DEVELOPMENT, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE SOCIAL RATE OF DISCOUNT

This article examines the role of the discount rate in makingdecisions that will have significant implications for the environment.The authors begin by providing a rationale for discounting ingeneral and by describing the main factors that determine thediscount rate. These factors—the private and social ratesof time preference, the opportunity cost of capital, risk anduncertainty, and the interests of future generations—allhave an environmental dimension. The article goes on to examinethat dimension and to explore the connections between the choiceof the discount rate and environmental concerns, such as excessiveexploitation of natural resources, inadequate investment inconservation, and insufficient attention to the irreversibleloss of certain environmental resources. The authors conclude that, in general, environmental concernsare not best addressed by lowering the discount rate—anaction that might have both benefits and costs for the environment.A more promising course would be to incorporate a criterionof sustainability into certain aspects of decisionmaking. Howsuch a criterion could be made operational is touched upon butnot developed in this article.      

The q-Theory Approach to Understanding the Accrual Anomaly

Interpreting accruals as working capital investment, we hypothesize based on  q -theory that firms optimally adjust their accruals in response to discount rate changes. A higher discount rate means less profitable investments and lower accruals, and a lower discount rate means more profitable investments and higher accruals. Our evidence supports this optimal investment hypothesis: (1) adding an investment factor into standard factor regressions substantially reduces the magnitude of the accrual anomaly, often to insignificant levels; (2) accruals covary negatively with discount rate estimates from the dividend discounting model, and for the most part, with estimates from the residual income model; (3) accruals with low accounting reliability covary more with capital investment than accruals with high accounting reliability; and (iv) expected returns to accruals-based trading strategies are time-varying, suggesting that the deterioration of the accrual effect in recent years might be temporary and likely to mean-revert in the near future.     

The Illiquidity Discount of Life Insurance Investments

We incorporate an illiquid life insurance investment in the multi-period investment strategy of an investor with constant relative risk aversion and independent and identically distributed returns. In our setup, the liquid and the illiquid assets are risky and correlated and the illiquid investment cannot be rebalanced. We calculate the illiquidity discount as the difference in certainty equivalent rates of return between the optimal strategy with all assets being rebalanced in each period and the strategy with the illiquid investment. Calibrating our model to data of the German market we find a negative relationship between the level of risk aversion and the illiquidity discount when the investor does not rebalance at all. However, when the investor rebalances his liquid assets in each period to hedge against the illiquid investment the illiquidity discount becomes economically negligible.     

What's your real cost of capital?

In valuing any investment project or corporate acquisition, executives must decide what discount rate to use in their estimates of future cash flows. The traditional approach is to apply the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which has remained fundamentally unchanged for 40 years. But the formula--in particular, its beta element--has long been a source of frustration. In fact, corporate executives and investment bankers routinely fudge their CAPM estimates, say the authors, because experience and intuition tell them the model produces inappropriate discount rates. CAPM has three main problems: First, beta is a measure of both a stock's correlation and its volatility; second, beta is based on historical data; and third, CAPM rates don't take into account the term of the investment. These factors together result in discount rates that defy common sense. As an alternative to CAPM and its beta element, the authors developed a forward-looking approach to calculating a company's cost of capital, the market-derived capital pricing model (MCPM). It does not incorporate any measure of historical stock-to-market correlation, relying instead on estimates of future volatility derived from the options market. This is helpful since investor expectations from the options market are built into a company's current stock price. Using GE as an example, the authors give step-by-step instructions for how to calculate discount rates with MCPM. They also offer evidence from a range of industries to show that MCPM's discount rates are more realistic--especially from the corporate investor's perspective--than are CAPM's.     

