Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure in the 1990s

Although the link between improved infrastructure services andeconomic growth is uncertain, it is clear that reforms aimedat creating competition and regulating natural monopolies establishan environment conducive to private sector participation, incentivesfor companies to strive for efficiency savings that can ultimatelybe passed on to consumers, and greater provision of services(such as faster roll-out of infrastructure or innovative solutionsto service delivery for customers not connected to an existingnetwork). In determining the form that infrastructure restructuringmight undertake or the design of a regulatory agency, policymakerscan generally benefit from a review of the experiences of othercountries. A key element of any decisionmaking process shouldbe a review of how the various types of reform will affect theefficiency of the sector and whether they will increase privatefinancing of its significant investment needs.      

Infrastructure and Public Utilities Privatization in Developing Countries

Should governments in developing countries promote private ownershipand deregulated prices in noncompetitive sectors? Or shouldthey run publicly owned firms and regulate prices at the expenseof rents to insiders? A theoretical model is used to answerthese normative questions. The analysis focuses on the tradeoffbetween fiscal benefits and consumer surplus during privatizationof noncompetitive sectors. Privatization transfers control rightsto private interests and eliminates public subsidies, yieldingbenefits to taxpayers at the cost of increased prices for consumers.In developing countries, where budget constraints are tight,privatization and price liberalization may be optimal for lowprofitability industries but suboptimal for more profitableindustries. And once a market has room for more than one firm,governments may prefer to regulate the industry. Without a credibleregulatory agency, regulation is achieved through public ownership.     

论民营化是加快城市基础设施建设步伐的有效途径

城市基础设施民营化是基础设施市场化改革和提升基础设施资产使用效率的有效措施。由于我国城市基础设施建设领域还存在制度和政府职能定位的缺失，使得民间资本未能广泛地进入城市基础设施建设领域，因而也制约了城市化的进程和基础设施建设的步伐。本文通过对民间资本进入城市基础设施建设的障碍和有效性分析，提出要加快基础设施建设的民营化进程，拓宽资金来源渠道，是加快城市基础设施建设步伐的有效途径。     

区块链与金融基础设施——兼论Libra项目的风险与监管

本文研究了区块链对金融基础设施的影响,并从这个角度分析了Libra项目的潜在风险和监管应对。金融基础设施分为账户范式和Token范式,前者以银行账户体系为代表,后者以区块链为代表。这两个范式有很大差异,但都可以用来承载金融资产和交易,在很多应用场景中呈现了复杂的替代关系和互补关系。Libra项目、金融机构间结算币和中央银行数字货币都是Token范式的代表。Libra项目基于Token范式实现了某种意义上的超主权货币,但不一定有货币创造,远不是货币非国家化。同时,Libra项目面临着法定储备投资管理不善、货币篮子结构失衡、Libra价格大幅波动等潜在风险,且由于涉及多个国家、多种货币而面临复杂的合规要求。     

论加强金融理财产品监管的制度建设

金融理财产品监管在我国是一个较新的监管领域。对于效果导向型监管、将理财产品纳入宏观审慎监管范畴、将标准化理财产品视为金融工具以及设立独立的理财投资者保护机构等问题,在我国还未形成监管共识。因此,相关监管和立法机构需要在监管目标、监管原则、监管范围、行业治理、违法行为惩戒、投资者保护和教育等方面加强合作和规范。     

Replacement Cost Asset Valuation and Regulation of Energy Infrastructure Tariffs

In Australia, access tariffs (rental charges) paid by third party users to the owners of energy transmission assets (e.g., gas pipelines) are determined by regulators on the basis of their depreciated optimized replacement cost (known as DORC). Reliance on the replacement cost, rather than actual cost, of existing assets inflates tariffs and incites the criticism that asset owners earn a return on investments of a scale never made. The economic rationale of the regulators' model is that it emulates the workings of a contestable market, by setting tariffs at a level just short of that required to motivate a new entrant (system duplication). Properly reconstructed, this model constitutes a dynamic and internally consistent theory of replacement cost valuation and depreciation. Its mathematical consequences, however, especially with regard to the valuation of sunk assets with long times to expiry, are shown to be practically and politically unpalatable. In particular, the implied tariff levels for such assets are very close to those that would apply to new infrastructure assets built today at today's prices. Regulators unwilling to accept this implication of a new-entrant-exclusion pricing logic are left with no alternative framework for DORC.     

Options in Compensation: Promises and Pitfalls

We derive the optimal compensation contract in a principal–agent setting in which outcome is used to provide incentives for both effort and risky investments. To motivate investment, optimal compensation entails rewards for high as well as low outcomes, and it is increasing at the mean outcome to motivate effort. If rewarding low outcomes is infeasible, compensation consisting of stocks and options is a near‐efficient means of overcoming the manager's induced aversion to undertaking risky investments, whereas stock compensation is not. However, stock plus option compensation may induce excessively risky investments, and capping pay can be important in curbing such behavior.     

Privatization and globalization: An empirical analysis

This paper examines the link between globalization-measured by foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) – and privatization of state-owned enterprises, in a multi-country sample that focuses on developing countries. We hypothesize that privatization has an effect on FDI/FPI as the process of fostering private sector participation is often accompanied by liberalization reforms, and by allocations of substantial shares of newly privatized firms to foreign investors. Similarly, we expect FDI/FPI to foster privatization efforts as new capital inflows, technology and managerial skills that accompany FDI/FPI make the environment more prone to competition, providing governments with incentives to privatize inefficient firms that need to be turned around. This relation is assessed in two ways, first in a dynamic panel using a generalized method of moments approach, and second through panel causality tests. We find a bi-directional positive relation between privatization proceeds and globalization, particularly in the case of FDI.     

论城市基础设施市场化改革中政府监管的主要环节

现阶段基础设施市场化改革在解决引资的同时,监管相对滞后,存在着系统性风险;科学定位城市基础设施行业,强化政府有效监管,主要涉及市场准入监管、成本价格监管、服务质量监管三个环节;完善城市基础设施服务质量监管链;构建政府监管与社会监督双层监督体系。     

Privatization and stock market liquidity

This paper shows that share issue privatization (SIP) is a major source of domestic stock market liquidity in 19 developed economies. Particularly, privatization IPOs have a negative effect on the price impact – measured by the ratio of the absolute return on the market index to turnover. This result is robust to the inclusion of controls for other observable and unobservable factors, having also considered the endogenous nature of the decision to privatize.     

Partial Privatization and Firm Performance

Most privatization programs begin with a period of partial privatization in which only non‐controlling shares of firms are sold on the stock market. Since management control is not transferred to private owners it is widely contended that partial privatization has little impact. This perspective ignores the role that the stock market can play in monitoring and rewarding managerial performance even when the government remains the controlling owner. Using data on Indian state‐owned enterprises we find that partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability, productivity, and investment.