Does internalization diminish the impact of quote aggressiveness on dealer market share?

We analyze data provided by NASDAQ to examine how quote aggressiveness affects dealer market share and whether the practice of internalization mitigates the impact of quote aggressiveness. Our empirical results show that although internalization does not reduce the impact of price aggressiveness on dealer market share, it mitigates the impact of size aggressiveness. This result suggests that although internalization may not affect the dealer's incentive to post aggressive prices, it may reduce the incentive to post large depths. We find that aggressive quotes are more effective in raising dealer market share in stocks with a less competitive (more concentrated) market structure. Our results also show that the effective spread is wider (narrower) for stocks with a smaller price (size) elasticity of dealer market share.     

Adverse Selection With Frequency and Severity Risk: Alternative Risk‐Sharing Provisions

The analysis considers an insurance market with adverse selection where individuals' loss distributions may differ with respect to both the frequency and severity of loss. We show that the combination of deductibles and coinsurance can be used to sort rationed policyholders. Because of their screening properties, coinsurance and deductibles may both be equilibrium forms of risk sharing for a particular insurer facing asymmetric information, with different rationed consumers choosing different risk‐sharing provisions.     

Money shouts! How effective are punishments for accounting fraud?

This study examines the impact of different punishments for Chinese accounting fraud on shareholder valuation of firms between 2007 and 2016. From an examination of both monetary and non-monetary ‘name and shame’ penalties, it is reported all punishments have a negative and significant impact on the shareholder wealth of fraudulent firms. Investors perceive punishments involving monetary penalties far more severely than non-monetary punishments used to combat accounting fraud. Stock market reactions are also sensitive to the type of fraud committed with manipulation of recognition and disclosure fraud viewed more negatively by investors than fraud related to disclosure. Information leakage to capital markets prior to the announcement of punishments is also observed. It is proposed fines have been relatively more effective, than ‘name and shame’ punishments in addressing Chinese accounting fraud during the last decade, due not least to information leakage.     

When LIBOR becomes LIEBOR: Reputational penalties and bank contagion

We study whether commonality of incentives and opportunity to commit fraud trigger reputational contagion from culpable firms to nonculpable firms. Relying on a sample of 30 banks involved in fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and a control sample of 30 banks, we find that banks' reputations suffered substantial damage upon the announcement of their involvement in the scandal. We also document reputational contagion spread from banks that manipulated LIBOR to banks that shared the same incentives and opportunity to commit the fraud. The reputational contagion is more pronounced for large derivatives dealers who have had the strongest incentive to commit the fraud.     

Industry informational interactions and corporate fraud

We examine three information channels through which product market interactions in an industry can affect firms' incentives to misreport financial information to investors. We find that lower product market sensitivity to individual firms' information and greater use of relative performance evaluation encourage the commission of financial fraud. Industry structures that give rise to less collection of information about individual firms decrease the probability of fraud detection and increase the probability of fraud commission. We also examine dynamic effects of fraud. Our results suggest that, in fragmented industries, fraud can amplify cyclical fluctuations in the real economy.     

Corporate Scandals and Household Stock Market Participation

We show that, after the revelation of corporate fraud in a state, household stock market participation in that state decreases. Households decrease holdings in fraudulent as well as nonfraudulent firms, even if they do not hold stocks in fraudulent firms. Within a state, households with more lifetime experience of corporate fraud hold less equity. Following the exogenous increase in fraud revelation due to Arthur Andersen's demise, states with more Arthur Andersen clients experience a larger decrease in stock market participation. We provide evidence that the documented effect is likely to reflect a loss of trust in the stock market.     

