Does Internal Corporate Governance Complement or Substitute for External Auditing? Evidence from China's Anti‐corruption Campaign

Two competing hypotheses have been developed for the relationship between internal corporate governance and external auditing. One proposes a complementary relationship, while the other suggests it is substitutable. This study takes advantage of China's recent anti‐corruption campaign as a quasi‐natural experiment to explore this relationship. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we find that, after the campaign, internal corporate governance improved more in SOEs (state‐owned enterprises) than in non‐SOEs. SOEs were less likely to choose Big 10 auditors after the campaign, while audit firms assigned less experienced auditors to their SOE client firms and charged lower audit fees. These effects were more pronounced in SOEs that exhibited greater improvement in corporate governance. Overall, we find the anti‐corruption campaign improved corporate governance in SOEs but, at the same time, reduced external audit quality, which supports the substitution view. We argue that this result might be driven by the fact that SOEs have limited demand for high‐quality accounting information because the Chinese government maintains strong control over the capital markets.     

Internal audit reporting lines,fraud risk decomposition,and assessments of fraud risk

The main purpose of this research is to examine the effects of internal audit reporting lines on fraud risk assessments made by internal auditors when the level of fraud risk varies. Significant emphasis has been placed on the importance of reporting lines in maintaining the autonomy of internal auditors, but the perceived benefits of requiring internal audit to report directly to the audit committee have not been validated or systematically investigated. Results of an experiment involving 172 experienced internal auditors and additional survey findings indicate that internal auditors perceive more personal threats when they report high levels of risk directly to the audit committee, relative to management. Perceived threats lead internal auditors to reduce assessed levels of fraud risk when reporting to the audit committee relative to when reporting to management. This finding runs counter to the anticipated benefits of requirements that the internal audit function report directly to the audit committee, and it reveals potential conflicts of interest and independence threats created by the audit committee itself. We also investigate the effects of fraud risk decomposition on risk assessments made by internal auditors. We find that fraud risk assessment decomposition does not have the same effects on internal auditors as it has on external auditors, and the effects of decomposition do not align with the expected benefits of decomposition.     

The impact of corporate governance on auditor choice: Evidence from China

As the largest and fastest growing emerging market, China is becoming more and more important to investors throughout the world. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of firms’ auditor choice in China in respect of their corporate governance mechanism. Normally firms have to take a trade-off in their auditor choice decisions, i.e., to hire high-quality auditors to signal effective audit monitoring and good corporate governance to lower their capital raising costs, or to select low-quality auditors with less effective audit monitoring in order to reap private benefits derived from weak corporate governance and less-transparent disclosure (the opaqueness gains). We develop a logit regression model to test the impact of firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism on auditor choice decisions made by IPO firms getting listed during a bear market period of 2001–2004 in China. Three variables are used to proxy for firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism, i.e., the ownership concentration, the size of the supervisory board (SB), and the duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors (BoDs). We classify all auditors in China into large auditors (Top 10) and others (non-Top 10), assuming the large auditors can provide higher quality audit services. The empirical results show that firms with larger controlling shareholders, with smaller size of SB, or in which CEO and BoDs chairman are the same person, are less likely to hire a Top 10 (high-quality) auditor. This suggests that when benefits from lowering capital raising costs are trivial, firms with weaker internal corporate governance mechanism are inclined to choose a low-quality auditor so as to capture and sustain their opaqueness gains. On the other hand, with improvement of corporate governance, firms should be more likely to appoint high-quality auditors.     

Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia

In emerging markets, the agency conflicts between controlling owners and the minority shareholders are difficult to mitigate through conventional corporate control mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeovers. We examine whether external independent auditors are employed as monitors or as bonding mechanisms, or both, to alleviate the agency problems. Using a broad sample from eight East Asian economies, we document that firms with agency problems embedded in the ownership structures are more likely to employ Big 5 auditors. This relation is evident among firms that raise equity capital frequently. Consistently, firms hiring Big 5 auditors receive smaller share price discounts associated with the agency conflicts. Also, we find that Big 5 auditors take into consideration their clients' agency problems when making audit fee and audit report decisions. Taken together, these results suggest that Big 5 auditors do have a corporate governance role in emerging markets.     

