therefore can have very different effects on the economy as a whole. We show how MBI can help to minimise mitigation costs, but also how taxes and tradable emission permits that are limited or constrained by many exemptions and distortions can raise costs considerably.     

Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies

In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of strategic environmental policymaking with different degrees of product differentiation and different market structures, and examine how strategic voting decisions are affected by the choice of environmental policy instruments (tax or standard). We show that in a Cournot market structure, voters elect tax-setting policymakers who are more green than themselves when product differentiation and/or environmental externalities are more prominent. In a Bertrand market structure, they elect more green tax-setting policymakers than themselves. On the other hand, they elect standard-setting policymakers who are less green than themselves. The results confirm the advantage of the overall use of emission tax over that of emission standard regarding the welfare effect of strategic voting.     

National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities

Abstract. We analyze the role of National Treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy. A social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good. We show that whether National Treatment of standards interferes with welfare‐maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker (consumption or emissions tax) and differences in the cost of complying with the standard. We also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal. This asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare‐maximizing policy to violate National Treatment.     

Policy mechanism choice for environmental management by non-commercial “lifestyle” rural landholders

For some environmental assets in rural areas, the landholders who are having the biggest impact are people with small holdings and an emphasis on lifestyle rather than commercial gains from their land. This paper aims to better understand the motivations and likely responses to policy for lifestyle landholders in Australia, in order to assess which policy mechanisms, if any, are likely to be most efficiently used to influence their land management. Through face-to-face interviews, we find that lifestyle landholders have important differences from commercial farmers, including much smaller properties, a stronger interest in environmental outcomes, a lack of land-management skills and a lack of time for land-management activities. From the perspective of environmental policy programs, engaging with lifestyle landholders is likely to involve higher transaction costs, and there are likely to be higher learning and transition costs per unit area. A framework for selection of policy tools is modified to take account of these findings. It is concluded that the prospects for worthwhile public investments in land-use changes by lifestyle landholders are lower than for commercial landholders.     

Using Non Market Valuation to Inform the Choice Between Permits and Fees in Environmental Regulation

The purpose of this short note is to open an exploration regarding the use of non market valuation to help guide the selection of economically efficient pollution control instruments. As long as non market valuation techniques can correctly estimate the slope of the marginal benefit of abatement curve, this information along with engineering cost estimates of the unit costs or slope of the marginal abatement cost will provide useful information to policy makers in choosing between fees and permits. An illustrative review of the literature suggests that both stated and revealed preference methods have estimated slopes of marginal benefit functions for reducing several pollutants. To investigate the efficiency of permits versus fees, an illustrative review of corresponding marginal abatement costs is also made. For air pollutants affecting visibility, the slope of the marginal benefit curve is far greater than the slope of the marginal abatement costs, suggesting permits as the efficient instrument. For nitrates in groundwater used for drinking, the marginal benefit curve is flatter than the rather steep marginal abatement cost, suggesting fees/taxes would be a more efficient economic instrument. We hope this note stimulates more emphasis in non market valuation on estimating the slope of the marginal benefit function to enhance environmental economists ability to make policy recommendations regarding the choice of pollution instruments for specific pollutants.      

Static and dynamic efficiency of pollution control strategies

A great deal of the economic literature on pollution control strategies concentrates on the efficiency of environmental policy instruments. Most analytical studies in this field show that market instruments are more efficient with respect to the cost of pollution abatement of a given number of polluters than non-market instruments. According to several analytical studies, market instruments should also be more efficient with respect to innovation in pollution abatement equipment than non-market instruments. In the empirical literature a great number of case studies exist with estimations of the savings of abatement costs of market instruments in a situation without technological progress. Empirical studies about the impact of environmental policy market instruments on the abatement costs in situations with technological progress are lacking.The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. The paper deals with an empirical estimation of abatement costs for the emission of SO₂ of coal-fired electricity units in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2000. First, the working of market instruments and non-market instruments (the existing environmental policy of the Dutch government) is simulated in a static situation. Second, we analyse the learning effects of flue gas desulphurization. The efficiency advantage of market instruments turns out to be larger in a situation of technological progress than in a static situation.     

Environmental regulation and trade openness in the presence of private mitigation

Acknowledging the differential ability of individuals to privately mitigate the consequences of domestic pollution for their health is essential for an understanding of their demands for regulation of the environment and of trade in dirty goods, and for analysis of the implications of these demands for equilibrium policy choices. In a small open economy with exogenous policy, we first explain how private mitigation at a cost results in an unequal distribution of the health consequences of pollution in a manner consistent with epidemiologic studies, and consequently how the benefits and costs of trade in dirty goods interact with choices concerning private mitigation to further polarize the interests of citizens concerning environmental stringency. The economy is then embedded in a broader political economy setting, and simulated to investigate the role of private mitigation in shaping political equilibria. We show that when citizens can choose between mitigating the health consequences of domestic pollution privately and reducing pollution through public policy, the same polarization of interests underlies equilibrium policy choices in both democratic and autocratic regimes.     