Keeping Up with the Joneses: A Model and a Test of Collective Accounting Fraud

This paper explains the variations in incidence of accounting fraud across economic settings by putting the behaviour and motivation of managers under the microscope. To safeguard their reputation in the managerial labour market, managers of firms that perform poorly are prone to fraudulently inflate earnings if they expect the economy to be strong, since that raises the likelihood of peers reporting high performance. A realised level of economic activity, on the other hand, counteracts this tendency on the part of managers to overstate earnings, by reducing the number of firms that actually perform poorly. We term these two effects the incentive effect and the need effect, respectively. The two effects yield a distinctive relationship between the incidence of accounting fraud and macroeconomic conditions. Specifically, the fraction of firms fraudulently over-reporting earnings is positively related to expected economic performance and negatively related to realised economic performance.
The incentive and need effects on collective fraud are examined empirically by relating proxies of the aggregate incidence of accounting fraud to expected and realised GDP growth rates. The results unambiguously support the predicted influence of macroeconomic performance.     

Search,product market competition and CEO pay

We develop a market equilibrium model to show how search frictions in the CEO market, agency conflicts and product market characteristics interact to affect CEO market tightness, firm size and CEO incentive pay. The theory generates novel implications that link firms' product markets with CEO markets. Different determinants of competition—the entry cost, product substitutability, and market size—have contrasting effects on CEO market tightness, CEO pay and firm size. We also derive new predictions for the impact of product market risk on firm size and CEO incentive compensation. We show empirical support for several cross-sectional hypotheses derived from the theory for how CEO pay, CEO incentives, firm size and market tightness vary with product market characteristics.     

Why computer-mediated communication improves the effectiveness of fraud brainstorming

Current auditing standards require auditors to conduct a fraud brainstorming session aimed at considering ways in which the audit client's financial statements might be fraudulently misstated. Lynch et al. (2009) document that computer-mediated fraud brainstorming is significantly more effective than face-to-face brainstorming for generating relevant fraud risks. In this study, we code and analyze process-level data from the Lynch et al. (2009) study to understand the factors contributing to the greater effectiveness of electronic fraud brainstorming. Specifically, we conduct mediation analysis to discern the degree to which equality of participation and two measures of task focus contribute to greater fraud brainstorming effectiveness when using a computer-mediated communication system compared to traditional face-to-face brainstorming. We also examine participants' perceptions of ease of system use, satisfaction with the process, and satisfaction with the outcome. Overall, the results indicate that the primary reason for the greater effectiveness of electronic fraud brainstorming is the greater degree of task focus as revealed through the length of comments made when using computer-mediated fraud brainstorming. In an absolute sense, participants using electronic brainstorming felt that their brainstorming mode was easy to use and they were satisfied with the process and outcome. The primary contribution of this study is in enhancing our understanding of precisely why computer-mediated fraud brainstorming outperforms face-to-face fraud brainstorming.     

Corporate fraud culture: Re‐examining the corporate governance and performance relation

We analyse the corporate governance and performance relation, when conditioning on corporate fraud, for fraud firms during 2000 – 2007. Fraud firms are identified as either self‐ reported fraud events, or subject to regulatory investigation. We use the inverse Mills ratio procedure to account for firms' (unobservable) fraud culture in the dynamic system GMM model of the performance‐ governance relation. We find that corporate governance is an endogenously determined characteristic that has no causal impact on firm performance when conditioning on fraud. Fraud is a significant regulatory event but its overall economic impact at the firm level is highly variable.     

Externalities of Financial Statement Fraud on the Incoming Accounting Labor Force

Financial statement fraud generates many negative effects, including reducing people's willingness to participate in the stock market. If it also stigmatizes accounting, it may similarly adversely affect the quantity and quality of workers willing to become accountants, thereby potentially creating negative effects for years to come. We examine the impact of fraud on the labor force entering the accounting profession, which is a key input into the production of accounting information (i.e., the output). Using data describing millions of college students across the United States, we find incoming students are actually more likely to major in accounting when local frauds occur during their formative years. These students are also more likely to have attributes desired by the accounting profession (e.g., high academic aptitude) and are more likely to subsequently serve in public accounting and become Certified Public Accountants. In the context of other fields (i.e., all college majors), we find that fraud similarly spurs interest in other business disciplines, but not in majors outside of business schools. Those attracted to other business disciplines, however, generally possess different traits. Specifically, students entering accounting are distinctively more likely to exhibit values espoused by the accounting profession, including a predisposition to public service and less commercial orientation. Thus, nonpecuniary motives appear to uniquely drive accounting student enrollment following fraud. Collectively, our findings suggest that, while fraud is unmistakably bad, it appears to have the positive unintended consequence of attracting labor into business disciplines and, in accounting, increasing the prevalence of desirable traits among entrants.     

