Payments for environmental services in Costa Rica

Costa Rica pioneered the use of the payments for environmental services (PES) approach in developing countries by establishing a formal, country-wide program of payments, the PSA program. The PSA program has worked hard to develop mechanisms to charge the users of environmental services for the services they receive. It has made substantial progress in charging water users, and more limited progress in charging biodiversity and carbon sequestration users. Because of the way it makes payments to service providers (using approaches largely inherited from earlier programs), however, the PSA program has considerable room for improvement in the efficiency with which it generates environmental services. With experience, many of these weaknesses are being gradually corrected as the PSA program evolves towards a much more targeted and differentiated program. An important lesson is the need to be flexible and to adapt to lessons learned and to changing circumstances.     

Payments for environmental services as an alternative to logging under weak property rights: The case of Indonesia

Decentralization reforms in Indonesia have led to local communities negotiating logging agreements with timber companies for relatively low financial payoffs and at high environmental cost. This paper analyzes the potential of payments for environmental services (PES) to provide an alternative to logging for these communities and to induce forest conservation. We apply a game-theoretical model of community-firm interactions that explicitly considers two stylized conditions present in the Indonesian context: (i) community rights to the forest remain weak even after decentralization, and (ii) the presence of logging companies interested in the commercial exploitation of the forest. Intuition may suggest that PES design should focus on those communities with the lowest expected payments from logging deals. However, we show that these communities may not be able to enforce a PES agreement, i.e., they may not be able to prevent logging activities by timber companies. Moreover, some communities would conserve the forest anyway; in these cases PES would not lead to additional environmental gains. Most important, the introduction of PES may increase a community's expected payoff from a logging agreement. A failure to consider this endogeneity in expected payoffs could lead to communities opting for logging agreements despite PES, simply allowing communities to negotiate better logging deals. Our results indicate that PES design is a complex task, and that the costs of an effective PES system could potentially be much higher than expected from observing current logging fees. Using data collected in Indonesia on actual logging fees received by communities, we illustrate how the theoretical results could be used in empirical analysis to guide PES design. Our results are likely to be useful in other cases where local people make resource use decisions but have weak property rights over these resources, and where external commercial forces are present. The results highlight the importance of understanding the details of the local context in order to design PES programs appropriately.     

Optimal design of pro-conservation incentives

Payments for environmental services (PES) schemes have become an increasingly accepted and popular mode for governmental and non-governmental agencies to use in addressing local and regional declines in ecosystem services. In PES schemes, payments can either be tied to indicators of actions for service provision or to indicators of the generated service itself. Performance payments are synonymous for this second group, i.e. payments are completely contingent on the procurement of an environmental good or service. Such a focus raises several practical issues during implementation. We review and translate key aspects of the economic theory of incentives into the context of performance payment schemes with special attention paid to two practical issues: risks outside the individual's control and distortion in the measurement of environmental services. Four different incentive payment approaches are presented and the effects of risk and distortion on optimal incentives are discussed. The investigation of each payment approach is accompanied by a discussion of examples from the field.     

Designing a payments for ecosystem services (PES) program to reduce deforestation in Tanzania: An assessment of payment approaches

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs aim to improve environmental outcomes by providing direct incentives to land managers for the provision of ecosystem services. Participation in PES programs is voluntary, so effective program design requires careful consideration of farmers' preferences. This study quantifies such preferences using a choice experiment. The study site is the East Usambara Mountains, Tanzania, an internationally recognized ‘biodiversity hotspot.’ We assess preferences for four payment approaches: constant and variable annual cash payments to individual farmers, a constant annual cash payment to a village fund on behalf of farmers, and an upfront manure fertilizer payment. We find that the manure fertilizer payment was statistically significant in motivating farmer participation while the group payment was non-significant. In addition, the relationship between the likelihood of participation and the stringency of conditionality is surprisingly non-linear. In a test of external validity, average willingness to accept (WTA) values are found to be similar to the average opportunity cost of maintaining land uses consistent with conservation objectives.     

