The Political Economy of Social Security

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity. In such a setting, a redistributive pay-as-you-go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is higher than the rate of population growth. The workers with medium wages (not those with the lowest wages) and the retirees form a majority which votes for a positive level of social security. This level depends on the difference between the rates of population growth and interest as well as on the redistributiveness of the benefit rule.     

The Political Economy of Social Security in a Borrowing‐Constrained Economy

This paper introduces a three‐income class, overlapping‐generations model with borrowing constraints. The labor income tax for financing pay‐as‐you‐go social security is determined in a majoritarian voting game played by successive generations. When the interest‐rate elasticity of consumption is low, the political equilibrium might be characterized by an equilibrium where the old and the middle‐income young individuals form a coalition in favor of a higher tax rate and greater social security, while the low‐ and the high‐income young individuals favor a lower tax rate and less social security. In this equilibrium, the size of social security is decreased by the mean‐preserving reduction of a decisive voter's wage if he/she is borrowing‐constrained.     

社会保障改革与经济市场化

文章首先探讨了社会保障制度改革与资本主义市场经济之间的关系，并在此基础上进一步研究了中国如何建立符合社会主义市场经济体制的新型社会保障制度。     

The Political Economy of Social Security under Differential Longevity and Voluntary Retirement

This paper studies a model where the existence of a pension system is decided by majority voting. We assume that individuals have the same income but different longevity. Retirement is voluntary and the pension system is characterised by a payroll tax on earnings and a flat pension benefit. Individuals vote only on the tax level. We show that a pension system emerges when there is a majority of long-lived individuals and that voluntary retirement enables to lower the size of the transfers received by the long-lived. A rise in average longevity will also increase the size of the pension system.     

The Reform of State-owned Commercial Banks in China: A Political Economy Perspective

This paper analyzes the logic of the reform of state-owned commercial banks during 1997-2006 from a political economy perspective, mainly by discussing three fields of the reform: shareholding system reform, marketization, and financial restructuring. It also points out the existing problems in each field. The conclusion is that although the reform is heading in the right direction and has already made great progress, it has largely been conducted at the technical level and the Government has avoided dealing with the core issue of the reform. More importantly, the consequences of the Government's policy—pursuing short-term objectives, like improving the short-term financial status of banks—puts the entire system in danger by accumulating long-term risks. This paper also provides some policy proposals and points out potential directions for further studies.     

The Effect of Public Education Expenditure on Shadow Economy: A Cross-Country Analysis

This paper empirically examines whether devoting more resources to education can reduce the size of the shadow economy on a cross-section of countries. The findings show a negative relationship between public education expenditure and the size of the shadow economy, which is robust to the inclusion of different proxies for the control variables, a large set of policy variables, regional differences and endogeneity. The findings also emphasize the role of education, suggesting that public policies devoted to higher education level imply a decreasing effect on the shadow economy.     

国际经济与国家安全分析——国际政治经济学视角

国际经济相互依存现象日益加强,国际力量不仅影响国家行为,而且更深入到国家内部结构。国家经济政策处于应对国际经济力量和国内社会行为体利益偏好的双重约束中。受此影响,经济全球化背景下维护对外开放经济体的国家安全的重要环节在于国内政治过程。符合社会需求的决策机制是国家安全的基础,也是经济顺利运行的重要保障。     

Political Equilibria with Social Security

We model pay-as-you-go social security systems as the outcome of majority voting within a overlapping generations model with production. When voting, individuals make two choices, pay the elderly their pensions or default, which amount to promise themselves next period. Under general circumstances, there exist equilibria where pensions are voted into existence and maintained. Our analysis uncovers two reasons for this. The traditional one relies on intergenerational trade and occurs at inefficient equilibria. A second reason relies on the monopoly power of the median voter. It occurs when a reduction in current saving induces a large enough increase in future return on capital to compensate for the negative effect of the tax. We characterize the steady state and dynamic properties of these equilibria and study their welfare properties. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78,     

西方社会保障制度改革与我国社会保障制度的重构

我国的社会保障制度还很不完善,社会保障水平严重落后于经济发展水平。我国应积极借鉴国外的经验与教训,加速建立全国统一的社会保障制度;逐步增加社会保障项目,完善社会保障的功能和体系;推进相关制度和政策的改革与调整;协调政府保障与家庭保障、社区保障、企业补充保险和商业保险。     

国有经济改革的文献综述

国有经济是一种国家现象,是国民经济中的特殊成分。随着中国改革开放的不断深入,国有经济受到越来越多的关注。从国有经济功能、国有企业效率、国有企业治理、国有企业绩效评价、国企改革与地方政府关系五个方面对国有经济改革相关研究进行回顾,为中国国有经济改革提供理论借鉴。     

Reforming Social Security in a Transition Economy: The Case of Lithuania

This paper points out a number of problems associated with the existing pension system in Lithuania. Reforms are proposed, including (i) a substantial increase in the basic pension benefit rate, financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, provided universally, and regulated according to wage/price indexation; (ii) a significant cut in the tax contribution rate to the public pension system matched by a rise in the VAT; (iii) a rise in the retirement age to 65 for both men and women; and (iv) a gradual conversion to a private, funded, mandatory pension system to replace the earnings-related part of the current pension system.     

作为社会理论的古典政治经济学

古典政治经济学实际上是一种社会理论 ,它认为社会由诸阶级构成 ,而阶级区分的依据是它们的不同经济职能 ,它们的社会和政治关系由其经济利益定位。斯密的社会阶级经济分析有首创之功 ,但因其未能前后一致地坚持劳动价值论 ,无法提供社会阶级关系的适当解释。李嘉图则在劳动价值论基础上提出了社会阶级冲突的可能性     

市场经济条件下国有企业社会保险制度改革研究

改革进入了关键阶段.把计划经济体制下的国有企业改革成为市场经济体制下的现代企业,是件非常艰难的事;同样,把计划经济体制下国有企业建立起来的一套社会保险制度改革成为市场经济体制下的社会保险制度,其难度也是显而易见的.因此,如何改革国有企业社会保险制度,改革能否顺利进行下去,是人们极为关注的大事.