Internal auditors’ use of interpersonal likability,arguments, and accounting information in a corporate governance setting

Internal auditors play an important role in influencing managers’ judgments. Yet, the practitioner literature indicates that, because internal audit lacks the client services incentives of external audit, internal auditors often adopt a “policeman approach” that can lead to negative interpersonal relationships with managers. We investigate three variables fundamental to internal auditors’ ability to influence managers: (1) internal auditors’ interpersonal likability, (2) the information used to support their positions, and (3) whether they present that information in a thematically organized argument. We find that managers agree more with an internal auditor who is both likable and uses a thematically organized argument. We find further that this joint effect occurs regardless of whether the internal auditor’s information is relatively supportive or unsupportive of his position. Overall, our theory and findings suggest that an internal auditor can achieve agreement from managers on important corporate governance issues with this fairly straightforward presentation tactic, even when the underlying information is relatively unsupportive and managers otherwise tend not to agree with the internal auditor’s position. Our study contributes to accounting, psychology, and writing and discourse theories with new evidence of the effects of an argument structure (holding the underlying information constant) on users’ judgments, and how those effects depend on the likability of the source of information. Our findings have important implications for internal auditors, managers, external auditors, and others interested in corporate governance.     

Internal audit,alternative internal audit structures and the level of misappropriation of assets fraud

In recent years, the importance of good corporate governance has received significant public and regulatory attention. A crucial part of an entity's corporate governance is its internal audit function. At the same time, there has been significant public concern about the level of fraud within organizations. The purpose of this study is to assess whether organizations with an internal audit function are more likely to detect and self‐report fraud than those without. In this study, we use a unique self‐reported measure of misappropriation of assets fraud for the first time. The fraud data are from the 2004 KPMG Fraud Survey, which reported fraud from 491 organizations in the private and public sector across Australia and New Zealand. The internal audit data are from a separate mail survey sent to the respondents of the KPMG Fraud Survey. We find that organizations with an internal audit function are more likely than those without such a function to detect and self‐report fraud. Furthermore, organizations that rely solely on outsourcing for their internal audit function are less likely to detect and self‐report fraud than those that undertake at least part of their internal audit function themselves. These findings suggest that internal audit adds value through improving the control and monitoring environment within organizations to detect and self‐report fraud. These results also suggest that keeping the internal audit function within the organization is more effective than completely outsourcing that function.     

The effects of firm size,corporate governance quality,and bad news on disclosure compliance

Motivated by calls for increased compliance, size-based regulation, and continued exemption of small firms from internal control reporting requirements, we assess the incremental effects of firm size, corporate governance quality, and bad news on disclosure compliance. We examine compliance with the disclosure requirements of an SEC-mandated filing that requires no computations or complex judgments but is nonroutine and may reveal value-decreasing information (bad news) that otherwise would not become public. The disclosures studied are those that firms provide in Form 8-K Item 4 when changing external auditors. We find that noncompliant firms have lower quality corporate governance and less need for external financing but are not smaller than compliant control firms. Additional analyses indicate that compliance is negatively associated with bad news.     

Auditors’ going‐concern‐modified opinions after 2001: measuring reporting accuracy

An important change in auditors’ reporting behaviour in the period after the high‐profile corporate collapses in 2001 is that auditors were more likely to issue going‐concern (GC)‐modified audit opinions. Comparing company failure rates subsequent to receiving a first‐time going‐concern (FTGC)‐modified audit opinion in the pre‐ and post‐2001 periods, we find a consistent type 1 error (misclassification) rate (the rate of survival among companies issued an FTGC opinion). Results are indicative of auditors maintaining GC reporting accuracy when comparing the 1995–1996 and 2004–2005 periods. This conclusion is supported after considering the impact of mitigating circumstances surrounding companies that received an FTGC‐modified audit report and survived.     

Do PCAOB Inspections Improve the Quality of Internal Control Audits?

We investigate whether Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections affect the quality of internal control audits. Our research design improves on prior studies by exploiting both cross‐sectional and time‐series variation in the content of PCAOB inspection reports, while also controlling for audit firm and year fixed effects, effectively achieving a difference‐in‐differences research design. We find that when PCAOB inspectors report higher rates of deficiencies in internal control audits, auditors respond by increasing the issuance of adverse internal control opinions. We also find that auditors issue more adverse internal control opinions to clients with concurrent misstatements, who thus genuinely warrant adverse opinions. We further find that higher inspection deficiency rates lead to higher audit fees, consistent with PCAOB inspections prompting auditors to undertake costly remediation efforts. Taken together, our results are consistent with the PCAOB inspections improving the quality of internal control audits by prompting auditors to remediate deficiencies in their audits of internal controls.     

公司动机、审计师声誉和自愿性内部控制鉴证报告——基于A股公司2008—2009年年报的经验研究

上市公司是否自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告,不仅取决于公司自身的披露动机,而且取决于审计师是否愿意出具内部控制鉴证报告。本文利用沪深两市上市公司在2008—2009年年报中自愿披露内部控制鉴证信息所带来的研究机会,实证考察了内部控制鉴证报告这一特殊的自愿信息披露行为的决定因素。研究发现,降低代理冲突和传递信号不仅是上市公司自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告的主要动机,而且是其自愿提高鉴证信息披露质量(扩大鉴证范围和提高保证程度)的主要动机;审计师声誉越高,越不愿意出具内部控制鉴证报告和为公司的内部控制提供高程度保证;大股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突以及内部控制质量会显著影响审计师对鉴证风险水平的评估,进而影响内部控制鉴证报告的鉴证范围和保证程度。     

Is the objectivity of internal audit compromised when the internal audit function is a management training ground?