构建我国海洋生态补偿法律机制的实然性分析

生态补偿制度在弥补市场失灵、解决外部化方面,为不同主体提供环境服务保障了现实的经济或财政刺激。这一制度在不同的适用领域均受到了广泛关注。尽管生态补偿制度并不适用于所有的环境保护领域,但在海洋环境保护的某些特殊领域的作用却是独一无二的。生态补偿制度在海洋生态环境保护中刚刚起步,且在实践中陷入了困境。海洋生态补偿在我国海洋保护的现实性与可行性究竟如何?这就需要结合我国海洋资源利用状况、海洋经济发展态势、海域使用权制度、海洋环境保护制度、减少因生态保护造成的贫困等进行全面论证,才能确立海洋生态补偿的可行性与现实性。     

Designing payments for environmental services in theory and practice: An overview of the issues

Payments for environmental services (PES) have attracted increasing interest as a mechanism to translate external, non-market values of the environment into real financial incentives for local actors to provide environmental services (ES). In this introductory paper, we set the stage for the rest of this Special Issue of Ecological Economics by reviewing the main issues arising in PES design and implementation and discussing these in the light of environmental economics. We start with a discussion of PES definition and scope. We proceed to review some of the principal dimensions and design characteristics of PES programs and then analyze how PES compares to alternative policy instruments. Finally, we examine in detail two important aspects of PES programs: their effectiveness and their distributional implications.PES is not a silver bullet that can be used to address any environmental problem, but a tool tailored to address a specific set of problems: those in which ecosystems are mismanaged because many of their benefits are externalities from the perspective of ecosystem managers. PES is based on the beneficiary-pays rather than the polluter-pays principle, and as such is attractive in settings where ES providers are poor, marginalized landholders or powerful groups of actors. An important distinction within PES is between user-financed PES in which the buyers are the users of the ES, and government-financed PES in which the buyers are others (typically the government) acting on behalf of ES users. In practice, PES programs differ in the type and scale of ES demand, the payment source, the type of activity paid for, the performance measure used, as well as the payment mode and amount. The effectiveness and efficiency of PES depends crucially on program design.     

Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services

In contractual relationships involving payments for environmental services, conservation buyers know less than landowners know about the costs of contractual compliance. Landowners in such circumstances use their private information as a source of market power to extract informational rents from conservation agents. Reducing informational rents is an important task for buyers of environmental services who wish to maximize the services obtained from their limited budgets. Reducing informational rents also mitigates concerns about the “additionality” of PES contracts because low-cost landowners are least likely to provide different levels of services in the absence of a contract. Paying low-cost landowners less thus makes resources available for contracts with higher opportunity cost landowners, who are more likely to provide substantially different levels of services in the absence of a contract. To reduce informational rents to landowners, conservation agents can take three approaches: (1) acquire information on observable landowner attributes that are correlated with compliance costs; (2) offer landowners a menu of screening contracts; and (3) allocate contracts through procurement auctions. Each approach differs in terms of its institutional, informational and technical complexity, as well as in its ability to reduce informational rents without distorting the level of environmental services provided. No single approach dominates in all environments. Current theory and empirical work provides practitioners with insights into the relative merits of each approach. However, more theoretical work and experimentation in the laboratory and the field are necessary before definitive conclusions about the superiority of one or more of these approaches can be drawn.     

Paying for the environmental services of silvopastoral practices in Nicaragua

Agricultural landscapes can provide many valuable ecosystem services, but many are externalities from the perspective of farmers and so tend to be under-produced. This paper examines an effort to make direct payments for ecosystem services (PES) in an agricultural landscape. The Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project is piloting the use of PES to induce adoption of silvopastoral practices in the Matiguás-Río Blanco area in Nicaragua. Silvopastoral practices could substantially improve service provision while retaining agricultural production, but they have found only limited acceptance among farmers. The Silvopastoral Project seeks to increase their adoption by paying farmers for the expected increase in biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration services that these practices would provide. The Project developed an ‘environmental services index’ (ESI) and pays participants for net increases in ESI points. Although the Silvopastoral Project is still underway, it already appears to have succeeded in inducing farmers to increase substantially the use of practices that generate higher levels of ecosystem services. In the project's first two years, over 24% of the total area experienced some form of land use change. The area of degraded pasture fell by two thirds, while pastures with high tree density increased substantially, as did fodder banks and live fences. On-going monitoring indicates that these land use changes are in fact generating the desired services. Questions remain about the long-term sustainability of the approach, however. To ensure sustainability, long-term payments are likely to be needed, raising the question of how they will be financed. Payments by water users and by carbon buyers provide a partial answer to this challenge, but still leave many gaps.     

Combining performance-based and action-based payments to provide environmental goods under uncertainty

Payments for environmental services (PES) are widely adopted to support the conservation of biodiversity and other environmental goods. Challenges that PES schemes have to tackle are (i) environmental uncertainty and (ii) information asymmetry between the provider of the service (typically a farmer) and the regulator. Environmental uncertainty calls for action-based payment schemes, because of the more favorable risk allocation if the farmer is risk-averse. Information asymmetry, on the other hand, calls for a performance-based payment, because of the more direct incentives for the farmer. Based on a principal-agent model, we study the optimal combination of both, performance-based and action-based payments under conditions of environmental uncertainty and asymmetric information. We find that for a risk-neutral regulator a combination is optimal in the majority of cases and that the welfare gain of the combined scheme over a pure action-based (performance-based) payment increases with information asymmetry (environmental uncertainty). We further show that for a regulator who is risk-averse against fluctuations in environmental goods provision the optimal performance-based payment is lower than for a risk-neutral regulator. We quantitatively illustrate our findings in a case study on the enhancement of the butterfly Scarce Large Blue (Maculinea teleius) in Landau/Germany.     

The working for water programme: Evolution of a payments for ecosystem services mechanism that addresses both poverty and ecosystem service delivery in South Africa

A payments for ecosystem services (PES) system came about in South Africa with the establishment of the government-funded Working for Water (WfW) programme that clears mountain catchments and riparian zones of invasive alien plants to restore natural fire regimes, the productive potential of land, biodiversity, and hydrological functioning. The success of the programme is largely attributed to it being mainly funded as a poverty-relief initiative, although water users also contribute through their water fees. Nevertheless, as the hydrological benefits have become apparent, water utilities and municipalities have begun to contract WfW to restore catchments that affect their water supplies. This emerging PES system differs from others in that the service providers are previously unemployed individuals that tender for contracts to restore public or private lands, rather than the landowners themselves. The model has since expanded into other types of ecosystem restoration and these have the potential to merge into a general programme of ecosystem service provision within a broader public works programme. There is a strong case for concentrating on the most valuable services provided by ecosystems, such as water supply, carbon sequestration, and fire protection, and using these as ‘umbrella services’ to achieve a range of conservation goals. The future prospects for expansion of PES for hydrological services are further strengthened by the legal requirement that Catchment Management Agencies be established. These authorities will have an incentive to purchase hydrological services through organisations such as WfW so as to be able to supply more water to their users.     

Efficiency of Payments for Environmental Services: Equity and additionality in a case study from a Biosphere Reserve in Chiapas, Mexico

Payments for Environmental Services (PES) have been claimed as a more efficient way of accomplishing conservation and development goals than other indirect strategies, reaching their optimum when the buyer pays the opportunity costs of the foregone benefits. Different inefficient situations have been described, like lack of additionality, where payments are given for practices that would have been adopted anyway. Trade-offs between efficiency and equity of PES have usually emerged as well. In this paper we assess the equity, additionality and stakeholders' perceptions of a PES scheme in a Mexican community inside a Biosphere Reserve. We applied structured interviews to all adults, a total of 66 people from 31 households. Our results show a dual response in equity and additionality, depending on land tenure. PES have an egalitarian effect within landowners and landless groups, but it broadens the gap between them. Additionality is low for landowners and high for the landless people in the community, even though the former are the ones with full decision over the land. Although the scheme does not seem efficient under the classical PES paradigm, it is perceived as a reward, reinforcing conservation attitudes even though most of the interviewees claim it to be insufficient.     

The CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe: Payments for wildlife services

Payments for environmental services (PES) have been distinguished from the more common integrated conservation and development projects on the grounds that PES are direct, more cost-effective, less complex institutionally, and therefore more likely to produce the desired results. Both kinds of schemes aim to achieve similar conservation outcomes, however, and generally function in analogous social, political and economic environments. Given the relative novelty of PES, what lessons can be learnt and applied from earlier initiatives? In this paper, we describe the evolution over the first 12 years (1989-2001) of Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), a community-based natural resource management programme in which Rural District Councils, on behalf of communities on communal land, are granted the authority to market access to wildlife in their district to safari operators. These in turn sell hunting and photographic safaris to mostly foreign sport hunters and eco-tourists. The District Councils pay the communities a dividend according to an agreed formula. In practice, there have been some underpayments and frequent delays. During 1989-2001, CAMPFIRE generated over US$20 million of transfers to the participating communities, 89% of which came from sport hunting. The scale of benefits varied greatly across districts, wards and households. Twelve of the 37 districts with authority to market wildlife produced 97% of all CAMPFIRE revenues, reflecting the variability in wildlife resources and local institutional arrangements. The programme has been widely emulated in southern and eastern Africa. We suggest five main lessons for emerging PES schemes: community-level commercial transactions can seldom be pursued in isolation; non-differentiated payments weaken incentives; start-up costs can be high and may need to be underwritten; competitive bidding can allow service providers to hold on to rents; and schemes must be flexible and adaptive.     