A coopetitive model for the green economy

The paper proposes a coopetitive model for the Green Economy. It addresses the issue of the climate change policy and the creation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. In the present paper the complex construct of coopetition is applied at macroeconomic level. The model, based on Game Theory, enables us to offer a set of possible solutions in a coopetitive context, allowing to find a Pareto solution in a win–win scenario. The model, which is based on the assumption that each country produces a level of output which is determined in a non-cooperative game of Cournot-type and that considers at the same time a coopetitive strategy regarding the low technologies, will suggest a solution that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of low carbon technologies within a coopetitive framework to address a policy of climate change, thus aiming at balancing the environmental imbalances.     

Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology:: Will the true ranking please stand up?

We investigate incentives through environmental policy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology. First, we study the case where the regulator makes long-term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new technology. We show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits, auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives, and standards may give stronger incentives than permits. Second, we investigate scenarios where the regulator anticipates new technologies. We show that with taxes and permits the regulator can induce first-best outcomes if he moves after firms have invested, whereas this does not always hold if he moves first.     

Reforms of Environmental Policies in the Presence of Cross‐border Pollution and Public–Private Clean‐up*

We construct a two‐country model where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Pollution abatement is undertaken by both private producers and the public sector. We characterize Nash optimal levels of the policy instruments in the two countries: emission taxes and funds allocated for public abatement activities. We examine the implications of a number of multilateral policy reforms. One of our findings is that the magnitude of the beneficial effect of a reform depends on the scope of the reform; if it is restricted to a subset of policy instruments, then the efficacy of environmental policy reform can be greatly undermined.     

Free trade and the burden of domestic policy

Abstract. Consider a small economy facing accession to a exogenously defined trade agreement. Before accession, the government controls trade and pollution policy. After accession, it retains control over pollution policy, but must allow free trade in all goods. This is a choice many governments face while joining trade agreements today. They decide whether greater market access to other members is more valuable than control over trade policy. I ask two questions. All else being equal what happens to environmental policy after accession? Second, what affects the choice of accession and how does this choice impact aggregate welfare? I show that a loss in control over trade policy alters the political incentives determining environmental policy. Before accession, producers can transfer a portion of their burden of environmental regulation to consumers through price increases. After accession the same regulation is borne entirely by producers. Owing to the change in burden, there exist plausible conditions under which the adoption of free trade can lead to more stringent environmental regulation, a reduction in the preferential treatment of special interest groups, and an increase in aggregate welfare.     

Regulation and innovation: Examining outcomes in Chinese pollution control policy areas

In this paper, we examine how two regionally implemented environmental initiatives in China have impacted the innovation ability of Chinese-listed firms. The regional implementation of these policies, with non-policy regions serving as controls, offers researchers the perfect conditions for a natural experiment. Using research and development (R&D) expenditures and patents as a proxy for innovativeness, we compare the record of innovation of firms inside the policy zones with firms outside the policy zones. We use a Difference-In-Difference-In-Differences (DIDID) method to eliminate endogeneity and take the quality of the patents into account by incorporating sub-items. Results show only one of the regulations had a positive effect and that low quality patents account for most of the innovation. We conclude that reasonably designed environmental regulations, when implemented regionally in competitive industries, do improve Chinese firms' innovation ability in line with the Porter Hypothesis. The results help us derive some useful policy implications regarding innovation.     

环境规制科技政策对科技进步与经济增长的影响

基于事件系统理论构建系统性、多层次性和综合性的政策量化分析框架，从政策属性、政策目标和政策工具3个维度对我国1985—2015年制定的198条环境规制科技政策进行量化研究。基于政策评估中的工具理性和价值理性两个层面，从环保科技进步效果和经济增长效应两个维度对环境规制科技政策有效性进行评估。研究发现，我国环境规制科技政策工具及政策工具协同对环保科技进步和经济增长的影响存在显著方向性差异。为此，进一步讨论了我国环境规制科技政策工具及工具协同的政策有效性评估结果，可为我国环境规制科技政策的完善和有效实施提供决策依据。     

THE SOCIAL EFFICIENCY OF INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PROMOTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES IN THE LIBERALISED POWER INDUSTRY

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper compares the social efficiency of the two main regulatory instruments used to promote renewable energy sources in electricity generation (RES-E), taking into consideration their role in promoting the preservation of the climate. They are based on a purchase obligation and act either by price (feed-in tariffs) or by quantity (RES-E quotas). In their reference design, the instruments show different performances in several dimensions: market incentives intensity, control of the cost for consumers, safeguards of RES-E investments, and conformity with the new market regime of the electricity industry. The comparison shows that neither instrument offers an optimal solution in each of these dimensions. In particular, the intrinsic qualities of the quotas instrument that are put forward to mandate its adoption by the EU members are overestimated. A government will thus select an instrument in accordance with the relative importance of its objectives: environmental policy versus cost control by market pressure.     