We conduct an experiment with 74 internal auditors to examine the effects of using the internal audit function as a training ground for future senior managers. Specifically, we investigate internal auditors' willingness to resist current management's aggressive revenue recognition policies, assuming that internal auditors expect to move into senior management positions in the future. We also examine whether increasing the power of the board of directors can reduce threats to internal auditors' objectivity. This is the first study to empirically examine whether training grounds influence internal auditors objectivity. Results of our study indicate that internal auditors are less objective (i.e. they are more likely to side with management's aggressive revenue recognition policies) when they expect to move into senior management positions, relative to when internal auditing is not used as a training ground. We also find that empowering the audit committee further decreases the objectivity of internal auditors. These results suggest that board power can have unintended consequences on the behaviour of internal auditors and that board empowerment does not guarantee improved governance or improved oversight of financial reporting.     

小额赢利、独立董事和审计鉴证

有关中国资本市场的研究揭示,微利公司更容易被出具非标准无保留意见,本文通过此类非标准意见的说明段,发现其涉及事项和独立董事关注的公司非正常治理结构明显重合。进一步的检验则揭示,独立董事比例的增加能够提升公司机会主义特征激发非标准审计意见的概率,聘入行业专家型的独立董事则有利于公司的营运能力激发标准的审计意见。结论表明独立董事在规避渎职风险的过程中,通过充分披露信息来避免过高的机会主义阻止成本,和审计鉴证发生了协同效应。     

The determinants of auditor switching from the perspective of corporate governance in China

This paper reports the association between firms' internal corporate governance mechanisms and their auditor switch decisions in the Chinese context. We identify two types of auditor switch, namely switching to a larger auditor and switching to a smaller auditor. Three variables are used to proxy for firms' internal corporate governance mechanism, including the ownership concentration (shareholding by the largest owner), the effectiveness of supervisory board (SB), and the duality of chairman of board of directors (CBoD) and CEO. We regressed the internal corporate governance variables over firms' audit switching types during a specific period of 2001-2004 when a bear market continued in China. The empirical results demonstrate that firms with larger controlling owners or in which CBoD and CEO are held by the same person are more likely to switch to a smaller auditor rather than to a larger one. However, the effect of the SB variable does not have a significant impact on auditor switching decisions. In general, the study findings suggest that firms with weak internal corporate governance mechanism tend to switch to smaller or more pliable auditors in order to sustain the opaqueness gains derived from weak corporate governance. On the other hand, with the improvement of corporate government, firms should be more likely to choose large (high-quality) auditors in making auditor switching decisions.     

Is the quality of female auditors really better? Evidence based on the Chinese A-share market

Unlike previous studies in which a single index was used to measure audit quality, this study establishes a new comprehensive index to measure audit quality via Discretionary Accrual, as estimated by Jones’ basic model (1991) and Audit Opinions. The former is used to measure the quality of financial statements, and the latter is used to measure the auditors’ independence in the mainstream international literature. We examine whether and how an auditor’s gender affects the quality of his or her audits under the framework of empathy theory and gender role socialization theory. Using a large sample of 9861 auditor-firm-year observations from Chinese A-share–listed companies from 2011 to 2015, we find that the audit quality of signed auditors shows significant gender differences: these significant gender differences differ from the findings of previous studies that female auditors could provide a higher-quality audit than male auditors; that is, in our study the audit quality of the male auditors exceeds that of the female auditors. After distinguishing the positive and negative directions of the Discretionary Accrual, we find no significant gender differences in audit quality between male and female auditors when the earnings had been adjusted upward by the client; that is, female and male auditors had the same audit risk perception. However, when the client adjusted earnings downward, which indicates a lower audit risk for the auditor, the audit quality of female auditors was significantly lower than that of the male auditors. After controlling for the age and position of the auditors, we also find that the gender differences in the auditors’ audit quality decreased significantly or even disappeared when the auditor’s age exceeded 45?years and/or their position was manager or above. These results are consistent with the empathy theory and gender role socialization theory.     