中国证券投资基金的需求与其风格“标签”关系的实证分析

对于以组合管理为基本方法的证券投资基金,由于其投资风格选择的不同会导致投资者对其投资偏好的差异,加之证券市场的非有效性和投资者的非完全理性,投资者对基金的投资决策更多基于心理动机和行为因素的判断。本文运用行为组合理论,对我国证券市场封闭式基金的折价状况进行了考察,分析了证券投资基金投资风格选择对基金需求的影响及我国证券市场投资者的需求特点和偏好状况。     

Price Elasticity of Demand and an Optimal Cash Discount Rate in Credit Policy

While the provision of a cash discount is equivalent to a reduction in price, the role of price elasticity of demand in determining credit terms has been neglected in the extant literature. In this paper, this role is investigated and it is shown that the optimal cash discount rate is affected by the price elasticity of demand for the firm's product. The comparative effects on the optimal cash discount rate with respect to exogenous changes in the fraction of credit sales paid after taking cash discount, the cost of short-term funds and the bad debt loss ratio are investigated. A trade-off between the time value gain and the price elasticity of demand is established. We find that firms which sell in locations having different price elasticities for their products, and/or which face various costs of short-term funds in different locations, should vary their cash discount terms accordingly.     

Pricing growth-rate risk

We characterize the compensation demanded by investors in equilibrium for incremental exposure to growth-rate risk. Given an underlying Markov diffusion that governs the state variables in the economy, the economic model implies a stochastic discount factor process S. We also consider a reference growth process G that may represent the growth in the payoff of a single asset or of the macroeconomy. Both S and G are modeled conveniently as multiplicative functionals of a multidimensional Brownian motion. We consider the pricing implications of parametrized family of growth processes G ^ε , with G ⁰=G, as ε is made small. This parametrization defines a direction of growth-rate risk exposure that is priced using the stochastic discount factor S. By changing the investment horizon, we trace a term structure of risk prices that shows how the valuation of risky cash flows depends on the investment horizon. Using methods of Hansen and Scheinkman (Econometrica 77:177–234, 2009), we characterize the limiting behavior of the risk prices as the investment horizon is made arbitrarily long.     

Do financial conglomerates create or destroy economic value?

This paper investigates whether functional diversification is value-enhancing or value-destroying in the financial services sector, broadly defined. Based on a U.S. dataset comprising approximately 4060 observations covering the period 1985–2004, we report a substantial and persistent conglomerate discount among financial intermediaries. Our results suggest that it is diversification that causes the discount, and not that troubled firms diversify into other more promising areas. In addition, the discount applies to all financial services activity-areas with the exception of investment banking and is stable over different combinations of financial activity-areas with the exception of commercial banking units combined with insurance companies and/or investment banking activities.     

Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics

Agency problems limit firms’ access to capital markets,curbing investment. Firms and investors seek contractual waysto mitigate these problems. What are the implications for investment?We present a theory of a firm’s investment dynamics inthe presence of agency problems and optimal long-term financialcontracts. We derive results relating firms’ investmentdecisions, current and past cash flows, firm size, capital structure,and dividends. Among the results, optimal investment is increasingin current and past cash flow; and optimal investment is positivelyserially correlated over time (after controlling for investmentopportunities). These results hold for a range of agency problems.(JEL G30, G31, G32, G35, D82, D86, D92)     

The option CAPM and the performance of hedge funds

We evaluate the investment performance of hedge funds using an asset pricing model that is characterized by a piecewise-linear stochastic discount factor, and which we estimate using the generalized method of moments by minimizing the Hansen–Jagannathan distance. Our results show that, once non-linearities and public information are taken into account, there is only evidence of positive performance for the overall hedge fund index, equity-market neutral strategy and the global macro strategy.     

The Sarbanes-Oxley act and corporate investment: A structural assessment

We assess the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on corporate investment in an investment Euler equation framework. We allow a dummy for the passage of the Act to affect the rate at which managers discount future investment payoffs. Using generalized method of moments estimators, we find that the rate U.S. firm managers apply to discount investment projects rises significantly after 2002, while the discount rate for U.K. firms remains unchanged. The effects of the legislation on corporate investment are asymmetric, and are much more significant among relatively small firms. We also find that well-governed firms, firms with a credit rating, and accelerated filers of Section 404 of the Act have become more cautious about investment.     

Firm value and investment policy around stock for stock mergers

We study a sample of publicly traded firms that expand by acquiring other firms in pure, stock-for-stock mergers. After these mergers, we find that the diversification premium decreases for the acquiring firm due to having added a target firm trading at a discount. Furthermore, the acquiring firm experiences a decrease in investment opportunities and a decrease in leverage. This is an effect confined only to non-diversifying mergers. Our results indicate that the acquirer’s investment efficiency at the firm level remains unchanged after the merger.     