Do environmental benefits matter? Evidence from a choice experiment among house owners in Germany

Residential buildings strongly contribute to global CO₂ emissions due to the high energy demand for electricity and heating, particularly in industrialised countries. Within the EU, decentralised heat generation is of particular relevance for future climate policy, as its emissions are not covered by the EU ETS. We conducted a choice experiment concerning energy retrofits for existing houses in Germany. In the experiment, the approximately 400 sampled house owners could either choose a modern heating system or an improved thermal insulation for their home. We used standard and mixed logit specifications to analyse the choice data. We found environmental benefits to have a significant impact on choices of heating systems. However, they played no role in terms of insulation choices. Based on the estimated mixed logit model, we further obtained willingness-to-pay (WTP) measures for CO₂ savings.     

环境政策工具对生态创新的影响: 研究回顾及实践意义

各种环境政策工具用来推进生态创新的开发、传播与应用，但不同政策工具对生态创新的作用效果还有待进一步挖掘。系统梳理了环境政策工具对生态创新影响的相关研究，探究不同政策工具的作用及其本质，以理解在推动生态创新开发、传播与应用情景下环境政策工具的作用及其实践意义。     

Factors that influence transaction costs in development offsets: Who bears what and why?

Environmental policy instruments generate transaction costs to public and private parties. There is a growing literature reporting on the size of transaction costs produced by environmental policy instruments. This paper extends that literature through an analysis of the factors that influence transaction costs in environmental policy and how this influence occurs. The theory based factors that influence transaction costs are categorised as: 1) transaction characteristics; 2) transactor characteristics; 3) nature of the institutional environment; and 4) nature of the institutional arrangements. We examined how these factors influenced transaction costs through the analysis of two Australian-based development offset schemes with different policy designs. We found evidence of all four theory-based categories of influence in the policy case studies. The degree of influence and how each factor influenced transaction costs varies across the two policies and between parties. Policy design as a component of the institutional environment had a particularly large bearing on transaction costs of offset buyers and the policy administrator. An important contribution to transaction cost theory assumes the institutional environment as given.     

Real option analysis for effects of emission permit banking on investment under abatement cost uncertainty

The present paper analyzes the investment effects of emission trading scheme (ETS) when emission permits are bankable and there is technological uncertainty with regard to the abatement cost. A real option model is employed to accommodate irreversibility of investment and cost uncertainty. In the absence of abatement cost uncertainty, a bankable ETS reduces a firm's incentive for environmental investment, because the firm can utilize the banked permits for future compliance which act as substitutes for abatement investment. However, when cost uncertainty is prevalent, investment may reduce the opportunity cost of irreversible investment under the banking system, thereby increasing a firm's investment incentive. The condition is derived under which a bankable ETS provides higher investment incentives than a non-bankable ETS does.     

Environmental tariffs on polluting imports

This paper examines the implications for the use of trade measures as weapons to address global environmental concerns. There are already proposals in the U.S. senate to impose an environmental tariff against foreign nations whose cost advantages stem from less stringent environmental standards than the U.S. The paper argues that trade policy measures typically are not the first best instruments for achieving environmental objectives. Even theoretically they could be shown to be welfare improving only under a very narrow range of circumstances. Their use in place of more efficient policy instruments may not only end up distorting the patterns of world trade but also may worsen the overall patterns of environmental quality. Simulation exercises undertaken here suggest that it is highly unlikely that countries would alter their environmental behavior because of the imposition of the proposed U.S. tariff. Hence the proposed legislation has very uncertain environmental consequences. Even if the policy has been mainly designed to protect domestic industries, it would only provide a minor margin of protection because the costs of complying with the environmental standards represent a relatively small element in the total costs. The analysis suggests that trade policy introduced in this fashion will have no significant impact on the patterns of world trade and pollution.     

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments

This paper investigates the impact of political lobbying on the choice of environmental policy instruments. It is argued that the prevalence of pollution emission standards over more efficient policy instruments may result from rent seeking behaviour. The model further predicts that when an emission standard is used to control pollution, rival political parties have an incentive to set the same standard. There is therefore a convergence of policies. Moreover, it is shown that emission taxes are more likely to be supported and proposed by political parties which represent environmental interest groups. This feature appears to accord with the observed support for environmental taxes by Green parties in Europe, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere.