评犹太人的商业文化

理论和实践证明，企业家在经济发展过程中发挥着关键作用，培养一支高素质的企业家队伍是我国发展经济的主攻方向之一。企业家的成长受到多种环境因素的影响，其中文化因素最为重要。在世界各民族文化中犹太人的商业文化独具魅力。本文先是对犹太人的商业文化作一介绍，然后是从理论、历史的角度对犹太人商业文化进行客观、公正的评价，目的是为我国企业家队伍的成长、壮大提供一种有益的文化滋养。     

中国人和犹太人的金钱观比较研究

所谓金钱观是指人们对金钱的根本看法和态度,它和人生观紧密相连,文章首先介绍了中国金钱观的历史沿革,然后通过分析中国人的金钱观与犹太人的金钱观的不同之处,来探寻中国金钱观存在的问题、根源和对策,以帮助人们树立正确的金钱观。     

民族高等教育与传承民族文化的关系及其问题研究

少数民族文化是中华民族文化不可分割的重要组成部分,是中华民族文化屹立于世界文化之林的坚实基础,因此传承和发展少数民族文化是我国当前最重要的任务之一.本文通过对民族高等教育、民族文化传承概念及相互关系的阐释,针对我国民族高等教育在传承民族文化过程存在的问题提出适当的建议,以期望民族文化通过高等民族教育得到更好的发扬.     

好莱坞的犹太人

对本书作者而言,电影只是一种媒介,是了解二十世纪美国犹太人处境变迁的工具,正如他在序言中所提及的一样:“电影提供了一份有价值的文本,通过它能了解那个时代的社会、政治和文化的真实面貌.电影提供的是一种强有力的视角,一扇回到过去的窗户,一次历史研究的机会.”因而,电影分析是本书的核心部分,这种分析通常聚焦于一部电影的特定情节.     

新疆民族文化旅游开发优势与问题研究

作为旅游资源大省的新疆,在旅游发展过程中应该充分挖掘和利用好自己的文化资源优势,把文化资源优势与旅游有机地结合起来,使之转化成经济优势,促进新疆旅游经济的大发展。新疆自古是一个多民族聚居、多元民族文化交汇的地方,有着独特的文化、优越的区位和丰富的资源优势。     

俄语阅读课的教学改革研究及启示

文章通过阐述分析当代俄罗斯民族崇尚阅读的心理,比较分析中国俄罗斯的阅读状况,目的在于了解俄罗斯民族文化特征,阐述俄罗斯民族崇尚阅读给我们的深刻启示,以此促进中华民族的阅读文化向深层次发展;为中国社会的文化强国建设提供借鉴的经验。     

熔铸创新科技元素做大做强文化产业——对连云港市文化创新与科技发展情况的调查与思考

文化是一个民族精神的体现,是一个民族的灵魂。文化的趋向决定了科技的发展方向。纵观历史,科技与文化的关系是相辅相成、相互影响的关系。连云港作为一座拥有悠久历史的文化名城,有着深厚的文化底蕴。在当今现代科技和文化产业的发展大潮中,如何挖掘和发挥好连云港的文化优势,把文化创新与科技发展有机地结合起来？是一个值得探索研究的课题。     

中国企业文化对民族文化的守护与发展

企业文化是企业在自己历史发展中所形成的文化传统、行为方式、制度形式和价值观念。中国企业由于是在中华民族遭受内优外患的特殊历史条件下诞生的，这就决定了中国企业文化不仅仅是一种管理文化，它还承担起守护和发展民族文化的历史责任。发扬中国企业文化的优良传统有利中国民族工业应对经济全球化的挑战。     

论解决民族问题的根本途径

我国是一个统一的多民族的国家.充分认识民族问题的长期性,并正确处理好民族问题是对维护民族团结,社会稳定和经济发展等方面有重要作用.因此对如何解决民族问题的有效途径进行深入研究对社会经济发展有很大的现实意义.     

Commitment to regulatory bureaucracy

A model is considered in which ‘regulatory bureaucracy’ is in the best interest of consumers as well as the regulated firm. Making it more costly for the regulator to discern the firm's true costs can help motivate the firm to act in the interest of consumers. But this is only true if the regulator cannot make binding precommitments concerning the use of his policy instruments. Endowed with the ability to precommit, prices below marginal cost, investment in excess of efficient levels, and the absence of regulatory bureaucracy will characterize the optimal regulatory policy.     

