Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation

This paper examined the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Rock (1986) suggests that IPO returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. We show that IPOs with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of “informed” activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have lower returns.     

Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks

We find that the underperformance of IPO stocks relative to the market over a three-year holding period is less severe for IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters. Consistent with prior studies, we also find that IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters are associated with less short-run underpricing. Among the various existing proxies for underwriter reputation, the Carter–Manaster measure is the most significant in the context of initial returns and also in the context of the three-year performance of IPOs. The study also provides an updated list of the Carter–Manaster measure for various underwriters.     

Underwriter Lock-up Releases, Initial Public Offerings and After-market Performance

The lock‐up agreement between an underwriter and an issuing firm's principals prohibits sale of securities for a period of time following the offering date. Investment banks must support the stock following an offering. The lock‐up assures investors that the restricted shares will not enter the market, at least for a period of time. Negative abnormal returns prior to the lock‐up release show that unrestricted investors liquidate positions prior to the scheduled lock‐up release. Negative abnormal returns are more robust for firms that are not influenced by SEC Rule 144 than for firms that are.     

The Pricing of Initial Public Offers of Corporate Straight Debt

This study examines the initial-day and aftermarket price performance of corporate straight debt IPOs. We find that IPOs of speculative grade debt are underpriced like equity IPOs, while those rated investment grade are overpriced. IPOs of investment grade debt are typically issued by firms listed on the major exchanges and underwritten by prestigious underwriters. In contrast, junk bond IPOs are more likely to be handled by less prestigious underwriters and are typically issued by OTC firms. Our analysis also reveals that bond rating, market listing of the firm, and investment banker quality are significant determinants of bond IPO returns.     

Underwriter Spread, Underwriter Reputation, and IPO Underpricing: A Simultaneous Equation Analysis

This paper studies the relationships between underwriter reputation, underwriter spread, and IPO underpricing. We consider the information content of underwriter spread and find that it conveys information pertinent to IPO quality. Because underwriter spread is endogenous, underpricing and underwriter spread are jointly determined in a simultaneous equation system. Also, we examine the IPO market for evidence of segmentation, and our results suggest some market segmentation. Underwriter spread impacts initial underpricing for a group of medium-reputation underwriters, while underpricing affects underwriter spread for groups of low- and high-reputation underwriters. Consequently, high-risk IPOs may not be priced the same way as low-risk IPOs. We attribute this finding to regulation, competition, and/or market segmentation.     

The Arrival Rate of Initial Public Offers in the UK

The Initial Public Offer (IPO) is an important event in the development of a firm yet there is little evidence regarding why firms choose certain times to come to the market. This paper extends the available evidence, concentrating on UK data and addressing a number of econometric problems with earlier papers. These advances include acknowledging the non-negative integer characteristics of count data, compensating for non-stationarity in the data, and explicitly testing for causality. The paper examines the incentives to conduct an IPO and the results suggest that both the value and number of IPOs are positively and significantly associated with the level of the stock market, with the introduction of the USM, and, in the case of the number of IPOs, positively and significantly associated with a business cycle indicator. Tests of causality suggest that the stock index predicts both the value and number of IPOs.     

证券承销商声誉机制:机理、缺失动因与路径

证券承销商担负着“信息生产者”和“质量认证中介机构”的功能,然而也面临着“可信性”的问题。在与证券发行企业、投资者的重复博弈过程中,承销商通过建立自身的行为规范,达成与证券发行企业、投资者之间的合作均衡所形成的声誉能有效缓解承销商的道德风险,保证承销商信息生产的可信性。通过分析承销商声誉机制的相关理论模型、形成机理及机制缺失的原因,提出了充分发挥承销商声誉机制的政策建议。     

Price Discovery in Initial Public Offerings and the Role of the Lead Underwriter

We examine the price discovery process of initial public offerings (IPOs) using a unique dataset. The first quote entered by the lead underwriter in the five-minute preopening window explains a large proportion of initial returns even for hot IPOs. Significant learning and price discovery continues to take place during these five minutes with hundreds of quotes being entered. The lead underwriter observes the quoting behavior of other market makers, particularly the wholesalers, and accordingly revises his own quotes. There is a strong positive relationship between initial returns and the time of day when trading starts in an IPO.     

Determinants of Underwriter Participation in Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock: An Empirical Study

This paper examines an optimal underwriter participation model and develops testable hypotheses regarding the influence of certain factors on the degree of underwriter participation in initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock. The issue of underwriter participation is important primarily due to the tradeoff between foregone underwriter compensation and underwriting risk reduction. The results of this paper indicate that factors related to the issue, issuing firm, underwriter, and IPO market conditions all are important determinants of the participation decision. Interestingly, the results also show that the importance of these factors is not consistent across underwriter prestige groups. In particular, factors external to underwriters (e.g., the issuing firm and market characteristics) are more important for explaining nonprestigious underwriter participation, while factors related to underwriters themselves play a more important role for explaining prestigious underwriter participation.     

Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects

This paper addresses the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This problem is common among public firms in many countries where the legal system does not effectively protect minority shareholders against oppression by controlling shareholders. We show that even without any explicit corporate governance mechanisms protecting minority shareholders, controlling shareholders can implicitly commit not to expropriate them. Stock prices of such companies are significantly higher and firms are more likely go public because of this reputation effect. Moreover, insiders divest shares gradually over time, at a rate that is negatively related to the degree of moral hazard.     