Taking stock: A comparative analysis of payments for environmental services programs in developed and developing countries

Payments for environmental services (PES) are an innovative approach to conservation that has been applied increasingly often in both developed and developing countries. To date, however, few efforts have been made to systematically compare PES experiences. Drawing on the wealth of case studies in this Special Issue, we synthesize the information presented, according to case characteristics with respect to design, costs, environmental effectiveness, and other outcomes. PES programs often differ substantially one from the other. Some of the differences reflect adaptation of the basic concept to very different ecological, socioeconomic, or institutional conditions; others reflect poor design, due either to mistakes or to the need to accommodate political pressures. We find significant differences between user-financed PES programs, in which funding comes from the users of the ES being provided, and government-financed programs, in which funding comes from a third party. The user-financed programs in our sample were better targeted, more closely tailored to local conditions and needs, had better monitoring and a greater willingness to enforce conditionality, and had far fewer confounding side objectives than government-financed programs. We finish by outlining some perspectives on how both user- and government-financed PES programs could be made more effective and cost-efficient.     

Towards a unified scheme for environmental and social protection: Learning from PES and CCT experiences in developing countries

Environmental protection and poverty alleviation in the developing world are usually heralded as joint objectives. However, these two goals are often associated with different sectoral policy instruments. While so−called payments for environmental services (PES) are increasingly being promoted for environmental protection, poverty alleviation is increasingly addressed by conditional cash transfers (CCT) program. These instruments although aimed to achieve distinct objectives have a number of similarities and challenges in their design and implementation phases. This paper elaborates on these similarities and develops a unifying generic framework that is used to discuss the extent to which both approaches could be unified.     

Selling two environmental services: In-kind payments for bird habitat and watershed protection in Los Negros, Bolivia

Marketing several environmental services from a single area can help access diverse sources of funding and make conservation a more competitive land use. In Bolivia's Los Negros valley (Department of Santa Cruz), bordering the Amboró National Park, 46 farmers are currently paid to protect 2774 ha of a watershed containing the threatened cloud-forest habitat of 11 species of migratory birds. In this payment for environmental services (PES) scheme, annual contracts prohibit tree cutting, hunting and forest clearing on enrolled lands. Farmer-landowners as service providers submit to independent yearly monitoring, and are sanctioned for non-compliance. Facilitated by a local NGO, Fundación Natura Bolivia, one service buyer is an international conservation donor (the US Fish and Wildlife Service) interested in biodiversity conservation. The second service users are downstream irrigators who likely benefit from stabilized dry-season water flows if upstream cloud forests are successfully protected. Individual irrigators have been reluctant to pay, but the Los Negros municipal government has on their behalf contributed ~ US$4500 to the scheme. The negotiated payment mode is annual quid pro quo in-kind compensations in return for forest protection. Predominantly, payments are made as “contingent project implementation”, transferring beehives supplemented by apicultural training. With regard to service provision, environment committees and education programs have increased awareness in downstream communities of the probable water-supply reduction effect of continued upstream deforestation. External donors have funded subsequent studies providing basic economic, hydrological and biodiversity data, and covered PES start-up (~ US$40,000) and running transaction costs (~ US$3000 per year over the last three years). The greatest challenges in the development of the PES mechanism have been the slow process of building trust between service buyers and providers, and in achieving clear service-provision additionality.     