Commitment and matching contributions to public goods

We study multi-stage processes of non-cooperative voluntary provision of public goods. In the first stage, one or more players announce contributions that may be conditional on the subsequent contributions of others. In later stages, players choose their own contributions and fulfill any commitments made in the first stage. Equilibrium contributions are characterized under different assumptions about the commitment ability of players, the number of public goods and whether players commit to matching rates or to discrete quantities. We focus on contribution mechanisms that can emerge and be sustainable without a central authority, and that may be particularly relevant for international public goods. Efficient levels of public goods can be achieved under some circumstances, while in others commitment is ineffective.     

Commitment and self-control

The literature on self-control problems has typically concentrated on immediate temptations. This paper studies a Gul and Pesendorfer [Temptation and self-control, Econometrica 69 (2001) 1403-1435; Self-control and the theory of consumption, Econometrica 72 (2004) 119-158] style model in which decision-makers are affected by temptations that lie in the future. While temptation is commonly understood to give rise to a demand for commitment, it is shown that ‘temptation by future consumption’ can induce its absence. The model also exhibits procrastination, provides an alternative to projection bias as an explanation for some experimental results, and can simultaneously account for myopic and hyperopic behavior. The evidence on preference reversals supports temptation by future consumption, and suggests that it may not be restricted to short time horizons.     

Adaptation to Climate Change: Commitment and Timing Issues

We study the impact of timing and commitment on adaptation and mitigation policies in the context of international environmental problems. Adaptation policies present the characteristics of a private good and may require a prior investment, while mitigation policies produce a public good. In a stylized model, we evaluate the impact of strategic commitment and leadership considerations when countries with different attitudes towards environmental cooperation coexist. We obtain equilibrium abatement and adaptation levels and environmental costs under partial cooperation for various timing and leadership scenarios. Crucially, global environmental costs suffered by countries are found to be greater when adaptation measures can be used strategically.     

Commitment to Rules on Investment: The Developing Countries' Stake

This study examines foreign direct investment into developing countries, and the stake those countries have in liberalizing or restricting these long-term investments. Of particular interest is the stake the developing countries might have in committing to codes or multilateral agreements on investments. Clear advantages to commitment are identified, involving attracting investments that would not occur otherwise. But disadvantages are also identified, involving the possible loss of rents to host countries that might have been captured in the absence of binding codes.     

Starting Small and Commitment

I study a model of a long-term partnership with two-sided incomplete information. The partners jointly determine the stakes of their relationship and individually decide whether to cooperate with or betray each other over time. I characterize the extremal—interim incentive efficient—equilibria. In these equilibria, the partners generally “start small,” and the level of interaction grows over time. The types of players separate quickly. Further, cooperation between “good” types is viable regardless of how pessimistic the players are about each other initially. The quick nature of separation in an extremal equilibrium contrasts with the outcome selected by a strong renegotiation criterion (as studied in Watson (1999, J. Econ. Theory85, 52–90). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D74.     

The Role of Bargaining Initiative Under no Commitment to Audit

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal contract design under costly state verification and no commitment to auditing when the contract offer comes from the uninformed party. Contrary to similar frameworks and to cases where the informed party retains the bargaining power, we find that the optimal contract is characterised neither by truth telling nor by mixed strategy equilibria. Depending on endogenous revenues and observation cost, a pooling equilibrium with either deterministic or random auditing occurs.     

Reserve Prices without Commitment

When potential bidders in an auction have to incur a cost to prepare their bids and thus to learn their valuations, imposing a reserve price and announcing that in case no bid is submitted there will be another auction without a reserve price is both revenue and welfare improving. Reserve prices that induce less than maximum entry in the first auction may be optimal. Also, entry fees are not necessarily better instruments than reserve prices.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D44.     

Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment

We study the effect of imperfect commitment in noncooperative two-person bargaining games. By establishing the reputation for being stubborn, a player sometimes commits to her initial demand, becoming unable to change her demands or to accept an inferior offer from her opponent. When the probability of being stubborn is small, the set of equilibria is shown to be small and agreement may be reached immediately despite the possibility of stubbornness. A player has greater bargaining power when she is more patient and/or is more likely to be stubborn. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78.     

Commitment in regulation: Defense contracting and extensions to price caps

Department of Defense regulation of weapons contracting uses incentive devices common to public utility regulation. This paper examines parallels between fixed-price contracts in weapons acquisition and the use of price caps to motivate public utilities. It uses defense contracting experience to identify limits to the efficiency and administrability benefits one can expect adoption of a price caps regime to produce in practice.