Competing for the Public Through the News Media

Interest groups seek to influence economic activity through public and private politics. Public politics takes place in the arena of public institutions, whereas private politics takes place outside public institutions often in the arena of public sentiment. Private politics refers to action by interest groups directed at private parties, as in the case of an activist group launching a campaign against a firm. This paper presents a model of informational competition between an activist and an industry, where both interest groups seek to influence public sentiment and do so by advocating their positions through the news media. Citizen consumers make both a private consumption decision and a collective choice on the regulation of a product that has an externality associated with it. In the absence of the news organization, the collective choice is not to regulate. The activist and the industry obtain private, hard information on the seriousness of the externality and provide favorable information to the news media and may conceal unfavorable information. The news media can conduct investigative journalism to obtain its own information, and based on that information and the information it has received from its sources, provides a news report to the public. Because of its role in society, the media has an incentive to bias its report, and the direction of bias is toward regulation. Its bias serves to mitigate both market failure by decreasing demand and a government failure by shifting votes in favor of regulation. The activist then has incentive to conceal information unfavorable to its interests, whereas the industry fully reveals its information.     

Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy

This paper provides a theory of private politics in which an activist seeks to change the production practices of a firm for the purpose of redistribution to those whose interests it supports. The source of the activist's influence is the possibility of support for its cause by the public. The paper also addresses the issue of corporate social responsibility by distinguishing among corporate redistribution as motivated by profit maximization, altruism, and threats by the activist. Private politics and corporate social responsibility not only have a direct effect on the costs of the firm, but also have a strategic effect by altering the competitive positions affirms in an industry. From an integrated-strategy perspective the paper investigates the strategic implications of private politics and corporate social responsibility for the strategies of rival firms when one or both are targets of an activist campaign. Implications for empirical analysis are derived from the theory.     

Private Environmental Activism and the Selection and Response of Firm Targets

Environmental activists are increasingly resorting to private strategies such as boycotts and protests focused on changing individual firms' behavior. In this paper, we examine activists' use of such "private politics" to engender firm compliance with activist objectives. We begin by developing a simple theoretical model of an activist campaign from which we develop a set of empirical hypotheses based on a set of observable features of firms. We test our hypotheses using a unique dataset of environmental activist campaigns against firms in the United States from 1988 to 2003. This paper fills an important need in the literature as one of the first empirical attempts to examine the private political strategies of activists and has important implications for the burgeoning literatures on industry self-regulation and the nonmarket strategies of firms.     

Private Politics

This paper introduces the subject of private politics, presents a research agenda, and provides an example involving activists and a firm. Private politics addresses situations of conflict and their resolution without reliance on the law or government. It encompasses the political competition over entitlements in the status quo, the direct competition for support from the public, bargaining over the resolution of the conflict, and the maintenance of the agreed-to private ordering. The term private means that the parties do not rely on public order, i.e., lawmaking or the courts. The term politics refers to individual and collective action in situations in which people attempt to further their interests by imposing their will on others. Four models of private politics are discussed: (1) informational competition between an activist and a firm for support from the public, (2) decisions by citizen consumers regarding a boycott, (3) bargaining to resolve the boycott, and (4) the choice of an equilibrium private ordering to govern the ongoing conflicting interests of the activist and the firm.     

Activism for Corporate Responsibility: Conceptualizing Private Regulation Opportunity Structures

In this article, we examine how private regulatory initiatives (PRIs) – which define standards for corporate responsibility (CR) issues and sometimes monitor their application by firms – create opportunities and constraints for activist groups aiming to push firms towards more stringent CR activities. Drawing on social movement theory, we conceptualize how private regulation opportunity structures affect such CR‐based activist groups' targets and tactics at both the firm and field levels. At the field level, we argue that both radical and reformative activist groups direct most of their time and resources towards PRIs with comparatively more stringent standards. At the firm level, while radical activist groups are likely to target firms participating in more stringent PRIs, reformative activist groups target firms participating in less stringent PRIs, or those that do not participate in PRIs at all. When facing unfavourable opportunity structures, CR‐based activist groups tend either to advocate the creation of new PRIs or to shift their activities to pressure other focal points. This article contributes to moving beyond extant literature's emphasis of PRIs as settlements of contentious firm–activist interactions towards also viewing them as starting points for activist groups aiming to push firms towards a more substantive CR engagement.     

Ambiguity in Electoral Competition

The paper proposes an explanation to why electoral competition induces parties to state ambiguous platforms even if voters dislike ambiguity. A platform is ambiguous if different voters may interpret it as different policy proposals. An ambiguous platform puts more or less emphasis on alternative policies so that it is more or less easily interpreted as one policy or the other. I suppose that a party can monitor exactly this platform design but cannot target its communications to individuals one by one. Each individual votes according to her understanding of the parties’ platforms but dislikes ambiguity. It is shown that this electoral competition has no Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless its max–min strategies are the optimal strategies of the Downsian game in mixed strategies. Furthermore, if parties behave prudently enough and if the voters aversion to ambiguity is small enough, these strategies do form an equilibrium.     