Bank credit default swaps and deposit insurance around the world

We investigate the impact of deposit insurance schemes on banks' credit risk – a predictor of failure and a key element in the current financial crisis. Unlike most studies, which use balance sheet measurements of risk, we adopt a forward-looking and market-based measure of bank credit risk: the credit default swap (CDS) spread. We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance systems have higher CDS spreads, supporting the “moral hazard” view. The results suggest that deposit insurance design features that lessen the adverse impact are risk-adjusted premium, coinsurance systems, government-established systems, “risk-minimizing” systems, and systems with dual-funding sources. Full coverage appears to stabilize bank risk only during the financial crisis period. More stringent bank regulation, such as capital adequacy regulation and independent supervision, could reduce the undesirable impact of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance seems to help stabilize volatile markets, as evidenced during the financial crisis and in countries with greater market volatility. In addition, we find that the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank credit risk is more pronounced for banks with low asset quality and low liquidity.     

The real effects of corporate fraud: evidence from class action lawsuits

Using a sample of lawsuit firms from 1996 to 2009, this study examines whether fraud revelation through shareholder class action affects corporate financing and investment policies. We predict that revelation of fraud damages defendant firms' reputation and undermines credibility of their financial disclosure. As a result, such firms experience difficulty in financing and reduce investment accordingly. Consistent with our prediction, we find that fraud‐committing firms experience a decline in total financing (total investment) by 1.5 per cent (0.8 per cent) of total assets after fraud revelation. Difference‐in‐differences analyses reinforce our main findings. The impact is more pronounced for firms with lower inherent fraud incidence.     

The federal deposit insurance fund that didn't put a bite on U.S. taxpayers

Unlike the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and the Bank Insurance Fund, the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) survived the 1980s without falling into a state of accounting insolvency. This paper analyzes how differences in incentive structure constrain the attractiveness of interest-rate speculation and other risk-taking opportunities to managers and regulators of credit unions. Despite these better incentives, robust present-value calculations establish that NCUSIF fell into economic insolvency during the mid-1980s.Besides calculating the extent of this insolvency, the paper also seeks to explain why, after NCUSIF became insolvent, it could rebuild its reserves without an explicit or implicit taxpayer bailout. Our explanation turns on cross-industry coinsurance responsibilities and the shallowness of the fund's observed insolvency relative to industry net worth. We identify forces in the decisionmaking environment tending to limit the depth and duration of unresolved insolvencies at individual credit unions. Managerial opportunities to benefit personally from taking risks that would flow through to NCUSIF are constrained by difficulties in converting a credit union to stockholder form and by the intensity of proactive monitoring of troubled credit unions by sister institutions and other private coinsurers. We conjecture that expanded use of coinsurance and private monitoring could reduce taxpayer loss exposure elsewhere in government deposit insurance systems.     

Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs

We examine how a firm's incentive to commit fraud when going public varies with investor beliefs about industry business conditions. Fraud propensity increases with the level of investor beliefs about industry prospects but decreases when beliefs are extremely high. We find that two mechanisms are at work: monitoring by investors and short‐term executive compensation, both of which vary with investor beliefs about industry prospects. We also find that monitoring incentives of investors and underwriters differ. Our results are consistent with models of investor beliefs and corporate fraud, and suggest that regulators and auditors should be vigilant for fraud during booms.     