券商声誉损失与公司IPO市场表现——来自中国上市公司IPO造假的新证据

理论研究表明声誉好的券商在公司IPO过程中能发挥认证作用,但是在实证中学者们对于券商声誉是否真的发挥了认证功能仍然莫衷一是。与国内外文献中普遍采用的券商市场份额、排名等间接声誉指标不同,本文以中国券商所承销的公司IPO过程违规造假为新的研究视角,从声誉损失的角度重新衡量了券商声誉,并以公司IPO后市场表现检验了券商声誉的认证效应。实证研究表明,相较声誉受损的券商,声誉未受损的券商确实具有更好的认证效果,具体表现在:(1)从同一时期来看,相较于那些没有被披露承销过IPO违规造假公司的券商,承销过IPO违规造假公司的券商再次承销的公司IPO发行抑价率较高,股票长期回报率较低;(2)对于同一券商,相对于在IPO违规造假披露之前,在披露之后(声誉受损)券商所承销的公司IPO表现为显著较高的发行抑价率和显著较低的股票长期回报率;(3)基于双重差分模型的结果依然支持上述结论。实证结果还表明相对于传统的券商声誉指标,基于IPO造假构建的声誉损失指标更加有效。     

承销商声誉、信息不对称和新股抑价:基于板块的新发现

我们采用2004年到201 1年上市的1,025个新股样本检验了承销商声誉和新股抑价程度之间的联系.我们发现,虽然新股抑价程度和承销商声誉表面上存在负相关,但是一旦控制了和板块相关、和年份相关的固定效应以后,这一负相关的显著性明显减弱甚至消失.我们还发现,主板新股抑价程度随着承销商声誉的提高而增加,中小板和创业板新股抑价程度则随着承销商声誉的提高而降低.对于相同的承销商声誉,中小板新股抑价程度的降低幅度似乎要大于创业板新股.我们认为这些结果和承销商声誉假说是不一致的,承销商没有起到降低信息不对称成本的作用.     

The Diversification Effects of Initial Public Offerings

Abstract:  A firm's stock becomes publicly tradable through an initial public offering (IPO). This study suggests a portfolio diversification perspective to explore IPOs. We examine whether investors can gain diversification benefits by adding an IPO portfolio to a set of benchmark portfolios sorted by firm size and book-to-market ratio. Using US IPOs from 1980-2002, we find that adding a value-weighted IPO portfolio does lead to a statistically and economically significant enlargement of the investment opportunity set for investors relative to investing solely in a set of benchmark portfolios. Specifically, the Sharpe ratio of the tangency portfolio increases by 5.50% on average after including IPO stocks. Furthermore, IPOs associated with prestigious lead underwriters are the main source of this augmentation of the mean-variance investment opportunity set. Finally, our study implies that issuing IPO exchange traded funds or similar products can provide diversification gains to investors.     

IPO市场承销商声誉机制的形成机理及实证检验

本文认为，考虑到中国IP0市场的特殊背景，承销商声誉的形成高度依赖于证券监管力量。本文实证结果显示，中国IPO市场承销商声誉的阶段性积累虽已初具雏形，但并没有形成明朗的分化，承销商声誉机制在一定程度上仍处于缺位状态。制度的市场化改革取向和外部约束力量的增强，是中国承销商声誉阶段演进的动力。同时，IPO市场上监管制度的缺陷以及由此导致的监管效率低下、市场约束机制弱化，是阻碍承销商声誉阶段性推进的主要原因。     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于"隐性—显性"契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了"公共服务"类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合"以商为荣"类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

Underwriter Reputation,Issuer Ownership,and Pre‐IPO Earnings Management: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the correlation between pre‐initial public offering (pre‐IPO) earnings management and underwriter reputation for issuers with different ownership structures in China. We document a significantly inverse relationship between underwriter reputation and pre‐IPO earnings management for non‐state‐owned enterprises (NSOE) issuers only, while no significant association is found for state‐owned enterprises (SOE) issuers. We also find that for the NSOE new issue market, underwriter reputation is positively correlated with issuer post‐IPO performance indicating that prestigious underwriters can incrementally improve issuer post‐IPO performance.     

A Comparison of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts and Original Initial Public Offers: Factors Impacting their Issuance in the IPO Market

The purpose of this paper is to assess the factors that affect the returns earned by investors in early trading of reverse LBOs and compare those results to factors affecting original IPOs which are matched by size, industry, and issue date. A mean excess return of 7.64% is observed for the sample of reverse LBOs during the period 1987 to 1998. This return is uniformly lower than returns earned by investing in original IPOs. These results support the information asymmetry hypothesis. The results also show that factors such as number of months the LBO was privately held, the over‐allotment, or greenshoe option, the size of the issue, insider ownership, and gross spread impact the returns earned by investors in reverse LBOs. Other factors which are known to affect returns on original IPOs, such as lead underwriter, whether the deal was syndicated, the number of managers, the listing exchange, lockup agreements, and auditor, are shown to have no impact on the returns in reverse LBOs for the sample in question. We find that the level of insider participation and the over‐allotment option are more important to original IPOs than to reverse LBOs in explaining the excess returns earned by shareholders in early trading. We find, however, that the size of the offering has more impact on excess returns for reverse LBOs than for original IPOs.