Single vs. Multiple Discount Rates: How to Limit “Influence Costs” in the Capital Allocation Process*

Most finance textbooks suggest that companies evaluate investment projects using discount rates that reflect both the debt capacity and the unique risks of the project. In practice, however, companies often use their company‐wide WACC to evaluate such investments because of the difficulty of (and subjectivity involved in) estimating the risk of individual projects, and the potential for managerial bias and influence to distort the estimates. This article proposes a practicable method for calculating the cost of capital that produces different discount rates for investment projects with different risks while minimizing the “influence costs” that arise when managers have discretion in the choice of discount rates. The proposed approach makes use of market information (in the form of the firm‐wide costs of debt and equity), thereby limiting managerial discretion, while typically still providing a good approximation of theoretically correct, project‐specific discount rates. The key to the method's effectiveness is its use of a project's debt capacity to define the capital structure weights, where debt capacity is defined by the amount of debt financing the project will support without lowering the firm's credit rating.     

How do accounting variables explain stock price movements? Theory and evidence

This paper provides theory and evidence showing how accounting variables explain cross-sectional stock returns. Based on Zhang, G. [2000. Accounting information, capital investment decisions, and equity valuation: theory and empirical implications. Journal of Accounting Research 38, 271–295], who relates equity value to accounting measures of underlying operations, we derive returns as a function of earnings yield, equity capital investment, and changes in profitability, growth opportunities, and discount rates. Empirical results confirm the predicted roles of all identified factors. The model explains about 20% of the cross-sectional return variation, with cash-flow-related factors (as opposed to changes in discount rates) accounting for most of the explanatory power. The properties of the model are robust across various subsamples and periods.     

Utilizing terminal values in teaching time value analysis

Traditional time value models, Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR), are now widely accepted in industry. This paper isolates three examples of how these simplified models can lead to less than optimal decision strategies. The conceptual basis for the discounting and reinvestment functions in time value analysis is first explored. Three investment areas highlighting misconceptions concerning the role of these rates are then analyzed. These areas include the utilization of risk adjusted discount rates, determination of bond yields and the analysis of leveraged leases. Finally, the impact of terminal values on the investment decision in each of these cases is demonstrated.     

Do financial conglomerates create or destroy value? Evidence for the EU

There is an ongoing debate about whether firm focus creates or destroys shareholder value. Earlier literature has shown significant diversification discounts: firms that engage in multiple activities are valued lower. Various factors are important in determining the size of the discount, for example cross-subsidization and agency problems. The existing literature, however, generally focuses on non-financial firms or on banks combining investment and commercial banking. Our paper focuses specifically on the valuation of bank-insurance conglomerates. We find no universal diversification discount but significant variability. The discount is explained by the size (increasing), the familiarity with the conglomerate business model (decreasing) and the risk profile (decreasing). Our results are robust to the historical origin, the merger record and the age of the conglomerate, as well as peer group specification and outlier elimination.     

Consumption in incomplete markets

We develop a method to find approximate solutions, and their accuracy, to consumption–investment problems with isoelastic preferences and infinite horizon, in incomplete markets where state variables follow a multivariate diffusion. We construct upper and lower contractions; these are fictitious complete markets in which state variables are fully hedgeable, but their dynamics is distorted. Such contractions yield pointwise upper and lower bounds for both the value function and the optimal consumption of the original incomplete market, and their optimal policies are explicit in typical models. Approximate consumption–investment policies coincide with the optimal one if the market is complete or utility is logarithmic.     

Collateralizing liquidity

I develop a dynamic model of optimal funding to understand why financial assets are used as collateral instead of being sold to raise funds. Firms need funds to invest in risky projects with nonobservable returns. Since holding these assets allows firms to raise these funds, investing firms value the asset more than noninvesting ones. When assets are less than perfectly liquid and investment opportunities are persistent, collateralized debt minimizes asset transfers from investing to noninvesting firms and thus is optimal. Frictions in asset markets lead to an illiquidity discount and a collateral premium, which increase with the asset’s illiquidity.