Auctioning Risky Conservation Contracts

Conservation auctions have the potential to increase the efficiency of payments to farmers to adopt conservation-friendly management practices by fostering competition among them. The literature considers bidders that have complete information about the costs of adoption and optimal bidding behavior reflects this information advantage. Farmers seek information rents and bids decrease when risk aversion increases because farmers are more averse to losing the auction. We contribute to the literature by allowing for cost risk. Our paper shows that farmers must balance the risk of losing the auction (thus foregoing information rent) with the risk of submitting a bid that is not high enough to pay the costs of adopting conservation practices (thus incurring losses). We design an experiment to trade off these two risks and examine how risk aversion affects bidding behavior when participants face different sources and levels of risk. Our experiment contributes to a small literature on experimental auctions with risky product valuations. We find that participants decrease their bids as risk aversion increases, even in auctions with cost risk, suggesting that the risk of losing the auction dominates. These findings uncover new challenges for the practical implementation of conservation auctions as an efficient policy instrument.     

Payments for Ecosystem Services Programs: Predicting Landowner Enrollment and Opportunity Cost Using a Beta-Binomial Model

This paper concerns predicting enrollment in payment for ecosystem services (PES) programs to promote habitat preservation on private lands. We develop a beta-binomial model to address both program participation and the amount of land enrolled by each potential enrollee. We apply the estimation approach to stated preference data from non-industrial private forest owners in Finland. As an alternative econometric model, we also develop a multivariate censored regression model of enrollments. Using cross-validation, we find that the beta-binomial model predicts at least as well as the multivariate censored model yet has fewer parameters. Using our estimation results, we demonstrate policy predictions regarding program enrollment and landowner opportunity cost.     

Agricultural landowners⿿ response to incentives for afforestation

Previous research has shown that afforestation of agricultural land is a relatively low-cost option compared to energy-based approaches for mitigating net carbon dioxide emissions, and that financial incentives affect landowner behavior and can be used to increase carbon sequestration on private land. In this paper we use stated preference data from private landowners in the Pacific Northwest region of the U.S. to examine the key factors affecting participation in an incentive program for carbon sequestration through afforestation. We also estimate the corresponding potential for carbon sequestration and its cost. Our results suggest that incentive payments would significantly and positively affect landowners⿿ level of enrollment in a tree planting program.     

京津冀大气治理生态补偿支付原则研究

生态补偿是跨界大气污染治理的重要政策工具。迄今为止,京津冀大气治理生态补偿机制仍未出台,严重制约着京津冀生态环保协同发展做深做实,创新思维方式、构建非传统领域生态补偿理论体系是当务之急。厘清了传统生态补偿认识误区,创新性地提出了生态补偿支付原则统一框架,将"污染者付费原则"(PPP)和"受益者付费原则"(BPP)统一在"改变者付费原则"(CPP)分析框架中,为京津冀大气治理生态补偿机制设计提供了思想前提和理论基础;通过构建京津冀大气治理CGE模型具体测算了特定大气质量控制目标下河北应获得的生态补偿额。这对于加快补齐京津冀生态文明建设制度短板、有效弥补河北大气治理资金需要、强化京津冀生态环境联建联防联治具有重要意义,对于全国和其他重点区域大气治理具有普遍启示意义。     

Evaluating wind-following and ecosystem services for hydroelectric dams in PJM

Hydropower can provide inexpensive, flexible fill-in power to compensate for intermittent renewable generation. Policies for hydropower dams maintain multiple services beyond electric generation, including environmental protection, flood control and recreation. We model the decision of a hydroelectric generator to shift some of its power production capacity away from the day-ahead energy market into a “wind-following” service to smooth the intermittent production of wind turbines. Offering such a service imposes both private and social opportunity costs. Since fluctuations in wind energy output are not perfectly correlated with day-ahead energy prices, a wind-following service will necessarily affect generator revenues. Seasonal wind patterns produce conflicts with the goal of managing rivers for “ecosystem services”—the maintenance or enhancement of downstream ecosystems. We illustrate our decision model using the Kerr Dam in PJM’s territory in North Carolina. We simulate the operation of Kerr Dam over a three-year period that features hydrologic variability from normal water years to extreme drought conditions. We use an optimization framework to estimate reservation prices for Kerr Dam offering wind-following services in the PJM market. Wind-following may be profitable for Kerr Dam at low capacity levels during some time periods if ecosystems services are neglected and if side payments, or reserves-type payments, are provided. Wind-following with ecosystem services yields revenue losses that typically cannot be recovered with reserves market payments. Water release patterns are inconsistent with ecosystem-services goals when Kerr Dam dedicates significant capacity to wind-following, particularly in drought years.