Disclosure Policy in a Mixed Market

This paper investigates the optimal disclosure strategy for private information in a mixed duopoly market, where a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a joint-stock company compete to supply products. I construct a model where the two firms compete in either quantity or price, and uncertainty is associated with either marginal cost or market demand. The model identifies the optimal disclosure strategies that constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by type of competition and uncertainty. In Cournot competition, both firms disclose information under cost uncertainty, while only the SOE or neither firm discloses information under demand uncertainty. Alternatively, in Bertrand competition, only the joint-stock company discloses information under cost uncertainty or demand uncertainty. Recently, developed countries have required the same level of disclosure standards for SOEs as for ordinary joint-stock companies. The findings described in this paper warn that such mandatory disclosure by SOEs can trigger a reaction by joint-stock companies, putting the economy at risk of a reduction in welfare.     

A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance

This paper provides a theory of firm behavior motivated by moral duty, self-interest, and social pressure. A morally managed and a self-interested firm compete in a market in which their corporate social performance (CSP) provides product differentiation. Some citizens have altruistic or warm glow preferences for products with associated CSP, personal giving to social causes, holding shares in firms providing CSP, and contributing to social pressure to increase CSP. Social pressure is delivered by an activist NGO funded by voluntary contributions by citizens. The model characterizes an equilibrium in the product market, the capital market, and the market for social pressure. The equilibrium establishes a price for CSP and for activist-induced social pressure. The theory provides predictions of the market values of firms, the prices of products, firm profits, target selection, contributions to the activist, and the amount of CSP supplied. For example, if citizens do not distinguish between morally motivated CSP and CSP induced by social pressure, the activist is more likely to target the softer, morally motivated firm. Higher quality activists are better funded, target self-interested firms, and obtain greater corporate social performance. Lower quality activists target morally managed firms.     

两个销售商Bertrand竞争下的供应链需求信息共享

考虑包含一个上游制造商和两个下游销售商的单周期供应链系统。销售商销售不同质的产品且分别拥有关于需求的私有信息。他们之间进行基于价格的Bertrand竞争。建立了三阶段博弈模型，并计算出均衡结果。最后通过模型结果分析需求信息共享前后期望利润的变化，提出了制造商激励销售商其享需求信息的策略。结果表明销售商的需求信息共享在一定条件下是可以很好地实现的。     

加强组织文化建设对构建民办高水平大学重要性分析

我国民办教育事业发展已有三十年左右的时间,但各民办学校的发展层次依然良莠不齐。民办大学作为民办教育事业的主力军,解决了我国长期以来,使学生只有通过激烈的高考竞争才有大学上难题,也培养了一大批优秀的人团。如今,伴随我国生源数量的减少,使得各类学校之间对生源的竞争显的异常激烈,这里也包括公办高校,这就在客观上促使各民办高校必须进行转型,才能使自己立于不败之地。做到如此,只有使自己成为一所高水平民办大学,才能得以健康、良性、可持续的发展。组织文化作为一个单位的精神所在,是单位发展的支柱。因此,如何加强组织文化建设,推动民办高水平大学的建设,值得我们深入研究。     

Disclosure Regulation in Duopoly Markets: Proprietary Costs and Social Welfare

Abstract

The argument of proprietary costs is commonly used by firms to object against proposed disclosure regulations. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the welfare consequences of disclosure in duopoly markets and to identify market settings where proprietary costs are a viable argument for firms to remain silent. We, therefore, solve the optimal disclosure strategies and distinguish two different potentially costly effects of disclosing private information: the strategic information effect and the market information effect. We identify the market settings for which a regulator prefers to impose disclosure regulation so as to maximise consumer surplus or total surplus. Regulation may be necessary because (i) the increase in welfare outweighs proprietary costs to the firms, or (ii) firms are trapped in a prisoners' dilemma. The first primarily applies to Bertrand competition with demand uncertainty and, to a lesser extent, to Cournot competition. The second applies primarily to Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty.     

Reverse Pricing and Revenue Sharing in a Vertical Market

Advancing in information technology has empowered firms with unprecedented flexibility when interacting with each other. We compare welfare results in a vertical market (e.g., manufacturers and retailers) for several types of pricing strategies depending upon the following: (1) which side (retailers or manufacturers) chooses retail prices; and (2) whether there is revenue sharing or linear pricing between the two sides. Our results are as follows. Under revenue sharing, retail prices (and thus industry profits) are higher if and only if they are chosen by the side featuring less competition. Under linear pricing, however, retail prices are higher if they are chosen by the side featuring more competition (for linear demand functions). Relative to linear pricing, revenue sharing always leads to lower retail prices, higher consumer surplus and social surplus. However, the comparison on industry profits depends on the demand elasticity ratios. Revenue sharing raises industry profits when the elasticity ratios are small, but the results are reversed when the elasticity ratios are large. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