The endogenous relationship between audit-report type and business termination: evidence on private firms in a non-litigious environment

This study provides evidence on the relationship between audit-report type and subsequent business termination for private companies in a non-litigious environment. The results show that an endogenous relationship exists between bankruptcy and audit-report type, and between voluntary liquidation and audit-report type. A non-clean opinion is typically issued when firms face financial difficulties, which in turn become more severe after the receipt of a non-clean audit opinion. We find evidence that, even without a litigation deterrent in Belgium, financial performance has a similar impact on audit-report type as in litigious environments. We find that the self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis holds for bankruptcy but not for voluntary liquidation. Our study also provides some evidence on audit reporting differences between Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors in the Belgian audit market. When financial difficulties are obvious, as is the case when a company is about to go bankrupt, both Big 6 and non- Big 6 auditors are as competent and/or independent to assess and report going-concern problems. However, when financial difficulties are less apparent, as is the case for firms that voluntarily decide to liquidate, our results indicate that Big 6 auditors are more likely to issue a non-clean audit opinion than non-Big 6 auditors.     

The influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of financial reporting and auditing: Perceptions of auditors and directors in Singapore

This study uses two hypothetical cases to examine the perceptions of auditors and directors in Singapore about corporate governance practices relating to the quality of financial reporting and auditing. In the first case, the strength of the audit committee, the existence of an internal audit function and the strength of a corporate code of conduct were manipulated. All three variables were perceived to have some influence on financial reporting and audit quality. However, some interesting differences were found between the perceptions of auditors and directors. Auditors place more weight on the internal audit function, possibly due to their familiarity with the role that internal audit can play in reducing audit risk and enhancing controls. Directors have more confidence in board enforcement of a strong code of conduct, possibly reflecting the view that this encourages staff to adhere to higher ethical standards. In the second case, audit partner rotation, outsourcing of internal audit services and whether the audit firm audited all companies within a group were manipulated. Auditors believed that their ability to resist management pressure was enhanced when they audited all companies within the group. No significant differences were found for the other variables, suggesting that neither group believes that these practices impair audit independence.     

The effect of general counsel prominence on the pricing of audit services

We investigate the effect of corporate general counsel (GC) ascension to the senior management team on the pricing of audit services. Prior research suggests that the GC position may have a significant influence in setting the tone at the top by promoting corporate integrity, ethics, and serving as a governance and monitoring mechanism, but also recognizes that prominent GCs may face ethical dilemmas, causing them to disregard professional responsibilities to curry the favor of the CEO and other executives. Using audit fees to proxy for audit engagement risk, we find a negative association between GC ascension to top management and audit fees. We investigate the mechanisms behind this relation and find GC ascension is associated with a reduction in both default risk and financial misstatement risk, which supports auditors’ perceived reduction in client business risk and audit risk, respectively.     

An Empirical Investigation of the Interface Between Internal and External Auditors

Professional standards place specific responsibilities on auditors for the discovery of material mis-statements in reports of corporate financial performance. Certain factors have been shown to increase the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. One warning sign is the potentially pervasive effect of a weak internal control environment consistent with a weak internal audit group. This study investigates the impact of internal audit department quality differences on auditors ‘willingness to place reliance on the work performed by internal auditors. The study also gives consideration to auditors’ recent experiences with material errors and irregularities and examines the influence of two previously untested individual auditor differences on audit judgment decisions: (1) conflict management style and (2) perception of internal/external auditor communication barriers. The results indicate that auditors attend to internal audit department quality differences and that individual auditor differences exhibit significant influence over auditor judgments. Implications for audit practice are considered and directions for future research are suggested.     

Earnings volatility and audit report lag

This study investigates whether earnings volatility influences audit report lag. If auditors view earnings volatility as affecting risk, and adjust effort in response to risk, we expect earnings volatility to impact audit report lag. Using a sample of 13,075 firm-year observations over the period 2004–2015, we find a negative relation between earnings volatility and audit report lag, consistent with auditors responding to less volatile earnings with increased effort. We also find that the association between earnings volatility and audit report lag is driven by non-industry-specialist auditors, auditors with short tenure, and small and medium sized auditor offices. Furthermore, we examine whether earnings management conducted by way of earnings smoothing affects our results. We find that low earnings volatility has a stronger impact on increasing audit report lag when there is a high degree of earnings smoothing     

Board independence,internal information environment and voluntary disclosure of auditors’ reports on internal controls

When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers, independent directors do not have enough information to perform their functions. Only when faced with a good internal information environment can such directors acquire enough information to provide advice and monitor managers, and only under these conditions can increasing their proportion on the board effectively reduce agency problems, such as driving managers to disclose information to investors. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms that voluntarily disclose their auditors’ reports on internal controls from 2007 to 2009, this study explores how the information acquisition costs of independent directors affect their monitoring effectiveness by investigating the disclosure decisions of their internal control audits. We find that when the information asymmetry between insiders and outside directors is low and the proportion of independent directors on a board is high, a firm is more likely to voluntarily disclose its internal control audit report.