The CDS market reaction to restatement announcements

I investigate the credit market's reaction to restatement announcements through changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads. I document an overall positive association between CDS returns and restatement announcements. Specifically, I find that more positive CDS returns are associated with restatements (1) involving fraud and (2) affecting more accounts. Moreover, these reactions are sensitive to the underlying entities’ credit ratings and the market‐wide investor sentiment. Next, I compare CDS and stock market reactions and find that more negative stock returns are associated with restatements (1) involving fraud and (2) decreasing reported income.     

The joint influence of Sarbanes-Oxley and FAS123R on financial misreporting

Prior research reports that a manager's equity risk-taking incentive (vega) is positively associated with financial misreporting. FAS 123R led to a significant decrease in vega while SOX increased the cost of financial misreporting. Consistent with the original intent of the legislation, we find that SOX contributed to significant decreases in both fraud restatements and AAERs. Importantly, our results suggest that the SOX-induced decreases in fraud restatements and AAERs have endured to more recent years. On the other hand, while we find evidence that equity-incentive-motivated financial misreporting ceased to exist in the immediate years after FAS 123R, we also find that this was only temporary. In particular, we find strong evidence of a significantly positive association between vega and accrual misreporting in more recent years.     

保险治理与公司违规——董事高管责任保险的治理效应研究

公司治理机制被认为是影响公司违规的重要因素,然而董事高管责任保险作为一种重要的外部治理机制,是否会影响公司违规尚未得到充分研究。本文研究发现董事高管责任保险显著降低公司违规概率,符合监督效应假说。经工具变量法、Heckman两阶段模型和倾向得分匹配法稳健性检验,上述结论依然成立。影响机制分析表明,董事高管责任保险显著降低了公司违规倾向,显著增加了违规后被稽查的概率,并降低了上市公司的第一类代理成本。对董事高管责任保险的监督职能做进一步分析发现:(1)董事高管责任保险对上市公司经营违规和领导人违规的监督效应更为显著,但对信息披露违规的治理作用并不显著;(2)董事高管责任保险发挥的监督职能与股权属性和保险机构股东治理存在替代效应,与外部审计师治理和董事长CEO二职分离存在互补效应;(3)分组检验结果表明,董事高管责任保险对公司违规的监督效应在外部监管环境较差或者公司内部信息透明度较高的情况下更加显著。本文既提供了保险合约通过公司治理渠道影响公司违规的证据,同时也表明保险机构通过董事高管责任保险为中国资本市场提供了一种较为有效的公司外部治理机制。     

Consequences of fraud and overcoming negative market reaction

We examine the market reaction to a sample of firms following the announcement of the firms' involvement in fraud, referred to as the trigger event. We find that these firms experience negative and significant returns following the announcement of fraud, in contrast to a control sample. More importantly, we examine tactics, such as changes in executives, auditing firm, and company name, that these firms may use to regain the market's confidence. We find that the market reacts negatively right after the change in executives, but the negative trend is reversed in the long-term for firms that make an executive change quickly after the trigger event. Similarly, firms that quickly change their auditing firm fare better. We also find that there is significantly more information asymmetry during the trigger event and at the litigation date, as well as during changes in CEO, CFO, and auditor. We find a prompt change in CFO is positively and significantly related to, and therefore predicts, better long-term stock performance.     

The Market's Valuation of Fraudulently Reported Earnings

This study examines the market valuation of accounting earnings during the period before it is publicly revealed that the earnings are fraudulent. Using both cross‐sectional and time‐series valuation models, we first find that the market accords less weight to earnings when the accounting numbers are fraudulent. We also show that the market better anticipates the presence of fraud when there is information in the public domain indicating a high ex‐ante risk of fraud. Our findings suggest that investors are able to accurately assess the probability of fraud and that such assessments affect the market's valuation of earnings even before it is publicly announced that fraud has occurred.