供应链竞争中的企业跳链壁垒及跳链路径研究

不同协同程度的供应链存在不同的跳链壁垒。松散型供应链存在低跳入壁垒和低退出壁垒;半紧密型供应链存在较高跳入壁垒和较低退出壁垒;紧密型供应链存在高跳人壁垒和高退出壁垒。节点企业可就面临的跳链壁垒与自身情况进行权衡,选择最佳的跳链路径。     

Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods

This paper contains a theoretical exploration of the potential effects of an information-supplying activist on a market for credence goods. Using a non-cooperative game-theoretic model with incomplete information, we find that such an activist can alter the decisions of firms and consumers and enhance the social welfare of market exchange. We also find that an activist can support equilibria in which firms differentiate their products on some credence characteristic even though this characteristic remains unknown to the consumer both prior and subsequent to consumption. In general, our analysis has several implications for the study of private collective action in markets.     

Incremental vs. Comprehensive Reform of Economic Regulation: Predictable Outcomes and Unintended Consequences

A bstract . Examination of the theory and politics of reform of government regulatory policy leads to the conclusion that comprehensive reform of economic regulation is desirable and possible, given that we understand how existing regulatory decision-making processes operate and how reform efforts in the past have failed. Options exist along a dimension of magnitude of change: incremental versus comprehensive reform. Under certain conditions regulatory reform is best achieved through comprehensive change and equilibration to new policy, rather than marginal adjustments to existing policy that often lead to more rather than less government regulation.
Comprehensive reform is held to be complete or nearly complete relaxation of government control over price, market entry and other aspects of competition among firms across an entire industry , or assumption by government of new , broad-scale controls over private lector market behavior. Comprehensive reduction of government control, i.e., deregulation , is in accord with the observation that government decision-makers sometimes behave as if economic efficiency were an important objective.     

A new political economy of oil

Oil carries external costs which increase with depletion. In conventional visions for the next 20 years, oil supply will exceed demand in the premium market for transport fuel; competition between producers will drive capacity expansion (though with a risk of investment cycles); and natural gas will limit growth in oil demand and price. The politics of the climate, of transport, and of power supply, now rank with OPEC as key political factors affecting oil. Energy security has become more important to exporters than importers. Producers are threatened by the possibility that economically available oil will be left in the ground.     

How Institutional Identity Shapes College Student Recruitment: The Relationship Between Religious Distinctiveness and Market Demand

Institutional diversity has long been recognized as a signature strength of the American system of higher education, yet the sector contributing most to this remarkable feature—small and midsized private colleges—currently finds itself under significant financial pressure as a result of recent social and economic disruptions. To overcome such challenges, campus leaders must understand the market positioning of the institutions they serve. This article investigates the relationship between market demand and organizational distinctiveness within one segment of the diverse private sector—religiously affiliated colleges. It draws upon longitudinal data from the membership of one national professional association, the Council for Christian Colleges & Universities, to develop an empirical typology of institutional religious distinctiveness and examine patterns of market demand over time. Results suggest that religious distinctiveness has a medium effect on student demand at both the application and matriculation phases of the admissions process. The article concludes by considering appropriate recruitment strategies for faith‐based colleges and universities depending on their degree of religious distinctiveness.     

基于顾客满意的服务接触链优化策略探讨

顾客对一家服务组织的质量感知及其满意度不仅受服务接触点的影响,而且受接触层次布局和衔接等的影响。基于此,服务组织要提升顾客整体感知服务质量和增加顾客满意度,就必须优化服务接触链,包括增加电话和互联网接触、避免过细的服务分工和增设综合服务提供点、缩小服务接触点空间范围、优化服务流程和路径、设置清晰和完善的服务标识、主动引导和送达顾客、平衡各服务接触点的服务能力和服务接触点之间信息共享等。     

Optimal targeting with entry

We study an advertising agency's optimal choice of targeting technology with endogenous market structure, namely, when targeting changes firms' entry strategies into the advertising and product market. We show that the advertising agency faces a trade‐off between demand‐expansion and profit‐dissipation: The former arises as targeting induces more entry and increases the demand for advertising; the latter refers to that targeting relaxes competition by inducing more differentiation. We show that perfect targeting is not optimal for the advertising agency. Compared to social optimum, the advertising agency underinvests in targeting when investment cost is low and overinvests when targeting is costly.     

中国石油企业“走出去”的风险及其规避

中国石油企业“走出去”,既有国内政治因素的考量,也有企业经济利益的驱动。国家石油公司的“走出去”虽然已取得较大成绩,但也积累了巨大经营风险,其现行模式难以持续。为了实现中国石油企业更健康地“走出去”,首要的是在国内放松管制、鼓励竞争。一方面应促进市场参与者实力的均等化,鼓励国有石油公司把经营重心更多地转向国外,努力成为国际化的石油公司;另一方面,要给民营石油企业更多发展空间,以利于其“走出去”参与国际竞争。